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Abstract
The organised crime industry on a whole generates an estimated gross criminal product 
of $800 billion USD annually generated from traditional crime industries like money 
laundering, cigarette and narcotics trafficking and prostitution. As a result of the new, 
globalised world, organised crime is diversifying its activities, penetrating legal sectors 
and further corrupting political systems. In general, it has been quick to adjust to the 
new economic opportunities and hew technologies that this global village has to offer, 
and has been far more efficient in. exploiting every available opportunity than its police 
and justice counterparts in preventing it from doing so.
The face of international organised crime has changed to include new, sometimes 
smaller, often more dangerous actors, and has seen the traditional crime families 
metamorphose to keep up with the new environment. Diversification, penetration, 
legitimisation are the new guiding motto. The Sicilian Cosa Nostra has sought 
alternative ways to generate additional profits whilst reducing the risk factor. In order 
to branch-out, escape prosecution and yet remain within a pivotal and strategic 
position, the Cosa Nostra has chosen, amongst other havens, the French Riviera.
Today, political and popular mobilisation and interest in combating organised crime is 
minimal, largely relegated to folklore status, crime annals, and the cinema industry. 
However, no judicial tool or innovation can have concrete and effective applications if 
the political will is not predominant and if concerted international co-operation is not 
enforced.
The risk, should this trend continue, is that organised crime will become a dominant and 
decisive actor in State affairs, may continue to take over unstable micro-states and 
pervert the democratic process and the rule of law around the world. The threat is not 
so much to stand by and wait as crime develops further, but how long this lack of 
reaction can continue before it becomes irreversible.
*y*able o f  c o n te n ts
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(Chapter 1
ntroduction
“In the new global age, borders have opened up, trade barriers have 
fallen and information speeds around the world 
at the touch of a button.
Business is booming... and so is transnational organised crime
Pino Arlacchi
Director General of the United Nations Office Vienna 
Executive Director of the ODCCP
Pino Arlacchi, Director General o f the United Nations Office Vienna, Executive Director o f the 
ODCCP: “Fighting Transnational Organised Crime” http.7afa.at/globalview/042000/org.hlml
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I Introduction
$800 billion USD^
The United Nations estimates the annual Gross Criminal Product of organised 
crime, comprised of all criminal activities at $ 800 billion USD. This alone represents 
nearly 15% of the world trade.^ To this estimate must also be added $400 billion USD 
generated by the dmg trade, largely conducted and controlled by organised crime groups, 
for an overall criminal activity of at least $1,200 billion USD.'  ^These alarming numbers 
not only bear witness to the world-wide economic scope of organised crime, but more 
than ever both justify and demand further research into this phenomenon.
Today, the attention starting to be directed at issues of internal state security, 
namely organised crime and Mafia activities, has not always been a priority for either 
states or international organisations. The perception by states in general, and especially 
France, of organised crime as a concrete, potentially dangerous threat, has slowly evolved. 
From simple curiosity about a distant Sicilian folklore, organised crime was “discovered” 
and to a certain extent exploited by the different media: Myth of the Mafia (i.e. 
Godfather)^ and finally began, only very recently to spurn budding interests amongst the 
political class.® Organised crime is a real threat, not just a myth. Cosa Nostra activities 
in Sicily and abroad are not imaginary, but rather very real. The death tolls of civilians, 
mafia soldiers and judges, as well as violence and bullet-ridden Palermo are proof of it. 
I f  s also a threat that will not go away on its own, quite the opposite. The longer states 
ignore the issue of organised crime, the more it will thrive, the longer it does so, the more 
difficult it will eventually be to eliminate it.
 ^According to other sources the figure may be as high as 1 trillion USD. Royce, Ed: US Information 
Agency: Subcomittee en Afiica; “Organised Crime can be devasting to Airica”.
^de Maillard, Jean. Un monde sans loi. Paris: Stock, 1998, page 48.
 ^The International Monetary Funds estimates the annual benefits of the world criminal organisations at 
5,000 billion French Francs a year (approximately 1,000 billion US dollars). This sum represents more 
than three times the French annual budget o f 1,500 billion French Francs.
®Puso, Mario. The Godfather. London: Mandarin. 1969. orPuso. Mario. The Last Don. London: 
Mandarin, 1996.
®d'Aubert, Francois. “La criminalité organisée et le blanchiment d'argent.” . Jouy-en-Josas: Hautes 
Etudes Commerciales et Parquet de Paris, 1998.
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A change in mentalities?
No doubt many state actors have at long last, begun to realise the potentially devastating 
implications of tolerating or harbouring any fonn of organised crime within its system, 
but deciding to act, or even being able to act to counter it is sometimes a very different 
issue. As with anything that touches, far or wide on politics or government, there is 
always the threat of political liability‘s. In fact, tackling issues linlced with organised crime 
may in fact halt or hinder a re-election prospective. The political uncertainty that plagues 
the fight against organised crime is also compounded by some very specific short-term 
benefits obtained through tolerance or blatant co-operation with organised crime. In some 
instances fighting to eliminate organised crime is no longer even possible such is the 
extent of the infiltration and domination on the regional and national economies.
Is organised crime really unwanted?
What levels of minimal organised crime presence can be tolerated before real action must 
be taken to secure the economy and avoid it becoming irremediably penetrated and 
corrupted by criminal proceeds? Answering, or even attempting to answer some of the 
essential questions is the aim of this research, while keeping in mind that in some 
instances no precise, quantitative answer can realistically be given.
Why research organised crime and the Mafia"}
Organised crime and Mafia activities are issues that have repercussions not only on the 
security field, but also on nearly every facet of society and the economy. The 
ramifications of Mafia presence and activities are eventually felt eveiywhere, as the very 
nature and modus operandi is to penetrate every sector and every strata of a state. Today 
no sector, be it economic, justice, police, politics or even arts and culture, can reasonably 
pretend it is totally immune to Mafia penetration. Organised crime as a “phenomenon is 
growing in importance but has been subjected to little systematic analysis”,® hence the 
need to research broader aspects of it.
Why research the Sicilian Cosa Nostra specifically?
Not only is the Cosa Nostra one of the most highly structured, most professional and most 
importantly most dangerous organisation, but it is believed, by experts and legislators
 ^Political liability, meaning that the political cost, for an elected official, o f attempting to fight organised 
crime may by far outweigh the benefits o f being perceived, by the electoral mass, as actively combating it.
^Williams, Phil. “Editorial.” Transnational Organised Crime .Spring (1995), page v.
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alike (including the Italian Anti-Mafia Parliamentary Commission) that the “defeat of the 
Cosa Nostra could cause a decisive weakening of other mafia organisations, while the 
possible defeat of the ‘Ndrangheta, Camonu, and Sacra Corona Unita would not have the 
same effect on die Cosa Nostra”’. Because many crime families have modelled their own 
organisations in comparison with, or in reaction to aspects, of the Cosa Nostra’s structure, 
hierarchy, mode of operation, recruitment procedure or ritual and choice of activities, 
researching the original source can lead to a better insight understanding of many of these 
“Mafia inspired” criminal organisations. In addition, not only has the Sicilian Cosa 
Nostra historically benefited from a profound lack of understanding by the political class 
and state of its aims and aspirations but also its structure and "^modus operands, and has 
in fact relied on this misunderstanding to continue relatively unhindered. The strength 
of the Mafia is that it has traditionally been underestimated throughout history, and to a 
certain extent continues to remain underestimated.*® It is possible that by carefully 
researching the Cosa Nostra, concretely understanding it, and widely diffusing the results 
in an effort for international co-operation, the Cosa Nostra can finally begin to cease 
being underestimated and efforts to vanquish it more precisely targeted.
How to research the Mafia?
Prior to the 1980's, practitioners in the police, law and government institutions, 
theoreticians, and to a certain extent academics had a tendency to focus on a single crime 
and a single peipetrator, in essence isolating the criminal event from the criminal element.
Today this trend of single focus, has evolved and now tends to encompass the broader 
criminal context including in the overall analysis the whole organisation: its nature, 
historical context and precedent, its structuie, political alliances, and the financial 
structures,** OC issues are not longer really looked at in an isolated fashion, but more 
generally placed within the broader context of international organised crime. By choosing 
to research organised crime in this much more global manner a better overall assessment.
 ^De Gennaro, Giovanni, and Diresione Investigativa Antimafia. Criminal Organisations with Particular 
Regard to Cosa Nostra: its Influence on Politicians. Media. Economv and Public Administration. Berlin, 
1993, page 3.
*®Falcone, Giovanni, and Marcelle Padovani. Cosa Nostra. Paris: Austral, 1991, page 110.
** De Gennaro, Giovanni, and Diresione Investigativa Antimafia. Criminal Organisations with Particular 
Regard to Cosa Nostra: its Influence on POLITICIANS. Media. Economy and Public Administration. 
Berlin, 1993, page 2.
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and no doubt more accurate pictuie can be drawn than previously. In order to carry out 
this research on organised crime a rather simple methodology was set up consisting of 
multiple interviews with experts in the field as well as an extensive research 
encompassing a variety of diverse sources in English and in French.
introduction 5
n  Methodology
The methodology and approach that was drafted to carry out the research was one 
of extensive overview of sources and interviews, as well as a macro to micro perspective 
on the subject. Starting from the international organised crime families and focusing 
inwards on one family the Cosa Nostra, operating within its own borders, and then 
exporting itself abroad.
Much of the existing literature on organised crime and the Mafia deals with only 
one specific aspect of the topic, and rarely the phenomenon as a whole. It focuses on one 
single activity or one single family rarely taking into account the necessity to place it 
within a larger ftamework. A multitude of sources are limited to one consequence of OC 
presence, like the increase in violence, effects on the state system or an overview of a 
specific activity without looking at organised crime as an issue with multiple roots, 
multiple aims and multiple repercussions. The aim of tins research has been to 
incorporate many of these different elements into the analysis.
Placing OC within a historical context?^
Because OC today is a direct result of the historical context from which it
originally emerged, and because it has been shaped and moulded by that same historical
background, recalling it and placing back into that specific framework can help the
analysis. Strongly anchored in history and containing much descriptive elements, this
thesis tries to blend essential elements of law, economics, geopolitics and international
relations to explain and analyse the topic. Because there exists so many misguided
priori" about the Mafia, much background and highly descriptive information has been
included in order to rectify the inaccurate preconceptions:
Men of science and men of action do not dispose of sufficient knowledge 
on numerous aspects of organised crime, starting at its definition until its 
manifestations and its dimensions.*^
The goal is to frame the topic as accurately and specifically as possible, and hence set the 
record straight, by giving ample historical and operational information. It is already very
*^  It should be mentioned that the author o f this thesis has a strong academic history background which 
may in part explain the natural tendency to always try and refer back issues, actors and events within a 
historical context in order to better define and analyse them.
*®Vasilijevic, Vladan. “Préalables a de meilleures prevention et repression du crime organise.” Revue 
International de criminologie et de police technique .4 (1992), page 486.
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difficult to establish, not only the existence, but also peculiarities and modus operandi of 
organised crime, and in order to “combat them efficiently, it is essential to better known 
their functioning.***
Breadth of research
Research for this thesis has included academic, and less academic sources, 
approximately 1,500 different sources were used to draft this thesis. One of the aims of 
this research was to tiy and select key sources from as wide a pool of literature as possible 
in order to obtain as broad a picture of the phenomenon as possible. These sources 
included academic essays from different academic discipline (economics, law, 
international relations), conference papers and proceedings, press articles and press 
flashes, international organisation documents, official government releases, opinion 
papers and magazine and journal articles. A significant amount of time was spent 
researching the availability of information on internet sites, but this did not prove to be 
the most successful endeavour.
Interviews
One of the unique aspects of this research is the variety and nature of the 
interviews conducted. From the onset, the author set out to obtain high level interviews 
that would serve to confront information obtained from written sources. The decision to 
interview a wide variety of people, coming from different institutions, fields of research 
and professions was also a goal of the research. By broadening the scope of the 
interviewees, just as by researching literature from a wide variety of sources, the research 
gained in richness, and was able to take into account a larger spectrum of ideas, opinions 
and reactions. Interviews were conducted in French and in English, and were carried out 
in France, the UK, Italy and Belgium. More than thirty interviews were conducted which 
appears to be quite a unique accomplishment especially since many were at quite high 
levels such as Pino Arlacchi of the United Nations, Admiral Lacoste former head of the 
French DGSE and Serge Sabourin of Interpol. It was necessary to travel throughout 
Europe in order to meet with all the different interlocutors, and overcome significant 
hurdles to be granted authorisation to speak with them. As can easily be imagined, 
persons of great responsibility or influence dealing with organised crime are often
***van der Heijden, Toon. “La definition du crime organisée.” . Strasbourg: Council o f Europe, Comite 
Européen pour les Problèmes Criminels, Comité d'experts sur les aspects de droit pénal et aspects 
criminologiques du crime organisée, 1997.
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solicited, by jomnalists, politicians, law makers and academics and have a limited amount 
of time to consecrate to interviews so appropriate introductions were essential for each 
potential interviewee to accept to meet with an academic researcher. The second 
difficulty encountered in obtaining the interview even after initial interest and subsequent 
authorisation was granted was more banal in nature but certainly important was finding 
a time and place were the person could be interviewed. Again because of the important 
duties, busy schedules, secui ity considerations and out of town status of many important 
figures, the researcher had to make herself available essentially throughout Europe and 
had to very rapidly mobile. Initially based in Scotland, it soon became apparent that to 
be reactive and obtain intei*views, it would be more functional to be centrally based in 
Paris.
Research Centres
Again, in order to draw information from the largest amount of available 
literature, research was conducted in a variety of research centres. This tended to avoid 
single-sided perspectives emanating from a single country as reflected in their purchasing 
of books or articles. Research was carried out in university libraries, documentation 
centres for international organisations, national libraries and private personal libraries, in 
France, the US and the UK.
Language
The strength of this research, it is hoped, will be the variety and richness of the 
information sources. The ability to consult, read and fully understand sources in French 
and in English (as well as elementary understanding of Italian sources) meant that a wider 
spectrum of information could be obtained. This was also beneficial when seeking to 
secure interviews as all of those contacted spoke French or English fluently.
The drafting process: Macro to micro to macro perspective
The idea when setting out the chapter layout was to begin with “funnel approach” 
to the problem and explaining the international context within which the Cosa Nostra 
operates, since it has already been stipulated that no single organised crime family can 
operate in a vacuum. By setting the scene, describing the main GOG actors, explaining 
their activities of predilection, as well as demonstrating their need for forging alliances, 
the research allows for a global understanding of the issues. The research then narrows 
and focuses on a single family, the Cosa Nostra. It concludes by placing the phenomenon
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back into the international context.
Case study
In order to illustrate the OC phenomenon, and in order to avoid conducting the 
research with too wide of focus, it was decided to focus one a single, yet illustrative case 
study: the Cosa Nostra. The Cosa Nostra was chosen specifically for several reasons, 
namely its history and tradition, availability of literature in French and in English*® 
focusing on it, as well as personal curiosity.
Again, in order to focus on a specific area of Cosa Nostra activities it became 
necessary to further delineate and focus the geographical breadth of the research. The 
presence of Mafia activities in the South of France emerged as a good research choice.
*® Research for example on the Japanese Yakusas or the Chinese Triads would have been far more limited 
because of the language constraints.
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M  Difficulties and obstacles to overcome
Once the researcher had decided on the specific topic she wished to address, it 
became quickly apparent that many obstacles would have to be overcome in order to 
carry out the research and draft the dissertation. The nature of these hurdles were very 
varied, some more easily surmounted than others, but being able to overcome each of 
them was energy and time consuming. Perhaps one of the most significant 
accomplishments of this research is not only the variety of sources, approach to subject 
and analysis, but perhaps also the hidden aspect of this research -  the innumerable 
hurdles that had to be scaled in order for this research to be conducted.
Non-porous structures:
The French police and gendarmerie structures are not easily permeable from 
the outside, and even between themselves are often not readily open to communication 
or even introspection. Being able to reach the appropriate interlocutor in order to 
obtain and interview was often closer to an obstacle course than a simple phone call, 
Wary of journalists and other press inquiries that tend to denigrate their work and 
severely criticise their accomplishments or lack of, the researcher found that obtaining 
the permission and willingness of policemen and gendarmes was a time consuming 
and difficult process. Surprisingly though, after the initial one on one interview, and 
having been properly “vetted” by the police officer, obtaining subsequent interviews 
within the same structure was more easily achieved.
Necessary introductions:
In order to obtain these contact and interviews, that provided the backbone of 
the research, it was quickly apparent that appropriate introductions were imperative. 
Being sponsored by a colleague or acquaintance was the best way of opening doors 
and being granted access to staff and resoui'ces. As always obtaining the initial contact 
and convincing him of the worth and objectivity of the research before he would open 
up his address book and allow the researcher to penetrate his network became of the 
most difficult challenges. Each interview was a “test”, and successfully passing each 
“test” meant obtaining an other contact name and number. Eventually the cascade or 
pyramidal affect was in place and obtaining new contacts was easier and a little less 
time consuming.
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Little help fi'om the university:
Because the neither the University of St. Andrews nor the International 
Relations department within it were specialised in organised crime it was impossible 
to rely on the academic setting to provide introductions and preliminaiy contacts in 
this speciality. Eventually, one Wilton Parks conference contact, that happened to be a 
terrorism contact for the I.R. Department, but also an OC expert. Professor 
Clutterbuck, provided the initial recommendations and contact information to begin 
intemews and subsequently start the cascade mechanism for interviews. It also 
became evident in many cases that persons with potentially interesting contacts were 
weary of sharing them and preferred to “safeguard them”.*®
The gender issue:
Save a few notable exemptions, like Alison Jamieson, the vast majority of actors 
involved in the fight against organised crime are men (police, military and politicians 
where men are far more represented than woman) the researcher being a woman 
initially posed a few problems. Especially in France, with its Latin mentality, were 
cross gender tolerance and acceptance is not always evident, a female researcher 
entering into the male dominated arena that organised crime remains to be was not 
evident at first. Rather than be accepted at face value as a competent researcher well 
versed and well informed in her field, it was imperative to pass the initial and quite 
subtle test of “acceptance” as a person first, and then be welcomed as a researcher. 
Having observed male colleagues in similar settings, the researcher is convinced that 
such a scenario was not de rigueur for male counterparts. Once this initial gender 
based obstacle was overcome, the very fact of being a woman researcher could then be 
transformed into an advantage. Having rare and limited contact with women 
researchers spiked curiosity and probably led to obtaining interviews that might not 
have been granted otherwise.*'*
Geographic proximity:
As mentioned earlier the issue of geographic proximity, or lack there of, to key players
*® Illustration o f this cascade mechanism: Professor Clutterbuck -  Alison Jamieson — Stehane Quere -  
Philippe Madelin -  Jean-Mîchel Colombani.
*^  As an illustration o f this “male dominated” arena, the researcher recalls that on several occasions when 
attending international conferences and symposiums it was immediately assumed that she was 
accompanying a participants or working for a participants rather than being present in her own right.
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and institutions was also problematic. Once the basic theoretical research was 
conducted and the basic framework was set up, it quicldy became apparent that 
remaining in Scotland might prove to be less advantageous than being more centrally 
located like Paris for example. Since the case study was determined to be Cosa Nostra 
in France, it was strategically necessary to have a geographic rapprochement to France.
Sensitive material:
A final consideration worth mentioning and that rendered research difficult 
was the very topic of the research. Organised crime and the methods to combat it are 
in some cases considered “sensitive” or sometimes classified and hence sometimes 
difficult to access. On occasion material was restricted as “eyes only”, no 
photocopies were allowed, and in some instances no notes could be taken either.
Overcoming these various hurdles proved time consuming and required some 
careful “navigation” in order to be able to pursue the research without too much delay. 
Once the preliminary difficulties were behind, as a result of negotiation, careful 
manoeuvring and negotiating, coupled with geographic rapprochement, the research 
was finitfiil.
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IV Organisation of the thesis
Organised in six parts and nine chapters this thesis evolves from a macro 
perspective on organised crime in general, to a much more precise example and case 
study, and its operations in France.
P a r t i  is a global survey of the crime families in operation today across the world.
Chapter 1 sets the technical framework for the thesis by presenting the 
methodology, the organisation of the research as well as offering the theoretical 
framework of analysis. It also evaluates the available literature, looks at the issue of 
con ectly using statistics and debates the accurate use of terminology. This chapter also 
looks at the field of organised crime, and the difficulties associated with exploring a 
relatively recent discipline, further compounded by the peculiarity of France^ ® as a sphere 
of interest.
Chapter 2 looks at the different international organised crime actors in operation 
today, and attempts to demonstrate the reality of the threat they pose, both on an 
individual operational level, but exponentially so when operating within the framework 
of a pact or alliance.
Part n  places organised crime within the French national context.
Chapter 3 looks at the French institutional framework, and how it can and does 
impact its ability to combat a new threat. It looks at the specific legislative arsenal, its 
advantages and downfalls for combating organised crime. It then analyses the complex 
issue of the French police, how it is structured, how the various forces interact, and how 
finally this directly impacts the capacity to quickly deal with a threat such as the Mafia
Part i n  presents the main protagonist of the research, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and its 
rapport with the nation state.
Chapter 4 explains and analyses the importance of the organisation by detailing 
its origins, structure and areas of activities.
France has a history of denying Mafia and organised crime presence within its borders.
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Chapter 5 poses the question of beneficial presence within a state of mafia 
activities and presence. Can the state derive benefits from the Mafia? Does the affect the 
political will?
Part IV looks at the transnational dimension of organised crime. After assessing how the 
Cosa Nostra thrives within its own national borders the research looks at the same 
instance operating transnationally in France.
Chapter 6 is the case study for Cosa Nostra interests and activities outside of 
Italy. It explores the reasons why the Cosa Nostra (among other organisations) has 
elected France as a base of activity, and a zone of reftige, and more specifically why it has 
chosen the French Riviera as its preferred destination.
P a r ty  explores the difficulties in combating such a phenomenon and loolcs at the role 
and methods used by Italy to combat organised crime.
Chapter 7 looks at the way in which Italy has attempted to combat the Mafia. It 
investigates and analyses the original methods used, and what lessons other States may 
be able to learn from the Italian experience.
Part VI concludes by retmning back to a more macro context of the fight against 
organised crime and the implication of international organisation in this fight.
Chapter 8 sets the issue of organised crime back into the wider international 
context and looks at the way in which specific international organisations such as Interpol 
or the UN have dealt with organised crime and what improvements to their structure or 
operational methods need to be made in order for organised crime evolution to be 
seriously halted.
Chapter 9 concludes the research and attempts to make a few modest predictions 
as to the course of evolution of organised crime, as well as the potentiality for effectively 
combating it.
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Theory
1. Assumptions about Global Organised crime
In order to categorise and identify with relative certitude what theoretical 
framework of analysis best suits the system within which global organised crime and more 
specifically the Mafia operates in, it is imperative to begin by enumerating the main 
assumptions of this thesis concerning GOC.
GQC and the State
GOC has become an increasingly important threat 
(nationally & internationally).
GOC is a non-state actor that can/does influence the State.
GOC can have positive short term and negative long-term 
bi-products for the State.
GOC questions/tests the legitimacy/sovereignty of the State,
^  GOC impacts the functioning of the State on many different levels.
States are not always capable of combating GOC effectively.
^  States are not always willing to combat GOC.
^  GOC needs the presence of the State.
The theoretical review of existing schools of thought reveals the limits of 
traditional theories, most notably realism, liberalism, pluralism and globalism, and seems 
to conclude rather in favour of a more contested approach of new medievalism. 
Described first by Berdiaev, but more widely diffused though largely discounted by 
Hedley Bull, the idea of a new medievalism is discussed at length and endorsed by Alain 
Mine, but also by Guehenno and Bossard. This historical regression, applied to modem 
times concords almost perfectly with the reality, presence, and activity of GOC and the 
Mafia today. Finally, another emerging theory throughout which organised crime can be 
analysed is the theory of predation, and predatory practices.
2. Traditional International Relations theories
The traditional international relations theories have proven to be rather limited in 
their application to issues concerning GOC. One or even several aspects may in fact be 
pertinent and concord well with a theory or school of thought, but on the whole each
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seems to lack a fundamental attribute in order for it to really suit GOC fully/®
Realism
According to realists like Hans Morganthau, and exponentially so for Classical 
realists (like Kaplan and Kissinger), the only body to be take into consideration in 
international politics is the state. It leaves virtually no room for the growing power and 
influence of non-state actors like GOC, an essentially relegates them to the backdrop. 
Because GOC have proven to be significant non-state actors capable of dictating in some 
cases or at the very least influencing the course of national politics, realism is not a really 
suitable approach.
Pluralism
The pluralist theory, sometimes referred to as functionalists (like Ernest Haas), is 
the “traditional” international relations theory that concords best with GOC because it 
recognises the importance and considerable influence of non-state actors, takes into 
account the non-unitary, non-rational reality of the State, and finally makes room for an 
extensive international agenda. The international presence of groups like the Triads, 
Yakusas and Mafia, as well as their international activities also concord with the pluralist 
model. However, the single pluralist assumption that clashes with GOC is the underlying 
premise that the influential non-state actors are positive for the state and wider state 
system. The predatory, violent nature of GOC demonstrates just the opposite, as it is 
pernicious for the state and can actually be very destructive. Additionally, application of 
the pluralist model to organised crime has come under criticism because of stipulation of 
one concept: pluralism entails participation in legal markets, but some theorists like 
Woodeliss content that Mafia participates only in illegal markets^ ®. A more middle of the 
road approach is to assert that the Mafia fiilfils some of the pluralist criteria, but that one 
of the principle characteristics is that it is involved in licit as well as illicit markets.
Globalism
The starting point for globalists is the global context within which states operate.
It is a macro perspective of the international political system, and contends that in order
^®Obviously the descriptions o f the major international relations theories will be rather succinct, and 
reductionist as the aim is not to discuss them in great length, but rather to quickly discard them as 
unsuitable for GOC. It is also understood that each has nuisances which will not be looked out.
Woodiliss, Michael. Organized Crime ~ The Dumbmg of Discourse. The British Criminology 
Conference, selected proceedings. Volume 3. Liverpool, July 1999.
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to explain behaviour it is imperative to fully understand the global context, and also relies 
heavily on the historical context. In addition globalists investigate the “mechanisms of 
domination and dependency” as the primary condition for action. Finally globalist focus 
on the crucial importance of economic factors.
Functionalism
In order to achieve any degree of state co-operation, first rivalry and deeply 
entrenched principles of sovereignty must be “attenuated”. This can be achieved by 
focusing on non-political matters that are less explosive and less threatening. By 
emphasising co-operation on less sensitive areas first, inroads can slowly be made towards 
the resolution of political issues. By circumventing the “explosive” inter-state issues, 
functionalists believe that States will grow accustomed to co-operating and will eventually 
prove less and less reticent to tackle political questions. However, with an issue like 
GOC, time is the important decisive factor, and efficient measures have to be taken 
rapidly to combat it, and cannot wait for states to grow used to the idea of co-operating.
3. HedlevBull: The Anarchical Societv^^
Although certainly not an advocate of New Medievalism, Hedley Bull lists it as 
one of many possible scenarios for the future of States. This alternative scenario, in sharp 
contrast with the contemporary state system, might develop into a modem, secular 
equivalent of the historical Middle Age state system. This suggestions calls for a 
disappearance of the sovereign state in favour of a system which Bull qualifies as a kind 
of “universal political organisation that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle 
Ages”, characterised by an overlapping of authority, and multiple loyalties. In contrast 
with its historic predecessor this new form of medievalism would not however be based 
or derived from the Church (and by extension God) but rather be secular. This 
Medievalism would also see the apparition of non-state actors with which the state would 
have to compete with, and probably share authority over its citizens, and sovereignty over 
territory. The notion of total state supremacy over territory and people would likely 
become obsolete.
According to Bull, in order for the New Medievalist scenario to really become
^Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
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probable, five criteria had to be met. They are:
a. Regional integration of States
b. Disintegration of States
c. Restoration of private international violence
d. Transnational organisations
e. Technological unification of the world
In 1977, he concluded that this new Medievalist scenario was not a plausible 
reality. At the time, he felt that non-state actors had not challenged the sovereignty of the 
state sufficiently to be considered a real threat. He did concede however that in the event 
that each criteria be met, and that the non-state actors really start to imperil state 
sovereignty then, and only then, would the classical state survival be menaced by the 
onslaught of New Medievalism. Bull also believed that this new era would be severely 
marked by “more ubiquitous and continuous violence and insecurity than in modem 
states”.
More than two decades and a half have elapsed since Bull made his suppositions, 
and the environment has changed significantly. Keeping within the narrow sphere of 
GOC (but realising that many other non-GOC examples exist), the Mafia seems to 
adequately fulfil the majority of elements that Bull set as precursors for a return to 
Medievalism. The Cosa Nostra in fact competes directly with the State for supremacy 
over the population, who either have total loyalty to the Mafia meets criteria “c”, “d” and 
“e”. The Cosa Nostra for example has more than adequately met the criteria of private 
international violence (criteria “c”). The bombings of strategic locations, like the Uffizzi 
Gallery in Rome, dynamiting of armoured car convoys of Judges Falcone and Borsellino, 
along with the hundreds of murders and executions in Italy and abroad amply satisfy that 
criteria. In addition, the Cosa Nostra has made strategic, rational choices that has 
propelled their sphere of activity into the intemational arena, making it transnationalist 
in nature (criteria “d”). Finally, the technological unification of the world (criteria “e”) 
is now a given thanks to the improvement and banalisation of the Internet, proliferation 
of cell phones, and capacity to transfer money around the world in mere seconds. And 
so, it can be concluded that at least 3 out 5 of the criteria set out by Bull have indisputably 
been met, and that the era of New Medievalism which he felt in 1977 to be possible but 
most likely improbable, may in fact be on its way in with the potential for regional 
integration (criteria “a”) and disintegration of states (criteria “b”).
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4. Alain Mine: New Medievalism^^
Mine theory on New Medievalism begins by denouncing the historical optimism 
that is traditionally associated with the evolution of states and state systems whereby 
history is always evolving towards something better and more orderly. He contends that 
much to the contrary the “positive modernisation” which lasted more than three centuries 
has abruptly come to and end. In fact, “Modem Times” have regiessed back to a system 
characterised by a loss of control by the State over certain actors, and certain geographic 
areas, the supremacy of force as the rule of law, and inadequacies of the existing State 
structures to combat any or all aspect of this phenomenon. This Medievalism is also 
plagued by return of violence and uncertainty, and the creation and expansion of “grey 
zones”.^ These grey zones represent all the areas, both physical and unpalatable (like the 
virtual financial circuits and Internet) where the State no longer maintains absolute 
control, and where its supremacy is routinely contested. He suggests that the primary 
beneficiaries of this chaotic environment are criminal elements like the Mafia. Where as 
States since the Renaissance have been conquering zones “void of control”,^ '* and 
establishing order around the world by imposing the rule of law,^^  setting limits and 
enforcing interdictions, for the first time today this system has been losing ground. Areas 
previously considered as “conquered” and hence orderly, have reverted back to chaos, 
tribalism and in some instance the “rule of the jungle”.^® To Mine all these conditions are 
testament to the incontestable return of medievalism.
This New Medievalist approach to the study of intemational relations is in 
complete accordance with the assumption of this thesis on GOC. In this new, more 
chaotic environment where the State has lost partial and in some cases nearly total control 
over its people and territoiy, GOC has been able to develop rapidly or gain additional 
momentum and has become a more important threat than ever. GOC influences the 
decisions and reactions of this weakened State, obviously tests the legitimacy and
^^Minc, Alain. Le Nouveau Moven Age. Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
“ These grey zones are also referred to as “lawless areas”, or “autonomous micro-societies”. 
^Void o f Western/Occidental control that is.
installing colonial empires and various other protectorates forms o f governments.
^^or example Sub-Saliaran Afiica, and certain South/Central American States like Colombia.
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sovereignty of the State, and impacts the State by further hindering its capacity to respond. 
In many instances, not only is the State incapable of effectively combating GOC, but in 
some cases is no longer is willing to even attempt to do so. However GOC can not exist 
without some semblance of a State presence, and hence tailors its activity to prevent its 
total demise.
The idea of grey zones out of the reach and control of the State is an essential pre­
requisite and attribute ofrfor Mafia presence. Not only can the Mafia and similar 
organised crime groups take control of and exploit these grey zones to their advantage, 
but they are also able, in some instances, to actually create the conditions necessaiy for 
their development. Mine cites several examples of “confirmed” grey zones, notably 
Sardinia and Sicily which he estimates have reached a “point of no return”, and suggests 
that Corsica, and the French Riviera are in danger of teetering in the same direction. 
Mine’s idea is that the fragmentation of the State, and its loss of sovereignty creates real 
extraterritoriality areas where competing authorities such as the Mafia are not dissimilar 
from Medieval feuding lords taking power and creating their own structures in 
competition with the King or Crown.
In summary the five basic principles of Mine’s New Medievalist theory, as 
applicable to organised crime are:
o Lack of historical optimism as pertaining to the evolution of states 
o Loss of control of state over certain non-state actors 
o Rule of force
o Insufficient existing structures 
o Grey zones
Mine’s theoretical approach (and to an extent Bull’s), especially when compared 
with the other mainstream intemational relations theories, appears to concord best with 
the assumptions set out about organised crime in general and the Cosa Nostra in France 
specifically. After examination, analysis and careful elimination of other more classical 
theories, the theoretical framework of analysis that bests suits this research is Alain 
Mine’s New Medievalism.
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5. Other supporting literature
Alain Mine is not the only advocate of New Medievalism, Several others, namely 
Guehenno, Bossard and Kaplan endorse this approach and contend that crime is one of 
the manifestations of a return to Medievalism.
Jean-Marie Guehenno: The end of the Nation-State“
Guehenno uses the term “imperial age” to describe what he believes is the up and 
coming state system, however his prediction is rather similar to that of new Medievilism. 
He begins with the assumption that 1989 marked the end of the nation-state that had been 
institutionalised as a result of the French Revolution. Not only is key nation-state concept 
of territory dwindling and vowed to disappear, but the world has become more abstract, 
less tangible and much more immaterial. He asserts that non-state actors, more powerful 
than the state themselves, will be able to “bypass the states with transnational games”. 
These actors include drug traffickers and crime bosses. Guehenno contends that in the 
Imperial Age the state will not be an effective opponent of these actors. In addition, an 
element than in his evaluation will mark the “imperial age” will be the onset of “imperial 
violence”, and with it the blurring of public and private violence. In effect the state will 
no longer command the monopoly over the use of violence, and private non-state actors, 
also referred to as "private agents”, whose importance and breadth of activity can rise 
above that of the State can also become “purveyors” of violence, and further muddy the 
distinction between State and private domain.^
André Bossard: Carrefour de la Grande Tmanderie“
Bossard also believes that today’s GOC’s state of affairs, and practices strongly 
resembles Middle-Age society. He stipulates that the protection system, ceremonial, 
family concept, exemplary punishments, and legitimisation present in modem day 
criminal organisations like the Cosa Nostra echoes the era of the Middle Ages.
* protection system:
The feudal stmctures allowed certain persons, notably lords and landowners, to gain
“ Guehenno, Jean-Marie. End of the Nation State. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota, 1995, 
Refer to chart on the State and the Mafia.
“ Bossard, Andre. Carrefours de la Grande Truanderie. Paris: Stock, 1998,
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power and a support base amongst peasants, in exchange for protection. The Cosa 
Nostra, in exchange for tacit support, co-operation and subservience, also giants 
protection.
ceremonial similarities:
The feudal system called for a physical demonstration of servitude. The vassal placed his 
hands in the cupped hand of his lord’s and promised to obey and respect him. The Cosa 
Nostra ritual also included paying homage to “lord” in the shape of the godfather, and 
requires a solemn promise of servitude and loyalty.
Family concept:
The feudal system, and its concept of loyalty and protection created a family-like rapport: 
the providing, protecting “father”, and the wealc son, the vassal. Similarly, the Mafia 
system also forged artificial family-lilce links between members (i.e. godfathers, initiation 
brothers).
 ^Punishment:
Vassals and peasants that violated their oath of obedience and allegiance to their Lord 
were mercilessly punished, and displayed as an example to the rest of the population. The 
type of crime typically determined the nature of the punishment and the cruelty with 
which it was inflicted. The Mafia uses symbolism-ridden punishments as well. Not only 
is a traitor, like a justice collaborator immediately and unequivocally sentenced to death, 
but the manner in which the sentence is earned out serves as a warning and example to 
others. The family acts as judge and executioner.
* Legitimisation of violence:
Within the feudal system, violence amongst the vassals was tolerated, so long as the 
outcome did not impact in any way the Lord. This same tolerance of violence is also 
present within the Mafia. Although internal violence is not permitted, unless ordered by 
the Cupola, violence outside the Family is tolerated, much along the same lines as for the 
feudal system. If the violence does not negatively impacts the Mafia then it is acceptable, 
but if it impact in any way the Family then it is admonished.
Robert Kaplan: “The Coming of Anarchy”^ & Ends of the Earth"
“^Kaplan, Robert. “The Coming o f Anarchy.” The Atlantic Monthly .February (1994). 
^^Kaplan, Robert D. The Ends o f the Earth: Random House, 1996.
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Robert Kaplan in his article and subsequent book uses Africa as a prism through 
which to see a growing number of problems that he estimates will eventually spill over 
to other states. He sees “criminal anarchy” as an emerging problem, and qualifies it as 
a “real strategic danger” that will “soon confront our civilisation”. Africa in his opinion 
is reminiscent of pre-Westphalia (1648) Medieval Europe. Kaplan uses Sierra Leone as 
an example (that can also be applied to the rest of Africa and the under-developed world) 
of this likeness to Medieval times. The situation in Sierra Leone today is characterised 
by five phenomenon all of which seem to validate Kaplan return to pre-Westphalian days: 
the withering away of the central government, rise of tribal and regional domains, the 
rampant spread of disease, the growing pervasiveness of war, and the increased violence 
that reigns.
In can be argued that GOC meets at least three of these criteria: withering away 
of a strong central government, rise of regional domains and increase in violence. Sierra 
Leone in his opinion is not an isolated example, but rather a pre-cursor of what may start 
to happen around the world. This situation is observed and exploited by some dangerous 
factions, such as intemational drug cartels. They regard the situation as beneficial for their 
activities, and have exploited the” weak and financially strapped West African Regimes” 
for their own seditious purposes. Kaplan imagines the new or impending cartography of 
the world (“the last map”), as an amalgam of city-states and scant few remaining nations 
all dominated by the “shadowy tentacles of cartels and mafia”. Instead of borders, he 
envisions only moving centi es of power like what was prevalent during the Middle Ages.^  ^
To support his view, Kaplan extensively cites Martin van Creveld of the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem (author of the Transformation ofWarL who also sees a “back to 
the future” scenario of the states. According to him in order to predict and assess the 
future:
The first step is to look back on the past immediately prior to the biifh of 
modernism, and the wars in Medieval Europe.
Richard Falk, author of “A new Par adigm for intemational legal studies” also supports 
the idea of a return to Medievalism. In his opinion the increased role of non-territorial
^ F^or a critical review o f Kaplan’s work refer to: Gourevitch, Philip. “Misfortune Tellers: In a new trend 
Hell is other peoples.” The New Yorker April 8 1996.
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actors may lead to the re-establishment of certain features of Medievalism,”
6. Predation theoiY'^:
The predation theory, through certain specific angles can be applied to organised crime 
in general, and more specifically to organised crime “business” practices. Predation 
theories have been very widely criticised and put in question as some experts argue that 
most instances labelled as predatory practices, are in fact only very aggressive 
competition” . Talcing Boudreaux’s economic definition of predation and predatory 
pricing^ ® a clear link between business-type predation practices and organised crime’s 
classic and common practices can be highlighted. If we consider in turn several key 
aspects of predation:
- “Predatory pricing is the practice of pricing below cost to achieve market 
power.” Organised crime traditionally “underbids” potential rivals to ensure that they 
obtain the market in question. This is especially true for public works contracts, sewage 
treatment, and various other construction type sectors of activity. Predatory pricing is said 
to foster market power in three possible ways: by eliminating rivals; by disciplining rivals 
who otherwise refuse to co-operate in keeping prices at monopoly levels; or by depressing 
the market value of rivals' assets so that the predator can purchase these assets at below- 
market prices. Again, organised crime survives by eliminating rivals, be they other 
organised crime groups, petty criminals, business rivals, and even in some cases the State. 
There is an evident contradiction that nonetheless remains quite prominent in organised 
crime business practices. In some instances organised crime eliminates prospective rivals 
by artificially lowering the price of the bids, in other cases in chases out a potential rival 
that refuses to maintain the prices at market value (obviously set by the specific organised
^ F^alk, Richard. “A new paradigm for intemational legal studies.” Yale Law Journal 84 (1975),
Barbare, Serge: Les pratiques de la predation dans le domaine des telecommunications. Ph.D. Thesis 
Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris Paris: 2001.
Alvares, Francisco Javier Soto: Price depradation as a monopolistic practice 
Predation is perhaps the monopolistic practice to have generated the most analyses and it has frequently 
caused arguments. As will be explained in this paper, the basic problem in analysing cases lies in 
distinguishing between a situation o f ferocious competition and one o f abuse by an agent with substantial 
power. Predation is usually understood as taking place when a company displaces or significantly harms a 
competitor by selling its products at below cost in order to eventually impose monopolistic prices —  very 
liigh prices that are only sustainable because o f  the absence o f competitors.
Boudreaux, Donald &  Kleit Andrew: “Predation: Here, there? Anywhere?”
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crime family attempting to conquer or keep the market). The contradiction is in fact 
possible because at an initial stage, when the organised crime family is attempting to 
conquer the market they are able to function at a loss, hence competing at a less that 
economically viable level in order to chase out all legitimate business that cannot 
obviously operated at below cost. For the organised crime families on the short term, this 
practice is not problematic as this represents a possible way to launder money, and hence 
acceptable to “lose” overheads costs. In another way, because of their substantial cash 
flow and cash deposit organised crime can operate at a loss and reclaim their initial losses 
on the medium term. On the medium to long term, once the market has been seized, and 
for the business venture to remain profitable, it is essential to drive away all potential 
rivals that do not fully co-operated with the pricing practices that have been established. 
Finally organised crime can also artificially deflate the market in order to force rivals to 
sell at a loss in order to save what they can, are able to buy up their shares, or take over 
their sector, and progressively straighten out the market back to its initial stature. This 
ability to entice or command the market trends to its own advantage is a key element of 
predation.
Despite very valid aspects and internationally recognised worth of many of the 
theories mentioned previously, careful analysis appears to lead the researcher to conclude 
that the single theory that is best suited for, and through which organised crime can be 
analysed most effectively, is the New Medievalist theory.
introduction 25
V Sources
Researching a topic like organised crime is difficult for several reasons, namely 
accessibility of information, quality and reliability of the data, a sensitivity of the 
information, reticence of many public servants to discuss the issue, and the overly media- 
friendly, “Hollywood-esque” nature of the subject. Research for this thesis was limited 
to literature primarily in French and English, but also occasionally in Spanish and Italian. 
In order to produce quality interviews, they were conducted solely in French and English.
1. Literature Review
Although there are some very serious, highly technical sources on Mafia activities, 
and organised crime issues more generally, there is also a plethora of sources that cannot 
be considered as academic or even remotely reliable. The problem with a subject like the 
Mafia, is in fact its very popularity. The Mafia has become a sure-selling topic almost 
guaranteed to generate attention and/or profits and hence books, movies, press articles 
have flourished, many of that are much more fictional that professionally researched. 
Literature pertaining to the Mafia can generally be categorised under five main headings: 
pure fiction, little research and much fantasy, rehashing of banalities, doom & gloom 
scenarios and finally the category that concerns this thesis, serious academic or 
professional sources. The difficulty quite obviously is being able to differentiate between 
all the categories, a task that can sometimes be quite daunting.
In addition, organised crime experts like Xavier Raufer of the Institut de 
Criminologie in Paris have purposely written scholastic/professionally researched articles 
for non-academic journals or magazines in order to mobilise public opinion, and actually 
provoke public debate about the issue. He contends that in fact, at least in the field of 
organised crime and terrorism, university-geared reports or articles in professional 
journals are largely ignored by the decision makers, hence the necessity to exploit less 
than academic sources like glossy, mass market, popular magazines as a way to diaw 
attention to the subject.
Because of a genuine lack of very recent and academically sound quantitative 
information on organised crime, reliance on less traditional sources like press articles, and 
wireservice information was also useful. However, interviews with different practitioners 
and public servants were exploited in order to counterbalance this reliance on press and 
wireservice sources. Also, several books, written not by academics or practitioners, but
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rather by journalists have revealed themselves to be not only credible and well researched, 
but also very much the reference within the field.”
Book^^
The series of books on different aspects of organised crime that proved to be the most 
professionally researched, up to date and well wiitten was Criminalité Internationale, 
directed by Xavier Raufer of the Institut de Criminologie (Université Pantheon-Assas 
Paris II). Each book dealt with a specific aspect of organised crime, and in this manner 
was able to shy away from an enumeration of banalities or over simplification of issues. 
The series contains, for the moment, a dozen books with many more scheduled to be 
published.
Journals
Two main quality journals were consulted for this study: Transnational Organised Crime, 
edited by Phil Williams, and published by Franlc Cass since 1995 and Trends in Organised 
Crime, edited by Roy Godson, and William Olson, and published by Transaction 
Periodicals Consortium, since 1996. The former contains academic-style analysis of 
various issues pertaining to organised crime, occasionally regrouped under one single 
heading (like an issue dedicated exclusively to the study of Russian organised crime), but 
generally are more a collection of essays and analysis. The latter is more unique in genre 
because it regroups under one journal articles, declarations, report excerpts published 
around the world and in different journals, magazines and newspapers about organised 
crime.
Reports and dissertations 
Obviously a variety of government or intemational organisation reports and documents 
were consulted, some like those emanating from Interpol or the United Nations proved 
more useful than others from more generalist organisations that study the subject like the 
European Union Commission or the European Parliament. Some government reports 
because of their limited distribution and confidential nature, could be discreetly consulted 
but not cited as a bibliographical source. In addition, a few student dissertations and
^^ This is the case with Nice-Matin journalist Roger-Louis Bianchini, and TFl television news reporter 
Philippe Madelin.
®^The aim o f this literature review is not to go over and analyse the usefulness of each book that was 
consulted but rather point out those that were particularly good and (hrectly relevant to this study.
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papers were looked at, but in general were found to either replicate other existing 
literature, or were plagued with errors and hence not reliable sources.
Newspapers
Because of the “media-friendlÿ^ (insofar as it attracts readers and hence increases 
circulation) nature of organised crime, newspapers also proved to be a good source of 
information, especially Le Monde for France,
Magazines
Glossy, mass market magazines proved to be, in some very specific instances, good 
sources because, as discussed previously, some academic authors contribute serious well 
researched work to these less “academic” sources. In France these magazines included. 
Le Point, VSD, L’Express, Figaro Magazine, to name only the top few.
Internet
With the reality of globalisation it has become essential to explore and exploit 
newer forms of data and information collection mediums, namely the Internet. Because 
of the popularity of a topic like organised crime or the Mafia, the Internet has become 
host to a deluge of sites, literally thousands and thousands of sites answering to the query 
“Mafia”. Although some sites have proved very useful because they are well researched, 
and well documented, and have good linlcs, the vast majority of sites are rather 
amateurish, and hence not usable at all. Part of the problem associated with the avalanche 
of sites available is the daunting task of sifting through all of them and eliminating all the 
sites having nothing to do with organised crime,”  those that are not interesting at all or 
contain only banalities. After having conducted a systematic elimination of sites, only 
two or three dozen quality sites remain.''®
Wireservice
Although wireservices do not generally constitute a sound academic source, they 
have actually been proven incredibly useful because many events that may not necessarily 
be considered important enough to be reported in the national newspapers, often appear 
in these wireservice reports. Because specific wireservices, notably the Agence France
“ i.e. Music groups Uke: Three-6-Mafia, Latin American La Mafia, Monkey Mafia, New Wave: Talent 
Mafia, or support Groups like: Mothers Against Fathers in Arrears, and various other sites like the 
acronym for a Homosexual Sex group. Juice Mafia or Mando Mafia mandolin string page.
‘‘"Search words included: Organised crime, Mafia, Cosa Nostra, Italian crime, Sicilian, godfather.
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Presse (AFP) offer specific topic related mailings (via e-mail), it is possible to obtain daily 
bulletins of any news clip containing a pre-deteimined selection of key words (i.e. Mafia, 
organised crime). In this manner, even if an event may appear inconsequential to a 
newspaper editor, it can still be used as a valuable secondary source by researchers. These 
wireservices include Reuters for English language, but also other much more obscure 
wireservice.
Television
Television as might be expected proved to be a very poor source of new reliable 
information on the Mafia and organised crime. A plethora of semi-serious, less than 
professional documentaries-dramas inundate the airwaves weekly and with a few scant 
exceptions are more elements of fiction than reality. However one documentary stands 
out as particularly professional and well researched “A girl against the Mafia”'”. In this 
case the variety and quality of high-ranking experts and professionals that were 
interviewed contributed to a refreshingly interesting and useful documentary.
2. Conferences
Surprisingly most conferences yielded veiy little new information or analytical 
approach to organised crime or the Mafia. Because of the brevity of the time-allotment 
granted to spealcers (rarely more than 25-30 minutes) the presentations usually remained 
quite broad and general in content, and rather uninformative on the whole. Even though 
papers are sometimes made available, in most cases again they are generally quite broad 
in scope. Perhaps the greatest benefit in attending conferences is the possibility of 
interacting with experts and practitioners in the field on a one-to-one basis, and the chance 
to ask very specific questions, and discuss the intricacies of the field. However, the 
Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines conference series stands out as particularly useful 
and informative.''^ Some of the conferences attended although very informative could not 
be cited, nor quotes taken from them because they were held “confidentially” with a 
selected audience, “off the record”, and information was not to filter from them. Finally 
on many occasions speakers although representing their specific institution or
‘”TEVA “Une Fille Contre la Mafia: Rita Atria.” Partanna (Sicily): Television Documentary, 1999.
‘'^Hosted by the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris H), and organised by Francois Haut and Xavier Raufer, 
the MCC conference series meets once a month on Tuesday.
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organisation asked not to be quoted as the opinions expressed were theirs and not those 
of their organisation.
3. Interviews
This thesis has attempted to integrate both classical academic research using 
primary and secondary written research sources, but has also attempted to include a wide 
spectrum of interviews with experts and practitioners who have first hand Imowledge of 
the subject matter. Interviews did not include any members of the Mafia. Two primary 
issues emerged concerning interviews, the first being the ability to actually obtain them, 
and the second being the quality and discourse of the interview.
Perhaps true in many other fields but most certainly exponentially so in the field 
of organised crime, interviews with practitioners and experts emanating fr om the police, 
justice or are very difficult to obtain. These experts are wary if not totally reticent to grant 
interviews because of the sensitive nature of the subject and occasionally for fear of 
personal security. The most effective method for obtaining an interview was always being 
presented or recommended by a person recognised as trustworthy, especially true in an 
environment as insular as the police.*'^  Obtaining interviews was not always a simple task 
even when the proper introductions were made. In some instances specific permission 
and cleaiance had to be obtained before any interview was granted, in another the police 
officer that was interviewed wished to remain anonymous for fear of administrative 
reprisals. Finally, in another interview a third party had to be present to censure and 
“manage” the interview. Notes taken during the interview were on occasion requested 
for review and appropriate approval.
Furthermore, the “usability” of elements obtained during an interview was not 
always evident as two types of discourses were generally used: official and officious. The 
official discourse although interesting was often rather banal and consistent with the 
official government policy. However, the officious discourse was almost always much 
more informative and rich in substance. But as this was an officious position, presented 
on a personal level, and not within the context of a professional body, these observations 
often lost their value.
‘'^Interestingly, some practitioners admitted that the two factors that incited them to grant this researcher 
and interview was the fact that I was a young researcher and not a journalist, and the fact that they rarely 
encountered women interested in what they considered a male dominated field.
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Care must however be taken to discern professional and academically sound 
material from that of less authoritative sources. Because of the popular interest of the 
Mafia-type culture as portrayed in book and films, a plethora of infoimation is available. 
Much of this information is either grossly over-simplified in order to reach out to a wide 
audience, or in some instance complete wrong. In addition, some authors/researchers 
have been particularly controversial, either because of the opaque origin of their 
information, and hence the impossibility to check and confront statistics, information or 
descriptions, and hence have been the target of substantial attacks. One such researcher 
is Claire Sterling. Prolific author she has been accused of inventing infoimation, and by 
others as being the willing, or unwilling CIA “misinformation” point person''^” Sterling’s 
sources in 1981 were unwillingly derived from a CIA misinformation campaign in 
Europe”.
Brandt, Daniel: Organised Crime threatens the New World Order” 01/1995.
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VI Statistics
Statistics are quite obviously a very useful, if not essential tool when doing 
research, but can also be quite problematic. They not only allow the researcher to place 
his subject within a quantitative perspective, but allow him to set an order of grandeur, 
and delineate his subject with greater precision. Statistics, however useful they may be, 
can also pose a serious problem, especially concerning their reliability and discretionary 
use. Statistics are generally used to prove or validate a statement or observation, and are 
habitually accused of saying only what is wanted and not depicting the whole picture. A 
given statistic is often presented as a finished product and rarely explains what elements 
have been used to calculate it, or what elements have been purposely left out. Not only 
is the original source of the statistic a good barometer for its reliability, but the purpose 
and aim it was used to prove or illustrate is also important factor: in effect, what has the 
researcher wanted his statistic to prove and has he been totally objective when choosing 
elements to calculate it?
In a field like organised crime, statistics pose an additional problem. Because of 
the very illicit and hence highly secretive nature of the subject, statistics can only be 
speculative, gross approximations of the subject matter at hand (i.e. is it nearly impossible 
to accurately calculate the annual profit margin the Cosa Nostra derives from drug 
trafficking). Certainly some statistical estimates because they have been corroborated by 
different trustworthy inside soui’ces (informants or justice collaborators) are quite reliable. 
Others however are completely subjective estimates that are probably a far cry from 
reality. In fact, in many instances, statistics from different sources but about the same 
exact subject matter can vary quite drastically.'*^
The most reliable, consistent statistics are generally those published by the various 
governments bodies or neutral intemational organisations, but again, in some instances, 
a Ministiy may chose to significantly downplay a growing phenomenon by choosing a set 
of statistics that may seem to minimise the reality of this phenomenon or an intemational 
organisation seeking to recognition and funds may try and inflate the numbers to serve its 
purpose. Additionally, some countries may not have the appropriate tools (institutions, 
manpower or funds) with which to calculate reliable statistics, and hence despite a
‘‘^ Throughout this thesis, and when ever possible, several statistics from different sources will be used to 
corroborate the estimated order o f grandeur, and give a range or scale.
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clear/evident desire to provide accurate statistical information, may not actually be 
capable of doing so. Again, even in cases of relatively objective, straightforward use of 
a given statistics, it still reflects only a small part of a much larger picture.
Do statistics pertaining to the number of seizures of drug shipments really say 
anything about the actual overall drug trafficking industry, or do they only reflect the 
number of seizuies without being able to place them within a larger quantitative context. 
For instance, (this is purely hypothetical), saying that the French Customs Agents 
intercepted 200 cocaine shipments in 1999, really means nothing at all because it is not 
placed within a quantitative perspective, 200 shipments out of how many? Does this 
represents 0.1 % of all shipments successfully smuggled in or 75% of all shipments 
successfully smuggle in? Hence much caution must be taken when interpreting this type 
of statistics, to a certain extent they remain completely meaningless when not presented 
within a greater quantitative context.
Circular validating of information:
Another issue facing researchers regarding their use of statistics and numbers is
the phenomenon that can be coined as circular validating of information. This process
entails the successive borrowing and citing of a statistics until its has been cited so often
it is considered reliable regardless of the reliability of its original source. One good
example demonstrating the circular validating of information, as well as the
precariousness, and difficulty in correctly using numbers and statistics is a case
originating within the Russian Ministry of Interior. Anatoly Ivanovich, a high ranking
officials at the Ministry of Interior, was asked by a reporter friend at the Moskovskaya
Gazeta for a quote giving the estimated number of people working for the Russian Mafia.
Not having the actual information at hand he made up an estimate of 980,000 members
in the Russian Mafia. This number was published, clipped, translated and entered into
an American newspaper information database, which was in turn consulted by an English
professor. He used the statistic in a paper he presented in New York that was in turn
published in a trendy American magazine that was bought and repatriated to Moscow by
a Russian businessman. This same businessman thought the article quoting:
“Professor Michael Lurge, the distinguished expert in the study of Russian 
organised crime phenomenon, says the Russian Mafia employs 980,000 
members”
might interest a fiiend of his in the Russian Ministry of Interior, who in fact had it
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translated back into Russian and transmitted it to Anatoly Ivanovich, whose reaction was: 
“Fancy that. I was right all along.
M eek, James. “The circular route to the truth on Russia's Mafia,” The Scotsman 24 March 1997.
introduction 34
The circular route to the truth about the Russian Mafia”
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” Meek, James. “The circular route to the truth on Russia's Mafia.” The Scotsman 24 March 1997.
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V m  Terminology
It seems obvious that accurately defining the terminology used to delineate the 
research field is primordial, however in the field of organised crime, the terminology itself 
is problematic. Organised crime, is a word that has a tendency to designate an “undefined 
general category”'*® where it is assumed that everyone knows what its is without 
necessarily being able to really define it. According to Smith, criminologists, academics 
and policy makers have been trying to come up with a definition for organise crime for 
more than fifty years without much success'*®; each new definition is riddled with 
problems and has its clear limits. Researchers must decide whether there is a true need 
for a universally agreed upon definition, or rather the need for a broader consensus on the 
definition and true co-operation on action designed to combat it.
If today nearly eveiyone (States, international organisations, NGO’s, etc) that 
acknowledges organised crime’s very existence and its world-wide presence is in 
agreement about the danger it poses, hardly anyone is in agreement about a universal 
definition of organised crime or Mafia activities. In fact, no universally accepted 
definition of organised crime exists. Francois d’Aubert, author of the French 
Parliamentary report on Mafia penetration contends that if identifying the enemy has 
become possible, trying to legally define it is quite another issue.”
Each country or organisation uses its own variant, and although in most cases they 
resemble each other quite a bit, the different definitions never seem to quite concord or 
overlap. In some countries there exists no actual definition as such, but rather a list of 
characteristics that help define organised crime, and in countries like China or New 
Zealand,^' no attempt is made to define or characterise organised crime at all.
- Is there a real need to precisely define organised crime?
Although defining organised crime may seem like a rather trivial exercise, in fact,
‘*®Anderson, Malcolm. “Working Paper IX: Control o f Organised Crime in the European Community.” . 
Edinburgh: Project Group on European Police Cooperation, University o f Edinburgh, 1993.
^Smith, DC. “Wichersham to Sutherland to Katsenbach: evolving and "official definition for Organised 
Crime".” Crime. Law & Social Change .16 (1991).
^"d'Aubert, Francois. ‘La criminalité organisée et le blanchiment d'argent.” . Jouy-en-Josas: Hautes 
Etudes Commerciales et Parquet de Paris, 1998,
^'Das, Dilip. “Organised Crime a World Perspective.” Transnational Organised Crime 3.3 (1997), page 
128.
introduction 36
from a judicial, jurisdictional and financial standpoint it is actually quite crucial. How 
can specific or even additional resources be allocated to fight organised crime without 
Imowing what organised crime is? Furthermore, how can a specific judicial penalty be 
attributed to an organised crime member without actually being capable of justifying or 
demonstrating why he is a member of organised crime group? Finally, how can a state 
grant specific authority or jurisdiction to a police or court system specialised in organised 
crime without having the proper justification?®^ It is clear that most practitioners 
recognise organised crime when they come across it, and in effect do not really require 
a universally-recognised definition to combat the phenomenon on a daily basis, but it does 
become especially necessary during court proceeding and extradition procedures, to name 
only a few specific instances: from a legal standpoint in order to indict a person of an act 
which is sanctioned by a specific law [i.e. criminal organisation], it is obligatory to 
determine what elements or acts constitute violation of that law, and what elements must 
be presented to prove culpability of the individual.®® In order to go before a tribunal, it 
is necessary to be able to define what the Mafia actually is.®"* If the Italian legislative 
system had not tackled the difficult task of defining organised crime, then it would never 
have been possible to draft the Rognone-LaTorre Mafia association law, and there would 
have been no feasible way of indicting a person for being a member of the Mafia.
- Need for action not debate about definition
Other factions involved with the study or curtailing of organise crime contend that 
time and time again, too much precious time is spent debating the question of “defining 
organised crime” and not actually combating it. Exasperated by this very same 
phenomenon, former US Senator Robert Kennedy one said: “don’t define it, stop it”.®® To 
many police officers, the difficulties surrounding the defining of organised crime is more 
and academic exercise than a concrete problem. To politicians, the issue is fundamental
®^ Malts, Michael. “Defining organised crime.” Handbook o f Organised Crime in the United States. Ed. 
Rob Kelly, Chin Ko-lin and Rufus Schatsberg. Wesport: Greenwood Press, 1994.
®®van der Heijden, Toon. “La definition du crime organisée.” . Strasbourg: Council o f Europe, Comite 
Européen pour les Problèmes Criminels, Comité d'experts sur les aspects de droit penal et aspects 
criminologiques du crime organisée, 1997.
®‘^ Rohlen, Celestine. “Le Crime Organise russe n'est pas une Mafia c'est bien piie, merae pour des 
Siciliens.” Courrier International 6 February 1999.
®®Anderson, Malcolm. “Working Paper IX: Control o f Organised Crime in the European Community.” . 
Edinburgh: Project Group on European Police Cooperation, University o f Edinburgh, 1993, page 10.
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Francois d’Aubert, former French minister, and author of the Parliamentaiy report on 
Mafia penetration equated the need and drive to accurately define organised crime and 
the Mafia, as the need the properly identify the enemy/^
-A little definition and a lot more action: the middle of the road approach 
A more middle of the road approach agreed that there is a need for a definition, but 
perhaps not so strict, as one too highly compartmentalised would in fact only distract 
attention from the practical task of actually dealing with it.®''
1. Misuse of terminologv 
defining the mafia
A further issue researchers are faced with when discussing Mafia activities, is the 
over-generalised use of this actually highly specific term: Mafia. Testament that the term 
mafia has become over-generalised is the fact that it has evolved from a proper name, to 
a common name.®® The Mafia is a unique organisation, and it actually refers only to the 
Sicilian Cosa Nostra, and not a plethora of organised crime groups habitually and 
generically referred to as Mafia. Even within Italy, criminal groups like the ‘Ndrangheta, 
the Camorra or the Sacra Corona Unita, should not be referred to as the Mafia. They are 
Italian organised crime groups, but only the Sicilian Cosa Nostra is really the true Mafia. 
Although again, obsessing over the accurate use and definition of the term Mafia may 
seem rather trivial, in fact, it becomes incredibly important when trying to pinpoint 
specific information or statistics about a particular crime family. It is quite difficult to 
differentiate Sicilian Cosa Nostra activities from more general Italian criminal activities 
because unfortunately consistent, categorical differentiation is rarely applied. Often 
statistics will regroup under one heading generically called Mafia, all Italian organised 
crime activities, and not specific Sicilian Mafia activities. Articles, even in professional 
reviews will refer to Mafia activities without specifying ’’which” Mafia/Crime family it 
is in fact referring to.
Recently there has also a phenomenon of over-generalised use of the term Mafia
®®d'Aubert, Francois. “La criminalité organise© et le blanchiment d'argent.” . Jouy-en-Josas: Hautes 
Etudes Commerciales et Parquet de Paris, 1998.
®^Commander Grieve o f the NCIS as quoted in Anderson, Malcolm. ‘Working Paper DC: Control o f  
Organised Crime in the European Community,” . Edinburgh: Project Group on European Police 
Cooperation, University o f Edinburgh, 1993.
®®Bossard, Andre. Carrefours de la Grande Truanderie. Paris: Stock, 1998, page 274.
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to refer to issues, events or perpetrators having absolutely no relation with Italian crime 
groups or even GOC. The term Mafia seems to occasionally have taken on a generic 
definition pertaining to an organisation that appears to be slightly secretive, less than 
100% legal, or very powerful In France alone in the last year a variety of books have 
been published using the term Mafia in their title but having nothing to do with crime 
families originating from Italy.
Mafia is a highly specific tenn that should only be used in a very specific context 
and regarding only a single crime family originating fi-om Sicily. However, the over 
generalised use of this term as a sound-bite, attention-getter, or generic term, has rendered 
research significantly more difficult as many potential information sources have to be 
eliminated as they are not specific enough in their use of the terminology.
2. What is Organised Crime?
Because there is no single universally accepted definition of organised crime, 
there exist a plethora of different definitions, that focus on certain elements, or 
components of organised crime. Whilst some definitions centre on the social aspect, 
others focus on the judicial constraints, while others, instead of focusing on a specific 
definition prefer an enumeration of criteria which must be fulfilled in order to be 
considered as organised crime.®"
According to Ziegler, there are three broad defining baits of organised crime: 
economic organisation, military hierarchy, and parental linlcs with the clan.®^  Organised 
crime is:
- Economic organisation which is capitalistic in nature and structures in order to 
maximise and guarantee profit. In effect their organisation is similar to that of any 
profit seeldng multinational corporation.
- Military hierarchy is also present with a clear territorial domination and use of 
violence, a form of authoritarianism regimented by orders, and also characterised 
by blindly following orders.
®"Quemar, Georges. Paris Mafia. Paris: Fayard, 1998, and Gaudino, Antoine. La Mafia des Tribunaux 
de Commerce. Paris: Alvin Michel, 1998.
®"Refer to appendix 1 & appendix 2 for listing o f different definitions.
®'Ziegler, Jean. Les Seigneurs du Crime: Les nouvelles mafias contre la démocratie. Paris: Seuil, 1998, 
page 22.
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“ Parental Units with the clans, and ethnic appurtenance to the family is also 
predominant.
For the puipose of this thesis, Interpol’s definition that will be used to define organised 
crime.
[organised crime is...] systematically prepared and planned committing of 
serious criminal acts with a view to gain profits and power and by more 
than three accomplices united in a hierarchy and job divisions in which 
methods of violence, various types of intimidation, corruption’s, and other 
influences are used.
3. What is the Mafia?
According to Xavier Raufer, the Mafia is a criminal society with initiation ritual, 
conceived to be practically indestructible.®^ The Mafia is not a few individuals getting 
together to commit a criminal act, or even a few highly organised individuals who act 
together to commit a crime, but rather a highly specific unique organisation.
In fact the term Mafia refers to only one organisation, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. 
Mafia-type, or Mafia-like structures exist, but the real Mafia is Sicilian, to “purists”, it 
is actually an error to refer to anything else as such.®® Hence, it is important to 
differentiate a Mafia-like organisation that presents many or even all characteristics 
associated with the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, and the true Mafia that it replicates.
Criminal associations, organisations and the Mafia®*^
Let’s imagine four concentric ciides. The outermost is crime in general, the closer to the 
centre the circles go, the more organised and dangerous the crimes become. The second 
circle is criminal associations, they can be more or less organised, and their duration in 
time hardly or non existent. The third circle represents criminal organisations that are 
highly organised and diversified. The fourth and final circle represents criminal 
organisations like the Mafia that is stable, organised, durable and very dangerous.
®^ Raufer, Xavier. “Les Mafias.” Cahiers de l'Express 1996.
®®Pino Arlacchi in Rohlen, Celestine. “Le Crime Organise russe n'est pas une Mafia c'est bien pire, meme 
pour des Siciliens.” Courrier International 6 February 1999.
"■^ Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” . Paris: Ministères des Affaires Etrangères, 
1998, page 8.
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According to Xavier Raufer, the only two organisations that are sufficiently evolved and 
durable to qualify for membership at the highest level of “Mafia-type”, are the Sicilian 
Cosa Nostra and the Chinese Triads.®® However, the term “Mafia” should refer only to 
the Sicilian Cosa Nostra.®®
®®Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” . Paris: Ministères des Affaires Etrangères, 
1998, page 9.
®®To easily differentiate the Mafia-like organisations the world will be not capitalised: “mafia”, and to 
refer to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, Mafia will be capitalised “Mafia”.
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v i n  The Organised Crime Discipline
1. New discipline
Organised crime is by no means a new topic, much the contrary, but organised 
crime as an actual independent field of research, or discipline in its own right, is in fact 
rather new. Previously organised crime was dealt with as an offshoot, a bi-product 
emanating from the study of another older, and more “noble” discipline, today it has 
become recognised as a full-fledged discipline. Although other disciplines can and do 
address issues pertaining to organised crime, it has become and independent entity. 
Instead of seeing organised crime as a result of a phenomenon, or as a bi-product of a 
situation, academics and experts are finally coming to realise that it has its place, and 
commands its own sphere of research, complete with its own bi-product and satellite 
research areas. This change is testament to the maturation of the academic field 
concerning organised crime.
2. Multi-disciolinarv nature
The study of organised crime can be a truly multi disciplinary field of research, 
requiring ‘Academic border crossing”,®'' and sometimes involving disciplines as diverse 
as law, history, economics, geopolitics, international relations, statistics, geography, 
political science, etc... Researching this thesis required basic knowledge of French and 
Italian criminal law as well as international criminal law: why does the absence of an 
equivalent Rognone-LaTone law®® insight members of the Mafia to seek shelter on 
France? In addition, significant historical background was useful in order to set the events 
and developments within their appropriate historical context: how did the Mafia’s 
tumultuous history affect its current structure and aims? Furthermore, a good grasp of 
economics, and understanding of market supply and demands was essential, especially 
when looking into drug trafficking, money laundering and other activities where the Mafia 
is engaged. Geopolitics and international relations were also essential prerequisites in this 
field of study, and seized as theoretical backgrounds guiding the overall research.
Research in this field could, and often is limited to only one speciality, but as the
®'MacDonald, William. “Globalisation o f Criminology.” Transnational Organised Crime .Spring (1995).
®® Refer to Italian Lesson chapter for more details on this Mafia specific legislation.
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issue is really multidimensional, observations and potential solutions emanating from only 
one single vantage point, tend to reflect only one side of the reality sunounding this 
problem. Organised crime is multi-disciplinaiy in its very nature and so it seems rather 
appropriate that its academic study also reflect this multi-disciplinary nature and hence 
take into consideration several fields of research like law, economics, history to name 
only a few:
[Transnational organised crime] is a subject that requires innovative 
approaches and both inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary 
perspectives.®^
3. Few Organised Crime specialists
Perhaps one of the most fundamental discoveries that researching organised crime 
and Mafia activities for this thesis has enabled to uncover is the fundamental lack of 
“pure” organised crime experts. There are quite obviously researchers and practitioners 
that have great expertise in organised crime, but few, if any, have actually been trained 
from the very beginning as organised crime experts. In effect, it appears that most experts 
dealing with organised crime today are “converts” emanating originally from another 
discipline. Although this may appear as a trivial observation, in fact it greatly affects the 
way in which the subject is broached. For a historian-tumed-Mafia expert, the subject 
remains very rooted in the historical approach. For a terrorist expert the base of 
comparison and approach will also be tailored by the original field of research. This is 
a predictable phenomenon as the organised crime field of research has only just recently 
come to the forefront of national and international security concerns, and hence there is 
a noimal lag in generating experts in that specific field. This is not to say that experts that 
have originally come from other fields of research are not as competent, quite the 
contrary, but it is just interesting to note that their approach to the topic of organised 
crime is certainly “tainted” by the previous field of research.''"
"Williams, Phil. “Editorial.” Transnational Organised Crime .Spring (1995), page vii.
^Arlacchi- sociologist /  Calvi - terrorism /  Raufer- sociology /Jamieson-terrorism / Debacq- Sampieri- 
Falcone- Borsellino - Magistrates /  Bianchini, Madelin - journalists /  etc...
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4. Criminology and organised crime
Criminologists have quite obviously made a significant contribution to the study 
of organised crime as a discipline. However, the various sources consulted tended to 
focus on the behavioural aspects of elements involved in OC and less often on the OC 
structure in its entirety. The criminologists also appear to have the tendency to dissociate 
the geopolitical context that affects the state and the international economic trends from 
the organised criminal and his behaviour. More recently though criminologists have been 
talcing a more “whole” approach to OC. The French Institute for Criminology has become 
the “lead” academic discipline in France looking at OC issues in innovative ways.
According to the father of American criminology, criminology can be defined as 
“ the scientific study of making laws, breaking laws and reacting towards the breaking of 
laws” (simplified as lawmaking, lawbreaking and reactions).''* The three principle areas 
of criminological theory are those who make the laws or criminology of criminal law, 
those who specialise in the elements who break the law, or crime causation (also 
criminogenesis or etiology) and finally those who look at the reasons for law brealcing or 
social response theorists. The two broader criminological theoretical trends can be 
simplistically summarised as classical criminology theory that tends to explain rather tlran 
predict and positivist criminology that leans away from explanation and focuses instead 
on prediction.
In the case of OC the traditional theoretical models of criminology although 
interesting and valuable in specific instances and to predict or interpret a specific 
behaviour again appear to fall short as an adequate theoretical model. It lack the larger 
perspective that takes into account the historical, social, economic, local, regional 
national and international and geopolitical context that impacts a crime family like the 
Cosa Nostra and influences its choice of activity, sphere of action and choice of refuge.
can be said then, that criminology is a valuable tool to look at aspects of OC, 
that criminology has indisputably contributed to better understanding of the criminal 
involved in OC, but that it is an incomplete theoretical model for looking at the It 
complex case of OC and more specifically Cosa Nostra.
Sutherland, Edwin. Principles o f Criminology. PMadelphia: Lippencott, 1960.
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IX Peculiarity of France
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of researching organised crime in France, is that 
France as represented by its successive governments has until very recently refused to 
admit that organised crime was in fact a reality. As such it necessitated, in the veiy first 
instance, acloiowledgement of its existence, and eventually a reaction to counter it. 
According to Xavier Raufer, director of the Institut de Criminologie of Paris, France 
suffers from a very peculiar syndrome he coins the “French exception”,''® which is a 
significantly delayed reaction to a growing menace.''® He explains that whereas most 
developed/Westem governments generally need 3-5 years to start reacting to a new or 
enhanced threat, France often needs twice if not three times as long to even acknowledge 
it.
Surely not unique to France, but certainly exacerbated in France is the political 
weight of acknowledging such a dangerous problem like the Mafia. To a certain extent 
denying its reality, means not actually having to do anything about it, and hence carries 
very little political liability. Alternatively, admitting to its existence, and having to 
combat it contains huge political liability. Perhaps this explains in part the political 
reticence that has plague politicians to tackle the issue of organised crime presence in 
France. Quite obviously such a situation greatly hinders the capacity to react quickly and 
effectively.
^®Raufer, Xavier. “Menaces Criminelles.” . Paris: Centre Universitaire Juridique de Recherche sur les 
Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines : Université Pantheon-Assas (Paris II), 1998. Raufer, Xavier. 
“Menaces Terroristes.” Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Paris, 1998.
^®Raufer gives another example o f France’s failure to react in a timely fashion to a threat, new or 
enhanced. According to the French government, police and justice officials, France does not have any 
serial killers. People who repeatedly perpetrate murder are not serial killers but rather, only multi­
recidivist murderers.
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X Conclusion
After having briefly outlined the economic impact that organised crime can, and 
does have, on the world economy with a gross criminal product estimates to reach $ 1,200 
billion USD a year and having sketched out the concrete thieat that inaction can pose it 
was important to focus on the significant obstacles (geographic, gender-related, 
impermeable French structures, sensitive topic) that had to be overcome in order to carry 
out the research.
In order to place the research within a concrete methodological method, the 
research have sought to summarily look at the main theoretical models that are used for 
the study of international relations and that might have been applicable to OC. Without 
attempting to reduce the importance of each model and its obvious contribution to the 
broader field of international relations and geopolitics, the research has chosen the 
theoretical framework of analysis that suited this specific research best. After analysis, 
the model selected is the concept of “New Medievalism”, first coined by Hedley Bull and 
later championed by Alain Mine, Jean-Marie Guehenno and Andre Bossard.
The New Medievalist theoretical model appears best suited as a spectrum through 
which to research, describe and analyse OC because its five guiding precepts (regional 
integration of states, disintegration of states, restoration of private international violence, 
transnational organisations and technological unification of the world) coupled with the 
idea that non-state actors will gain in important and influence to the detriment of the state 
(and not necessarily in a positive way) correspond well to today’s reality as acted out by 
OC and more particularly Sicilian Cosa Nostra.
Rather than use the case study of Cosa Nostra activities in Italy, or even in the 
United States, the research has sought to look at another more recent and less well loiown 
international venture: peneb ation of the French Riviera and France by the Sicilian Cosa 
Nosba. By analysing the case of France, conclusions as to the motivations, sbategic 
choices and judicial considerations can be inferred.
However because the Cosa Nosba is not the only crime family operating in a 
globalised way today, it is important to begin by taking the time to briefly look at the 
other main criminal players around the world, their joint ventures and common 
operational agreements. The main non-Italian crime families that have exploited and
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profited from the globalised world are the Russian Mafiya, Japanese Yakusas, and 
Chinese Triads. Smaller, yet very potent, crime groups also operate internationally but 
their interaction and impact on the Cosa Nostra is less significant. These include the 
Colombian drug caitels, Nigerian crime groups and Turkish criminal enterprises. In order 
to not “dilute” the subject matter. These groups will not be analysed in this research.
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Appendix 1
Definitions of Organised Crime and the Mafia
European Parliament (OC)
Association of two or more people acting with the common aim of committing crimes and 
infractions, notably drug trafficking, trafficking in humans, money laundering and other 
forms of financial fraud, notably financial frauds on the Internet system or using menu 
transfers, financial investments, and exploiting extraterritoriality, fiscal fraud [...], 
terrorism and having recourse to the protection of persons belonging to important 
institutions to dissimulate or facilitate the realisation of the infractions'll
European Union (OC)
1. Collaboration between two or more people
2. Specific tasks attributed to each person
3. A prolonged or indefinite period of time
4. A form of discipline and control
5. Suspected of having committed serious legal infractions
6. Acting on the international level
7. Recourse to violence or other means of intimidation
8. Utilising commercial or commercial-type structures
9. Recourse to money laundering
10. Exercising influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial or 
economic authorities
11. Acting for profit and/or power
A minimum of six of the eleven criteria must be met, and imperatively 1, 5 & 11. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (OC):
Organised enterprise crime is a continuing criminal conspiracy having organised structure, 
fed by fear and corruption and motivated by greed.'®
Saint-Araille, Marie-Christine, and Guy Deregnaucourt. “Le point de la Session Parlementaire: 
Criminalité organisée: renforcement de la coopération entre Etats membres.” . Strasbourg: European 
Parliament, 1997, page 24.
'®Baker, Thomas. “Le FBI et le crime organise: le role du renseignement.” La Criminalité Orgamsee. 
Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paiis: La Documentation Française, 1996.
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French Ministry of Finance (OC):
- infraction of an extreme seriousness having repercussions on a person or on human 
dignity
-criminal activities that reveal by their breadth, a high level or organisation
- activities entailing large sums of money to launder, and hence the necessity to deploy 
itself internationally to launder money.'®
French Parliament: (Mafia)
Unitary organisation, doted with a pyramidal and compartmentalised structure founded 
on a “cell base” (the family), within which authority is exercised by a chief. The Mafia 
is regimented by a set of inflexible rules and ensures their application with the use of 
force, and disposes, on its territory of the monopoly over the use of violence."
Germany (OC):
Business or business like structures and exerts influence on politics, media, public 
administration, judiciary, or the economy
Interpol (OC):
Systematically prepared and planned committing of serious criminal acts with a view to 
gain profits and power and by more than three accomplices united in a hierarchy and job 
divisions in which methods of violence, various types of intimidation, corruption, and 
other influences are used.
Italy: (Mafia)
Those who form it make use of the power of intimidation provided by the associative 
bond and of the state of subjugation and criminal silence which derives from it to commit 
crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the running or control of economics activities, of 
concessions, grants, contracts and public services in order to realise illicit profits or 
advantages for themselves or others.'®
State of California (OC):
Organised crime consists of two or more persons who, with continuity of purpose, engage 
in one or more of the following activities: the supplying of illegal services, and predatory 
crimes. Several distinct types of criminal activities fall within this definition of organised
'®Ministeres des Finances. “Les Notes Bleues de Bercy.” . Paris, 1993.
"d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de 
Lutter Contre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, 
page 14.
'®De Bacq, Michel. “Criminalité Organisée.” Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1996.
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crime. The types may be grouped into five general categories: Racketeering, vice­
operations, theft/fence rings, gangs, tenorists."
United Nations (former)(OC):
Organisation of groups with criminal intentions and activities, hierarchical links or 
personal relations that allow certain individuals to direct the group, recourse to violence, 
intimidation and corruption, and laundering of illegal profits.®"
United Nations (new definition) :
Organised criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing 
for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit®*.
79Abadinsky, Howard. Organised Crime. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1990, page 2.
®"United Nations Conference. “Le Crime Organise et le traffic de drogue.” . Naples: United Nations, 
1994.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime: Palermo December 2000.
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Appendix 2 
Defining Mafias®®
Mafia OC Criminal Association
1. Group of several people Yes Yes Yes
2. Use of violence Yes Yes Yes
3. Adaptability to circumstancesYes Yes Raiefy
4. Ability to corrupt Yes Yes —
5. Seeldng influence Yes Yes —
6. International expansion Yes Yes —
7. Hierarchical stiucture Yes Yes —
8. Pre-eminence of organisation Yes 
(over the individual)
Yes —
9. Duty to obey Yes Yes —
10. Permanent membership Yes Yes '—'
11. Reference to the family Yes Yes _
12. Permanence of the structures Yes Yes
13, Sense of honour Yes Sometimes
14. Culture of death Yes Sometimes —
15. Founding myth Yes Sometimes
16. Initiation Yes — —
17. Example Triads Cartels Gangs
®®Cretin. Thierrv. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1997, 
page 158.
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(Chapter 2
G lobal O rganized Grime
« Crime is no longera problem that any nation 
can consider in isolation, 
if we want to  understand it, and to  combat it, 
we must see crime in its global context. »
Pino Arlacchi
« Nations Build Alliances to Stop Organised
Crime »
U.S. Department of State (www.USinfo.state.gov)
I Introduction
In order to fully understand the regionally specific case study of this thesis, the 
Sicilian Cosa Nostra and its activities in France, it is important to define first and explain 
the global organised crime activities. The Cosa Nostra does not, and cannot operate in 
a vacuum and hence the international context is also key in understanding it. By 
presenting the major actors, their spheres of interest, their members and structures, the 
global crime problem can be defined and delineated more accurately and more completely. 
The main axis of this chapter are: The presentation of the major organised crime families, 
the presentation of the major activities, and the presentation of the strategic alliances they 
have forged.
Not only is organised crime a concrete threat, but it is further exacerbated by the 
multiplicity of the different organised crime families. There are five broad “categories” 
of organised crime families, mainly delineated by their geographic origin: Italian, Russian, 
Japanese, Chinese and South American cartels. In addition to these traditional GOC 
. families, must also be added smaller crime syndicates, sometimes referred to as criminal 
upstart groups like the Nigerian and Turkish criminal networks.
Each family is totally separate entity, has its own unique personal history that has 
shaped its development, encouraged certain types of activities, and tailored its relationship 
with its “host” state. Even though many of the GOC families have a similar type of 
background, most notably, the Robin-Hood image with its defence of the oppressed 
populations, or may even have borrowed a few elements from the structure of one or 
another organisation, they share the same goal: profit. The only two groups that have 
identical origins are the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and its independent offshoot the American 
La Cosa Nostra, but today they are also considered as separate entities.
By looking at each family individually, explaining its origins, analysing its 
structure and choice of activities, it becomes clear why each on its own already poses a 
threat to the state within which its operates, impedes fair market practices, hinders healthy 
economic progression, and corrupts local and national decision makers. By repeating this 
process for each of the major GOC families, it become obvious that compounded, the 
threat posed by the multitude of OC families is exponentially menacing.
Despite each family’s autonomous standing, and each family’s preferred spheres 
of interest, there are a few activities which are universal to all families, namely: drug 
trafficking, money laundering, as well as other “popular” activities like human trafficking. 
Other activities like organ trafficking are newer to the GOC scene but appear to be
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quickly rising as an activity of choice because of its high profit yield.
The GOC have not shied away from the era of globalisation, and much the 
contrary have embraced it and used it to their advantage. It can be considered that the 
GOC families, in many ways act like any multinational corporation, and have sought to 
forge alliances, develop joint ventures, and diversify their activity portfolio in order to 
profit from the era of globalisation, and ensure their survival. By forging ties with other 
crime groups, GOC families have specialised, streamlined their activities, exploited their 
geographic domination, and made themselves even more resilient. This era of inter-GOC 
activities has especially enabled each family to increase its profit, resulting in further 
penetration of the global economy.
Several new factors, products of the new global order, have revolutionised the 
world, and the way business is conducted both for GOC and legitimate business structures. 
The by-products of this new order include: a communication and transportation 
revolution, increased migration of people, and permeability of national boundaries. 
Additionally the end of the Cold War has opened up new markets in the East, and has 
permitted the former satellite countries to actively participate in the Western markets. 
Although these new facilities have greatly benefited legitimate business ventures, and 
have allowed the individual greater access to the world, these same new facilities have 
also tremendously benefited the criminal organisation who have used and exploited theses 
system to their strategic and financial advantage.
53
international organised crime
II Multiplicity o f Organised crime families: a tangible threat
1. Italian Organised Crime Families'
Natlofial BWTEO 
CROWN
Activities
Camorra - drug trafficking, e 
cigarette contrabanAng. Siegai 
works contracte.
'NdraiH^Mta - tratStiona 
drugtnalRckmg 
(Mlad Sacred Crown 
tramcWng. exwdion. usury, 
oommui% and Alma.
pubttc 
(ànsom. extortion.
There are four major crime families operating in Italy today, each of which is 
geographically delineated: the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, the Camorra in Naples, the 
‘Ndrangheta in Calabria, and the Sacra Corona Unita in Apulia. A fifth major crime 
group of Italian origin and distant cousin of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra operates in the 
United States and Canada La Cosa Nostra. Each crime family is completely independent 
from the others, but when necessary can chose to co-operate with another family. 
Generically referred to as a unitary group: the Italian Mafia, each family is in fact very 
different, possesses a unique structure, individual history, and preferred spheres of 
interest.
The Gross Criminal product of all Italian crime families confounded is estimated 
to reach $20-25 billion USD annually and is roughly broken down in the following
'All the maps that have been scanned and entered into this chapter come from one source: United 
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. “The World Ministerial Conference on Organised 
Transnational Crime - Naples Italy 21-23 November 1994.” . Vienna; Ur'tÇ(LNaüons^ 19Q5
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fashion:'
Drugs trafficking: 20%
Extortion: 20%
Public Works Contracts: 20%
Theft/Robberies: 20%
Other: 20%
(Including fraud, prostitution smuggling)
Racketeering/extortion, is an easy way for the organised crime families not only 
to make money, but also an important way to reaffirm their control over a given territory. 
By systematically calling on the different businesses, shops and factories for 
“contributions” they are reminding everyone of their permanent presence and reaffirming 
their control and power. The following table illustrates the number of dynamite 
explosions, fire bombing attempts and extortion denunciations in Italy in 1990. It can be 
concluded from this table that not only is a disproportionate number of these bombings 
(88%) and extortion attempts (60%) occurring in the Soutli, where the Mafia is based, but 
they are also predominantly occurring in regions controlled by the four Italian organised 
crime families: Campania: Camorra / Apulia: Sacra Corona Unita / Calabria: ‘Ndrangheta 
/ Sicily: Cosa Nostra'.
Racketeering in Italv^
(In 1990)
Region Dynamite explosions 
Fire-bombings
Extortion
Denunciations
Campania 74 341
Apulia 461 437
Calabria 498 136
Sicily 425 468
Total South 1,540 1,589
Total Centre-North 196 1,029
Total Italy 1,736 2,618
The table further illustrates the involvement of the different organised crime families in 
these bombings and extortion attempts. The Cosa Nostra is the organisation that is most 
involved in extortion, both in the South and in Italy, while the ‘Ndrangheta is responsible 
for 1/3 of all bombings in the South, slightly less for all of Italy, closely followed by the 
SCU and the Cosa Nostra. The Camorra is only marginally involved in bombings and
'Sterling, Claire. Crime Without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Organised Crime and the Pax 
Mafiosa. London: Little, Brown & Company, 1994, page 94.
®For the clarity of this table, four regions have been left out: Abrusse, Molise, Basilicate, and Sardenia. 
^Sommier, Isabelle. Les Mafias. Paris: Montchrestien. 1998. p a g é ^ /
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ranks third in extortion attempts. Interestingly, the SCU despite is small membership size 
(the smallest amongst the four Italian OC families) is disproportionately involved in 
violent incidents.®
a. Cosa Nostra
The oldest amongst the five Italian crime groups, the Cosa Nostra seiwed as an 
example for many other crime groups who decided to replicate certain aspects of its 
structure and organisation into their own organisations. However, as the Cosa Nostra is 
the case study for this research, it shall be discussed in great detail in a subsequent 
chapter.
b. Camorra
The word Camorra may have its origins from “morm” a game particularly 
appreciated in the South of Italy.® Two predominant theories exists concerning the origins 
of the Camorra as a criminal group: the oldest traces it back to a humility society of the 
XVI century, and the more recent origin traces it back to a XIX century organisation 
emerging from the popular Naples neighbourhoods. Regardless, the Camorra was bom 
no later than the XIX in Naples, and slowly expanded its control to the surrounding 
region. Interestingly, it is the only Italian crime family whose origins are urban and not 
rural.
Membership boasts a total 106 families and 5,000 soldiers. Naples alone harbours 
67 families and 3,350 soldiers making it the strategic epicentre of Camorra operations and 
manpower. Rocked by devastating internal wars in the 1980’s (approximately 400 
victims) two powerful families emerged from the main the Camorra: the nuovafamiglia 
headed by Michele Zaza, and the nuova camorra organizzata headed by Rafaele Cutolo.
The Camorra structure, unlike the ‘Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra, is much more 
horizontal in nature, resembling an informal federation of local organisations, loosely 
governed by a few dominant clans rather than a strictly pyramidal structure like other 
crime families.' The godfathers of the Camorra are very young by Italian organised crime 
standards, the average age is 25-30. Interestingly, the Camorra includes women among
® Historically the Camorra has always tolerated much more violence.
®Bottamedi, Claude. La Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 1997, page 47.
'^d’Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de 
Lutter Contre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, 
page 30.
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its members and in one case permitted the ascension of a woman to the position of 
godfather: when Rafaele Cutole was arrested, his sister took over his prestigious position 
before being arrested herself in 1993.
Up until the 1960's the Camorra’s main activities included cigarette trafficking, 
equivalent to 10% of the total Italian national market, extortion and theft. In the 1970's, 
the Camorra expanded its activities to included cocaine and heroin trafficking, for this 
purpose, forging links with Italian crime groups already present in the United States. In 
addition, the Camorra also became involved in money laundering industry, a way of 
insuring the conversion of their drug and crime profits.* Cigarette trafficking, and 
clandestine lotteries remain profitable activities even today, estimated to generate $2 
billion USD a year.' Another speciality of the Camorra is the diverting of public money. 
Following the 1980 earthquake that rocked the region and resulted in 240 victims, the 
Italian government allocated emergency funds to rescue victims, aid the displaced 
population and rebuilt housing. It is estimated that as much as 60% of those emergency 
funds was directly diverted by the Camorra." According to the Italian census, the 
Camorra is a large employer; it unofficially hires as many as 400,000 of unemployed 
workers whose primary job is selling contraband cigarettes."
Internationally the Camorra is especially present in Europe (Germany, Portugal, 
Great Britain, Switzerland, Monaco, France Hungary, the Netherlands, and former 
Yugoslavia), North and South America (the United States, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay 
Colombia Venezuela).
c. Sacra Corona Unita
The Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) is the smallest and youngest of the Italian 
organised crime families, only dating back to the 1970's, and is in fact an independent 
offshoot of Rafaele Cutolo’s Camorra family. Based in Apulia, is primarily centred 
around the cities of Bari, Lecce and Brindisi. The SCU is comprised of 32 clans and 
2,542 affiliates (or members). The SCU is perceived as the undisciplined element of the 
Italian organised crime: its word of honour means nothing, and leaders often go back on
*Bottamedi, Claude. La Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 1997, page 47.
*'Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 
page 130.
'"Bottamedi, Claude. La Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 1997, page 49.
"This fact may explain, at least in part, the local and regional governments reticence to tackle the 
Camorra, as doing so would propel all these Camorra-employees” back into the unemployment sphere.
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their promises, or act in complete opposition to what they have agreed on, and hence are 
considered totally unreliable by the Cosa Nostra, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta. In addition, 
the SCU is characterised by an incredible level of violence: whereas the other Italian crime 
families tend to avoid murdering women and children, the SCU sometimes seeks them out 
as ideal victims, and ideal vectors through which to sow fear and violence. Because of this 
violence and unreliability the other crime families tend to limit their interaction they have 
with the SCU.
The SCU rituals and vocabulary are deeply rooted in a fervent religious belief; for 
example, the initiation ritual is called the baptism, il hattesimo. To become a member of 
the SCU, a person must be nominated by a godfather, who in turn becomes guarantor of 
the recruit’s loyalty and answers for his actions. The structure of the SCU is highly 
hierarchical, comprised fifteen different levels." A member must proceed through every 
level, to move up an echelon, each member must have committed a criminal act worthy 
of promotion, and have remained in the previous echelon for a pre-determined period. 
Each advance is marked by a ceremony, always conducted on a Saturday and an uneven 
number of members must also be present for the ceremony to be valid.
The SCU engages in traditional criminal activities like extortion, loan-sharking, 
and public works contracts, but with strategic, and even easy access to the Balkans, they 
have, like the ‘Ndrangheta maximised this advantage to develop various activities. The 
SCU has forged ties with Albanian, Montenegro and Turkish criminal groups to pursue 
weapons, drug, contraband and immigrant trafficking across the Adriatic."
Internationally the SCU is present in the United States, South America, Albania, 
Montenegro and Turkey.
d. ‘Ndrangheta
The name ‘Ndrangheta, from the Greek “andragathia” or “andraghetos”, meaning 
manliness or man of valour first appeared in the XVIII century." The archives of the 
Seminara carabinieri made mention of an organisation of thieves that defended the 
peasants from the Pietmontese invaders. Like the Cosa Nostra, the origin of the
"The founder, crimine, crimine distaccato, quartino, tre-quartino, messo-quartino, evangelista, santista, 
sgarrista, cammorista (full-fledged), cammorista di sangue, cammorista fatto a voce, picciotto (full 
fledged), picciotto di sangue, picciotto a voce.
"Marrusso, Feliciano. “Organisation de type mafieux a I'horizon 2000.” Revue Internationale de 
Criminologie et de Police Technique .February (1997).
"Vulliamy, Ed. “Mafia Strides into Power Vacuum.” The Guardian 25 May 1992.
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‘Ndrangheta was noble, defending the oppressed against the invader, and becomes 
“officially” criminal a century later.
The structure of the ‘Ndrangheta is a tree. The trunk, referred to as capobastone 
is the heait of the organisation, comprised of the few key decision-makers. The most 
important branch, and hence second most important role within the organisation is held 
by the accountant. The other sturdy branches represent the essential experts that hold the 
organisation together. The little offshoots, known as piccioti are the new recruits. The 
buds and flowers form the pool of potential recruits. Finally the dead leaves falling from 
the tree symbolise the traitors that have fallen from grace. Incidentally, it appears that 
these traitors are actually physically scarred by the organisation to mark them permanently 
as outcasts."
The ‘Ndrangheta controls the entire lower boot of Italy, but is chiefly centred in 
three provinces Reggio, Cosensa and Catansa. Its membership counts approximately 142 
families. Called 'ndrines and 5,000 soldiers. The two main factions are controlled by the 
De Stefano -  Tegano -Libri families and the Imerti -  Condello -Serraino families. In 
1991, the two families met and decided on a strategic split of the region, each keeping 
control of one specific area, and hence helping to reduce any “temtorial” based conflicts 
between them."
To become a member of the ‘Ndrangheta a young man must cany out a murder, 
but must demonstrate agility, intelligence and complete calm when doing so. 
Recruitment generally takes place within the family, is subject to a democratic vote, and 
finally is censured by an entrance fee known as the dritta. Like the Camorra, women are 
admitted into the ‘Ndrangheta. The ‘Ndrangheta is especially known for its section of 
baby-killers, young men no older then fifteen who have already proven themselves worthy 
of membership by demonstrating keen skills for executions.
Primarily agrarian, the 1960's mark a turning point for the ‘Ndrangheta because 
they launched into drug trafficking and cigarette contraband. They easily took advantage 
of their strategic location on the Balkan route and exploited this position to promote illegal 
activities." The real speciality of the ‘Ndrangheta remains kidnapping for ransom, and 
although they tend to kidnap victims outside of ‘Ndrangheta territory, they generally
"Boltamedi, Claude. La Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 1997, page 45.
Pellegrini, Aneiolo; The “Ndragnetha; Asn account of the situation” D.I.A., Centro Operativo Reggio 
Calabri (1997),
"  The Balkan route, jointly exploited by Serbian and Italian organised crime provides the entry point
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sequester them in the Calabrian country side (Aspromonte), sometimes detaining them 
there for years." American millionaire Paul Getty’s son was a high profile victim of 
‘Ndrangheta kidnapping. Like the Cosa Nostra, it has managed to instil the rule of 
omerta, the art of not speaking, and thus preventing the villagers, or any eye-witnesses 
from going to the police. In addition, the ‘Ndrangheta favoui^political penetration to 
ensure its survival and for this purpose cultivates close ties with the local elected officials: 
according to Italian Anti-Mafia officials, the ‘Ndrangheta controls 15-20% of the local 
elected officials in Calabria." According to the DIA, the four main activities of the 
‘Ndrangheta are, drug trafficking, extortion, arms trafficking and money laundering." 
Internationally the ‘Ndiangheta is particularly present in Europe (France, Spain, Portugal 
and the Netherlands), but also Canada and the United States.
into Europe for all forms of trafficking (weapons, immigrant, cigarettes).
■^ ®Cesare Casella was kidnaped, chained in a grotto, and held captive for 742 days despite his mother 
having paid the ransom demand. Source: de Vericourt, Guilemette. Les Mafias. Toulouse: Editions 
Milan, 1998, page 13.
■^ C^retin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 
page 123,
Pellegrini, Aneiolo; The “Ndragnetha; Asn account o f the situation” D.I.A., Centro Operative Reggio 
Calabri (1997).
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e. La Cosa Nostra
United States of America
US COSA NOSTRA
Major activities
pubHCWMmAàpOÊÊtÊdtt,imKf,
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Size and structure
InternationSi connections
La Cosa Nostra (LCN), distant cousin of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra originated in the 
American city-ghettos of the XIX th century. With massive immigration from Italy to the 
United States, (more than 4,000,000 between 1820-1930, nearly 80% of whom were from 
Southern Italy), these ethnically singular city ghettos (generally little-Italy) replicated the 
“clan’Vfamily mentality that existed on the Old Continent and brought with them some 
aspects of the Mafia. Because so many of these immigrants did not speak English, the 
privileged few who did quickly acquired status and power acting as intermediaries, 
interpreters and job recruitment specialists for the Italian immigrants. This position 
known as "'padrone" began to formalise further and created the precursor to the American- 
style Mafia “the Black-Hand”. The Black Hand not only took interest in finding jobs, and 
being rewarded for it, but also in organising illegal gambling, trafficking and murder." 
In 1919, the Volstead -Prohibition Law was voted and the Black Hand/ Mafia took off, 
solidifying its power and wealth by importing alcohol, and controlling its sale and 
distribution, the powerful American La Cosa Nostra emerges from this period.
^^Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 
page 92.
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Today, LCN is estimated to have approximately 3,000 men of honour and 20,000 
associates gravitating around 20-25 families. LCN is implanted across the United States 
but is particularly present in New York/ New Jersey, Chicago, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, 
Miami and Atlantic City. The five “historic” families are based in New York and include 
the Bonnano, Colombo, Gambino, Genovese and Lucchese families. Generally one 
family dominates one city, with the exception of New York which is split between the five 
historic families."
The internal structure of LCN is the same as its Sicilian counterpart and in 1931, 
Lucky Luciano set up a “commission” as an arbitrating board for the different families to 
air their grievances against one another, and try and prevent inter-family wars over 
territorial domination or conflicting activities. The only family that remains completely 
independent and is not a member of this commission is the New Orleans family." 
Membership criteria for LCN requires that the father of the prospective member be bom 
in Italy, preferably in Sicily, but at the very least in the South but exceptions, and special 
derogations can however be made.”
Organised crime in the United States is estimated to gross $60 billion USD, 
equivalent to 1.1% of the GNP, and represents more than the metal, copper and steel 
industries put together." LCN is thought to generate 50-80% of that sum, and an estimated 
$6.5 billion USD of taxes revenues is lost just on illicit LCN activities."
LCN activities are varied ranging from dmg trafficking, extortion, racketeering, 
illegal gambling but also activities like prostitution and pornography that are banned in 
Sicily. One of the peculiarities of LCN is the immense control it had, and still has though 
to a lesser degree over trade and labour unions. Through this control, and by threatening 
labour strikes LCN is able to effectively racketeer and extort entire sectors of industries. 
Trade unions that are particularly prised by LCN are the hotel and restaurant unions.
^^Campagnola, Francois. Crime organise et gansterisme professionel: experience française et analyse 
comparée. Paris: Institut de Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure, 1996, page 18.
^^Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée Internationale. 
Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 50.
^^Germani, Gino. “International Organised Crime Groups (Distinguished Lecture Series).” . Rome: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.
^^Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée Internationale. 
Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994.
•^‘^ Germani, Gino. “International Organised Crime Groups (Distinguished Lecture Series).” . Rome: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.
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dockers as well as construction companies, waste disposal, food, water and gasoline 
distribution unions.
For example, LCN families in New York (mainly Gambino and Gennovese) 
control not only the unions associated with waste removal, but also control the sub­
contractors authorised to treat the 25,000 tons of waste produced each day in the city. 
For this reason the cost of treating a square meter of waste in New York is significantly 
higher than in other American cities: $17.5 in New York, versus $5 in Chicago and only 
$4 in Los Angeles."
Like all organised crime families that try and create a legal front to their illegal 
activities, and look for legal ventures through which to either launder their dirty money, 
or invest in with dirty money, LCN has an extensive portfolio. In 1985, according to the 
American Presidential Commission on Organised Crime, LCN owned at least 768 “legal” 
properties/investments. The breakdown was as follows:"
- Restaurants, grocery stores, liquor stores 253
- Construction & public works companies 137
- Legal gambling establishments 78
- Waste disposal companies 58
- Clubs, hotels, etc.. 47
- ' Car dealerships and repair shops 41
- Various confection shops 34
- Real estate companies 18
- Banks 9
- Other 93
^^Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée Internationale. 
Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 53.
^*Though this statistic is dated, it can be assumed that today a similar breakdown of areas of interest still 
exists. Source: Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée 
Internationale. Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 51.
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2. Russian: Mafiva
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In 1994, Boris Yeltsin called his country the “biggest mafia state in the world.. .the 
superpower of crime that is devouring the state from top to bottom””
Although some organised crime groups existed under the communist system, since 
its collapse in 1990, the old, in addition to the ever-multiplying new groups have been 
able to flourish and expand their influence, activities and profits dramatically. The 
repressive Communist State had been able to keep criminal organisations in check by 
handing out extremely harsh sentences (up to 17 years in high security Siberian prison- 
camps for associating with criminals), however it had never set up, developed or 
reinforced the institutions and tools necessary to combat a potentially growing and highly 
lethal criminal population." Today, Russian organised crime has literally exploded in 
numbers with as many as 3,000,000 associates, or helpers." Arguably, the Russian Mafiya 
is one of the primary enterprises that has benefited from the collapse of the Soviet Union." 
A much more violent and unpredictable New Mafia has outclassed the old Mafia present
Borchgrave, Arnaud: Russian Organised Crime, CSIS Panel Report 1997.
^®Freeh, Louis. “Russian Organised Crime (Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy).” Moscow: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994 and Freeh, Louis. “Hearing on Russian 
Organised Crime (House Committee on International Relations).” Washington D C.: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 1996.
^^These associates are not confirmed members of a gang, but rather work as “contractors” . They do not 
benefit from “ status” of a Maffiya member, but receive financial compensation for their help and 
loyalty.
^^Handelman, Stephen. “The Russian Mafiya.” Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994). 64
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under the USSR.
The old system of Vo?y V Sakone, “Thieves professing the code”" is slowly being 
chipped away by the new Mafias. The Sakone’s, thought to number 600 at the close of the 
Soviet Era, originally detained a territorial monopoly in trade, but as they began to 
weaken, they sought out a partnership with government officials.
The new Russian Mafiya is not a homogeneous entity, much the contrary, it is 
made up of.more than 12,000 gangs regrouping approximately 160,000 “confirmed” men 
and more than 3,000,000 associates.” The New Mafiya can broadly be broken down into 
five main categories:
- voryv sakone are the “old style” more traditional criminals
- ovforify are the new criminals
- ethnic centred gangs that recruit only within their ethnic population
- activity centred gangs that recruit specialists in a particular area
- corrupted government officials."
Pakhan —  —  Spies (at least 2)
Boss /  Godfather 
Brigadier 
Assistant to the Pakhan 
Level 1 
“Elite Group”
Organisation - Ideology - Administration 
Level 2 
“Support Group”
Recruitment - Maintenance - Relations between crime communities - Security Group
Level 3
Various “Crime Communities”
-Pick-pockets - prostitution pimps - black market specialists - drug dealers
The Pakhan, aided by his brigadier, can manage as many as four different crime cells at 
once. He generally employs at least two spies who report back to him on the loyalty and 
actions of his brigadier,"
^^Hockstatder, Lee. “Russia's Criminal Condition: A Time of Thieves Series.” Washington Post 26 
February 1995. ' '
^^ de Maillard, Jean. Un monde sans ldi. Paris: Stock, 1998, page 69.
^^Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: '-les Mafias”.” . Paris: Ministères des Affaires 
Etrangères, 1998.
*^^ Blanc, Helene. Le Dossier noir des Mafias Russes. Paris: Balsac-Le Griot, 1998, page 73.
^^Serio, Joseph. “Organised Crime in the Soviet Union and Beyond.” Low Intensitv Conflict and Law 
Enforcement 1.2 (1992). and Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1997.
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Businesses are the primary targets of the Russian activities as they are forced to 
pay vast sums of protection money, sometimes to several different families at once." The 
average protection rate is 20% of the businesses overall income." Failure to pay usually 
results in immediate use of escalating violence, most often ending with murder. Russian 
law enforcement officers file up to 700 extortion charges, and 15 kidnapping situations 
(chiefly aimed at businessmen and their families) each month." In 1994, a record high 
of 170 of businessmen were assassinated." Foreign businesses are easy targets for the 
Mafiya because they are generally not under the protection of any crime group, are 
perceived to be rich and hence able to pay exorbitant protection money. In addition 
foreign businessman are usually ill informed of the Russian crime situation, have little 
knowledge about how to manage protection demands, and don’t know whom to turn to 
for help. For this reason many national governments (including the United States) have 
issued strongly worded advisories to businesses seeking to establish themselves in Russia.
The estimated Mafia turnover dramatically illustrates the growth in importance it 
has experienced since the collapse of the Soviet Union:
Annual Mafia Turnover:"
1989 less than 1 billion Rubbles
1991 130 billion Rubbles
1996 70 trillion Rubbles”
By 1991, the Russian Mafia managed a 130 billion rubble turnover, a sum 
equivalent to the size of the national deficit. Interior Minister Alexander Gurov glumly 
predicted that in the next few years,, the annual turnover would reach 200 billion roubles, 
which would equate to controlling 30-40% of the GNP. It appears from the latest 
available statistics that Gurov’s estimates were dramatically underestimated as 1996 
figures on the annual mafia turnover reached 70 trillion roubles. The criminal world has 
gained control of as many as: 35,000 economic entities (including 400 banks), 47 
exchanges, and 15,000 business and insurance agencies." An estimated 60-80% of 
Russian banks have fallen under the control of the Russian Maflya."/**^
^®However, there does not appear to be any real universal consensus on the definition o f the Russian 
crime structure: one Russian official stated, there does not seem to be a head or a tail.
^ F^or a more extensive discussion of the threat posed by OC to foreign businessmen refer to: Serio, 
Joseph. "Threats to Foreign Business Community in Moscow.” Transnational Organised Crime .Special 
Issue Summer 1996 (1996).
‘^ Y.ewis, Flora. “Long-Armed Russian Mafias Should be Manacled Now.” International Herald Tribune 
13 October 1994..
■^^Wireservice. “Russian: Internal Affairs.” BBC Summarv 4 September 1996.
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The activity that concerns the international community most is the possibility of.
theft and trafficking in nuclear weapons, or components. There is great controversy about
. . si/sithe reality and extent of the threat posed by the theft and sale by Russian organised crime  ^
of nuclear weapons and weapons grade nuclear material.” For the moment it appears that 
the theft of nuclear material from very poorly guarded nuclear facilities has been limited, 
confined to a few amateur smugglers, and has not yet become an activity of choice of 
organised crime and “poses no strategic danger”.” The potential for involvement in this 
activity should not however be totally eliminated as nuclear trafficking could generate 
immense profits.
A further issue of concern pertaining to the Russian Mafiya is the possibility that 
former KGB and police agents may have defected into the Mafia. Because of their 
important contacts and extensive knowledge of criminal and government networks, these 
former agents can potentially be very dangerous.”
"^ S^terling, Claire. Crime Without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion o f Organised Crime and the Pax 
Mafiosa. London: Little, Brown & Company, 1994, page 117.
^Blanc, Helene. L Dossier noir des Mafias Russes. Paris: Balsac-Le Griot, 1998, page 11.
^Wireservice. “Russian: Internal Affairs.” BBC Summarv 4 September 1996.
' ‘^ de Maillard, Jean. Un monde sans loi. Paris; Stock, 1998, page 72 and Direction des Affaires 
Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. “Conference des 
Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias"/’ . Paris: Ministères des Affaires Etrangères, 1998.
De Borchgrave, Arnaud: Russian Organised Crime, CSIS Panel Report 1997.
^No author cited. “Russian Mafia Infiltrates Britain.” Sunday Times 3 September ,1995.
^^andelman, Stephen. “The Russian Mafiya.” Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994).
^^lanc, Helene. L Dossier noir des Mafias Russes. Paris: Balsac-Le Griot, 1998, page 78.
^^Blanc, Helene. L Dossier noir des Mafias Russes. Paris: Balsac-Le Griot, 1998, page 82.
^Wccording to the Albanian minister of interior significant theft/pillaging has taken place in their 
military depots. The following is a list of weapons that have “disappeared”: 2 million light weapons, 3.5 
million hand grenades, 1 million mines, 840,000 mortars, 1.5 billion bullets (all calibers) 3,600 metric 
tons of TNT as well as an unspecified number of canons, rocket launchers, surface to air missiles.
Source: Raufer, Xavier. Dictionnaire technique et critique des nouvelles menaces. Ed Minos. Paris: 
PUF, 1998, page 37.
^ F^or more details, refer to: Center for Strategic and International Studies, ed. The Nuclear Black 
Market. Washington D.C.: CSIS Task Force, 1996.
^^Lee, Rensselaer. “Recent trends in nuclear smuggling.” Transnational Organised Crime .Special Issue 
Summer (1996).
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Internationally the Russian Mafiya is present in Europe (Belgium, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Spain), the United States, Canada and 
the Middle East, particularly in Israel In France, the Russian Mafiya is primarily 
concentrated in two regions, the Paris-Ile de France area, and the Riviera. Smaller 
Mafiya presence has been sporadically detected in Brittany where real-estate ventures 
have been traced back to it. Both in Paris and on the Riviera coast the Russians are 
predominantly present in the trafficking of prostitutes and more generally the sex trade. 
Whereas up mitil the early 1990’s the prostitution network in Nice and Cannes were run 
by and supplied either indigenous French women or alternatively by West African girls, 
since then a prostitution war has opposed these « traditional » prostitutes to the Eastern 
European and Russian prostitutes trafficked into France by the Mafiya. The Russian 
controlled girls are young, sometimes far younger that the minimum legal age of 18, 
beautiful and cheap. To ensure a maximum number of clients “prices” are cut 
significantly below “market value”, and elementary hygiene and health concerns (like 
safe sex) are ignored. As many as 70% of the non-voluntary prostitutes in France are 
thought to be controlled by the Russian criminal networks.^^ The jet-set type life 
complete with yachts, casinos and luxurious hotels appears to also line Russian criminal 
bosses to the Riviera to spend and invest their profits.
^^Colombani, Jean-Michel. “Commissaire SDAC.” Nanterres. France. Ed. Police Judiciaire. OC and 
the Police Judiciaire, 1997. Farah, Douglas. “FBI Chief: Russian Mafias Pose Growing Threat to US.” 
Washington Post 2 October 1997. Farah, Douglas. “Russian Mob, Drug Cartels Joining Force.” 
Washington Post 29 September 1997.
55 bis . ( j  g Department o f State 2002 Trafficking in Persons Report.
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3. Japanese: Yakuza
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Commonly called Yakuza, the real name for the Japanese criminal organisation 
is in fact Boryokudan: Yakuza actually refers to the members of the Boryokudan. The 
etymology of the term Yakuza originates from a card game called Hanafuda. The losing 
hand in this game is the Ya: 8, Ku: 9 and Sa: 3. The Yakuzas, or losing hand (8-9-3), was 
the word that was appropriated by the losers or outlaws of society.”
Yakuzas came into existence in the 17* century when samurai soldiers, 
demobilised after the civil war, met and created rituals, codes and a language (dialect). By 
the beginning of 20* century the Yakuzas had evolved from roving armed bandits that 
terrorised travellers to a truly organised professional criminal operation. They 
progressively began to infiltrate and take over unions and syndicates, corrupt law 
enforcement and buy up key politicians. The Yakuzas were particularly linked with the 
ultra nationalist factions of the 1920’s and 1930’s. The strength of the Yakuzas drastically
^^Interestingly, although the Yakuzas are predominantly ethnic Japanese, they also welcome Koreans 
into their ranks. Source: Crump, Thomas. The Death of an Emperor: Japan at the Crossroads. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991, page 49.
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increased during the US occupation of Japan, Just as with the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the 
US seeking allies against the growing communist influence, enlisted the aid of the 
Yakuzas. They became increasingly involved in politics, and following a “communist 
take-over scare”, the two main Japanese political parties (one backed by the US, and the 
other supported by the Yakuzas), united to form the Liberal-Democratic Party. The 
Liberal-Democrats acted as a shield against communism, but also tended to protect 
organised crime families and the interests that hid behind them, in essence 
institutionalising the Yakuza within Japanese political society. In fact, today of the 820 
political parties registered as extreme, or far right, 350 are directly under Yakuza control."
Since the 1960*s Yakuza membership has been steadily on the decline with a 50% 
drop between 1960-1992.
Despite this apparent decline in numbers, the Yakuza has remained more virulent then 
ever, primarily because it has managed to infiltrate the economic, real estate and banking 
sector, and hence has made the overall Japanese economy vulnerable.^
During the post World War II era, the “Y Era”, the Yakuzas profited vastly from 
the black market trade, and as the economy of Japan began to improve and prosper, so to 
did Yakuzas activities, and began to include gambling, drugs and prostitution. By the 
1990's the Yakuzas had well penetrated the economic sphere and detained control of more
than 26,000 legal business, were present on the Tokyo stock market, held shares in many 
real-estate companies, and were heavily involved in art dealing.
In 1991, following a severe government crackdown, the Yakuza decided to 
regroup into two main strategic axis: the Western axis, dominated by the Yamaguchi- 
Gumi and the Aisu Kotetou Kai families, and the Eastern access and Tokyo, composed 
of the Sumyoshi Kai, Inagawakai and Kyokuto Kai families.
The relationship between Yakuza members and the rest of the populations is very 
compartmentalised, regarded as “us”: the Yakuza, and “them”, the outside civilian world: 
the KatagL Yakuza rules require that the Katagi (civilian population) remain at all costs 
outside of Yakuza activity, and in fact murdering or even harming a Katagi is not 
permitted.
For additional details see: Kaplan, David, and Alec Dubro. Yakuzas. New York: Macmillan, 1986. 
^^No author cited. “Shadow run: Yakuza.” http://vavo.cc.monash.edu.au.
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The structure of the Yakuzas is not dissimilar to that of the Sicilian Mafia. It is 
highly hierarchical, demands absolute loyalty and obedience, is governed by the law of 
omerta, and recognises the position of authority of the Godfather. The Yakuzas have 
extensive rituals and initiation ceremonies. The physical manifestation of belonging to 
the Yakuzas used to be partial amputation of the little finger, and extensive tattooing, but 
this habit is less prevalent today.
The relationship between members of the Yakuza mirrors the relationship in a 
traditional between a father and a son. A confirmed member of the Yakuza can recruit 
new members and becomes their father. If in turn one of his children recruits one or 
several children, then he becomes big father to his child’s children (grandchildren), and 
his child become “small father”."
The overall annud revenue of the Yakuza is estimated to total $10 billion USD, 
80% of which is acquired through illegal activities, and 20% through legal activities. Theft 
and robbery are considered beneath the Yakuza, instead intimidation and bribery are . 
commonly practised. Gambling, racketeering and drug trafficking comprise the bulk of 
Yakuza illegal activities, with the amphetamine trade reaching more than 1/3 of all 
activities.
The Yakuza control a great deal of the Japanese economy, either by directly 
buying or investing in companies and industries, or by extorting or blackmailing company 
CEO, which allows them to indirectly control their decision making process: “ Japan and 
its economy have a crime problem”." Japanese financial experts, as well as financial 
police, now believe that the economic difficulties that have recently plagued the Japanese 
economy can be attributed in part to Yakuza involvement, and has been labelled by some 
as the “ Yakuza Recession”. Japanese crime experts believe that 40% of the banking 
industry’s bad loans, roughly equivalent to $235 billion USD, are tied to organised crime."
Whereas Japanese companies tend to avoid direct confrontation with the Yakuza, 
and generally choose to meet their demands in order to maintain peaceful operatioiis, 
foreign companies who are generally less complacent, and unwillingly to pay the 
protection or extortion fees may clash violently with the Yakuza. Morgan Stanley, an
^^Amaoua, Frederique. “Japon: mafia et finance font bon menage.”.Liberation 5 July 1997.
‘'“’Clark, Gregory. “Japan and its economy have crime problem.” International Herald Tribune 8 October 
1997, Saito, Hitoshi. “Des entreprises gangrenees par le racket et la corruption.” Courrier International 
20 November 1997. Jurgenson, Caroline. “L'Economie Japonaise gangrenee par la pegre.” Le Figaro 12 
November 1997.
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American firm that investigates the nature and stability of foreign portfolios for US clients 
estimates that out of the 49 Japanese companies they investigated for clients, at least 40% 
had direct ties with organised crime." According to one Japanese newspaper survey (Asatu 
Shimbun) nearly 70% of the top 45 Japanese companies received racketeering demands 
from the Yakuza.®^ *^*
Internationally the Yakusa are present mainly in Asia (Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan), the Pacific Islands (Philippines), Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States. In France the Yakusa presence is quite limited, primarily focused in Paris. The 
Yakuza activities in France are mainly based on financial investments and real-estate 
ventures, and to a lesser degree loan sharking and trafficking amongst the Japanese 
immigrant community in Paris.
‘^ ^Kaplan, David. “Yakuza Inc." U.S. News & World Report 13 April 1998.
‘^ ^Kaplan, David. "Yakuza Inc.” U.S. News & World Report 13 April 1998.
‘^ ^Bremner, Brian, and Thorton Emily. “Blackmail.” Business Week 21 July 1997.
'^Kaplan, David. “Yakuza Inc.” U.S. News & World Report 13 April 1998. 
‘^ ^Sommier, Isabelle. Les Mafias. Paris: Montchrestien, 1998, page 105.
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4. Chinese: Triads
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HOMME
Triads, means “society of sky and earth”(Tiandihui), or “society of the three 
unions”(Sanhehui), man is the link between the sky and the earth.*^
Triads are secret societies formed in the 17 century (1644) by pro-Ming patriotic 
Chinese Buddhist monks to combat the oppressive and highly corrupted Ch’ing dynasty. 
They eventually assisted in the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty and set-up the Republic 
(1911), governed by one of their members, Sun Ya Tson/^ Originally the Triads were 
more mutual aid societies, but started to evolve as criminal organisations by 1912. The 
legitimisation and subsequent institutionalisation of the Triads began under the Japanese- 
rule. The Triads worked, or were used by the Japanese occupier during World War II to 
gather intelligence and information on enemies and in exchange for their services their 
criminal records were destroyed.® By 1949, the Chinese Triads had fully developed into 
professional criminal organisations, but wishing to escape the Communist rule, exiled 
themselves to Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Today the triads have settled outside of mainland China,'’*’ especially in Hong 
Kong. There are six major criminal triad groups, ranging in size from 5,000 members to 
60,000 members and totally about 125,000 members:^®
• New Virtue Peace/ Sun Yee On: 50,000
# 14K/Sap Sse Wui: 20,000
# Bamboo United/ Chu Liun Pang: 20,000.
• United Group / Luen Ying Shen: 5,000
• Four Seas/ Si Hai Pang: 5,000
• Grand Circle/ Tai Huen Tsai: 5,000
• Harmony /Federation Wo: 20,000
Man is the third pillar in the triangle earth and sky. He is the link between the two. Faligot,Roger: La 
Mafia Chinoise en Europe, Calmann-Levy (2001) page 23.
*^ C^hin, Ko-Lin. “Triad Societies In Hong Kong.” Transnational Organised Crime .Spring (1995), page 
47.
For additional details see also: Posner, Gerald. Warlords of Crime: Chinese Secret Societies, the 
New Mafia. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988, and Posner, Gerald. Triads. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Although most have headquarters in Hong Kong the families comes from different geographic areas. 
Province of Fujian & Jiangxi /  Province of Guangdong & Guangxi / Province of Yunnan & Sichuan / 
Province of Henan & Hebie /  Province of Shejiang & Jiangsy.
Faligot, Roger: La Mafia Chinoise en Europe, Calmann-Levy 2001 page 345.
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Although their structures vary from family to family, they are engaged in many 
similar activities. The structure of the Chinese triads is pyramidal, rigid and highly 
organised. Each level is given a name, but also a symbolic number that identifies its rank 
within the hierarchy. Each triad is composed of a powerful leader, the dragonhead, 
shouldered by a second in command Fu chan shu, and six “lieutenants” each responsible 
for a specific task. Under this “command” structure are all the confirmed members of the 
triad, and finally the aspiring novices waiting to be confirmed, blue lanterns.
Triad structure'^
Members
Blue Lanterns 
Novices
Dragon Head 
Shan Chu 
489
Fun Shan Chu 
438
Red Stick 
Discipline Officer 
Hung Kwan 
426
Superior Officer
438
Director of Operations 
Sin Fung 
438
Straw sandals 
Liaison Officer 
Cho Hai 
432
Master of the Incense
(Responsable for initiation & rituals)
Heung Chu
White Paper Fan 
Advisor 
Pak Tse Sin 
415
The primary activity of the Chinese triads is drug trafficking, amounting to $200 billion 
USD (specifically heroin and speed): the Triads have produced and marketed the China 
White, 99% pure heroin. The Triads are also involved in weapons trade, Chinese
^^ Le Corre, Philippe. “La toute puissance des Triades.” Le Point 21 December 1996 and Observatoire 
Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 98
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immigrant trafficking, with more than 100,000 illegal immigrants smuggled into the US 
in 10 years and credit card fraud as well as counterfeits products and documents.” 
Internationally the Triads are operating in Europe (France, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Germany, The Netherlands, Great Britain), North America, the Middle-East (especially 
Saudi Arabia), South America (Paraguay) and across Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Japan) 
as well as Australia and the Philippines. Below is a map of triad presence in Europe in 
2000.^^
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As is the case for the Japanese Yakusa, the Chinese Triads are present solely 
amongst the iminigrant community and barely impacts the French non-Chinese 
population. Geographically concentrated in the greater Paris region, within France the 
main activity for the Triads is migrant trafficking, game rooms, loan sharking, drugs 
trafficking and to a lesser degree prostitution trade. Again the target population, with 
the exception of the drug trade, is the resident Chinese population.
^^Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Désarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” Paris: Ministères des Affaires Etrangères, 
1998, page 18.
Faligot, Roger: La mafia chinoise en Europe. Paris: Clamann-Levv 2001
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In addition to the main global organized crime groups, namely the Italian crime 
groups, Russian, Japanese and Chinese criminal networks, there also exists other 
criminal groups such as the South American drug cartels, Nigerian and Turkish crime 
groups. These groups are generally considered to have less sophisticated structures 
(mainly horizontal) and have single activities like drug trafficking. Although their 
activities have impacts on societies abroad (like the impact of drug trade on all Western 
societies) their structures are not adapted to penetrate and permeate state-structures like 
those of the Italian Mafia or the Yakusas. Because looking at each of theSe smaller 
crime families would take a specific analysis, and certainly because it would detract for 
the primary focus of the Mafia research, they will not be discussed in detail and only 
mentioned in passing when they cooperate, compete or contrast with the Cosa Nostra.
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Please refer to the following sources for additional information on the South 
American drug cartels, Nigerian crime groups and Turkish criminal gangs.
^Clutterbuck, Richard. Drugs. Crime and Corruption. London; Macmillan, 1995,
^^ In addition to their drug trade, these cartels were able to provide the CIA with paramilitary militia to 
combat the political leftist force in South and Central America,
the mid-19801s however, the United States under the Reagan administration launched and 
aggressive “war on drugs”. Faced with the threat of extradition towards the US, and very harsh 
sentences, cornered drug lords often turned themselves into the local authorities in exchange for non­
extradition and lighter almost symbolic sentences.
^^Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 
page 13.
% ali cartels leaders include: Orejuela, and Santacrus. Medellin leaders include: Ochoa, Gacha and 
Escobar.
^^Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 93.
*®Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” . Paris: Ministères des Affaires 
Etrangères, 1998, page 14.
^^The Cartels offered to reimburse a significant share of the external debt in exchange for immunity. In 
addition, current President Ernesto Samper is suspected of having received substantial contributions 
directly from the Cali cartel for his 1994 electoral campaign.
“ Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996.
“  Refer to appendix of this chapter for an example of a drug route.
^Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 84.
“ Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” . Paris: Ministères des Affaires 
Etrangères, 1998, page 16.
“ The measurement is in metric tons.
*^Ebbe, Obi N.:”Slicing Nigeria’s National Cake”
“ Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” , Paris: Ministères des Affaires 
Etrangères, 1998.
“ Dupuis, Marie Christine, and Gilles Leclair. Stupéfiants, prix, profits: l'economie politique du marche 
des stupéfiants industriels. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 120.
^Gordon, Marcy. “US Officiais Announce Break-up of Nigerian drug Ring.” Associated Press 11 
October 1996.
"Anonymous. “Nigerian Drugs: Intertial Trade.” The Economist 26 August, 1995.
" u s  Congressman Jim Leach, chairman of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee 
warned Iowa of these Nigerian frauds. Apparently the same fraud was detected in at least 16 other 
countries.
'^Fope, iNicoie, "La multiplication des scandales politico-mafieux menace le premier ministre turc." Le 
Monde 12 November 1999. Pope, Nicole. “Ses liens avec la mafia contraignent le premier ministre turc 
a la demission.” Le Monde 27 Novembef 1998.
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"  There are about ten big families the most im o^ant of which are Ayanoglou /  Baybasin /  Cakili / 
Heybetli /  Karaduman /Ulucan. Marion, William: Lettre de ITHESI numéro 15 (9.96)
"Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 
page 44.
"de Vericourt, Guilemette. Les Mafias. Toulouse: Editions Milan, 1998, page 16.
"van Dyune, Petrus. “Organised Crime Markets in a Turbulent Europe.” European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research 1-3.
"Vemet, Daniel. “Les reseaux albanais de Vheroine, pa propagande de Belgrade contre UCK et la 
realite.” Le Monde 5 April 1999.
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Global Organised Crime Families Across the World
Group Country City/Region Number of 
Families/Clans
Number of 
Members
Cosa Nostra Italy Sicily 120-130 40-50,000
‘Ndrangheta Italy Calabria 150 5,500
Camorra Italy Naples 111 6,700-7,200
Sacra Corona U. Italy Appulia 32-51 2,500
La Cosa Nostra United States scattered 20-25 20,000-40,000
Mafiya Russia across FSU 5,000 3,000,000
Triads China Hong Kong 50 50,000
Sun Yee On China Guandong ? 45,000-60,000
14K China South 30 24,000-30,000
Federation Wo China Hong Kong 10 29,000-42,000
Bamboo United Taiwan 13 20,000
Four Seas Taiwan ? 5,000
Wen Kung Lok China Hong Kong 5,000
Federation Tu China Hong Kong 3,000
Grand Circle China 5,000
Yakuza Japan 3,155 87,000
Yamaguchi Gumi Japan Kobe 750 23,000
Inagawa Kai Japan Tokyo 313 6,700
Sumiyoshi Kai Japan Tokyo 177 7,000
Toa Yuai Jigyo 
Kum
Japan n/a 6 800
Cali + Medellin 
Cartel
Colombia dispersed 2,500 25,000
Mafiya Turkey Istanbul 10 n/a
Nigerian Nigeria Lagos /  Kaduna n/a n/a
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I l l  Spheres of Interest
By outlining and defining the spheres of interest of the GOC families it quickly 
becomes evident just how important the scope of the threat is, as well as the large variety 
of activities they are involved in. By highlighting the breadth of activities it also 
highlights the subsequent need for action to limit and combat it. This acts as a type of 
exhibition of the situation, demonstrates the interests, and techniques of OC and proves 
the problematic is not limited to a few choice areas, but rather that OC tries to always 
further develop and diversify its activities.
International organised crime is interested in conducting any activity that 
generates a healthy profit: aside for a few exceptions, GOC has no real "scruples" about 
the nature of the activity.”’ As in any business, they take calculated risks, make an 
informed, rational choice as to their activities of predilection based on two factors: risk 
and potential profit:™
Risk
Potential profits
If a sector of activity is high in risk and low in profit, then it is generally 
considered unsound, and in the reverse if the risk is low and the yield high, then it makes 
for a sound investment of resources, time and manpower. Because legislation changes and 
tighten and market demands fluctuate, the activities that GOC engages in also tend to 
change^". Because GOC is a dynamic organisation, they are able to adapt quickly to the 
changing business, consumer and legislative environment.
The main sectors of activity, classified by overall gross profit for organised crime 
families are: drug trafficking and money laundering. They are also implicated in 
secondaiy areas like arms and weapons trafficking, nuclear proliferation, women, children 
and body parts trafficking, racketeering, extortion, etc... According to Xavier Raufer of 
the Institut de Criminologie, organised crime, reflecting the profits/risks equation, is 
slowly turning away from drug trafficking and focusing on lesser high-risk activities that 
are equally as profitable like subsidy fraud.
"Only a few organisations have constraints on certain activities: Cosa Nostra members are forbidden 
form promoting pornography pr prostitution, and Yakuza members may not steal.
“^ Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée Internationale. 
Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 7.
This was the case for the Cosa Nostra in Italy. As the state began to crack down on drug trafficking, 
they switched to other less “risky” activities like money-laundering, 81
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The estimated total sum of organised crime activities around the world is thought 
to reach between $1,000-1,500 billion USD annually, roughly divided as 1/3 drug 
trafficking, and 2/3 various other activities. The following table is a partial breakdown 
of major criminal activities but does not include several important activities like the 
pornography trade, extortion, theft, illegal gambling and organ trafficking. Money 
laundering is not include^n the table because it concerns the recycling of criminal 
proceeds that have already been calculated as a criminal activity.
Breakdown of maior world criminal activities
Drug trafficking: $400
Human trafficking™ $ 84
Animal trafficking $ 100
Computer Pirating $ 100 +
Medicine Counterfeits $ 80
Commercial Counterfeit/Fraud $ 150-470
EU subsidy fraud™ $ 53-80
Total $ +/-100 billion USD
1. Drug trafficking^ ''^
The drug trafficking trade represents $400-500 billion US dollars a year and is 
estimated to yield $250 billion US dollars in gross profit alone. This huge profit margin 
(50%) is partly due to the fact that as an illicit activity it is obviously not subject to tax or 
duties.™ When calculated, it averages out to $100 per year per person in the world.'"^ 
Raymond Kendall, Secretary General of Interpol stated that of the 250,000 major 
criminals listed and actively pursued by Interpol, 200,000 of them (equivalent 80%) are
^"de Maillard, Jean. Un monde sans loi. Paris: Stock, 1998.
“^ Human trafficking presumably includes: immigrant trafficking, prostitution and slave labor rings, child 
and infant trafficking.
^"Ruimschotel, Dick. “Ambiguities between criminal policy and scientific research: the case of fraud 
against the EC budget.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 1-3. Knudsen, Per Brix, 
andUCLAF. Fraud against the EC budget. Edinburgh, 1997. David Hume Institute. Fraud on the 
European Budget. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996.
“^ The drug production statistics for cocaine, heroin and cannabis, unless otherwise cited come from: 
Dupuis, Marie Christine, and Gilles Leclair. Stupéfiants, prix, profits: l'economie politique du marche 
des stupéfiants industriels. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1996, and Observatoire Géopolitique des 
Drogues. Géopolitique des Drogues. Paris: La Découverte, 1997.
“^ Jaraieson, Alison. Terrorism and drug Trafficking in the 1990's. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, page 
23.
®^^ The typical addict spends between $15,000- $20,000 a year to feed his habit.
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tied, in one way or another to drug trafficking.™
Large-scale drug trafficking primarily revolves around four major drug categories: 
cocaine, heroin/opium derivatives, cannabis derivatives and synthetic drugs. There are 
three primary production centre for drugs: the Golden Triangle (Myanmar/Burma, 
Thailand, Laos and China), the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran), and 
South-Central America (Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru). Heroin production is limited 
to South West Asia, the Middle-East and South East Asia. The principal coca-leaf 
production sites are in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.™ According to the United Nations, 
drug trafficking accounts for 8% of the world trade, and between 3.3 - 4.1% of the world 
population is a consumer of drugs (roughly 218 million people)."® Drug trafficking in 
Europe and the United States generates $122 billion USD annually (61% hashish, 29% 
cocaine, 10% heroin)."^
No single criminal organisation has a complete monopoly or control over the 
entire drug trafficking trade, rather certain groups have a preferred drug trade (i.e. either 
cocaine or heroin), or specialise in a specific regional distribution network. Drug 
trafficking is a highly profitable activity which can yield as much as 75% net profits to the 
cartels drug-lords and for some drugs has a very low interception rate only 15% for 
heroine which makes it a high yield low risk."^ Organised crime plays a vital link in the 
“global commodity chain”, linking the producers of drug crops to the consumer market 
that is often thousands of miles away. Because the cultivation sites are generally quite 
remote and secretive, there needs to be a highly organised structure that controls the 
transfer and transportation of the drug to the consumer and manages the distribution chain. 
Organised crime structures and cartels are the “service” providers that guarantee this 
cmcial link.'"
“^ Raufer, Xavier, “a Global Perspective.” Securitv (1996), page 7.
■^“ Jamieson, Alison. Terrorism and drug Trafficking in the 1990's. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, page 
70.
141.2 million consumer of cannabis, 55.7 consumer of chemical/synthetic drugs, 13.3 million 
consumers of opium derivatives, 8 million consumer of cocaine. Source: de Maillard, Jean. Un monde 
sans loi. Paris: Stock, 1998.
"^Kopp, Pierre. Economie de la drogue. Paris: La Découverte, 1997, page 49.
^"parrel, Graham. “The Global Rate of Interception of Illicit Opiates and Cocaine, 1980-1994.” 
Transnational Organised Crime (1995), page 134.
"^Williams, Phil. “Transnational Criminal Organisations: Strategic Alliances.” Order and Disorder after 
the Cold War. Ed. Brad Roberts. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996, page 238.
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The drug industry employs five categories of workers, peasant-farmers, 
transformers, transporters, whole sellers, and finally drug pushers. To these broad 
categories must also be added more specialised employees like accountants, scientists, as 
well as all the corrupted state/government officials that are on the payroll of a cartel or 
crime group. Once the drugs have penetrated the consumer country, the organisational 
structure for distribution involves at least three levels: the whole seller that sells in bulk, 
generally by the kilo, the resale distributor that sells by the ounce, and finally the pusher 
who sells by the gram.'" The average distribution network, within the consumer country, 
typically involves 39 drag traffickers for 62 hard core regular users and as many as 150- 
300 recreational, occasional users.'" The top two drug traffickers at the first tier of the 
distribution operation can supply several different networks at once.
a. Cocaine
Cocaine, the drug derived from the coca leaf, is produced using a three step 
process transformation process. The total potential world production of cocaine is 
estimated to range between 955-1,170 tons:"®
The drug industry in Bolivia is a major “employer”, each cocaine production network 
employs and average of 117,000 people, 68% of which are coca farmers.
The total coca leaf production in South/Centi*al America in 1995 was 319,400 tons, with 
Peru producing nearly 57.4% of the total production, followed by Bolivia 26.6%, and 
Colombia 12.7%. After transformation Peru produces 667 tons of cocaine, still followed 
by Bolivia 335 tons, and Colombia 60.
^"Brochu, Serge. Drogue et Criminalité: une relation complexe. Montreal: Presses Universitaires de 
Montreal, 1995, page 222.
^"Whole seller (large scale): 7 /  Distributors: 7 /  Dealers : 25 /  Users: 62 regular - 150-300 recreational. 
Source: Labrousse, Alain, and Alain Wallon, La Planete des Drogues: Organisations Criminelles, 
guerres et blanchiement. Paris: Seuil, 1993. Page 27.
“^ The transformation coefficient ranges between 1:330 in Bolivia to 1:500 in Colombia. Source: Morel 
and Dupuis use US Department of State’s International Narcotics control Strategic Report statistics. 
Morel, Bernard, and Frederic Rychen. Le Marche des Drogues. Paris: Editions de TAube, 1997, page 
32.
^^ F^or coca leaves with a high alkaloid content 1 ton o f leaves = 10 kg of paste.
“^ Dupuis, Marie Christine, and Gilles Leclair. Stupéfiants, prix, profits: l'economie politique du 
marche des stupéfiants industriels. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 47.
Cocaine industry in Bolivia
150 leaders of the organisation ( see next page) 84
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b. Heroin:"'
Heroin, an opium derivative, and the most expensive drug on the market is 
produced primarily in the Golden Triangle (64.3%), Golden Crescent (30.6%), and more 
recently South America (6.3%). Burma is the top heroin producing country (2,340 tons) 
followed by Afghanistan (1,250 tons). In addition to the list of “traditional” producing 
nations, must also be added Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ousbeskhistan, Ukraine and Iran. 
Heroin transformation requires sixteen separate cycles."' The potential value of total 
possible heroin production:
$962 billion USD.'*'
c. Cannabis and synthetic drugs
Cannabis the third “natural” drug crop, is the drug most widely cultivated 
across the world, estimated to be grown in 120 countries. It exists primarily in two forms 
marijuana and hashish/kif . The consumer market for cannabis products are Europe 
(19%), United States (80%) and rest of world (1%)."^ The largest marijuana producer is 
Mexico (60%) followed by Colombia (11%). The largest hashish producers are Lebanon 
(48%), and Afghanistan (26.5), Pakistan (17.6) and Morocco (7.5%).
The world cannabis trade is estimated to reach $7.52 billion USD a year with as 
much as $1.56 million USD of profit per ton: the further the cannabis is exported and the 
more its cost is elevated. The “Dutch cannabis connection” demonstrates an increase in 
price from $4,800 USD per ton near the production cite to $3 million USD when exported 
to Great Britain or Scandinavia."®
850 professional, salaried employees to supervise the overall cocaine production
5.000 . chemists
25.000 pisacocas (peasants who mash up coca leaves to make paste)
6.000 coca leaf negotiators
80.000 cocaleros (coca farmers)
117.000 people total
^^^Cocaine production tonnage calculated as an average of high and low estimates.
^^^Morel, Bernard, and Frederic Rychen. Le Marche des Drogues. Paris: Editions de l’Aube, 1997.
^^ F^or a detailed analysis of trafficking in the Golden Triangle and South East Asia, refer to : Ancel, 
Herve, and Xavier Raufer. Trafics et crimes en Asie du Sud-est: le Triangle dPr. Paris: PUF, 1998.
^^ 5^0,(KX) flowers = 10 kg opium ($1,000- $1,500 USD)= 1 kg heroin= street value of $200,000 -
260.000 USD
^^^Dupuis, Marie Christine, and Gilles Leclair. Stupéfiants, prix, profits: Peconomie politique du 
marchedes stupéfiants industriels. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1996 and Morel, Bernard, and 
Frederic Rychen. Le Marche des Drogues. Paris: Editions de l’Aube, 1997.
^^^Morel, Bernard, and Frederic Rychen. Le Marche des Drogues. Paris: Editions de l ’Aube, 1997.
^^ ‘^ Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 212.
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Synthetic drugs
There are four broad categories of synthetic drugs: designer drugs, opiate derivatives 
(methadone), amphetamines (Speed), hallucinogens (LSD).
The manufacturing of synthetic drugs by specialised chemists has proven to be a 
very profitable industry. According to Robert Sager of the US Drug Enforcement Agency, 
with an investment of $150 USD and four days of work, a chemist can produce 500 grams 
of synthetic heroin (3-methyl fentanyl). This is equivalent to 50 million doses, and a 
theoretical profit margin of $500 million USD."'
The Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, published a recent survey revealing 
the major production cites of synthetic drugs. The three main production cites for LSD 
are the United States (West Coast), the Netherlands and Great Britain. Ecstasy is 
manufactured in Canada, the United States (Great Lakes Region), and Europe (UK, 
France, Netherlands & Eastern Europe). Synthetic Opiates and PCP are only produced in 
the US, while amphetamines were manufactured in the US, Canada and Mexico, Nigeria, 
India and South East Asia, as well as Europe and former Soviet Union. Methaqualone 
derivatives were produced in South Africa, India, The Philippines, and Western Europe. 
Synthetic drugs are most often manufactured from products readily available on the 
pharmaceutical market, and are generally produced in the consumer country, and rarely 
imported for consumption."®
Most of the information available about synthetic drugs are estimations and vague 
approximations, because in reality very little is known about the industry: “their modes 
of manufacturing and distribution circuits are totally obscure”."'
Dmg trafficking trade routes vary according to the production zone, and consumer 
nation, but remain as diverse and imaginative as the traffickers allow. They are however
a “few”classic trade routes like the Balkan trade route."” The drug interception rates in 
France are broken down in the following manner: Road (80%), Plane (10.5%) and Train 
(9.5 %)."'
'^^^Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUP, 1996, page 197.
^^*Brochu, Serge. Drogue et Criminalité: une relation complexe. Montreal: Presses Universitaires de 
Montreal, 1995.
^^ d^e Maillard, Jean. Un monde sans loi. Paris: Stock, 1998, page 44.
^^ ^Refer to section this chapter on Turkish criminal groups.
"^ ^^ Dupuis, Marie Christine, and Gilles Leclair. Stupéfiants, prix, profits: Teconomie politique du 
marche des stupéfiants industriels. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 132.
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Operation Margarita (1994) demonstrated the resources and logistical possibilities 
that drug traffickers will resort to, in order to try and guarantee safe arrival of their product 
into the consumer nation. Operation Margarita tracked the drugs from Colombia to 
France followed the laundered money to the United States, and counted six separate 
operational phases. The cocaine was exported out Colombia to Mexico via sailboats that 
were loaded and unloaded at sea. Small planes then earned the drugs from Mexico to the 
Antilles, dropping their cargo at sea. Small boats recuperated it and load it on to larger 
cargo ships. These ships crossed the Atlantic and unloaded the cocaine via small boats 
onto isolated beaches in France and Spain. The drugs are sold in Europe, the hard 
currency laundered in Bureau de Change in Marseilles, that transferred the converted cash 
to banks in Paris. The Parisian banks then transferred the money into the United States.
With the net profit of drug sales and trafficking is estimated to reach 75%, it is not 
surprising that GOC and cartels continue to focus on this activity, especially since the raw 
material cost is negligible (evaluated at 0.2%)."'
Drag trafficking revolutionised the traditional organised crime structure, and 
forced GOC families to modernise and to internationalise. Before entering the drug trade, 
most organised crime families were primarily acting within national boundaries, but with 
drag trafficking their horizons expanded internationally. In addition, drag trafficking 
because it generated such significant profits, reinvigorated many crime groups like the 
Sicilian Cosa Nostra and propelled them into a new era. Foimer liaison magistrate to 
Rome, Michel Debacq, echoed the importance of the drug trade to the modification of 
traditional organised crime: “The exponential development of drag trafficking has 
profoundly modified the habits of organised crime, and imposed alliances”."'
The money generates from the drug trade, upwards of $500 billion USD annually 
and its profits nearing half that amount are un-exploitable, unusable if they cannot be 
inserted, by one method or another, into the legitimate financial circuits. In order to do 
so narco-traffickers were obliged to devise systems through which to camouflage the 
illegal origin of their money and converts it into seemingly legitimate currency: the money 
laundering process.
^^^ Primary material (0.2 %), Manufacturing/Transport. (3.7 %), Passage of contraband (15 %),
Transport ( 5 %) : Total (24%) = Net profit (76%) Dupuis, Marie Christine, and Gilles Leclair. 
Stupéfiants, prix, profits: Teconomie politique du marche des stupéfiants industriels. Ed Xavier Raufer. 
Paris: PUF, 1996. From Rand Drug policy Research Center.
^^^Leauthier, Alain. “Un juge français.” Liberation 29 January 1993.
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2. Money Laundering^^
Money laundering, the parallel activity of drug trafficking and of all criminal activities,
accounts for $300 billion dollars a year, averaged out to approximately $1 billion dollars
a day and is defined as:"'
[...] the conversion of profits from illegal activities into financial assets which 
appear to have a legitimate origin."*
It is crucial for the conversion of profits, usually in cash form, originating from
all types of illegal activities, but especially from drug trafficking into investable
currency,"' Since most drug transactions incur the exchange of small bills (in the US: $5,
$10 and $20’s mostly), the drug trafficker is left with huge amounts of paper currency that
need to be converted in one way or another into income that can be spent. The paper
volume generated by drug sales is generally more voluminous than the actual drug
volume. Because of money laundering legislation in North America and Europe it is no
longer possible to make cash acquisitions or transaction of more than $10,000 USD (or
equivalent) without a justification of origin and poses a problem for drug traffickers who
have to find ways to convert this cash currency into less suspicious, less monitored
currency. In fact, $1 billion USD in $100 denominations weighs over 11 tons, which
makes storing it, and transporting it quite a daunting task. It is more easily hid, and
transportable, when it has been transformed into “virtual cash” in the banking system.
Increasingly, money laundering is becoming a professional activity, a totally
separate entity from he drug production and distribution, professionals launders are called
financial engineers”. Drug cartels advertise a laundering job, accept bids and contract
out the job. The money laundering operation generally occurs in three phases:
pre-washing / or placement: where the money is placed in a financial circuit 
laundering / layering: where the origin is camouflaged with a series of transfer 
recycling / integrating: where the laundered money is integrated into the legitimate 
economy
The term: “Money Laundering”, originated with the LCN during prohibition. A godfather based in 
Chicago was looking for a way to dissimulate his profits from the sale of illegal alcohol from the 1RS.
He decided to buy a large chain of laundromats because there was no possible of control of stock or 
overhead. He could easily inject his tainted alcohol money into the legitimate laundry front: hence 
money laundering.
See also Herail, Jean-Louis, and Patrick Ramael. Blanchiment d'argent et crime organise. Ed Xavier 
Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1996.
^^ “^ Clutterbuck, Richard. Drugs. Crime and Corruption. London: Macmillan, 1995, page 98.
^^ F^or a more complete definition of money-laundering and money-laundering offenses, please refer to: 
Council of Europe. “Convention on Laundering, Search, Seisure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime.”Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1990. 88
The drag cartels have developed their own unique and almost impenetrable money 
laundering system, also known as the “Colombian Hopscotch”. It involves five phases 
of laundering, finally allowing the near-totality of the currency to reappear in Colombian 
bank accounts in pesos.,
For laundered, each step is studied and each location is evaluated in terms of 
governing legislation, international treaties concerning banking secrecy and finally 
rapidity with which transfers can be accomplished."' Because the various cartels and OC 
families want to limit the quantity and value of laundered money being seized by 
authorities, they hire armada of advisors, specialised accountants and international 
lawyers, whose task is to study the different legislation and loopholes of the financial 
circuits, and advise the cartels on how best to recycle their drug money with minimal risk.
However, because of increased global pressure to crackdown on money 
launderers, and the increased penalties incurred when arrested, the actual cost of a full- 
service money laundering process has grown exponentially, from 6% to 26% of the overall 
sum being laundered. Full service laundering usually includes: pickup of the currency, 
multiple transfers, merging with legal funds, and finally investment."”
Despite the recent measures to curb money-laundering it nonetheless remains a 
very low risk activity. Experts in the Larchet Report (French Senate) estimate that only 
1 % of money laundered in France is actually confiscated ( = 1 00  million FF out of a 
possible 14 billion)."'
^^ *Farah, Douglas. “Russian Crime Finds Haven in Caribbean: Colombian Drug Ties Suspected.” 
Washington Post 7 October 1996.
^^^Andelman, David. ‘The Drug Money Maze.” Foreign Affairs 73.4 (1994), page 99.
■^ '^^ Andelman, David. “The Drug Money Mas^.” Foreign Affairs 73.4 (1994), page 98.
■^^ L^abrousse, Alain, and Alain Wallon. La Planete das Drogues: Organisations Criminelles, guerres et 
blanchiement. Paris: Seuil, 1993, page 13.
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There are countless ways and methods of money laundering, but a dozen or so 
methods seem to be the most commonly used. The preceding graph is an attempt to 
illustrate and summarise some of the ways with which money can be laundered. The 
flexibility and speed at which GOC adapt to money-laundering legislation means they are 
always on the lookout for new, less risky routes. The most popular ways of laundering 
drug money include:""*
a. Casinos:
There are two main methods to launder cash through casinos. The simplest consists of 
converting a suitcase full of cash to game tokens, and then converting these tokens back 
in the form of a certified casino check. The second method consists of voluntarily losing 
vast sums of cash to a casino run by organised crime. The casino returns the cash (in the 
form of a certified check), minus a commission. In some instances, casinos accept 
gambling chips from other “friendly” casinos, and by using this system, the launderer can 
buy his gambling chips in one casino, and reconvert them into a certified check in another, 
minimising the risk of being detected."^
b. Phvsical transformation of cash bv courier:
A courier, will physically taJce the tainted money to one or several banking establishments 
and request a certified bankers check in exchange, or will simply deposit various amounts 
of cash into different accounts that will eventually be transferred and regrouped: this 
process is referred to as "'‘smurfing"'. This process can appear quite tedious and 
cumbersome, but the potential for laundering by one person is surprisingly high. Miami 
police recently arrested a courier who had deposited $12.8 million USD in 88 different 
banks in eighteen months.'" In order to curb money laundering many states have 
emulated the US and have enacted legislation that forbids cash deposits in excess of 
$10,000 USD (or equivalent). To counter this measure, smurfers multiply the number of 
deposits, always staying just under the $10,000 limit.
c. National banking svstems:'"^
With a lack of effective international money laundering legislation, many “lax” banks
^^^Jean-Pierre, Thierry, and Patrice de Meritens. Crime et Blanchiment. Paris: Fixot, 1991, page 193..
■^^ D^upuis, Marie-Christine. Finance Criminelle. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1998, page 167.
^■^Dupuis, Marie-Christine. Finance Criminelle. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1998, page 56.
^^ T^he United States government estimates that between $300-500 billion criminal dollars entered the 
US banking system in 1995 Raufer, Xavier, “a Global Perspective.” Securitv (1996), page 9.
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continue to accept deposits of money with suspect or unknown origins, allow automatic 
money transfers to transit in anonymous accounts, or certify checks with out proof of 
legitimate origin of the funds. Dirty money can be deposited in one branch and transferred 
anywhere else in the world. Additionally, different OC families have begun to buy banks 
in Russia and around the world to greatly facilitate their laundering transactions. For 
instance, Jose-Antonio Fernandez, a Colombian drug trafficker, was able to take-over a 
Florida bank called the Sunshine State Bank, and used it as a gigantic money laundering 
facility until he was arrested in 1984."®
d. Fictitious commercial operations:
The accounting of various businesses can be doctored to show much more profit 
that actually achieved, and hence permit the insertion of the tainted money into its 
accounts. Fake bills and invoices repaid by tainted money can also be issued. The launder 
and his client are protected as each detains a receipt for the superficially legitimate 
exchange of the money.
e. Export of currency
Currency if exported to a more “lenient” country where it is laundered in any number of 
ways.
f. Creation of a facade/front comnanv and offshore banking
Facade companies that exist only on paper are one of the most common practices to 
launder money. Offshore banking establishments, created to facilitate the rapid 
transmission of money around the world, are used by criminals to transfer and bounce 
dirty money from one account to another until is original source is untraceable.
h. Foreign exchange bureaux:
The Italian Mafia has been able to buy up many Bureau de Change across the 
world to facilitate its money laundering transaction. Certified checks, travellers checks or 
money orders can be issued in the desired currency, in exchange for the cash brought to 
the Bureau de Change, further facilitated by the fact that transactions are not recorded and 
remain anonymous."^ In one instance, Michele Zaza (godfather in both the Camorra and 
Cosa Nostra), laundered $300,000 in one transaction."* The average laundry commission
^^ *^ Raufer, Xavier. La Maree Noire de l’Argent du Crime. Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 
115.
■^‘^ ’^ Financial Action Task Force(FATF). “Annual Report.” . Paris; OECD, 1996. Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF). “Typologies Exercice: Public Report.” . Paris: OECD, 1997.
^^Derogy, Jacques, and Jean-Marie Pontaut. Enquête sur les Ripoux de la Cote - de l'affaire Médecin 
au meutre de Yann Fiat. Paris: Fayard, 1991, page 361.
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in Bureau de Change fluctuates between 0.15-0.5% of the total sum converted which is 
substantially less than in more complicated financial circuits (up to 26%). The example 
of the “Basque Connection” demonstrates how Bureau de Change can be used to launder 
money, and eventually convert them into gold bars, either stored directly in Swiss bank 
vaults, or sold and the money transferred to Swiss bank accounts. The “Basque 
Connection” was being used by the Chinese Triad members living in Paris to launder 
more than $300 million USD, primarily coming from drug trafficking and gold trafficking. 
Police infiltrated and stopped this connection in 1991.
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The Secured Loan System'": The Basque Connection
i
gI
1
ÏI
I
%
T..)
CARRIED OVER PYRENEES
PFXF.TAS
BUREAU DE CHANGE"
FRFMITH FW A MrS
SWISS SWISS BANK
BANK ACCOUNTS
rt, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de 
L ntre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993.
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I. The “Japanese work-ants”:
The Yakuza have devised an interesting, but cumbersome system known as the “Japanese 
Work-ants” to launder money, and make additional profits in the process. Japanese 
nationals are approached by a Yakuza contact and offered the opportunity to travel to 
Europe for free and even make a healthy commission in the process. Those that agree are 
given a plane ticket, a large sums of “dirty”cash and sent to France where they are told to 
buy luxury items (jewellery, leather goods, perfumes, designer items), and return to Japan 
laden with these goods. After the work-ants return, they hand over the items to their 
contact and are paid a set commission for their work. These goods are then sold, at 
significant profit in luxury boutiques in Japan completing the money is laundering 
process.
j. Corrupted lawsuits:
Another original method of laundering money and transfening it into an unsuspecting 
banking system involves setting up a fake lawsuit. The crime group first transfers the sum 
to be laundered into a protected banking system (i.e. Cayman Islands). Once it has been 
received an accomplice in the United States then begins a lawsuit procedure against a 
company or person for a made-up motive. The first method consists of settling out of 
court, where the “undisclosed” sum is transferred to the “winner” of the lawsuit. The 
second method consists of going through with the lawsuit and using the dirty money to 
settle the compensatory fines. Either way, the justice system validates the provenance of 
the money for the plaintiff and the legitimate origin (proceeds from a lawsuit) can be 
identified.
k. Lottery tickets
An imaginative and effective way of laundering money involves the national lotteries. A 
person, not affiliated with OC, wins the national lottery, and before he officially claims 
his prize is approached by an organised crime member who offers to purchase his ticket 
for more than the prize value. Once the exchange has taken place, the purchaser (OC 
contacts) can legitimately claim his prise, and attest to the legitimate origin of his money: 
winnings from the national lottery.
1. Secured Loans 
Cartels are able to invest and buy real estate and business ventures across the world 
through a system of secured, legitimised loans. The drug money is transferred out of the 
United States to various offshore accounts. These accounts are then transferred to the 
accounts of facade companies who uses them to secure loans to buy real estate. This
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system is sometimes called the “Dutch sandwich” because of one successful Mafia 
operation conducted by Mafia financier Meyer Lansky. The funds to secure the loan are 
deposited in a bank in the Dutch Antilles, but the actual loan secured in the Netherlands. 
Little by little the principle on the loan is reimbursed with dirty money, but the overall 
operation appears to be legitimate as it is conducted through a legitimate banking 
establishment (the BCCI also used this system quite effectively)
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m. Diamond Sales'*'
The diamond market is estimated to generate $70 billion USD a year, most of the
transaction occurring in cash and leaving the opportunity for criminal money laundering
wide open. The Chinese Triads have used the diamond exchange method to launder their 
drug money. The sale of heroin in the United States generates “dirty” cash that is then 
used to buy diamonds locally that are then shipped to Hong Kong where no import 
declaration is required. These diamonds are then sold across Asia, often generating a 
handsome profit in the process.'"
n. Fiscal paradises and off shores'"
Off shores, and fiscal paradise are not necessarily synonymous, but in most respects carry 
out same functions.'" Off shores are centies that offer financial services to individuals and 
companies that are non-residents.'" There are three types of fiscal paradises: Anglo- 
Saxon, where the details of the accounts are kept secret but the identity of the holder can 
appear, Swiss, where nothing is revealed except at the fiduciary level, and total secrecy 
where no information is stored about account holders.'" Off shores and fiscal paradises 
are not only used by organised crime, and were in fact created and exploited as a method 
for North American and European companies to legally evade paying part of their taxes 
or securing contracts trough corruption or promises of kick-backs, but organised crime 
saw the immense benefits they could also derive from this system. Companies and GOC 
either hold an account at a bank in these offshore/fiscal paradises, or have “letterbox 
companies”'" matriculated there.'" By transferring dirty-money to the off shores.
"^^ K^erry, John (Senator). The New War: the Web of Crime That Threatens America’s Securitv. New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1997, page 159.
^^^Some experts believe that this method is not prevalent, because the diamond market is tightly 
controlled by De Beers and the Antwerp diamond buyers. Source: Dupuis, Marie-Christine. Finance 
Criminelle. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: PUF, 1998.
^^^ Refer to annexe for a list of main offshore/fiscal paradises.
^^ '^ Refer to the following source for a complete country by country analysis of each fiscal paradise. 
Beauchamp, Andre. Guide Mondial des Paradis Fiscaux. Paris: Grasset, 1992.
^^^FATF definition. Source: Dupuis, Marie-Christine. Finance Criminelle. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: 
PUF, 1998, page 37.
'^ ‘^^ Herail, Jean-Louis, and Patrick Ramael. Blanchiment d’argent et crime organise. Ed Xavier Raufer. 
Paris: PUF, 1996, page 400.
"^^ T^hese are companies whose headquarters are established in these off shores, but in reality are nothing 
more than a mailing address or a post office box use to benefit from the offshore status.
^^^Beauchamp, Andre. Guide Mondial des Paradis Fiscaux. Paris: Grasset, 1992, page 27.
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sometimes transiting in several off shores in succession, the origin of the money is totally 
hidden and protected by banking secrecy acts. The money can then be easily transferred 
into a national banking system without fear of discovery.
o. Other forms of monev laundering 
Many other forms of money laundering exists (stock market, fake certificate attesting to 
the sale and amount of artwork, jewellery, precious materials). They are only limited to 
the imagination and resource of the client. Organised crime families take it for granted 
that they will lose some of their profits during the laundering process, but that amount is 
negligible in terms of their overall profits and classified as an overhead.
The money-laundering industry appears to always remain one step ahead of the 
Justice and police organisations committed to tracking them down. They are able to 
change tactics and techniques, move their operations to a different country, or safe haven 
faster than the authorities can monitor, and hence have largely been able to evade capture. 
It takes only a few minutes for money to hopscotch across the globe going from offshore 
to offshore, and account to account, yet it can take decades for police to retrace the route, 
punctually impeded by the various banking secrecy acts.
E. Human trafficking
Trafficking in humans, amounting to $84 billion USD, and involving the transfer 
more than 1 million people a year, can take on many different forms: immigrant 
trafficking, children trafficking for the purpose of adoption, but also trafficking in women 
for the sex-slave industry, prostitution or small children for the paedophilia industry.'"
To traffickers this form of trade is non other than another lucrative form of 
merchandising that yields very high profits, and continues to yield profit for some time.^ *^  
In addition because few countries actually have legislation condemning and punishing 
this form of trade, traffickers are more apt to engage in people trafficking as the sanctions, 
are much less harsh, if present at all.
^^^Savona, Ernesto, Sabrina Adamoli, and Paola Soffi, eds. Organised Crime Across the Borders. 
Helsinki: European Institute of Crime Prevention and Control (affiliated with the United Nations), 1995, 
page 7.
Beurt, Michel: “Traffic d’Etres Humains: les immigrants, nouvelle marcahndise des Mafia” Le nouvel 
Observateur 11/05/1995.
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Prostitution and sex industry:
Not only does this trade benefit the traffickers themselves as well as the industry 
they supply, but sadly they also prey on the haish economic reality prevalent in some 
countries and encourage parents to sell, or even lease their daughters and small children '^^  ^
into this form of sexual slaveiy. For others the prospect of a better life, a well paying job 
elsewhere is enough to encourage these people, generally young ladies or teenage girls to 
accept dishonest propositions and leave their homeland. Humans are considered as basic 
merchandise, a commodity no different really that weapons, or drugs. At the 
Afghan/Pakistan border women are kidnapped and sold, the price being established based 
on the weight: 600 rupees per kilo (about $9.80USD).^*^^
A young Nigerian, girl of only 15 years old pays up to $40,000 USD to guarantee 
safe passage out of Africa and into Europe. In order to pay off this debt she must work 
as a prostitute for up to four years. In another case, a young Cambodian girl is leased to 
a brothel for three months by her family. In exchange her father receives $200 USD. Her 
proceeds generated by her work are obviously kept from her and given to her “keeper”^^ .^
Trafficking in women and young girls is crucial to cheaply supply and replenish 
the sex-slave industry across the world.'" The three criminal organisations that are 
primarily responsible for this type of trade are: the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese triads 
and the Russian criminal networks.'" Many other criminal organisations dahble in this 
trade, but the preceding three are the largest market providers in this area. The Yakuza 
and Triads control and supply the brothels and prostitution rings of the Far East, and have 
been key in developing the concept of sexual tourism.'" Women are brought in to Asia 
and the Pacific under false pretences, promised good jobs as part of a housekeeping staff,
Child prostitution figures vary substancially but UN estimates that in Asia the child sex trade is 
comprised of: 300;000 children in India /  200,000 in Thailand /  100,000 in the Philippines /  40,000 in 
Vietnam. Source: Arlacchi, Pino: MCC conference, 2"** March 2000.
600 Pakistan Rupee = 9.80873 US Dollar: so a woman is sold for $9.8 USD to the kilo. Source: 
http:www.uri.edi
Arlacchi, Pino: MCC conference on 2"‘* March 2000.
*^^ The International Organisation for Migration defines the trafficking of women as: “When a woman in 
a country other than her own is exploited by another person, against her will and for financial gain.” 
Source: Editorial. ‘Trafficking in Women.” Trends in Organised Crime .Summer (1998).
Caldwell, Gillian, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinsor. Crime & Servitude: and expose o f the 
trafficking of women for prostitution in the NIS. Moscow, 1997.
‘^^‘^ Castells, Manuel. End of Millennium. Malden: Blackwell. 1998. page 172.
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only to discover upon arrival that they are in reality destined to become sex slaves. 
Others, like many Chinese clandestine immigrants arrive at their destination, and must pay 
off their travel debt (as much as $35,000 USD) as sex slaves. Because most of these 
“immigrants” still have family in their home-country they are easily convinced to pay off 
their debt, and not escape, because otherwise their “keepers” will take there revenge out 
on their family members (use of leverage). As their passports are confiscated and are the 
girls kept under tight surveillance (sometimes chained to their beds) they have no way of 
escaping. They supply the brothels, massage parlours, strip-clubs and call girl services, 
and receive little or no salary. Organised crime groups are the intermediaries between the 
“collection’Vrecruitment of the girls and the brothel owners, and are key for the smooth 
operation of thé activity and are primarily responsible for corrupting government officials 
and obtaining fake travel documents, or visa, co-ordinating their travel and supplying the 
guards that ensure they don’t escape.
Children are also sought out for trafficking, kidnapped off the street, lured or 
bought and forced into sex slavery and they mainly supply the paedophile, and child 
prostitution trade."' The Hong Kong Vice squad reported recently that the average age for 
prostitution had dropped, forcing girls as young as 13 years old into the trade. Girls who 
refuse to comply, or are not fully pleasing their customers are beaten and tortured.'" In 
Macao a child being sold into prostitution fetches $100 USD, whilst in India the selling 
price is $500 USD.'" In Thailand, poverty stricken families sell their virgin daughters for 
H.K. $1,600. For the brothel owner, his investment in generally returned in one night’s 
work: “girls scarcely weaned are handed over to pimps for the equivalent of a small sum 
of dollars and soon find themselves shut up in a brothel for life”."® Across the world more 
than a million girls are sold into prostitution^^^: Thailand: 800,000'" /  Taiwan: 40,000-
'^^ R^efer to Sexual Exploitation of Children in: Castells, Manuel. End of Millennium. Malden: 
Blackwell, 1998, and World Congress Against the Commercial Exploitation of Children (Stockholm) 
1996.
‘^^ Chin, Ko-Lin. “Triad Societies In Hong Kong.” Transnational Organised Crime .Spring (1995), page 
52.
*^^ K^ent, George. Children in the International Political Economy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 
page 57.
^^ ®Kent, George. Children in the International Political Economy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 
page 61.
A problem linked with the sex industry and prostituting of children is the prevalence and spread of 
disease, most notably AIDS. Many o f these child prostitutes end up contaminated with HIV and 
subsequently AIDS and die in atrocious conditions at a very young age.
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60.000 / India: 100,000+ / Brasil:600,000"* / Peru: 500,000 / Venezuela: 40,000 / Sri 
Lanka: 20,000+/US: 200,000/Philipinnes: 100,000.'"
Adoption
Adoptions can also on occasion lead to child prostitution. According to Interpol, 
there are many cases of people adopting children from underdeveloped countries and 
forcing them into prostitution.'"
Illegal adoptions also constitute child trade (valued as a million-dollar business),"® 
and has been an activity of organised crime. Because the infant adoption market (for 
white infant babies) in Western Europe and the United States has become so difficult, 
couples have sought to adopt elsewhere, primarily Central America, Eastern Europe and 
Asia. Organised crime has set up networks that either kidnap or buy infants and sell them 
to unsuspecting couples. An infant can cost as much as $15,000-20,000 USD but can be 
“delivered” in only a few days time. The Cartels, Russian Mafiya and Chinese Triads and 
Yakuza are involved in this trade.
Immigrant trafficking
Also implicated in human trafficking is immigrant trafficking.'" The 1994 United 
Nations Report estimates that 1,000,000 people a year are illegally smuggled in foim poor 
countries into rich countries, with an estimated 20% of those being Chinese nationals. 
Again GOC networks are chiefly responsible for this trade charging anywhere from a $2-
3.000 USD to smuggle a Mexican over the American border to $35-40,000 USD to
^^^According to the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights, Source: Castells, Manuel. End of 
Millennium. Malden: Blackwell, 1998, page 155.
^^Not all child-prostitutes are controlled by organised crime, but those that are generally are required to 
have sex on average 20 times a day.
^'^UNICEF statistics. Source:Cretin. Thierry. “Mafias et Jeunesse.” Enfance Majuscule .October- 
November (1997).
Kendall, Raymond. International Svmposium on the Traffic of Human Beings. 1988.
^^ '^ Savona, Ernesto, Sabrina Adamoli, and Paola Soffi, eds. Organised Crime Across the Borders. 
Helsinki: European Institute of Crime Prevention and Control (affiliated with the United Nations), 1995.
^^^The US dismantled one smuggling ring that had smuggled 12,000 Indians into the US via Russian 
and Cuba, and was estimated to be worth $200 million USD, spanned 4 continents, 1,000 job cites in 38 
US states and each passage cost $20-28,000 USD, Source: Branigin, William. “US Dismantles 
Smuggling Ring that Marketed Indian workers.” International Herald Tribune 23 November 1998.
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smuggle in a Chinese immigrant into Europe or North America/"
Alien smuggling sometimes offers different “package-deals”. First class 
smuggling includes good quality fake documents, second class generally includes cargo 
sea transport with no comfort, or being transported hidden in a track. Options include safe 
houses, and relocation assistance, clandestine jobs, and services of a lawyer.'"
Immigrant trafficking necessitates much planning and so most immigrant 
trafficking “ventures” call for co-operation between GOC families: in August 1997, the 
prefect of Calabria published a report that highlighted the links between the Russian 
Mafiya and Italian ‘Ndrangheta in immigrant trafficking. For 6,000 Swiss francs Kurdish, 
Iraqi, Sri Lankan and Egyptian nationals were smuggled into the European Union via 
Italy. To escape detection from the Italian Coast guard, the boats followed the Albanian 
coast, descended South, crossed the Aeonian Sea, and unloaded their human cargo onto 
the beaches of Catansaro. Because the smuggling fee was high, many of the “illegal 
aliens” were forced to pay off their travel debts by working on regional plantations under 
‘Ndrangheta control.'*® The Italian crime groups are increasingly involved and directing 
alien smuggling routes, putting to use the expertise they have accumulated through various 
other forms of smuggling (like cigarette trafficking), and using the geographic advantage 
of Italy to land aliens and smuggle them into Europe.
Because France has tightened and severely cut down the attribution of visa to 
Algerian nationals, a new immigrant trade route has emerged between North Africa and 
Italy, managed by the Cosa Nostra. Charging between $900USD and $3,000USD, 
Algerian nationals can procure passage from Tunis to Sicily, and on into the European 
Union.'*' Jean-Pierre Garson, expert in immigration at the OECD warns that trafficking 
in immigrants does not only include clandestine passage, but generally also entails 
subsequent exploitation in the black-market economy.
^^ ®Winer, Jonathan. “Nature of Alien Smuggling.” Trends in Organised Crime .Summer (1998).
^^^Staff correspondent. “Smuggling o f aliens thriving.” Dawn 21 December 1998.
^^^Siegler, Jean. Les Seigneurs du Crime: Les nouvelles mafias contre la démocratie. Paris: Seuil,
1998, page 127.
^®^ Beuret, Michel. “Trafic d'etres humains.” Le Nouveau Quodidien 11 May 1995.
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F. Organ Trafficking^ *'
Organ trafficking, also coined New Cannibalism^", no doubt the most gruesome 
activity of organised crime families involves the trafficking human organs and especially 
kidneys.'*'' According to a European Parliament report, organ trafficking and drug 
trafficking follow the same rational, it just deals with a different commodity.'" As 
highlighted in the Sottas Report,'*® this form of trade is rumoured to become increasingly 
prominent and corresponds perfectly to the risk/profit equation: light penalties and huge 
profits. Because the recipient list for organs surpasses by far the donor list the possibility 
for organised crime groups of making profit by coming up with “alternative” sources for 
organ “donations” is very real.'*' In addition the vast improvements in medicine and 
transplant technology have made organ transplants more successful than ever, and hence 
making it a “tradable commodity”. Today the transplant success rate for kidneys is 81- 
92%, and heart transplants 70%,'**
Body parts trafficking, also called organ harvesting, has increasingly become a 
financially profitable business and an activity of choice for several organised crime family 
syndicates. It entails the kidnapping and murder of innocent victims for the purpose of 
extracting various organs and reselling them on the medical, pharmaceutical or organ- 
recipient market.'*® Because patient awaiting transplants are place on interminable waiting 
lists, the possibility of circumventing the official pipeline is appealing and creates a 
“black-market”demand for organs. Additionally, because certain religions (Islam, and 
Judaism) frown upon the denaturing of the body through organ donation after death, 
people belonging to those faiths are in need of organ donations outside of their countries.
^"Refer to : International Conference on the Commerce of Organs, University of California - Berkeley 
(1996). Rothman, DJ, E Rose, and et al. The Bellagio Task Force Report on Transplantation. Bodily 
Integritv and International Trafficking in Organs: Transplantation Proceeding, 1997.
This term was coined by Nancy Scheper, member of the Bellagio Report team and prominent 
researcher and advocate of organ trafficking legislation.
^"Staff Writer. “Kidneys for sale.” Turkish Dailv News 17 September 1998.
^"Leventhal, Todd. “The Child Organ Trade Rumour.” . Washington DC: US Information Agency, 
1994.
^"The Sottas Report was commissioned by the international organisation SOS- Torture. Sottas, Eric, 
and Esther Bron. “Exactions et Enfants (I^ 39-40-41).” . Geneva: World Organisation Against Torture, 
1993.
^*^Rothman, David. “Organes Humains: le Marche Mondial,” Courrier International 6 May 1998. 
^"Rothman, David. “Organes Humains: le Marche Mondial.” Courrier International 6 May 1998. 
^"Pinero, Maite. “Enlevements d'enfants et trafic d'organes.” Le Monde Diplomatique August 1992.
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Although organ harvesting is rarely cited as an industry, it is slowly becoming 
more documented and further evidence of the extent and profitability of this trade 
available. A recent Russian investigation found that “organ transplantation is the most 
profitable business in Russia and it will grow”.'®® In Russian organ trafficking is not a 
crime and so it can develop unhindered. In November 2000, police stopped a Russian 
grandmother after she sold her five-year-old grandson Andrei for $9O,0OOUSD to an OC 
group to be used as an organ donation, a type of spare parts person.^^  ^ Children, (generally 
from developing countries)'®' are abducted and killed, or illegally adopted then killed for 
their organs, and otherwise healthy hospital patients are “euthanised” for corneas, kidneys 
or hearts.'®' These organs are either sold to an organ donor bank, to a medical laboratory 
for experimentation, or finally directly to a client/recipient.'®'/"'^
A 1993 European Parliament report on organ trafficking concluded that 3,000 
children has been adopted from Brazil, sent to Europe and harvested for organs. As a 
result of this scandal the Brazilian government temporarily suspended international 
adoption pending investigations.
The main perpetrators of body parts trafficking are the Mexican drug cartels, 
namely the Guadalajara and Sinaloa families, the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads.'®® 
Cases of organ trafficking have been reported in Guatemala, Argentina,'®' China, Russia, 
Mexico, Brazil, Honduras and Peru. The main “buyers” are German, Italian and Swiss 
patients or donor banks, but increasingly Israelis and Saudis.'®* A healthy kidney can fetch 
$30,000 USD on the recipient market.'®® This trade is “helped” by the fact that little or no 
international agreements exists concerning the trade, trafficking, acquisition and sale of
^^"'Williams, Phil. “The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime.” Transnational Organised 
Crime Review (1995), page 27.
Franchetti, Mark: “Russian families sell their children to organ traders” Sunday Times, 26 November 
2000.
^^^Hassam, Ahmad. “Afghan camps hunting ground for human organs.” Dawn 12 November 1998.
Khan, Noushad. “Organised crime focuses on organ theft.” Dawn 19 April 1998.
•^"Muntarbhorn, Viti. “Sale o f children: Report o f the special rapporteur.” . New York: UN 
Commission on Human Rights, 1993. Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, “Theft of Life: The globalisation of 
Organ Stealing.” Anthropology Todav .June (1996).
^^^Sottas, Eric, and Esther Bron. “Exactions at Enfants (N° 39-40-41).” . Geneva: World Organisation 
Against Torture, 1993.
^^ ^Khan, Naushad. “Asie Rumeur: Quand le crime organise s'empare de vos organes.” Courrier 
International 6 May 1998.
^^ “^ Quere, Stéphane. “Les Mafias Internationales.” Drogues l 'Etat de Dépendance 21.September (1996), 
page 13. 105
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G. Fraud/counterfeits 
Fraud and counterfeits on commercial productions, medicines, patents concern between 
3-9% of the items in the world trade, and represent a 60-100 billion USD industry, and 
$25 billion USD in loss of profits for the holders of copyrights."' Book publishers are 
estimated to have lost $500 million USD in unauthorised copying, computer software 
companies are thought to have lost $200 million USD in software counterfeits, and the 
perfume industry accused losses of $100 million in counterfeit perfumes sales. Of all the 
products counterfeited around the world 7 out of 10 are French.'" Counterfeits and. 
product frauds account for 100,000 loss of jobs a year in Europe, and 30,000 a year in 
France.
The ability to copy luxury, copyright, or patented products cheaply, and make part 
of the $60-100 billion profit has obviously lured criminals to this sphere of activity. 
According to Interpol, organised crime dominates the counterfeit market in specific 
geographic areas: The Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuzas are the two GOC families 
with the most interest in this activity.'"'
In addition to the activities mentioned above, there are countless others criminal 
activities that generate profit for organised crime families. They include (but are not 
limited to), computer crimes,'" endangered species imports, computer crime blackmail 
and extortion, subsidy fraud. The variety of activities in which organised crime is 
involved in is limited only to the imagination and resources of these crime groups.^"
■^ ^^Wireservice. “Organ Trafficking a reality." : Reuters, Î993.
One report found that one company illegally extracted: 700 major organs (kidneys, hearts, lungs) - 
1,400 liver sections -18,000 thymus organs - 2,000 eyes - 3,000 pairs of testicles. Source: Williams,
Phil. ‘The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime." Transnational Organised Crime Review 
(1995), page 27.
^^^ Kerry, John (Senator). The New War: the Web of Crime That Threatens America's Securitv. New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.
^ ^ h e  reality of organ trafficking is not unanimously agreed on because of the medical difficulties 
associated with extracting, transporting and transplanting organs. In addition, random kidnaping and 
abductions do not make for good organ transplants as organ compatibilities must be ascertained between 
donor and recipient.
^"international Federation of Senior Police Officers & UNESCO, ed. Bossard, Andre. Contrefaçons et 
Crime Internationale. Paris, 1992.
^"Ministère de I’lnterieur, ed. Direction Generate de la Police Nationale, and Direction Generale de la 
Police Judiciaire. Stage de lutte anti-contrefacon. Paris, 1994.
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By defining the vast array of sectors in which OC families are pivotal in 
organising, exploiting and making profit from, it becomes evident that OC is a beneficiary 
of globalisation. Through diversification it guarantees its survival because even if one 
market collapsed the livelihood of that family is not necessarily affected. In order to 
efficiently exploit this globalisation opportunity, GOC has had to export itself, and its 
crime structures and models around the world in strategic locations to continue and 
dominate certain activities. Finally, because OC is always seeking high profit yielding 
opportunities it preys on peoples weaknesses (poverty, ill health addiction) to further 
develop its current activities or create a new one. In addition, because GOC is perpetually 
changing, diversifying and branching out, it becomes increasingly difficult to map out, 
with any exactitude all of its activities. GOC has proven that it has a great capacity to 
change, adapt and create a market demand or supply.
The following graph is an attempt by Professor Albert Stahel to chart out the GOC 
alliances around the world. As can easily be noted no single OC operates totally 
independently, and in fact, for logistical and strategic reasons operate in a vacuum. 
Every family is linked in one way or another, through and activity like drug trafficking 
to another and must forge, and cultivate at least one alliance, but often times at least 
several other OC “colleagues”.This chart also demonstrate the pivotal position of two- 
alliance epicentre, New York and Palermo.
^"Delval, Pierre. Faux et fraudes. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998.
^"Martin, Daniel. La criminalité informatique. Ed Xavier Raufer. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1997. Martin, Daniel, and Thomas Marten. “Cybercrime.” . Paris: Menaces Criminelles 
Contemporaines, 1999. Beqai, August. “Computer Fraud and Computer Crime.” . Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe, 1990.
Environmental crimes, hasardons waste treatment, trafficking in spoiled and re-treated food products, 
trafficking in endangered species. In fact Interpol estimates that trafficking in endangered species has 
the second highest profit margin after drugs, and yield at least $6 billion USD annually. Source: 
Porteous, Samuel: “Organised Crime impact study -  Highlights" Public Works and Government 
Services o f Canada (1998). Page 6-7. 107
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IV Creation and Reinforcement o f Strategic Alliances and Global Crime 
Summit
Attempt at charting out the global criminal alliances'"®
^Stahel, Albert. “Criminalité Mafia et Politique.” Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense / Centre des 
Hautes Etudes de l'Armement: Ecole Militaire. Paris, 1998.
108
international organised crime.
L The Global Crime Alliance and the Pax Mafiosa"'
By focusing on intra or inter family problems and conflicts, competition, territorial 
disputes, GOC was not only becoming less efficient in their criminal endeavours, but they 
were also becoming more vulnerable from within and from outside. Denunciations, 
murder plots, coups and internal treason were increasingly prevalent and obviously 
detrimental to the business activity and profit yielding ambitions they were seeking. By 
ending these intestine wars GOC families were able to refocus their attention, time and 
resources on their criminal activities.
In order to maximise their profits while reducing overall competition, the major 
organise crime families decided to forge a global alliance and declare a Pax Mafiosa.^ ®® 
The Pax Mafiosa instated a non-aggression pact between crime families and divided up 
the world into zone of influence. Each major crime family was attributed a “domain” 
within which it could operate undisturbed and unchallenged. This Pax Mafiosa amounted 
to: “carving up the planet into privileged sanctuaries”."® Giovanni Falcone referred to this 
multilateral agreement as an “operational welding” of the crime families. By drafting this 
peace treaty, they were minimising the incidence of turf wars, increasing their overall 
sphere of influence, main streaming their operations and generally revolutionising the 
criminal enterprise.
The first crime summit was prompted by and economic reality: drug trafficking 
yielded high profits and so this activity ought to be privileged. In order to do so a division 
of labour and a separation of tasks needed to be defined to ensure maximum profitability. 
This was in fact a strategic summit motivated by the prospect and anticipation of an 
explosion of the drug consumption and demand.
a. Multilateral Crime Summits
In order to concretely map-out the new Pax Mafiosa, the crime families had to 
meet repeatedly to negotiate and finalise each project. The pre-cursor to the global Pax
^"See Hedges, Michael. “New Crime Links, Mafia Others Join Forces Worldwide.” Washington Times 
31 July 1994.
Prior to the Pax Mafiosa there had been violent and deadly conflicts between different families as 
within crime families, usually sparked by “territorial” wars or a desire to monopolize a specific sector of 
activity.
^"Raine, Linnea, and Frank Ciluffo. Global Organised Crime: the new Empire o f Evil. Washington 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.
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Mafiosa/^" was an Italian/American Crime Summit that took place in Sicily from the 10- 
14 October 1957/" The Italian and American Cos a Nostra met to discuss a drug strategy 
aimed at importing drugs to the United States via Sicily. The Hotel des Palmes 
conference was highly significant in that it was the first crime summit of its kind. The co­
operation that was agreed upon laid down the frame for future co-operation.
Chronology of known Crime Summits:
1957 Hotel des Palmes (Sicily)'"
Godfathers Summit Meeting
US Cosa Nostra (Lucky Luciano) - Cosa Nostra
1975 Turkish- Sicilian Pact'"
Informal meeting to discuss drug trade routes through the Balkans
1981 Negresco Hotel (Nice)'"
‘Ndrangheta - Camorra - Cosa Nostra - US Cosa Nostra - Corsican Mafia
1987 Aruba'"
Drug Trade Summit 
Colombian Cartels - Sicilian Mafia
1989 Elysée Palace (Nice)'"
Italian Godfathers Summit 
Cosa Nostra (Zaza)
1989 Marseilles
Riviera Summit
Cosa Nostra - Camorra - Corsican 
1992 Rome'"
Mafiosa: an agreement to avoid conflict, devise common strategy and work the planet peaceably 
together. Source: Sterling, Claire. Crime Without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Organised 
Crime and the Pax Mafiosa. London: Little, Brown & Company, 1994, page 13.
According to government witness and former Cosa Nostra godfather Buscetta, the Hotel de Palme 
meeting never took place, however and informal meeting between representatives of the LCN and CN 
may have taken place at the Spano restaurant. Source: Arlacchi, Pino. Buscetta: La Mafia par l\in des 
Siens. Paris: Felin, 1994, page 72.
^^^Sterling, Claire. Octopus. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990, page 81.
^^^ Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Ed Xavier Raufer, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, 
page 46.
^^^Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le 
Midi. Paris: Seuil, 1995, page 21.
2J5Sterling, Claire. Thieve’s world. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, page 23.
^^ ‘^ Calvi, Fabrisio. LEurope des Parrains: La Mafia a 1 Assaut de 1 Europe. Paris: Grasset, 1993, page 
128.
^^^Sterling, Claire. Thieve's world. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, page 27.
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Colombian/Italian Summit
1992 Prague’"
Russian/Italian Summit
1992 St Jean Cap Ferrat (Riviera)
Godfather summit meeting 
Catagirone’s daughters wedding
1992 Rome
Colombian / Italian Summit
1994 Beaune (France)""
Russian/ Yakuza/Triads/Cali cartel
b. Criminal Alliances 
The chronology of crime summits listed above is no doubt far from complete, 
but it attests to the growing concern of GOC families to concentrate their efforts, co­
operate when necessary and feasible, in order to maximise their profits but sharing tasks, 
and splitting up areas of competence.
In addition to the numerous formal summit meetings repertoried above, that 
officially allied important criminal families, a multitude of smaller, more informal 
meetings were held across the world to punctually link specific crime families for a 
specific operation: Cosa Nostra/Russian,"' Russian Mafiya/Cartels,"’ Chinese 
Triads/Mexican cartels, Nigerian Crime networks/Colombian cartels, Yakuza/Sicilians,'"
^^^Jamieson, Alison. “The Transnational Dimension of Italian Organised Crime.” Transnational 
Organised Crime Review 1.2 (1995).
^^ T^he five Colombian cartels being represented were: Medellin, Cali, Costa, Calle des Norte and 
Pereira.
^^ *^ de Vericourt, Guilemette. Les Mafias. Toulouse: Editions Milan, 1998, page 53.
Obviously many summits went undetected by police authorities and hence cannot be repertoried. To 
a certain extent those that became known outside of the actual participants in one way or another failed 
on at least one level; the secrecy of the event was not preserved.
^^^Phillips, John. “Russian Mafia Links up with Cosa Nostra.” The Times 14 November 1994. Burns, 
Jimmy. “Italian Mafia building up criminal links in Russia.” Financial Times 22 May 1996.
^^^Freeh, Louis. “Russian Organised Crime (Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy).” . Moscow: Federal 
Bureau o f Investigation, U.S. Department o f Justice, 1994, page 3. See also Farah, Douglas. “Russian 
Mob has Ties in Caribbeans.” Washington Post 1 December, 1996, and Farah, Douglas, “Russian Crime 
Finds Haven in Caribbean: Colombian Drug Ties Suspected.” Washington Post 7 October 1996 ,
Adams, David. “Russian Mafia in Miami: Red fellas linked to plan to smuggle in coke by submarine.” 
San Francisco Examiner 9 March 1997. Farah, Douglas. “Russian Mob, Drug Cartels Joining Force.” 
Washington Post 29 September 1997.
^^^Castells, Manuel. End of Millennium. Malden: Blackwell, 1998, page 172.
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Turkish B aba/Sicilian, Turkish Baba/SCU, etc... Essentially, every possible contraction 
of alliances was effectively achieved. These alliances were not necessarily durable, but 
rather operative for the duration of the joint venture and most often dissolved right after.
2. Aruba the strategic merger: Cosa Nostra and Medellin Joint Ventures'"
An example of a strategic merger, as planned out by the Cosa Nostra and the 
Medellin Cartel is the overtaking of Aruba. It not only shows the capacity of GOC 
families to develop a precise goals orientated strategy, but also proves their ability to 
efficiently collaborate when their shared economic interests converge.
The island of Aruba and the progressive take over of its land and economy by the 
Cosa Nostra is a good example of the increased co-operation between different GOC 
families in the era of Pax Mafiosa. The raison d'être of Aruba was money laundering and 
a massive drug deal between the Sicilian clan and the Medellin Cartel chiefly orchestrated 
by the Cuntrera brothers.
Aruba, a small island off the coast of Venezuela was until 1985 a part of the Dutch 
Antilles, at which time in gained a quasi-autonomous, but not yet fully independent status 
Aruba was scheduled to gain its full independence in 1996, but this motion was postponed 
due to American and European pressure, and growing concern about its infiltration by 
organised crime."" By 1993, the Sicilian mafia had invested so heavily in the Island’s real 
estate and economy that Aruba became known as the first Mafia owned state. As a former 
joint French/Dutch islands, Aruba benefits from “border free” access to the European 
Union, has no police/border checks, criteria that greatly facilitates criminal activities like 
drug trafficking. Furthermore, until 1992, Aruba was an extradition free State.'"
Officials from Aruba have always been reticent to apply too many stringent 
controls because they might result in strangling the economy: “We have no resources and 
we need to survive”."® The Prime Minister himself was repetitively accused of having 
financed his campaign with drug money. Not only did the US State Department 
International Narcotic Control Report move Aruba from a medium risk to a high risk
^^^Cole, Rich. “Indictment Show High Level Mafia-Colombia Drug Link.” Associated Press Wireservice 
3 November 1989, and Wireservice. “U.S. Indictment Links Mafia and Medellin.” New York Times 3 
November 1989.
^^%eauchamp, Andre. Guide Mondial des Paradis Fiscaux. Paris: Grasset, 1992, page 186-187.
^^^ Leve, Geoffrey, “How the Mafia Moved to Paradise.” Associated Press 13 March 1993.
^^^Noblet, Kevin. “Under the Sun-and-Fun: Mafia and Money Laundering.” Associated Press 15 May 
1993.
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country within only three years, but in December 1996, President Clinton put Aruba on 
the list of major illicit drug transit countries/"
In 1987, the Sicilian Mafia invited the Colombian Medellin cartel to a strategy 
meeting. The Aruba Summit, and the subsequent agreement it brought about, made the 
Cosa Nostra and the Medellin cartel partners in the drug trafficking industry. The 
agreement they drafted was worth over $300 billion USD/year."" The initial planing was 
conducted by Sicilian, Francesco Madonia and his lieutenant John Galatolo, and involved 
the four major Cosa Nostra families: Cuffaro (Palermo), Madonia (Gela), Santapaola 
(Catania) and Corleone. Before the official meeting, Galatolo flew to New York to meet 
with the Italian Mafia families who directed the heroin trade there, explained the project 
and gained their approval, and finally went on to Aruba to meet with the Medellin Cartel 
representative, Waldo Aponte Romero.'" The strategy of the meeting consisted in shifting 
the cocaine market to Europe and the heroin market to the United States. The European 
Market was completely saturated with heroin, where the selling price was $50,(XX) per kg, 
almost four times less than the selling price in the US. To the reverse, the American 
market was saturated with cocaine with a selling price of 1/5 lower ($11,0(X) /kg) than in 
Europe ($50,000/kg). The Medellin Cartel and the Cosa Nostra agreed on an exchange 
of product. The Cosa Nostra would control the European cocaine trade, while the Cartels 
would retain control of the heroin distribution in the United States. The idea was also to 
solidify the triangular trade relations between Sicily, New York and Caracas (used as a 
port through which to massively export cocaine). The first shipment of cocaine 
(approximately 6(X) kilos) sailed to Palermo from Aruba on 7 January 1988, aboard a boat 
called the “Big John”. It was unloaded off the boat onto the Sicilian beaches, reloaded 
with heroin and sailed back to the Caribbean. Experts believe that this Colombian/Italian 
drug deal may have resuscitated the Cosa Nostra, the Sicilian’s influence had been 
dwindling for a while, mainly because of internal conflicts and power struggles, and this 
historic agreement propelled them into a new era.
The choice of Aruba as the site for a Colombian/Sicilian strategic merger was not 
haphazard. Much to the contrary it was a rational, highly strategic choice. Not only was 
Aruba a very attractive state for investment and money laundering (namely because of its
^^^Blickman, Tom. ‘The Rothschilds of the Mafia on Aruba.” Transnational Organised Crime 3.2 
(1997).
^^^iolante, Luciano, La Mafia dell Eroina. Rome; Riuniti, 1987.
^^ ^The representatives of five New York LCN families that were consulted were: Gambino brothers, 
Rosario Naimo, Paolo Loduca, Lorenso Mannino and Domenico Mannino.
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access to the European Union, and its extradition free status), but Aruba has slowly fallen 
under Mafia control, both political and economic. Because Aruba lacks natural resources, 
it opted to encourage gambling, created tax shelters for foreign investors, and offered 
prime real estate for sale as a means of sustaining its economy. The Mafia saw this as a 
unique opportunity to take control of a state and with the help of the Cuntrera Brothers 
(Pasquale, Paolo and Gaspare),'" also known as “the Rothchilds of the Mafia”,'" began to 
buy substantial amounts of property and shares in businesses around the island. They 
invested in casinos and hotels and infiltrated legitimate businesses.'" Between 1988-1990, 
the Mafia through the Cuntrera brothers'" bought up 60% of the total land and businesses 
on Aruba.'" In addition to their land and other economic acquisitions, the Cuntrera 
brothers corrupted many politicians and public servants.
Aruba was not only attractive because of its lax legislation on money laundering, 
but also provided a key strategic location for the drug trafficking industry in South 
America. Aruba became the headquarters for international criminal joint ventures 
involving drug trafficking and money laundering between the Americas and Europe.
The Aruba merger showed how efficient GOC collaboration could be, and how 
weak a small and complacent island like Aruba could be in the face of this powerful 
alliance. The Aruba example should not be considered as exceptional, but rather as 
demonstrative of the reach and power of GOC.
^^^Noblet, Kevin. “Under the Sun-and-Fun: Mafia and Money Laundering.” Associated Press 15 May
1993.
^^^Blickman, Tom. “The Rothschilds of the Mafia on Aruba.” Transnational Organised Crime 3.2 
(1997).
^^^Wireservice. “Sicilian Mafia Attempts to Buy Caribbean Island,” Sun Sentinel 3 June 1993, 
Wireservice. “Mafia State Plan Feared on Aruba.” Independent 3 May 1993, and Clough, Patricia.
“Mafia Family Reported Buying Own Island.” Ottawa Citisen 3 May 1993.
In September 1992, as a result o f American and international pressure, Aruba extradited its first 
criminals to Italy: the Cuntrera brothers.
^^^Blickman, Tom. “The Rothschilds o f the Mafia on Aruba.” Transnational Organised Crime 3.2 
(1997).
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V Conclusion
OC preys on the inadequacies or in some cases total absence of laws (for example 
on organ trafficking) in order to exploit certain types of activities and make profit. 
Because as a rule, it does not recognise the law as applicable to it, it is not limited in its 
choice of activity and is therefor free to develop whatever trade or commerce it pleases. 
As gruesome as organ trafficking may appear to many people there is a real demand for 
organs and hence an excellent “business” opportunity to be set up to supply that demand 
exists. GOC can step in and organise that market. By engaging in certain types of activity, 
like money laundering, GOC is able to penetrate the legitimate economy and potentially 
destabilise it. It is able to achieve this by either being able to rapidly inject huge sums of 
laundered money into it, or withdrawing these same huge amounts of money, but also by 
seizing control of financial institutions (like regional banks) or creating monopolies in 
some sectors of activity (like public works or waste management) and hence controlling 
one aspect of an economy. Whenever vast amounts of GOC activity or profits are present 
then the local, regional and in some cases national economies are made vulnerable.
This chapter has tried to show that the multiplicity and diversity of the different 
GOC families poses a concrete and indisputable threat not only state institutions or actors, 
but also perverts fair market practice and menaces the overall well being of the global 
economy. No sector of the economy of a state, or local authority), is immune from OC 
penetration and participation. Because each families has a different structure, hierarchy 
and operating regime, they have to be looked at individually, not globally, as international 
organised crime, despite its appellation, is not a homogeneous single entity. The only real 
point in common to all GOC families is their goal to make money, but the same could be 
said of legitimate multinational corporation as well.
GOC can also be seen as a “product” capable of easily being exported around the 
world. Rather than remaining quartered within national boundaries, GOC has expanded 
by exporting its crime product, way of life and business “ethics” transnationally. The 
expansionist agenda is not a new phenomenon, it has been occurring ever since massive 
population migration have happened,'" but with a new border-less Europe'", ease of travel.
■^ ^^ GOC tends to first focus on their ethnic immigrant minorities, and eventually broaden their activities 
to the rest of the country. According to Freeh, as the Asian-American community increases it will 
become a choice target for Asian organised crime groups. Freeh, Louis. “Asian Organised Crime (17th 
Annual International Asian Organised Crime Conference).” . Boston, Massachussets: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 1995.
^^ ®Tendler, Stewart. "East-West Crime Syndicates Exploit Open Frontiers.” The Times 3 December
1994.
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and more generally era of globalisation, this phenomenon has become more accelerated.
One such expansion has been the “trans-alpine”move of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra 
into France.'" The research that follows will explore one GOC family, the Sicilian Cosa 
Nostra, and will look into its expansionist agenda into France by analysing the reasons 
that motivated its choice, looks at its aims, and operational structure abroad. Because the 
Cosa Nostra has sought to expand its strategic operational base, and because it considered 
that the French Riviera presented ample business opportunities, it followed the world 
expansionist trend and set up a secondary, retreat base there.
Because organized crime, in the “Mafia-sense” of the term, is not indigenous to 
France it presents and interesting example of an international “venture” for the group. 
Other organized crime groups are present in France, as well as indigenous crime gangs, 
but this research stipulates that the single organized crime group that, in addition to 
presenting the largest threat to the French national, regional and local structures, also 
has the potential to adversely impact the local economies by gangrening it, is the 
Sicilian Cosa Nostra, and to a lesser degree its sister Italian crime family the Neapolitan 
Camorra. Altliough penetration of state structures is still very much limited to local 
authorities like on the Riviera, France as an activity base has already undergone several 
trends of expansions. France has also become reputed for being a zone of refuge for 
Mafiosi fleeing Italian and international inquiries.
It is therefor interesting, and actually quite important, to look at the French state 
apparatus, and more specifically the institutions in place that aim to combat these type 
of non-military threats in order to more fully comprehend the strengths and weaknesses 
in the French state structures. By identifying potential gaps in authority, or quite the 
contrary conflicting or overlapping areas, it is then possible to better observe the impact 
of a menace like the Cosa Nostra and target the inadequacies and eventually suggest 
possible improvements. Bearing in mind that each national crime fighting or judicial 
apparatus is unique, a reflection to a certain extent the cultural and historical fiame of 
mind of its population, it is also possible to contrast the French system with the Italian 
system that has had more concrete experience in combating OC.
^ *^The Sicilian Cosa Nostra expansion into France is the subject of Chapter IV’s case study.
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Appendix 1 
Offshores^^^
Offshore countries and islands offer ample opportunities for money laundering generated 
by criminal activity. They are considered as pivotal in the money laundering process. 
Despite international sanctions to try and combat this money laundering practice very little 
is actual done to enforce international agreements because these offshores, just like fiscal 
paradises, actually survive thanks to this process."^
Countries with cities/states having offshore status:
United States: Colorado, Delaware, Miami, New York
Ireland: Dublin
Morocco : Tangier
Great Britain: London
Taiwan
Thailand
Islands with offshore status:
Americas: Anguilla, Antigua, Dutch Antilles, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados,
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Nevis & St. Kitts, St Lucia, St. 
Vincent, Turks & Caicos, Virgin Islands
Asia/Pacific: Hong-Kong, Labuan, Macao, Marianne, Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Niue, Western Samoa, Singapore, Vanuatu
Europe: Cyprus, Guernsey, Jersey, Madeira, Malta, Isle of Man
Others: Bahrain, Mauritius Islands, Seychelles
Non-insular States with offshore status:
Andorra, Belize, Costa Rica, Dubai, Gibraltar, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Panama, Switzerland
OECD / FATF: Financial Action Task Force Report on Offshore states and islands.
It must be noted however that many democratic governments, signatory to international convention to 
combat money laundering routinely use these same offshore entities to either funnel illegal campaign 
contributions to political parties or political regimes, or use these offshores to pay “under the table” 
commissions to intermediaries o f big national contracts (ie sale of military planes), ^
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Appendix 2 
Counterfeit around the world"'
Brazil:
Bulgaria:
Canada:
China:
France:
Germany:
Great Britain:
Greece:
Hong Kong:
India:
wines,
Italy:
Japan:
Morocco:
Mexico:
Netherlands:
Pakistan:
Philippines:
Portugal:
Singapore:
South Korea:
Spain:
Switzerland: 
Taiwan: 
Tunisia: 
United States:
sporting goods, glasses, perfume pharmaceutical 
alcohol, pharmaceuticals 
books, electronics
electronics, mechanical pieces, pharmaceuticals 
jewellery, perfume, leather, textiles, computer programs 
mechanical pieces, textiles 
all products
luxury items, leather, books, pharmaceuticals 
computers, games, textiles, clockworks, luxury items, clothing 
perfume, pharmaceuticals, sporting-goods, jewellery, sparkling 
textiles
luxury goods, household appliances, books, clockwork, 
clothing, car-parts
computers, games, sporting-goods, electronics 
luxury goods, perfume, leather 
all products
distribution hub for all European counterfeits 
pharmaceuticals, perfumes, textiles
luxury items, leather, electronics, leather goods, clothing, car parts 
alcohol, sporting-goods, car parts, luxury items 
all products
sporting goods, leather, electronics, leather goods, 
clothing, car parts
drinks, games, leather goods, clothing, sporting goods
clockwork
all products
leather, textiles, books, clockwork
luxury items, perfume, electronics, mechanical spare-parts
^^^Ministere de 1 Intérieur, ed. Direction Générale de la Police Nationale, and Direction Generale de la 
Police Judiciaire. Stage de lutte anti-contrefacon. Paris, 1994.
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Appendix 3 
Colombian Drug Trafficking Routes
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Niaerîan business fraud letter scheme
ENGR. KINSLEY NWOKEDI 
TCUFAX-, 2 î4 -1 -4 S 2 e i8 fl 
LAOOS .'NIGERIA
RE; TRANSFER O F S23 M ILUON INTO YOUR COMPANY’S ACCOUNT
I GUESS MY LETTER WOULD NOT EMBARRASS YOU S N C E I HAD NO PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE WITH YOU 
YOUR COMPANY'S DETAIL W AS GIVEN T O  ME BY A  CLOSE FRIEND W H O  HAS LIVED IN YOUR COUNTRY FOR 
50M A N Y Y EA RS.H E A SSU RED  ME O F YOUR REUA8IUTY AND CAPACIUTYTO A SSIST US THOUGH I DIO N O " TELL HIM THE NATURE O F I M S  TRANSACTION.
HOWEVER. MY REQ U EST CENTRES ON MUTUAL COLLABORATION AND YOUR MORAL SU PPO RT. MY GETTINC 
YOUR ADDRESS IS TH E W O RK  O F ALMIGHTY G OD AND SINCE THEN I HAVE A STRO N G  HOPE THAT YOU CAN 
HELP ME EVEN THOUGH THE P R E S E N T  WORLD IS FULL OF DISHONCSTY AND MISTRUST.
I AM THE CHAIRMAN O F TH E TASK F O R C E  THAT REVIEWED ALL PREVIOUS CONTRACTS AWARDED BY 
VARIOUS M M STW ES IN THE COUNTRY. THIS APPOINTMENT IS FROM  TH E OPFICE O F  TH E PRESIDENT O F  THE FEDERAL REPU BUC O F NIGERIA AND C O M PRISES O FA  SIX MAN TASK FO RCE.
SINCE THATWPOINTMENT. W E HAVE JOINTLY DISCOVERED SOME IRREGULARITIES WHICH COM PRISES OVER 
INFLATED CONTRACT VALUES. 0U PU CA T1N G  AND C R O SS  FRAUDULENT ACTTVITIES. IN THE MEAN TIME, W E 
HAVE DISCOVERED ABOUT S 225.000,0 0 0 .0 0  (TW O  HUNDRED AND TW ENTY-THREE MILUON U.S. COLLARS 
ONLY) WITH O U R  VARIOUS POSITIO N S AND STATUS. W E ARE CIVIL SERVANTS. W H O  EARN LITTLE O R  NO 
SALARY. AND I CANNOT HESITATE TO COMMENTTHAT WE ARE NO ANGELS AS WELL TO BE FRANK WITH YOU. 
W E HAVE AGREED TO  DECLARE ONLY $20D.OOODOO.OO (TWO HUNDRED MILUON U .S. DOLLARS ONwY) TO THE 
GOVERNMENT W HILE W E  SHALL REMIT THE BALANCE O F *23 ,000 ,000 .00  (TW ENTY-THREE MILUON U.S 
DOLLARS) OUTSIDE TH E COUNTRY FO R  O U R PERSONAL INTEREST.
WE ARE CO NFU SED  O N  W HO TO  A PPRO A C H  BECAUSE OF TRUST AND TO  BE GANOID THIS IS A U FE  TIME 
OPPORTUWTY WHICH W E  CANNOT W S S . YOUR MAXIMUM CO-OPERATION IS HIGHLY NEEDED. PLEASE FAX THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO  US FO R  IMMEDIATE ACTION, THE NAME AND A DD RESS O F YOUR SANK. 
THE ACCOUNT NUMBER W H ERE W E CAN REMTT THE FUND INTO. AND YOUR TELEPH ON E AND FAX NUMBERS.
FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS TRANSACTION W E HA\Æ AGREED TO  O FF E R  YOU 30%  O F THE TOTAL FUND 
AND 10% FOR BOTH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EXPENSES THAT MIGHT BE IN CURRED  BY BOTH PARTIES 
WHILE YOU WILL K EEP THE REMAINING 60%  FO R U S THE OFFICIALS INVOLVED.
I ASSURE YOU THAT ALL N ECESSARY  SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN PER FEC TE D  IN THE FEDERAL 
MNISTRY OF FINANCE AND THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (CBN) FOR A  HITCH FREE TRANSFER O F THIS SUM 
WITHIN FOURTEEN W ORKING DAYS O N  RECEIPT O F THE EA RU ER M eN D O N ED  INFORMATION.
I AM EXPECTING Y OUR IMMEDIATE REPLY BY FAX S O  THAT I CAN S T O P  FU RTHER NEGOTIATIONS.
NOTE THAT THIS BU SIN ESS IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND M UST BE CONFIDENTIAL BECA U SE W E  ARE MEN 
OF PROVEN INTEGRITY AMO WOULD NOT WANT ANYTHING CAPABLE O F DENTING O UR GOOD IM AGES IN THE COUNTRY,
LOOKING FORW ARD TO  A REW ARDING RELATIONSHIP IN THIS AND OTHER FUTURE VENTURES. 
B ESTR E G A R D S,
IGRWNSLEYNWOKEDl
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C E N T R A L  B A N K  O F  N I G E R I A
PRESS STATEMENT ON ADVANCE FEE FRAUD SCAM
YOU HAUE BEEN WHRNEOISimee <be early 1990a, the Ceanal Bank of raferto (CBN) ham eadeavottfed to combat the aoQVfe of AdvaaoB Fee Fiaid/ScaB betnf perpetrated by ftaudkten via iettco, iBielta. telex,etc., boOi locally and overacaa, itaoufh pdtUctty campalgna. acntinan. pnat 
natetncnta. and coopenbon with law eoforcement agcpcka. To date, 
the CBN baa placed adviicry adveittaeaeata ta over 80 newqiepem 
and magazlDea ia 12 laoguages in 36 Gountilta, in ill effon to forewarn 
all Gotpondani and Indivtdsab who are ttkdy to taD prey to ttw acan 
and thereby beÿ tiamp out die pndlfentlaD of Advance Fee Fnaal, 
aka *419". Furthermore, the Bank lepbea routinely to all eaqidrtea 
fdadng to acare letien, telefax, etc., to die effect (bat the "cWia" are 
bofua and fraudulent and that the daimama are being duped. 
Appropilate Erhbaaaiea and High Commiaalooa ta Nigeria are aiao 
Aioiahed artlh copka of correqtondenoe emanartag from their oouairieB 
to prevent ruination of their nadoauda.
2Unfiaitunately, the acam baa continued unahaied, even «Mb IncreaitagBOfihiitkaOon. bectnie of the crimliiaUty, avarice and greed of the ao-caUed victimi or the team, arho are aiao vtnataa. The bogua tuataeaa" propoaala/deala which run taao mUlona of US 
ddlaramantftat ftnidiileotinieBtiooa ah initio, which duxiidotrlinarily 
put any rc^ooaible «Id taw abiding peraon on inquiry. However, iktvco 
by fraudulent tendency, greed and the tuge to make quick and eaay 
money «  die etqrenie of Nigeria, many of the ao-cnlledvictlma have 
conttaued to ignore the warninga of the Centrai Bank of Ntgcala, to the 
effect that asch wanaacticoa are bogua and fraudolett.
3 To rccaptadate, an advance fee friudfrcam takea varloua forma. Atypical cueatamwMtakaiBf of aollcttatinn,ft)DowBdby telcfhx or tdex meaaagea. The tettera offea offer to teanafer huge arnouati 
of money, uauaPy la US doDara, purported to be part procceda of cenata 
contracta, to the addreaaee a bank account, to be abated ta aome 
proportion between the writer and the addreaeee. A fiiMMiihhle reaponae 
to the letter la fblowed by excuaea adiy the ftmda cannot be remitted 
leadBy and anbaequntly by demanda for proponkwaie diare payment 
of varioua "taxer" to fedUtate the ptoceaaiog and remitianoe of the 
ftmda. The oae of M b Govemmeot, Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria 
Nabmal Petroleum Corporation, etc, documenta la aoommonpractioe. 
The fraudaten uauaily requcat dut the trantactton be dtme under the 
cover of coofldeotlailty. Somedfflet, the "victimf ’ are InvMed to Nlgaia 
where they would be glvea red*eacpet reception and attended by the 
ftandateet poetag ae Mgeda Government or Central Bank Qffidala. 1b 
oonsummatB the "tranaactiao", tae "victim" would be required 10 pay 
advance {ere fbr vartoua reaaona. e^. PiDceaaing fieea, udbteaeco taxea, 
nomcefeea.regiatratl€ofieea,aigntag/tawymfrea.NaliooalBoonoealc 
Recovery Fund feea, inaurance coverage releaie feex, VAT, etc. 
CnllecHnB r t  ttuae advance feet la artnallvthe real objective of the 
wwn- A recent variant of the acam, directed primarily at charitable 
orgailaatioaa and reUgiaua bodtaa oveneaa, tavolvea bogua infaciitanoe, 
loder a will Again die aota aim la to collect the advance feea deaoibed 
at one form of inheritaaoB tax or othec
4:The Central Bank of Nlgerialma taken Olia initiative of once again warning the butineas oommtmky aral tadividualt becauae of ha concern to the good name of the Bank and ha public
atandhig aa weO aa Ihoie of its Senioc Executives. Often die namea of 
the BtBk,meabgtcfka top mariagenieot team, Inaurttag the Governota 
(past and pteacnt) and the Deputy Governon together widi tboae of 
b l^ y  placed Government ofhctala, have been frauduleotlyoaed and 
abused by the fraudatera with reddeat ahaadon, to lend credibility and 
reapectabiBtytotheiqun. Aaonprevioum ccaaiona.tbcCeiBtalBaBk 
of Nigeita wiahea through tUi medhim, 10 wtan aO aad atndty about theexittence and the modua fywwiu r t  uw tMrmaMntmi rHmtnW 
ivadlcatea whoae nefartftni vetlvitlM have heaa » •narctt of 
embenw:mAn!m(l,ehmmlp=dihcNlMrtar,t]ovwmnemL
50o anmerout occaaiooa, the aivcalled victhna O f  (he "419" acam have brought law aultaagatari the Central Bank of Nigeria, aU of wMch tae Bank haa defended aucoeaaftiUy. In t  recent landmark Judgement on an advance fee acam taw suit brought by Latiy Scrth and 
hk. & hfca. Ibl Va. The Central Bank of Nigeria, et ai, the iaanea of 
advance fee fraud, the tatpoatora and Clearing House banks were 
decided on by Hon. Justice Qauka A  Sham of the United Siatts of 
America District Court (Eruiem District of bAaaoaai). The case was 
ruled in favour of the Central Bsnk of Nigeria. The Jndige ruled that the 
case of the platadffe. Messrs. Sordi and Ibl-was not suatainahta, 
becansetfaeynclfeer engaged In soy commercial trsarsaction with the 
defCndsmt, nor had contact with genuine Central Bank of Nigeria 
offlctala, nor with any official of the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
The Judge Itather noted thta documenta tendered by the plaiBtiffs US 
evidence were forgeries and that they were, from the onset aware that 
fee itaneartiona were bogus, ftaudiden t and too good to be true. We 
hope threthlataodmark Court decision among many others decided in 
fSvoorofthe Bank wotdd serve as aufffdem warning to aU those who 
do not heed oor advisory advertlaements and who would subiequeady 
like so seek relief from the corets after falling "victim" to ndvarsce fee 
acam trvaactlooa.
6 The Central Bank of Nigeria la once again wamiog aU recipients of rwdb fraudulent letiert that there are no ccmiact payments trapped In the Bank. AI#o,th«aBdocumeeta, appertaining to these "payments ,^ "dahna" or "transfers ,^ purportedly issued by the 
Bank, its Senior Executives or the Govemmeot of the Federal RepuhBc 
of Nigeria sre all forgeries, bogua and fraudufesn. These docutswrna do 
not origtaratfrorn the Bank or die Oovcrament They are not Mtimtic 
YOU ARB THEREFORE, WARNED AND ADVISED. IN YOUR 
OWN INTEREST. TO IGNORE THE "GBT-RICH-QUICK" 
BUSINESS SOLIOTAnONS. Tl« Csotiil Bank of Nigetia implatea 
you 10 asstat in the light agatan these cthntaai syndfeates by repordng 
any tolichstion to your local taw enforcement agencies or the local 
Imcmatlooal Police Organization (INTERFOL).
7 Per the avokhasoe ofdoabt.lt should be restated that the Central Bank of Nigeria win not aco ^  respomlblllty for any loss austataed by any person or corporation ihatfblla to heed ore wamtaga.
8YOU HAVE BERN WARNED SEVERAL TIMES BIPOREt YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED AGAINtI
C E N T R A L  B A N K  O F  N I G E R I A
Samuel Ladokc Aldntola Way» RM.B. 0187, Gaiki, Abuja, NIGERIA
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n re n c h  In stitu tions
API:
BAC:
BNEE:
BR:
BRB:
BRI:
BRI:
BSP:
CCLPS:
List of Acronyms
Agent de la Police Judicaire 
Agent of the Judicial Police
Brigade Anti-Criminalite 
Crime Brigade
Brigade Nationale d’Enquete Economiques 
Economic Crimes Investigation Brigade
Brigade de Recherche 
Investigation Brigade
Brigade de Repression du Banditisme 
Brigade for the Suppression of Banditry
Brigade de Repression et d’information 
Brigade for the Suppression and Information
Brigade de Recherche et d’intervention
Brigade des Stupéfiants et du Proxenistisme 
Drugs and Prostitution Brigade
Service Central des Laboratoires de Police Scientifique 
Central Police Laboratories Service
CNRDF:
CPP:
CRS:
DCGN:
DCPJ:
DCPN:
Centre Nationale de Recherche, Documentation et de Formation 
National Center for research, Documentation and Training
Code de Procedure Penale 
Criminal Procedure Code
Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité 
Intervention squads
Direction Centrale de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
Central Directorate of the Gendarmerie
Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire 
Central Directorate of the Judicial Police
Direction Centrale de la Police Nationale 
Central Directorate of the National Police
DCSP: Direction Centrale de la Sécurité Publique 
Central Directorate for Public Security
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DCT: Division du Contrôle Technique
Division of Technical Control
DEP: Division des Etudes et de la Prospective
Division of Research/Reports and Prospective
DEC: Division de Formation et de Communication
Division of Training and Communication
DLO: Division de Logistique Operationelle
Division of Logistics and Operations
DPJ: Division de Police Judiciaire
Division of the Judicial Police
DRI: Division des Relations Internationales
Division of International Relations
DST: Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire
Territory Surveillance Directorate
FRC: Fichier des Recherches Criminelles
Criminal Investigations Database
GIGN: Groupement d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale
National Gendarmerie “SWAT" team
GIPN: Groupement d’intervention de la Police Nationale
National Police *SWAT" team
GN: Gendarmerie Nationale
National Gendarmerie
GRB: Groupe de Repression du Banditisme
Banditry Suppression Group
IGPN: Inspection Generale de la Police Nationale
General Inspection of the National Police
IJ: Identité Judiciaire
Judicial Identity
MO: Maintien de l’Ordre
Maintenance of Order
OCBC: Office Central de lutte contre le Trafic de Biens Culturels
Central Office to combat the trafficking of national cultural 
treasures
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OPJ: Officier de la Police Judiciaire
Officer of the Judicial Police
PAF: Police de 1* Air et des Frontières
Air and Border Police (became DICCILEC)
PJ: Police Judiciaire
Judicial Police
PN: Police Nationale
National Police
PP: Prefecture de Police de Paris
Prefecture Police of Paris
PVM: Patrouille Volante Motorisée
Motorised Flying Squad
RAID: Recherche Action Information Dissuasion
Search Action Information and Dissuasion Unit
RG: Renseignements Généraux
Intelligence Services /  Political Information Research Service
SCDC: Service Central de Documentation Criminelle
Centrale Service for Criminal Documentation
SCIJ: Service Central dTdentite Judiciaire
Central Service for Judicial Identity
SCTIP: Service de Cooperation Technique Internationale de la Police
International Technical Cooperation Service of the Police
SR Section Recherche
Research Unit (Gendarmerie)
SRPJ: Section Regional de la Police Judiciaire
Investigations Branch of the Judicial Police
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I Introduction
In France four ministries are involved in fighting organised crime, the Interior 
Ministry, the Justice Ministry as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Defence. Each has been equipped with a cell, unit, division or police structure that in one 
aspect or another is entitled to combat one specific aspect of organised crime. The co­
ordination remains very inefficient and limited, the legislative arsenal less than formidable. 
In France today, despite a rising awareness of crime issues and particularly global 
organised crime issues^no really specific, highly targeted organised crime legislation really 
exists, and as a result France continues to remain a place of refuge for Mafia criminals.
On the terrain however, the police institutions are confronted with the reality and 
repercussions of organised crime. Unfortunately their police stracture, having evolved over 
several centuries and plagued with internal problems and co-ordination impediments can 
not combat organised crime efficiently either.
The police is the last rampart between crime and violence and the public. It is meant 
to protect the public from the threat of insecurity. It reassures the public that criminals are 
eventually caught and held accountable for their actions. The laws and ordinances decreed 
by the various government institutions and ministries no doubt seem rather foreign, distant 
and theoretical to the vast majority of the French citizens, yet to the police, as practitioners 
of these laws, as guarantors of security, they are concrete tools that aid and sometimes 
hinder the fight against crime. The police represents the final link between the government, 
the Justice and lawmakers, and the criminals. No matter how good, complex or well 
intended the laws to curb organised crime are, if the police is incapable, unwilling or ill - 
equipped to apply them, they remain useless.
Especially in the case of highly organised, transnational and sophisticated crime 
syndicateslike the Mafia, the police needs to operate at its optimum capacity and level, must 
possess adequate, efficient resources and tools, and needs to intensely co-operate and co­
ordinate its actions. However, the French police is not a flawless institution, and is far from 
operating at its optimum level. It is plagued with historical, legal and structural problems 
that hinder its work, and foster resentment and rivalries, rather than the much-needed co­
operation. Needless to say, the primary beneficiaries of this less than ideal environment are 
the criminals.
The fight against organised crime, assuredly implicates political will and a strong 
legal framework, but also the different police institutions. The French, despite their
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reputation as Cartesians, did not have a systematic or rational approach to devising their 
police institutions. In fact the French police model is rather an accumulation of structures, 
services, and sections that overlap, compete and overstep each other. The principle reason 
behind this seemingly haphazard model is the fact that most branches and specialises 
services were created throughout history, as a response to a threat, situation or political 
climate, and not as a well-thought out preventative stmcture, clearly delineated and mapped 
out from the start.' This situation has certainly contributed to the difficulty in efficiently 
combating security threats like organised crime.
In France, civilian security (as opposed to national or military security) is ensured 
by two different police forces, the Police Nationale (PN), and the Gendarmerie Nationale 
(GN), respectively under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defence. 
Both services are delineated by their operational field: theoretically, the Police Nationale 
operates in urban areas and the Gendarmerie Nationale in rural areas. Off all the crimes 
committed in France 31,3% are reported and dealt with by the Gendarmerie, and 68.7 % 
by the Police Nationale.' The Police Judiciaire (PJ) is a third, highly specialised police unit, 
sort of offshoot the Police Nationale, but also regroups officers from the Gendarmerie.
The bi-cephal nature of the police in France has contributed to many problems 
including unhealthy competition between the PN and GN, lack of co-ordination, 
withholding of crucial information and generally bad morale, all of which have led to 
botched affairs, and unsolved cases. This unproductive and actually potentially destructive 
environment has quite obviously, not helped the fight against organised crime, on the 
contrary its is the villains and criminals who benefit most fiom this chaotic environment. 
There are in fact four factors within the French police institution that contribute negatively 
to the fight against organised crime. They are organisational problems, internal structural 
complexities, functional difficulties and political involvement.
^Madelin, Philippe. "Journalist /  Author.” Paris. France. Police Rivalries, 1997.
^Cairo, Robert. “Organisation generale et missions de la police en France.” Revue Internationale de 
criminologie et de police technique .4 (1991).
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II The French Ministries & the laws
1. The Ministries
In France, four different ministries, theoretically work in conjunction with each 
other, handle various aspects of organised crime. They are the Interior Ministry, the 
Ministry of Defence, the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Finance. In reality though 
little real, hands-on co-ordination really occurs, as their relationships are generally marred 
by years of intense competition and aggressive rivalry.
The Ministry of Interior
The Ministère de l’Intérieur, in addition to the various police structures that will be 
discussed at length below, is also equipped with three specialised organised crime cells.
- The Unité de Coordination et de Recherche Anti-Mafia (UCRAM)^/^.
The UCRAM’s aim is to facilitate understanding and co-ordination by bringing together, 
under one structure ranking members of the Interior/Defence and Finance Ministry to 
discuss and act on organised crime issues. Created in 1992, the original intent was to 
prevent and “eventual” penetration of Mafia activities into France. There are three official 
mandates for the UCRAM, they are to co-ordinate, animate and orient the actions of the 
different police services with and aim to combat organised crime activity in France.^
- The Section Centrale d’investigation sur le Crime Organisé (SCICO)^ and within it the 
Centrale du Renseignement et de l’Analyse sur le Crime Organisé (CRACO)^
- Office Centrale pour la Repression du Banditisme (OCRB)^
 ^Sister organisation to the UCLAT: Unité de Coordination et de Recherche Anti-Terrorisme.
 ^Anti Mafia Research and Co-ordination Unit 
 ^Ministry of Interior: Http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/dcpj/iutte.htm 
Central Section for Investigation on Organised Crime 
 ^“Centrale" for Information and Analysis on Organised Cripie
 ^Central Office for the Repression of Banditry
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The Ministry of Defence
The Ministère de la Défense uses the Gendarmerie Nationale and detaches forces, either 
Officers of the Judicial police or Agents of the Judicial Police to the Police Judiciaire in 
order to combat organised crime/
The Ministry of Justice
The Ministère de la Justice, in addition to the court sections that can prosecute organised 
crime cases brought before them, has two other structures to combat organised crime:
- Direction des Affaires Criminelles et des Graces (DACG) possesses a sub-directorate on 
Economic and Financial Affairs, that in turn has a unit specialised in organised crime cases, 
but generally limited to those of a financial nature/'^ This sub-directorate in addition to co­
ordinating organised crime actions within the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry, is also 
responsible for training magistrates and public servants and making them aware of 
organised crime issues.
- In addition, in a move to co-ordinate international efforts to combat organised crime the 
Ministry of Justice detaches liaison magistrates to other European capitals. This Magistrate 
is supposed to facilitate procedures (for extradition for example), help co-ordination efforts, 
facilitate communication on a bilateral level, and generally keep his Ministry informed of 
events pertaining to OC occurring in his host country.
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministère des Finances also has two specialised organised crime structures, the 
TRACFIN and the DNRED:
- Traitement du Renseignement et Action Contre les Circuits Financiers (TRACFIN)" 
Direction Nationale de la Recherche et des Enquêtes des Douanes (DNRED)" and the 
parallel Dhectorate, the Direction Nationale de la Recherche et des Enquêtes des Finances
 ^Please refer to information on the Gendarmerie Nationale later on in the chapter.
Minsitry of Justice: http://www.justice.gouv.fr/minister/mindacg.htm 
" Treatment, Information and Action Against Financial Circuits
" National Directorate for the Research and Investigation of Customs and of Finances
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(DNREF)
Created in 1990, TRACFIN has a staff of 35 people, 20 of whom are investigators. The two 
aims of TRACFIN are to regroup, analyse and diffuse information pertaining to clandestine 
financial circuits and money laundering operations within the Ministry of Finance and to 
receive all declarations and reports of suspicious financial transactions in the banking 
circuit. If TRACFIN finds elements that point to money laundering (dmgs and OC) it has 
the ability to report it with the “procureur” and request the opening of a formal judicial 
inquiry." TRACFIN is also able to co-operate, on a bilateral basis with other national 
banking control mechanism and transmit and receive information from/to them".
The structures that were devised in France to help combat organised crime are a good start, 
but should not be considered as the solution. It is a step in the right direction, but because 
their scope of action is so limited, and because they are tangled within inter-Ministry 
rivalries, with no one having the decisive jurisdiction over all aspect of organised crime, 
they are largely inefficient. Again, France could learn from the Italian example and think 
about creating a French equivalent to the DNA, or the DNA. For the moment the structures 
that exist, with the possible exception of TRACFIN, are much more research and 
information gathering units than really effective anti-mafia mechanisms.
2. The legislative arsenal, or lack thereof
France, unlike Italy has not equipped itself with and arsenal of Mafia specific 
legislation. It has no specific Mafia incrimination law, no specific judicial procedure, no 
specialised court," no confiscation of assets, no reversal of the burden of proof, all of which 
are tools that are available in Italy to combat organised crime." In addition the few 
legislative tools that could be used to target organised crime are quite limited in their 
application, and hence in their efficiency because they focus on the infraction, on the actual 
crime, rather than focusing on the appurtenance to an organised crime network. For
In 2000, TRACFIN repertoried 2537 declarations of suspicion, 156 of which were brought to the 
“procureur” for further investigation. Source: Ministry of Finance: http://www.finances.gouv.fr
"  As of 19 December 2000: 19 countries, European and non-European have signed a co-operation 
agreement with TRACFIN.
"  In cases involving terrorism however a specialised court “parquet anti-terrorisme” presides.
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example, a Mafia boss can be prosecuted for extortion, or fraud, but not for actually being 
a member of, or running an. organised crime network.
• Law 450’1 NCP - Association de Malfaiteur
In France the closest law to the Italian Mafia association law is the “Association de
Malfaiteur”, roughly translated as the Association of “ill-doers”.
Constitutes an association of “malfaiteur” all groups formed, or established in view 
of the preparation of, characterised by one or several material facts, of one or 
several crimes or infractions punishable by 10 years of imprisonment.
ThistAssociation the Malfaiteurls punishable by ten years of prison and 1,000,000 
FF of fines.
# Law 90-614 (of 12 July 1990)
This law targets money laundering by holding responsible the financial institutions that 
accepts the proceeds from drug trafficking generated income.
* Law 132-71 (of 14 May 1993)
This law introduced for the first tiifti? in France the notion of an organised group with the 
intention to commit one or several infractions. This law can be used as an aggravating 
circumstance when prosecuting another crime.
Extradition Lawsi
The extradition laws in France are such that no person can be extradited abroad, even in the 
presence of a bilateral extradition treaty, if the offence that he is being charged with in that 
country does not exist in French law. Hence, when Michele Zaza (Camorra and Cosa 
Nostra godfather) was arrested on the French Riviera, Italy requested that he be extradited 
on the grounds of Mafia association. This posed a significant problem for France who 
could not extradite him on that basis because Mafia association was not a crime in the 
French Penal Code."
The following table, presents the laws in the French “Code Penal” although not Mafia 
specific that can be used to prosecute the infraction or crime perpetrated by and organised 
crime member. These laws are not as effective as the Italian Rognone-Latorre laws that
Raufer, Xavier & Quéré, Stéphane: La Criminalité Organisé. Que sais-je Paris: 2000.
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stipulate that belonging to or participating in an organised crime group is sufficient grounds 
for prosecution.
The ai'senal of laws that Italy devised went after the very nature of organised crime by 
attacking the profits, freezing assets and requiring that the burden of proof be reversed. In 
France this is obviously not the case, France limits its laws to the acts and not the cause 
or the nature of the organisation within which, or for which it was committed. In order for 
France to really begin to make inroads against organised crime, it is quite probable that it 
will have to make legislative changes that allow for the belonging of organised crime to 
become a prosecutable offence.
"  Zaza was finally extradite on grounds of drug trafficking, cigarette contraband and murder.
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French Penal C ode.
Articles pertaining to activities of Organized crime
Article Description of Crime Maximum Maximum
Encarceration Fines
221-1 Murder 30
221-3 Murder - premeditated life
222-17 Threatening to commit a crime 6 months 50,000
Death threat 3 300,000
-222-.18__ JIhreatvvithnonditioiis to he fulfilled 3 -300,Q00_.......
Death threats with conditions 5 500,000
222-34 Organizing a drug trafficking network life 50,000,000
222-35 Manufacturing drugs 20 50,000,000
'Mandfacturing drugs by organized crime 30 50,000,000
222-36 Importing or exporting drugs 10 50,000,000
Importing or eiqporting drugs by organized crime 30 50,000,000
222-37 Possession of drugs 10 50,000,000
222-38 Money Laundering 10 5,000,000
222-39-
1
Inability to justify resources with a connection to 
drugs
5 500,000
224-1 Kidnapping and seqimstering 20
if  freed within a week 5 50,000
224-2 Kidnapping+ maiming or mutilation life •
224-3 Kidnapping by organized crime 30
225-5 Prostituting another person 5 1,000,000
225-6 . Acting as an intennediary to prostitution 5 , 1,000,000
225-8 Prostitution rings held by organized crime 20 20,000,000
225-10 Ruiming or owning a house of prostitution 10 5,000,000
226-1 Violation of personal privacy 
(in view o f blackmail)
1 300,000
225-13 Exploitation of woikers 2 500,000
225-15 Exploitation of many workers 5 1,000,000
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227-23 Child pornography 1 300,000
227-
25/27
Sex with a consenting minor 2 200,000
311-1/3 Theft 3 300,000
311-4 Aggravated theft 5 500,000
311-8 Armed robbery 20 1,000,000
311-9 Theft by organized crime 15 1,000,000
Armed robbery by organized crime 30 1,000,000
312-1 Extorhon 7 700,000
.312-6...... E#prMon crime. ........ ..................... .. 20 ..1,000,000
312-10 Blackmail 5 500,000
312-11 blackmail when carried out. 7 700,000
313-1 Fraud 5 2,500,000
313-2 Fraud by OC 7 5,000,000
432-10 Corruption by a public servant 5 500,000
432-11 Passive, corruption 10 1,000,000
432-12 Public Servant abusing his position and jSnancially 
benefttting from his position
5 500,000
432-14 Obtaining illegal advantages on public works bidding 2 200,000
432-14 Embezzling state-ftmds 10 1,000,000
433-1 Active corruption 10 1,000,000
433-2 Soliciting favours from a public servant 5 500,000
433-2 Intimidation and threats against a public servant 2 200,000
Death threats 5 500,000
442-1 Counterfit Currency 30 3,000,000
442-2 Circulating or transporting counterfit currency 10 1,000,000
when organized crime 30 3,000,000
450-1 Association de Malfaiteurs 10 1,000,000
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I l l  The Police Institutions
The police is typically associated with the outward, visible aspect of state control. 
It tends to symbolise a state’s attempt at maintaining public order and guaranteeing public 
security, and is the obvious, physical manifestation of the State, yet it remains widely 
misunderstood and its missions and objectives largely unfamiliar to the vast majority of the 
public.^*
Significantly, very little academic work focusing on the police has been conducted 
in France. What little research does exist focuses primarily on the history or legal 
administrative duties of the police, and hardly at all on the sociology, culture or work of the 
police.^*’ More recently (since mid-eighties) more research has been done in France^”, but 
many issues remain untouched, seemingly taboo. Appropriately, one such recent study was 
entitled “Cops; 120,000 strangers”.^  ^ The press and media seem to focus on the police 
mishaps and scandals, and occasionally focus on the rivalries between the different 
services, but even then it serves more as a newsworthy episode coverage rather than a 
serious analytical approach to understanding the inner working of the police institution.
Studies have been published on the French police institutions by Anglophone 
researchers, but the French tend to dismiss their analysis as simplistic and erroneous. The 
French academics and practitioners^^ are extremely skeptical of the Anglo-Saxon work in 
particular because they attempt to analyse the French police institutions within the context 
of their own more communitarian police, rather than as a unique and purely French 
institution, devoid of any correlation or resemblance with any other non-French institution. 
Much of the terminology is specific to France and cannot be accurately tianslated and 
hence it is for this reason that it will appear in its original format and not as mediocre
^^Leclerc, Marcel. Problèmes actuels de la police. Conference: Ecole Nationale de l ’Administration, 
1986.
^^Gleizal, Jean-Jacques. La Police en France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993 and Gleizal, 
G, J Gatti-Domenach, and C Tournes. La Police. Paris: PUF, 1993.
^^efer to Cairo, Robert. “Organisation generale et missions de la police en France.” Revue Internationale 
de criminologie et de police technique .4 (19911 and Madelin. Philippe. La Guerre des Police. Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1989.
^^Leauthier, Alain, and Frederic Ploquin. Les Flics: 120.000 Inconnus. Paris: Flammarion, 1990.
^^The interviews conducted for this chapter all reflected the same sentiment: the Anglo-Saxon approach to 
analyzing the French police institutions are considered inaccurate by French practitioners, and hence 
should be altogether dismissed.
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attempts at finding English approximation.” According to the French academics, the 
“raison d ’etre** of the police is composed of three primary missions and four tasks. The 
mission of the police contradicts the objectives of organised crime: to protect people and 
goods, re-establish order when it has been perturbed, and defend the institutions and the 
state. Its four principle tasks are information gathering, regulation of societal life, 
participation in the exercise of justice, and maintenance of public order." The 
Revolutionary (1789) definition of the police objectives further reflected aspects of these 
missions:
Article 16/17 of the Code of offences and infractions (3 Brumaire year IV)
The police is instituted to maintain public order, liberty, propriety and 
individual security, its main characteristic is vigilance, society considered 
“en masse” is the object of its solicitude."
L Police Nationale
The two main branches of the Police Nationale as it stands today, are the “police
judiciaire” (PJ), and “police administrative”(PA). First separated in August 1790 to
preserve the autonomy of the judicial from the police, it has largely remained in its original
format since then. The primary authority of the PJ comes from judicial tribunals and
private law, whilst the PA is governed by the administrative tribunal and administrative
law. It is a judge however who decides which branch of the police is competent in what
matter. The legal framework of the police nationale is defined by Article I of the
Deontological Code:"
To be active on the entirety of the territory, guaranteeing liberties and 
defending the institutions of the republic, maintaining peace and public
^^For an Anglo-Saxon explanation of the French police structure, which the French experts reject as 
oversimplified and inaccurate, please refer to the following sources: Anderson, Malcolm. "Working 
Paper I: The French Police and European Co-Operation.” . Edinburgh: Project Group European Police 
Co-Operation, University o f Edinburgh, 1991. Anderson, Malcolm, and Monica den Boer. ‘‘European 
Police Co-Operation: Proceedings of a Seminar.” . Edinburgh: Project Group on European Police Co- 
Operation University of Edinburgh, 1992.Kurian, George Thomas. World Encvclopedia of Police 
Forces and Police Svstems. New York: Facts on File, 1989.Becker, Harold. Police Svstems o f Europe. 
Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1973.Becker, Harold, and Donna Lee Bercker. Handbook of 
the World's Police. London: Scarecrow Press, 1986.
'^^ Aubert, Jacques, and Raphael Petit. La Police en France: Service Public. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1981, 
page 31.
^^Aubert, Jacques, and Raphael Petit. La Police en France: Service Public. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1981, 
page 31.
‘^^ The French police is subjected to the Republican code and the concept of “Etat de droit”.
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order and protecting people and property.”
The mission of the Police Nationale is that of an urban police with a generalist 
mission to prevent disorder and restore order." More specifically, its mission is composed 
of two main objectives: to participate in the protection of the territory, and finally to guard 
the institutions of the state and ensure their proper functioning. In addition, the law 
pertaining to the orientation and programming relative to security (Law 95-73), enumerated 
the PN five main duties: to ensure the security of people and goods, protect the country 
from terrorist or outside threats, combat organised crime, delinquency and drug trafficking, 
control migratory fluxes, and guard against clandestine work, and finally maintain public 
order. Its jurisdiction is urban areas with a population of more than 10,000 population.” 
The Police Nationale operates on a budget of $5.6 billion USD (27.96 billion FF) 
and employs more than 126,000 people, 90% of which are considered active, and 10% are 
support/administrative personal, divided into eight broad categories:"
- High ranking functionaries 79
- Directors 9
- Inspector Generals 13
- General Comptrollers 57
- Management corps 2,084
- Commanding corps 17,441
- “Regular police” 94,162
- Administrative personnel 12,463
- Total “active” employees 113,766
- Total employees: 126,229
Since September 1,1995 the ranks and categories within the Police Nationale are 
divided in three main categories:
^Tnstitut Social de France, “Tout ce que vous devez savoir sur le Ministère de l'Interieur et de la Sécurité 
Publique.” . Paris: Institut Social de France et des Etats de la Communauté Européenne, 1993.
^^Law 3 September 1986 pertaining to ID checks enables the police to carry out verification of individuals 
disturbing public order or infringing on the security of people or goods.
^*Law of 1941.
^^inistere de l'Interieur. “Effectifs de la police nationale." www.interieur.gouv.fr.
This total does not include the 7,104 police auxiliaries. These auxiliaries will slowly be phased out.
It is interesting to note that women comprise only 14.36% of the active police employees and a staggering 
76.98% of the administrative personnel.
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Corps de Conception et de Direction / Direction Corps
Inspecteur General / Inspector General 
Controlleur General / General Controller 
Commissaire Divisionnaire / Divisional “Commissaire* 
Commissaire Principal / Principal “Commissaire** 
Commissaire de Police / Police “ Commissaire**
Corps de Commandement et d’Encadrement / Training and Command Corps
Commandant de Police / Police Commandant 
Capitaine de Police / Police Captain 
Lieutenant de Police / Police Lieutenant
Corps de Maitrise et d* Application
Brigadier Maj or / Brigadier Major
Brigadier /  Brigadier
Gardien de la Paix / Guardian of the Peace
Headed by the director general, the Police Nationale, is divided in three sections, 
the administrative directorate, the cabinet and the “active” directorate and services, the 
latter being the most involved in the fight against organised crime.” There are eight 
directorates within the “Directions et Services Actifs de la Police” each of which has a 
number of sub-directorates or specialised sections. The active directorates are:
High official security department (VO)
DICCILEC (former Central air and border police administration - PAP) 
International department for technical police co-operation (SCTIP)
Territorial surveillance administration (DST)
Central/general information administration (RG)
Central state security (DCS?) only used for military establishments 
Central judiciary police administration (DCPJ)
General/national police inspection department (IGPN)
C. Who fights organised crime specifically?
The three specialised units that fight organised crime are the Direction Centrale de 
la Police Judiciaire (see following section), but also the Renseignements Généraux who 
gather information and intelligence in France, and the Direction de la Surveillance du 
Territoire that gathers intelligence outside of France. The Police de l’Air et des Frontières 
is also involved in combating specific activities of organised crime, namely immigrant 
trafficking.
^^Please refer to the organization chart.
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The Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieur (1989) is the newest branch
of PN. It is a research unit on organised crime, and offers classroom teaching for
ambassadors, police officer, customs agents, and senior level civil servants, as well as
conference/symposium bringing together ranking officers of all the French security services
to promote a better understanding and co-operation. The aim of the IHESI is to train
practitioners not academics. The three missions of the IHESI are:
Increase awareness of specialists by offering training 
Animate and co-ordinate study and research programs 
Facilitate access to information
2. The Police Judiciaire
A rather simplistic, but effective differentiation of missions: the police 
administrative (PA) deals with the prevention of infractions, and the police judiciaire (PJ) 
deals with offences once they have been perpetrated.” As a highly specialises police unit, 
it has the peculiarity of being subject to a dual supervision, both by a magistrate and its 
respective administrative superiors. The three main areas the Police Judiciaire operates in 
are “flagrant delit” (offence in the process of being committed, or having just been 
committed), preliminary investigation, and commission rogatoire delivered by the Juge 
d’instruction.
The Legal Framework that guides the operation and structure of the Police Judicaire
is Article 14 of Code Procedure Penale"
The PJ is instructed with the duty to observe violation to the penal law, to 
assemble proof and to seek the authors of that infraction, so long as a case 
is not opened. When a case if officially opened, it shall carryout the orders 
of the Instructing Judge and defers to his requests.
The mission of the PJ broadly consists of centralising, distributing and exploiting 
information about criminals. Petty crimes, like theft, burglaries and aggressions are the 
jurisdiction of the local police. Crimes implicating aspects of organised crime, terrorism, 
and/or drug trafficking by their seriousness demand the competencies of highly trained and 
specialised police officers and are the jurisdiction of the Police Judiciaire.” Former Minister
^^des Saussaies, Bertrand. La Machine Policiere. Paris: Seuil, 1972.
'^^ The new CPF went into effect 1/3/1959 should not be confused with the Penal Code pf 1/3/1994 that 
replaced the 1810 Napoleonic C ode..
^^Genthial, Jacques. “La Police Judiciaire.” ENA Mensuel Special Police: XXVII.April (1985), page 13.
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of Justice Briand said that the PJ should only be called upon for infractions that may 
endanger public security at a high level." The official mission is setout in the 31 August 
1911 decree (completing the 1908 decree). The Contrôle General des Recherches is 
entrusted with the following mission:
- direct the Regional Brigades of the Mobile Police
- search for professional criminals and centralise all information pertaining to them.
- suppress all espionage
- centralise and distribute, by way of a publication called Bulletin Hebdomadaire de 
la Police Criminelle (Weekly Criminal Police Bulletin), the mandates and warrants sent out 
by the Ministry of Justice, against criminals at large.”
The four major axes of the Police Judiciaire are the centralisation efforts, the international
dimension, specialisation and territorial delineation:”
Employees and Personnel
The Police Judiciaire (PJ), strong of 7,800 employees in twenty different
directorates is a highly specialised unit whose central administration, the Direction Central
de la Police Judiciaire (DCPJ) falls under the authority of the Police Nationale. However,
this directorate possess a very unique status, as its legal authority is determined by the
presiding magistrate, and hence the Ministry of Justice. The PJ is in effect a special
assistant to the judge. Primarily police commissioners of the Police Nationale and officers
from the Gendarmerie Nationale can be entrusted, by the Ministry of Justice as Officers of
the PJ, and are authorised to work in a specific domain. This explains why PJ directorate
appears both in the PN and GN organisational chart. The legal framework of the PJ is
defined by Article 16 of CPP:
The Judicial Police is placed under the supervision of the Prosecutor of the 
Republic, (Procureur de la Republique) the supervision of the General 
Prosecutor (who attributes the accreditation), and the control of the 
Chambre d’Accusation (Indictments Chamber).
Several categories of persons can be assigned to the PJ, within two broad, profiles: Officers
of the PJ (OPJ) and Agents of the PJ, (APJ).
- Members of the OPJ are either officers of the Gendarmerie, 
Commissioners and Divisional Inspectors of the Police Nationale, Mayors
■^‘^ Susini, Jean.
^^Hreblay, p 19.
^^Hreblay, Vendelin. La Police Judiciaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, page 20-24.
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and their adjuncts, and general controllers.
- Members of the APJ, are those who do not respond to the profile of the 
OPJ, but have at least five years seniority and have passed a special exam.
- Other members of the police force or Gendarmerie can be recruited for a 
specific PJ mission and are then given the “occasional” PJ accreditation.
This allows them to work as an OPJ for a specific mission of a specific 
duration.
- Finally, as a result of Law 30 of the CPP, prefects are given special OPJ 
powers when a crime is deemed to put French national security in jeopardy.
In essence the Officers of the Police Judiciaire have several supervisors: for administrative 
purposes the DCPJ for the Police Nationale, the DCGN for the gendarmes OPJ and for all 
judicial matters the Ministry of Justice." The DCPJ has four sub-directorates (or sub­
administrations). They are criminal affairs, economic and financial affairs, technical and 
scientific police force, and exterior relations.
Sous Direction des Affaires Criminelles; Criminal affairs
- DLO: Division Logistique Operationelle
Operations and Logistics
- SCODCRACO: Section Centrale Opérationnelle de Documentation Centre de Recherche et
d ’Analyse pour le Crime Organisée, documentation center for research and 
analysis of Organised Crime.
- OCRTEH: Office Central pour la Repression de la Traite des
Etres Humains, which deals with trafficking in human 
beings (Created 31/10/58)
-OCRS: Office Central pour la Repression du Banditisme,
which deals with banditry and organised crime.
(Created 11/10/73)
-OCRVOOA: Office Centrale pour la Repression de Vol d*Oeuvres
et d ’Objets d'Arts, which deals with theft of artwork.
(Created 2/6/75)
- OCBC: Office Central de Lutte Contre le Trajïc de Biens Culturels,
Which deals with trafficking in national cultural treasures.
-OCRTIS: Office Central pour la Repression du Traffic Illicite de Stupéfiants, which deals
with drug trafficking. (Created 21/11/33)
- OCTAEMS: Office Central pour la Repression du Traffic d ’Armes,
des Munitions, des Produits Explosifs et des Matières
^^Davenos, Laurent. “Le Role du Magistrat.” ENA Mensuel Special Police: XXVII.April (1985).
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nucléaires, biologiques et chimiques, which deals with 
the trafficking of weapons, munitions, and explosives, 
as well as nuclear, biological and chemical materials 
trafficking. (Created 13/12/1982)
Sous Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières:
- DLO: Division Logistique Operationelle
-BNEE Brigade Nationale des Enquêtes Economiques
Which deals with economic and financial crimes investigations
-OCRGDF: Office Central pour la Repression de la Grande
Délinquance Financière,
Which deals with financial crimes (Created 9/5/90)
-OCRFM: Office Central National de la Repression du Faux Momutyage et de la Contrefaçon
des Sceaux de l ’Etat, which deals with counterfeit money and fake state seals. 
(Created 11/9/1929)
Sous Direction de la Police Technique et Scientifique:
- DLO: Division Logistique Operationelle
Operations and logistics division
-SCDC: Service Central de Documentation Criminelle
Criminal Documentation Center
-SCIJ: Service Central d ’Identité Judiciaire
Judicial Identity Service
-SCLPS: Service Central des Laboratoires de Police Scientifique
Police Laboratories
- CNRDF: Centre Nationale de Recherche de Documentation er de Formation,
Which deals with documentation and training.
Sous Direction des Liaisons Extérieures: external affairs
-DFC: Division de Formation et de Communication
Training and Communication
-DCT: Division du Contrôle Technique
Technical control
-DEP: Division des Etudes et de la Prospective
Research and prevision
-DRI: Division des Relations Internationales
International Relations division
Regional Services of the PJ (SRPJ)
Today there are 19 regional services of the PJ, plus the Paris PJ. Each that corresponds 
more or less to the jurisdiction of one or several Court of Appeals, and is responsible for 
2-8 different “departments”. The SRPJ employs 3,100 people, 2,300 of which are police
The French Institutions 141
officers. Each regional service has a technical section, a criminal section and an economic 
and financial section. Any regional division can be called upon, by a judge, to investigate 
a national matter, technically outside it territorial jurisdiction.
The two service of the Police Judicaire that deal exclusively with organised crime 
are the Office Centrale pour la Repression du Banditisme, and the Office Centrale pour la 
Grande Délinquance Financière. The OCRB handles all mafia association cases, as well 
as racketeering and premeditated murders, while the OCGDF specialises in money 
laundering cases. The OCRETH can also handle certain organised crime cases when they 
involve prostitution and immigrant trafficking cases. The OCRIEST can also be called on 
when OC networks are involved in clandestine work.
Officers of the PJ have special powers in the investigative phase of a case. These 
powers are established bv Articles D3 and D4 of CPP: °
- Right to move across jurisdictions:
Prior to being called the PJ, this police unit had been the Mobile police. It has 
retained some important elements from its origins, namely retaining the right to move 
across jurisdictions while investigating or pursuing a criminal. This measure was 
introduced to combat crime more effectively as the criminals obviously totally disregarding 
borders and territorial delineation were at a significant advantage over the police that was 
sequestered to specific areas. The procedure that enables the PJ to move across 
jurisdictions is set out in Article 18 of CPP. A Commission Rogatoire has to be opened by 
the Magistrate in the original jurisdiction of the PJ. If the PJ unit finds they need to leave 
their jurisdiction, the Magistrate heading the Commission Rogatoire has to be warned 
(Article D18 of CPP), as well as the State Prosecutor of the Jurisdiction in which the PJ is 
entering (Article D12 of CPP).
“ garde a vue (police custody)
Garde a vu is regimented by very strict procedural laws, and can only be ordered by an 
officer of the Police Judicaire when pertaining to a crime punishable by imprisonment. 
Normally the duration of police custody is 24 hours, but with authorisation from the State 
prosecutor, or presiding magistrate it can be extended a further 24 hours, however in the 
case of drug trafficking and terrorism, police custody can be prolonged for a total of four
'^ '’Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire. “La Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire et la Lutte 
Contre la Criminalité Organisée.” . Paris: Direction Centrale de la Police Nationale, 1997.
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days (96 hours).
- searches
Searches may only be conducted by officers of the PJ, and may be assisted by Agents of 
the PJ, but are subject to specific regulations. In a preliminary investigation written consent 
from the owner must be obtained in order to conduct a search. A search may be conducted 
against the will of the owner, only within the context of a Commission Rogatoire, or when 
caught in the act (flagrant deli). Searches may not be started after 9:00 p.m., or before 6:00 
am. However if a search is already in progress it may continue past the 9:00 p.m. deadline. 
Some searches are allowed outside the stated hours, but only in cases pertaining to 
prostitution, drug trafficking, and terrorism. In these instances, the magistrate must also 
give his written consent and may be present on site during the search.
- seizures
Seizure of evidence may be conducted at the place of the crime, at the residence of the 
accused, or an individual present at a search. Since seizures in French law are considered 
an infringement of personal rights, permission from the accused must be obtained during 
a preliminary investigation. In the case of a crime in the process of being committed 
(flagrant delit), seizures become the right of the police. All items seized must be 
inventoried and immediately placed under lock and key.
- piece judiciaire:
The police report (“procès verbal”) written by an officer of the PJ has legal 
authority. In effect, his police report can be introduced as evidence (“piece judiciaire”) 
during the trial, and the officer need not testify before the court. His report is considered 
as legally binding. This peculiarity of the French Law vis a vis the PJ demonstrates the 
special relationship between the Judge (representative of the Ministry of Justice) and the 
PJ.
-jirst to be called on the scene:
The officer of the Police Judicaire is supposed to be the first policeman called to the 
scene of a crime, as he is the only one allowed to take down a deposition. If an OPJ is not 
available immediately, any police officer may take down a report, but it must be 
authenticated and signed later on in the presence of an OPJ.
- Telephone wiretaps:
Law very strictly protects the privacy of telephone communications in France, and hence 
police tapping is strictly regimented. The presiding judge can order officers of the police
The French Institutions ^43
Judicaire to conduct wire taps, only when the suspected crime carries a sentencing of 2 
years imprisonment or more, and the wiretap can not exceed four months. Special 
allowances are made in cases pertaining to national security, the preservation of French 
scientific technology or national economic well-being, terrorism and organised crime, when 
requested by the Prime Minister and when placed under the control of an independent 
national monitoring commission.
- Reduction or withdrawal of incarceration 
Provisions are made within the French Penal Code to reduce or exempt firom imprisonment 
perpetrators of specific crimes (drug trafficking, terrorism and organised crime) that have 
collaborated with police and justice authorities.
There have been several currents within successive French governments to try and 
detach the Central Directorate of the PJ from the Police Nationale, and attach instead to the 
Ministry of Justice, but because the Police Nationale has strongly opposed this move, and 
so it has remained with the PN. Statistically speaking, the PJ has proven quite successful, 
it claims that it solves 90% of all its murder cases, and 60% of all it armed robbery cases."'^
3i The Prefecture de Paiis^ ^
The Prefecture de Paris (PP) benefits from a particular status. It has its own PJ that 
although attached to the Central Directorate (DCPJ) benefits from a status of quasi­
autonomy. The mission of the Prefecture de Police de Paris is pluralistic as it entails 
administrative duties that we have seen are normally attributed to the Mayor, as well as 
security and policing duties. Its main mission is to guarantee order and security and protect 
the citizens of Paris.
The prefect of Paris is responsible for the protection of 5, 982,000 people in the 
greater Paris region, 2,059,700 in actual downtown Paris. The prefecture de Paris counts 
39,678 total employees, 32,321 of which are actual police officers, and 7,357 of which are 
support staff.”
Uniformed police officers 27,037
Non-Uniformed police officers 4;925
‘^ ^Ministere de l’Interieur. Gendarmerie Nationale : de la Tradition vers la Modernité. Paris: Service 
Diffusion Gendarmerie, 1996.
is worthwhile mentioning the Prefecture de Police de Paris even though it has limitrophe involvement 
in the national fight against organize crime, yet not mentioning it at all might be construed as an oversight
'^^Secretariat General pour P Administration et la Police (SGAP)
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Police Commissioners 
Support staff
Total number of employees
359
7,357
39,678
The prefect commands a very large jurisdiction which includes: Paris defence zone 
(8 departments and De de France), 3 surrounding departments (Hauts de Seine, Seine St. 
Denis and Val de Marne) for police administration. His mandate puts him in charge of m 
municipal police and administrative police, and seats him as the hierarchical Superior of 
Paris Judicial Police. There are five active, and four administrative directorates within the 
prefecture de Paris, as well several other specialised units:
• 5 active directorates:
- public security
- Judicial police
- Political research (RG)
- Technical Services
- General inspection of services
• 4 administrative directorates
- personnel, budget, equipment
» general policing
- traffic, circulation and communication
- public protection (sanitation field)
Inter-departmental unit (6 sub-units ■¥ 3 PJ units)
Fire Brigade (actually military but sponsored by Mairie de Paris) 
Military Unit
The French Institutions 145 "
»  
t ï ”
! ^$'' ! il H r C  V ,2 t  _ & j51
%
%
g
:saBM
I !
5 w 2  ê
4. The Gendarmerie Nationale^ (GN)
The Gendarmerie Nationale, regimented by the Charter of 20th May. 1903. watches
over 95% du territoire and 50% de la population. Reports 1/3 of all crimes, and solves half
of all crimes. Its mission is dual as it encompasses both civilian and military tasks”.
Napoleon though the Gendarmerie was a very special unit:
It is a special organisation that does not exist anywhere else in Europe. It 
is the most effective way of guaranteeing the tranquillity of the people. It 
is half-civilian, half-military surveillance, spread all across the national 
territory.”
The breakdown of duties carried out by the Gendarmerie demonstrates that more than half 
of its time is dedicated to administrative policing, whilst a third is spent working for the 
Police Judiciaire.
The Gendarmerie employs nearly 90,(XXT' soldiers, specialised in policing. The breakdown 
of ranks is as follows:
- Officers 2,549
- Sous-officiers (NCO’s) 74,766
- Enlisted 605
- Auxiliaries 10,342
In departmental gendarmerie is divided in OPJ: 17,000, and APJ: 30,000. GN is mainly
Closest translation is the National Constabulary.
^^The missions and competencies have evolved significantly and progressively broadened in scope since 
its inception: 1536 - crimes and robberies /  1547 - murders /1564 - armed mugging /1670  - robberies 
that included braking and entering, and riots.
F in is tè r e  de la Defense. National Gendarmerie. Paris; Service de diffusion de la gendarmerie 
nationale, n/a, page 5.
^^Gleizal, Jean-Jacques. La Police en France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, page 37.
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career military recruited directly as Commissioned Officers or Non-Commissioned 
Officers, 14,000 men chose to do their mandatory military service in the GN, while women 
represent 7.5% of NCO and CO.
The two main sections of the GN are identifiable by the colours of the epaulettes 
on their uniform: white epaulettes signify departmental gendarme, and the yellow a mobile 
gendarme. The gendarmerie is divided into progressively smaller “jurisdictions”, starting 
with three regions, Atlantic, Mediterranean, North-Eastern, down to the basic unit the 
squad:"
- squads 3,807
- companies 420
- battalions 97
- legions 31
- districts 9
- regions 3
4-1 mobile gendarmerie in each district
'^ T^here are 6-15 squads to a company, an 6 companies to a battalion.
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3 REGIONS 9 DISTRICTS
d
37 BATTALIONS
31 LEGIONS
420 COMPANIES
3807 SQUADS
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IV Rivalries between police forces
According to many police and gendarmes, one of the biggest hindrances to 
combating a phenomenon like organised crime, is the lack of co-operation, and destructive 
rivalries that exist between the different forces, as well as the rivalries that exist between 
different ministries. The root of rivalries between and even in some cases within police 
forces are not a recent phenomenon, but rather the evolution of historical conflicts, set 
within a modem context. The four main reasons behind these rivalries are organisational 
complexities, internal-structural problems, functional difficulties, and finally political 
involvement. There are of course other, more minor reasons that will not be covered here. 
Each instance alone, would already disrupt the smooth operation of the police, but 
compounded these difficulties have hindered police work:
These rivalries oppose the different police services like warring tribes:
uniformed against non-uniformed, lower-ranks against elite, inspectors
against commissioners, Parisians against provincials, the list is long...."
Once again, within the context of impending threats, these conflicts can prove 
disastrous. Rather than co-operate in order to rapidly and efficiently investigate, arrest and 
prosecute a criminal, the different police forces have been known to quarrel over 
jurisdiction, withhold valuable information and in some cases voluntarily mislead their 
colleagues, all of which inevitably lead to botched cases and letting criminals go free.
JL Organisational problems:
The French policing stmcture, bi-cephal (PN and GN), or even tri-cephal (including 
the PJ) was never actually planned out to have different services attached to different 
ministries, but this situation occurred almost accidentally, as an accident or bi-product of 
French history.^ ® These institutions reflect their haphazard origins, in that they are not 
properly delineated in terms of scope of activity, jurisdiction, and the rules that govern their 
rapport vague. The services that eventually evolved into the modem PN, GN and PJ were 
created as reactions to a threat political climate or situations, rather than as a well though- 
out, preventative structure. This system of hindsight rather than foresight meant that in the
‘^ ^eauthier, Alain, and Frederic Ploquin. Les Flics: 120.000 Inconnus. Paris: Flanunarion, 1990, page 
67.
^^rbes, Jean-Marc, “De l'Ordre a la Sécurité.” L'Ordre Public et les Citoyens 229.March (1993), page 6.
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face of a new menace, a new unit was devised, not always, and in fact rarely, taking into 
consideration the existence of other services. Predictably, the result was a structure of 
overlapping, competing and pile-up of services. Few reforms were enacted, and those that 
were, tinkered^  ^ with the system rather than giving it a full overhaul. The result is a 
veritable patchwork of services that often conflict with each other and fight over territorial 
and jurisdictional authority.
The French State, as is its detestable habit, has multiplied the organisations,
and has not forgotten to place them in situations of competition”
2. Internal - Structural Problems
Rivalries exist not only between the different police institutions, but also within the 
individual institutions. One of the main sources of conflict with the PN, pertains to hiring 
procedure and the “pernicious system of elitism”." Candidates with a higher university 
degree can qualify for the “Commissaire” exam, which if successfully passed, admits them 
to the “Ecole des Commissaires” (officers training school/police academy), and eventually 
propels them directly into police leadership." In practice officers with little or no 
experience can end up supervising and commanding men with years of field experience. 
Not only does this contribute to tensions between the “elite” Commissaire, and the “lowly” 
policemen, but often the elite completely lacks the ground knowledge necessary to properly 
conduct investigations. The Commissaire end up being perceived as not one of the police 
who has walked the beat and then risen through the ranks, but as one of “them”, the ruling 
elite with little ties with the common man. This rift within the force is responsible for 
clashes between the stratums and a genuine lack of understanding of tactics. The 
Commissaire are more familiar with policing theory than policing reality." So even within 
a police organisation, harmony is not always achieved and hence the smooth flow of
•^^ Monet, Jean-CIaude. “Une Administration face a son avenir: police et sciences sociales.” Sociologie du 
Travail Special Police: XXVII.April (1985), page 373.
^^Thierry, Jean-Pierre. Le Droit des Plus forts. Paris: Fixot, 1990.
^^Diamant, "Commissaire". Les Reseaux Secrets de la Police. Paris: La Découverte, 1993. (Diamant is a 
pen-name, and his book is viewed by some as more of a political propaganda pamphlet than a reliable 
source of information.)
■^'^ L’Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police - St. Cyr au Mont d’Or, also known as the Ecole des 
Commissaires, trains two classes of 70 commissaires a year.
^^Madelin, Philippe. “Journalist /  Author.” Paris. France. Police Rivalries, 1997.
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operation is hindered. Turmoil within a force certainly cannot help create a propitious 
environment to co-ordinate with another police force like the Gendarmerie.
3. Functional problems: the role of the Magistrate
Functional problems also plague the various police institutions, harbours rivalries 
and end in conflicts that impair their ideal operation. The main problems are competition 
for high profile cases and the unfamiliarity of certain magistrates with the criteria for 
selection of a specific unit. Although a bit of competition can prove healthy since it can 
motivate and push the different services to work harder and achieve more, constant, 
obsessive competition is destructive for the police institutions. Because of the 
particular legal framework that allows the Judge to decide to whom he wishes to give the 
case to, the competition is ever present (covered by Article D1 of CPPl." The PJ of the GN, 
and PJ of PN occasionally enter into open war-like competition for attribution of important 
cases, each hoping to receive the glory and praise associated with solving it. The higher 
the profile, the higher the honours and the greater the reward. The different services can 
attempt to petition the Investigating Judge (Juge d’instruction) for control of the case, and 
sometimes get involved in quasi- bidding wars. This competition although officially 
condemned by the government and the ministries, is secretly encouraged by the police 
leadership.”
A gruesome murder in 1990, of a little boy named Gregory, made these police 
bidding wars infamous". The inquiry’s investigative authority flip-flopped back and forth 
between the Police and Gendarmerie, making a farce of the whole investigation process, 
and highlighting the problems surrounding attribution of cases. The case was first entrusted 
to the Gendarmerie, who were immediately accused (in the hopes of winning the case 
back), by the Police Nationale of having sabotaged the case by destroying valuable on the 
scene evidence. The Gendarmerie was dismissed from the case, and the Section Regional
'^ ‘^ See previous chapter for additional details on attribution of cases.
^T^eauthier, Alain, and Frederic Ploquin. Les Flics: 120.000 Inconnus. Paris: Flammarion, 1990, page 
67.
^^ On October 14,1990, little Gregory Villemin was found drowned in very suspicious circumstances in a 
river in the Vosges mountains. The inquiry which captivated France and sent the media into a frenzy, was 
first given to a young judge from Epinal, Michel Lambert, before being completely canceled and 
reassigned. During a recreation of the events leading up to the drowning, Gregory’s father murdered his 
brother in law, convinced he was implicated in his son’s death.
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of the Police Nationale was appointed to investigate. The case, because of additional 
mistakes, was withdrawn from the Judge and given to a Judge in Dijon, who proceeded to 
re-entrust it to the Gendarmerie.”
Much of this competition could be alleviated and tensions eased if all the 
magistrates were completely familiar with the competencies of each police service, and 
used those as the only barometer for attribution of cases. This however is not always the 
situation, as many magistrates are not wholly familiar with the specificity of each service 
and can “ill-attribute” a case to the wrong unit and cause strife to the overlooked party."
4. Political Involvement
Perhaps considered by many as dangerous ground to tread on, political involvement 
and meddling deserves to be mentioned as one of the reasons for continued rivalry between 
police forces. Had the politicians tnily wanted to eliminate competition and encourage co­
ordination, they would have done so, seems to the sentiment echoed by academics and 
practitioners alike._France has had a long tradition of political manipulation of police," the 
idea was to assimilate police to the governing power in order to control it, tame it and 
appropriate it for its defence."
A more modem approach to the reasons backing a political involvement in police 
affairs is that in fact the police wars are deliberately encouraged by politicians, in an 
attempt to avoid it becoming too powerful. Creating rivalries divides the police and makes 
it easier to control, and prevents a military or police coup." To others, the police has simply 
become a toy, or in some cases a tool for the politicians." A way through which to obtain
^^adelin, Philippe. La Guerre des Police. Paris: Albin Michel, 1989, page 303.
*^^eblay, Vendelin, La Police Judiciaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, page 34.
^^Louis XIV was a pioneer in this area, and used the police as an army of spies to gather information on 
his subjects and particularly on his enemies as did his successor, Louis XV. Antoine Sartine, his Lt 
General of Police used to openly boast:“Sire, when three people are talking in the street, one of them for 
sure is mine”.
‘^ ^Leauthier, Alain, and Frederic Ploquin. Les Flics: 120.000 Inconnus. Paris: Flammarion, 1990, page 
177.
*^ ^MadeIin, Philippe. La Guerre des Police. Paris: Albin Michel, 1989, page 15.
"^Leauthier, Alain, and Frederic Ploquin. Les Flics: 120.000 Inconnus. Paris: Flammarion, 1990, page 
175.
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information on political opponents and a way to “sink” a political foe."
In addition, the prestige of having one police, either PN, GN or PJ crack a case also
entails a positive the media effect, and brings to the Ministry from which it depends glory
and public recognition.
...success and prestige, if it created emulation, it also sharpens appetites, 
especially in a society where the media coverage is not the least attraction.
The consequence is that everyone wants to participate in the grand hunt, 
and do it, seeks and capture its prey, adopts its structures and its strategies, 
often in complete contradiction with its original vocation."
^  The Erignac Case”
The case concerning the murder of Corsican prefect Claude Erignac (6 January, 
1998) illustrates the extent and destructiveness of police rivalries. It shows how these 
rivalries hinder the investigation process and advantages the culprits. The investigation that 
looked into his murder, and possible Mafia links between different suspects," became the 
subject of violent police wars, political involvement as well as inter-ministry conflict, and 
brought the investigation to a virtual stand-still, with one of the main suspected culprits 
having been identified but not arrested. Today more than 3 Y2 years later the case is still not 
solved and one of the main suspects is still not in police custody.
The multiplicity of actors that were involved in one stage or another of the case, 
SRPJ of Ajaccio, DNAT, Gendarmerie, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Prime 
Minister’s Office created an imbroglio that paralysed the police institution for nearly a year.
- From the veiy beginning of the investigation, two rival services were already 
facing off: the SRPJ of the Gendarmerie Nationale under the direction of Mr. Dragacci, and 
the DNAT emanating from the Police Nationale, under the direction of Roger Marion. 
Where as the SRPJ had excellent knowledge of the local situation, Mr. Marion had
‘^ ^Former French President Francois Mitterand was notorious for misusing the police for political 
purposes.
*®*^ Hreblay, Vendelin. La Police Judiciaire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, page 28.
‘^ ^Follorou, Jacques. “Rivalités et conflits on retade I'enquete sur I'assasinat de M. Erignac.” Le Monde 15 
January 1999.
^DNAT director Marion, and investigating judge Bruigieire, went to Rome to investigate possible links 
between the prefect murder and a person suspected of having links both to the Mafia and the Corsican 
separatist movement. Source Ceaux, Pascal. “La police judiciaire soupçonne Mathieu Filidori.” Le Monde 
15 January 1999.
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excellent support staff and a highly centralised unit.
- 23 February, the DNAT (PN) got sole possession of the case on the 
recommendation of two investigating judges, Bruiguiere and Le Vert, thus infuriating Mr. 
Dragacci. The DNAT suspected the SRPJ of not fully co-operating, withholding important 
information and being at the origin of leaks to the press. However the local police (SRPJ) 
was unconvinced of the efficacy of the DNAT and eventually as animosities rose, Mr. 
Dragacci was forced to resign (1 May)
- In June, the DNAT arrested members of Dragacci family and interrogates them 
on possible links between two potential suspects and the ultra-nationalist Corsican 
separatist groups
- As the investigation proceeded the local Gendarmerie Nationale become involved, 
because the gun used to murder the prefect was the same gun that was stolen form their 
precinct the previous Fall (6 September 1997).
- The new prefect, Mr, Bonnet obtained additional help and special powers from the 
third investigating magistrate, Mr. Thiel, to solve this murder, and choose to work 
exclusively, in a covert fashion, with the Gendarmerie Nationale, because he believed that 
the Police Nationale (DNAT) had too many close political ties that could impede the 
investigation.
- By this time the separate investigations were taking place, yet the DNAT (PN) 
was unaware that the Gendarmerie was also on the case. The DNAT and Gendarmerie were 
without knowing it replicating each others work, requesting identical phone-taps, trailing 
the same people, etc...
- The DNAT accidentally heard about the involvement of the Gendarmerie 
Nationale, discovers who it was trailing (Jean Castella) and arrested him without warning 
the GN. In their defence the DNAT affirm that they already had incriminating evidence 
against the suspect, and that the information the Gendarmerie had against him had been 
obtained through DNAT leaks.
- The Gendarmerie is obviously furious and accuses the DNAT of having sabotaged 
their investigation, by preventing them from arresting the suspect in the act of committing 
a crime (“flagrant delit”).
In addition to the intense rivalries that existed between the DNAT (PN) and 
Gendarmerie, as well as the lack of consensus between the three presiding judges, the Prime 
Minister’s office also became involved in the Erignac case preferring the Gendarmerie over
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the DNAT. The PM’s office was supposedly concerned about persons in the Minister of 
Interior entourage, especially within the Renseignements Généraux, that might be involved 
in covert networks controlled by former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. The PM’s 
involvement becomes more intense after the Ministry of Interior is left with no minister." 
During his absence Prefect Bonnet had begun to work, confirm and report not to the interim 
Minister of Interior, but rather directly to the Office of the Prime Minister.
This amalgam of different rivalries benefited the possible suspects of this murder 
because despite having been pinpointed as the prime-suspect in Erignac’s murder, having 
been cited in the press for more than two weeks, Mathieu Filidori had not yet been arrested 
and interrogated. As the satiric French newspaper Le Canard Enchaine stated, the Erignac 
case could be qualifies more of: “Police, gendarmes and magistrate disperse”, than any 
degree of visible essential co-operation between Justice and police forces.”
VI Co-ordination efforts
Especially when combating a phenomenon like organised crime, strict
compartmentalisation, hoarding of information, and lack of co-ordination is particularly
destructive. The very illicit nature of OC, transnational, illicit activity pluralistic, with total
disregard for jurisdictions demands intense co-operation and co-ordination of activities
amongst the different police forces implicated in a given case. The Erignac case
demonstrates that even when, or maybe because of, the rank and importance of the victim,
and despite the possible involvement of the Mafia in the murder co-operation was never
achieved, much the contrary, everything was done to prevent it.
Two main items have attempted to materialise co-ordination efforts, they are the
conclusion of the Rapport Belorgey, that tried to set down the framework establishing a
deontological code, and D8 of the Code for Penal Procedure,
Article D8 of CPP:
Within the context of texts and Interministerial agreements in vigour:
The Gendarmerie addresses to the relevant service of the Direction de la 
Police Judiciaire, or Surete Nationale the information relative to criminality, 
susceptible of being exploited in the goal to centralise, classify and
*^^inister of Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevenement fell into a coma after an anesthesiology accident during 
surgery preparation. He miraculously recovered but was on sick leave from September 1998 to January 
1999. During this period police rivalries intensified further.
^^Angeli, Claude. “Chevenement et la Guerre des Polices.” Le Canard Enchaine 20 January 1999.
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distribute (advisories, files and statistics).
The same service of the PJ transmits to the Gendarmerie, by message or circulars, 
all indications useful in the identification or investigation of criminals. When the 
distribution of information is done at the request of a service of the Gendarmerie, 
the latter must appear amongst the list of authorities to contact when the wanted 
criminal is found.
Today co-ordination, and co-operation between police forces is far from being at 
optimal level, and in fact there exists a form of parasitising, due to existing rivalries 
between the diverse services.” There is an evident necessity to encourage a minimal level 
of good will. In this respect, the political leadership has to pave the way, be an example, 
and show, at the higher echelons, that they are willing and able to work constructively 
together. It is not by building bridges intended to force co-operation that co-operation will 
inevitably settle in, but the political will to really believe in this co-operation is probably 
more important. If Ministers cannot work together, it is unrealistic that police officers 
operating in rivalry plagued administration will willingly co-operate.
Co-operation starts fi*om the basic issue of information sharing. Making sure that 
the colleagues in one police force are aware and informed of developments, events, or 
information that might be pertinent to their investigation. Too often important information 
is withheld.
Because France’s police system is already fashioned by multiple overlapping 
structures and different legislation, it is - important to ask whether or not the current police 
institutions actually capable of working together, or if perhaps it might be more useful and 
efficient to abolish the entire structure and create a new one?” Perhaps legislators could 
learn from the current situation and strive to build a new police structure that is devoid of 
such rivalries and that through its very structure encourages and mandates co-operation.
^^Corvalan, Sandrine, and Viviane Du Castel. “Euro-Terrorisme: La Lute Anti-Terroriste en Europe.” 3 
ieme cycle. Paris V, 1990.
^^Erbes, Jean-Marc. “De l'Ordre a la Sécurité.” L'Ordre Public et les Citovens 229.March (1993), page 
415.
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brought about a significant hierachalisation as well as bureaucratisation of the police force. 
Since XIX century the police has become increasingly specialised^*, and has fractioned off 
into two main areas, information gathering and judicial policing. The final defining 
phase for the police really came about only in the XX century, when it finally differentiated 
itself from the military, and the gendarmerie.Frora an institutional stand point, the police 
unit was bounced back and forth between several different ministries, changed names, and 
finally was formalised in 1966 as the Police Nationale.^'
April 1942 for all police in cities o f 10,000 or more).
'^^ For example, in 1846 the General Commissioner charged with controlling the railroads was creates, 
followed in 1855 by the Railroad police, and finally the Renseignements Généraux.
^^1796-1818: Ministry of Police /  most XIX Century flip-flopped between Surete generale in the Ministry 
of Interior and the Ministry of Police. In 1887, the Surete General became an autonomous branch o f the 
Ministry of Interior. Law of 28 April 1934 created the Surete Nationale. In 1941 the Surete Nationale 
was abolished and replaces by the Police Nationale, which in turn abolished and replaced by the Surete 
Nationale. Law 9 July 1964 gave state control o f the Parisian police, and 9 July 1966, formally integrated 
it to the Police Nationale.
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The following page represents an attempts to graph the involvement of police and justice 
ministries and services, and reveals the complexity of the relations, also demonstrating why 
co-operation and co-ordination is so essential."
•^^Madelin, Philippe. La Guerre des Police. Paris: Albin Michel, 1989.
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V n  France within the European Union context
Although France maintains much of its national sovereignty, as a member of 
the European Union it is also bound by certain European treaties and reports back to 
European institutions such as the Commission. The fight against organized crime is 
one area where the European Union is actively involved and has signed on to binding 
treaties that impact its member states, such as France. Part of the difficulty however is 
that within this same context and European framework the individual member states 
are often stinggling internally to maintain as much sovereign power as possible and in 
many instances relinquish as little as possible to Europe.
The police matters, judicial issues and cooperation agreements that an active 
pan-European anti-crime policy requires are particularly sensitive areas for France. 
However, France has, on the whole, been very willing to cooperate and sign on to 
European initiatives to counter organized crime. The French government has always 
prided itself in being a locomotive for Europe and hence has wanted to be perceived, at 
least by others European states, as responsive, pro-active, participatory in all issues 
with a Europe-wide effect. Organized crime is no exception. The French parliament 
that in many cases has to debate and ratify measures that the government has signed on 
to has not always been as demonstiatively enthusiastic, especially when E.U. legal 
provisions in binding agreements entail modifying French national law or constitution. 
France in general though is actively involved in, and supportive of E.U. measures and 
conventions to curb organized crime.
The European Union has drafted a significant amount of treaties and 
conventions that aim to combat, curb and sanction organized crime and encourage 
member countries and candidate countries to take measures to fight against it. The 
Action plan. Joint Actions, Pre-Accession pacts, Tampere conclusions are such anti- 
O.C. initiatives. The inaugmation of Europol is another landmark in Europe’s 
commitment to actively combat 0 C \
74bisRgj^ r^ to International and regional organizations chapter for a more detailed discussion o f European 
Union initiatives on combating organized crime.
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v in  Conclusion
Again, and it is important to emphasize this point, the French do not so much 
analyze their own police system as be content to describe it since they argue that there 
is no rationale as to how it became what it is today. History is the only explanation 
offered up to simplistically explain the French police model. From the hand of Louis 
the XIV and with each subsequent king or president, the police structure 
metamorphosed little by little into the complex entity it is today. According to French 
police researchers like Philippe Madelin, the Anglo Saxon’s perception attempts to 
place the French police structure within a prisms and tries to make it *‘fit” into a 
theoretical model, rather than just see it as it is, a system of overlapping; sometimes 
competing structures.
The overlap of police services and lack of logical structures:
The French police institutions are an amalgam of structures superimposed on 
each other without ever contemplating a full over-haul and redesign. Rarely have 
previously existing structures been dissolved to make way for newer, potentially more 
efficient services. In some areas the overlap is such that not only does it encourage 
severe and potentially harmful rivalries, but it never allows for a clear perception of 
who, or what service, is actually responsible for carrying out a specific task. One such 
flagrant example is the GPP and SPHP rivalry.
The French police has special units that protect important people like terrorism 
judges, at-risk-foreign ambassador, foreign dignitaries and currently serving French 
ministers. This “task”, as a result of historic occurrences is not carried out by a single 
specialized police unit, but rather by two rival units that obtain, seemingly on an ad 
hoc basis, the tasking to protect a person.
The two “rivaling” police units are the Groupe de Protection des Personnalités 
(GPP) and the Service Protection des Hautes Personnalités (SPHP). In the case of the 
United States diplomatic representation in France, the confusion and potential for 
competition is particularly elevated since both the @PP and the SPHP are mandated to 
protect and accompany the two Chiefs of Mission. In fact, the U.S. Ambassador to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is protected by the 
SPHP whilst the more senior ranking Ambassador of the United States to France is
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protected by the SPP. Each unit has different operating tactics and reports to a 
different hierarchy whilst carrying out the same function. On occasions when both 
Ambassadors are present on a common event, or when international incidents require a 
tightening of security, the fact that there are two different police services (who readily 
admit that they interact as little as possible with each other), with different procedures, 
different resources and different tactics can be veiy detrimental This is just one 
example among many present, almost “accidentally”, within the French police 
structure because no complete over haul and redesign of the police structure has been 
done. The historical pile-ups have so complicated the police structure that it has 
become opaque and probably less than optimal in terms of its reactivity and capacity to 
fight effectively against a phenomenon like O.C.
The French police in general is excellent, but the point is that it probably could 
surpass itself even more if the police structures reflected a logical process aimed at 
optimizing its capacities. Organized crime is such a fast moving, constantly changing 
and adaptable entity that any “flaw” in a system can easily be exploited.
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Appendix 1
History of the the Police Nationale
1032 Prevot de la Vicomte de Paris
1667 Abolition of Prevot, creation of Lieutenant de Police
1789 Abolition of Lt de Police, replaced by Police Municipale
1796 Ministère de la Police Generale
1800 Prefecture de Police
1887 Surete Generale
1941 Police Nationale then Surete Generale
1966 Police Nationale
The primary mission of the French police today is the maintenance of public order, 
but this was not always its principle directive. The history of the French police and its 
institutions has been quite chaotic, and has not followed any sort of rational plan. On the 
contrary in fact it has evolved throughout the last three centuries according to the whims 
of the reigning monarch, political climate and succeeding government’s expectations or 
fears. The French police is both highly centralised and state controlled, concepts that have 
slowly emerged and evolved since the First Empire. Neither one of these concepts, 
occurred in a systematic or continuous form. Centralisation focused on the powers of the 
police, whilst “étatisation”, or state control, was aimed at the actual police forces.
Although today the primary duty of the police is to protect citizens and guarantee 
public order, in its origins in the XI century (1032) as the Prevot de la Vicomte de Paris, 
the civil authority heading the Chatelet, its duties included administration, justice and the 
military. It continued to increase its powers throughout the Middle-Ages, and was 
eventually devolved in 1667 by Louis XIV. In its place, the King created a Police 
Lieutenant". This new job, first held by Gabriel Nicolas de la Reynie, and a result of the 
March 1667 edict, truly marked the official “beginning” of the police in France. This also 
formalised the King’s attempt to separate powers by disassociating the police from the 
justice, yet still retaining many administrative duties.. Although first only implanted in
‘^^ Cairo, Robert. “Organisation generale et missions de la police en France.” Revue Internationale de 
criminologie et de police technique .4 (1991), page 419.
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Paris, by 1699, its powers were extended to all cities with a population exceeding 40,000.
Louis the XIV eventually associated the police to his “attendants” already prominent 
throughout the territory, and managed to create a veritable web of control across his 
Kingdom.
During the XVI century, and up until the XVZff century the French police, was also 
responsible for an amalgam of duties including the general protection of people, weights 
and measures, floods and fire, various administrative duties, maintenance and construction 
of roads, preservation of morality, and control over the arts". The French Revolution 
defined its role, and limited its scope of authority, making it one of several administrative 
services, and not the sole administration. It was to a certain degree a notion of newly 
expressible liberalism that strove to delineate the police’s role and sequester its tasks to 
specific domains.
Two main currents helped mould the shape the modem police force, the 
centralisation of power into one Ministry, and increased state control (“étatisation”). 
Etatisation and centralisation were not always synonymous concepts, however in the case 
of France, centralisation efforts certainly helped the étatisation process along.
In 1789, following the Revolution, the Lt. General of the police position was 
eliminated and replaced by a municipal police, under the direct jurisdiction of the Mayors, 
they themselves elected officials. This change meant that the police ceased to be a purely 
administrative branch. The police system continued to complexity, and by 1796, the 
Ministry of General Police (Ministère de la Police Generale) was created, followed in the 
Year VEH (First Empire) by the posts of prefect, prefecture of Paris and police 
commissioners in cities of 5,000 or more, but did not however eradicate the municipal 
police".
The logic of centralisation affected the separate logic of “étatisation’ primarily on 
financial grounds, Etatisation of the police forces alleviated the budgetary strain of 
communes, by redirecting the financial costs implicated in mnning a police service, away 
from the locality and placing it rather within the State budget". This étatisation also
^^Gleizal, Jean-Jacques. La Police en France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, page 13.
series of laws further centralized the police at the municipal level including laws of 6 April, 1884 and 
24, April 1941.
^^Governed by laws “etatizing” the police of major cities (19 June 1851-Lyon /  5 May 1855 cities over 
40,000 / 1908-Marseilles /  1918- Toulon&Seynes /  1920- Nice /  1925-Alsace & Lorraine /  and finally 24
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Appendix 2 
History of the Police Judiciaire
1907
1907
1908
1928
1941
1946
Decree creating Contrôle General des Recherches (4/3/1903) 
Clemenceau creates twelve Brigades de Police mobiles (31/12/1907) 
Circulary of the Minister of Interior describing mobile functions 
(4/4/1908)
Creation of the National Central Bureau (18/12/1928)
Law actually creating the Police Judicaire within the DGPN 
Attached to Sécurité Publique (1/3/1946)
Vichy government law 23/4/1941 established the PJ as one of three active directorates of 
the Direction Generale de la Police Nationale.
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Appendix 3 
History of the Prefecture de Paris 
The prefecture de Police of Paris was created by Napoleon Bonapartre, and became 
an organisation with a very unique administration. Until 1967, Paris had two police forces, 
the Prefecture de Police de Paris and the Surete Nationale. Their jurisdiction covered all 
of the Seine Department (including the Seine St. Denis, Hauts de Seine and Val de Marne).
Law of 10 July 1966, sponsored by General de Gaulle, and voted through by the 
Parliament, unified the two forces, and attached them to the Police Nationale.
Prefect of Paris is the chief of the Prefecture de Paris, and benefits from a special. 
As a result of a much publicised and controversial police affairs, Ben Barka“, the 
authorities decided that the complete autonomy of the Prefecture de Police de Paris was too 
dangerous and reattached it to the DGPN. Even though the prefect of Paris is supposed to 
receive his orders form the Director General of the PN, in fact he is consulted and rarely 
ordered to do anything. In fact the prefect of Paris is widely regarded as the most important 
prefect of France. Until French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing Paris had no Mayor. 
This peculiarity arose from the 1870 Commune incident that sparked civil unrest. The 
Mayor of the capital city was considered too powerful and too dangerous and hence the 
position was eliminated. Under Giscard d’Estaing the Mayor’s position was restored. 
Many of the Mayoral duties had gone to the prefect after 1870, and were not returned, so 
in fact the Prefect of Paris, in many regards is as, if not more powerful than the actual 
elected Mayor*'. The special status of the PP of Paris allowed it to be exempted from the 
Joxe Police Reforms of 1988.
The Prefecture de Police is widely regarded as being the French origin of Scientific 
Police work. In 1882, Alphonse Bertillon began measuring individual brought in, and 
compiling files containing their measurement and physical attributes on each of them. This 
same system, also referred to as anthropometric would later be perfected and used by the 
Police Judiciaire Scientific police branch.
Barka was the leader of the Moroccan opposition. He was arrested on October 29,1965 and taken 
away by two police officers of the Prefecture de Police of Paris, and was never seen again. This situation 
was obviously very embarrassing to the Police and especially to the Minister of Interior, Roger Frey, and 
also reflected badly on the president. General de Gaulle. For more details refer to: Leauthier, Alain, and 
Frederic Ploquin. Les Flics: 120.000 Inconnus. Paris: Flammarion, 1990 and Erbes, J-M, et al. “Polices 
d'Europes” . Paris: Institut de Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure, 1992, page 186.
^^Diamant, "Commissaire". Les Reseaux Secrets de la Police. Paris: La Découverte, 1993, page 78-80.
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Appendix 4
History of the Gendarmerie Nationale
1190 King Philippe Auguste creates “Sergeants d’Armes”
1501 Compagnie des Maréchaussées
1544 Francois I, pioneers dual nature of institution (civilian/military)
1720 Reforms of the Maréchaussées (Louis XV)
1791 Statutes set-down by law, officially becomes Gendarmerie Nationale
1798 Charter of Gendarmerie Nationale drafted
1903 Reforms
The Gendarmerie Nationale has a history stretching back more than eight 
centuries. The more modem origin of this branch of the police came under 
King Philippe Auguste. In 1190, he created the job of “sergeant d’armes” 
to maintain peace and tranquillity in the Kingdom while he was away on the 
Crusades. Under the authority of the “Grand Senechal”, the Sergeants 
specialised in inquiries, arrests and judgements. This position evolved and 
eventually became the Compagnie des Maréchaussées, the oldest branch of 
the French Army. It survived throughout the centuries because of it 
capacity to evolve and adapt. The duality of services carried out by the 
military police came as a result of Francois I who extended its mission to 
included not only military duties, but also additional civilian duties". 
Successive Kings used this military police to establish their authority 
throughout the Kingdom and control the other powers, namely seigniorial, 
and ecclesiastical, but the actual territorial delineation and break-down of 
France, still present today occurred only under Charles VH, and was further 
encouraged by Louis XV in 1720. He divided the temtorial units into 
squadrons, each responsible for supervising 2-5 leagues. Despite the French 
revolution’s keen desire to destroy every institution created by the 
monarchy, surprisingly the “Gendarmerie Corps” benefited from vast public 
support", and hence was maintained. In an effort to separate the different
^^Edict of 3 October 1544: Prevots Maréchaux competence to report thefts on public thoroughfares or in 
the countryside, sacrileges and aggressions.
^^ In fact the Gendarmerie Corps was cited in the “carnets de doléances” (grievances books) as the only 
useful institution.
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powers, it was stripped of its judicial authority. It officially became known
as the Gendarmerie Nationale on April 17,1798, and set out the aims of the
modern gendarmerie at that time. The charter passed on that date defined
de gendarmerie as follows:
The National Gendarmerie Corps is an institutionalised force that 
guarantees the maintenance of order and application of laws within the 
Republic [of France]".
A subsequent charter was passed on May 20*^  1903, defining it specific tasks, and its 
principles of operation, and reaffirm the duality of service, military and civilian of the GN. 
Although some amendments have been made since then, it remains the fundamental 
backbone of the GN;
^Ministère de la Defense. Gendarmerie Nationale de la Tradition vers la Modernité. Paris: Service de 
Diffusion de la Gendarmerie Nationale, 1996.
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Cosa Nostra Territories in the 1990's^
"'^ Questo e* la stessa cosa*^
(He is the same as us)
I Introduction
The term Mafia or its synonym onorata societa (honourable society) refers to the 
Cosa Nostra: a one-of a kind organisation equipped with a unique power structures and 
commanding far-reaching influence. Giovanni Falcone defined the Mafia as an 
organisation of mutual aid that acts only for the benefit of its own members.^ The Cosa 
Nostra is not a new, nor volatile, or temporary organisation, but rather a historically 
rooted organisation, criminal in nature that threatens not only the functioning and 
democratic process in Italy*, but also that of Europe and the world in general. It is solidly 
anchored and well protected, thanks to its resilient nature, its highly compartmentalised, 
secret and well-protected structure, weathered the test of time, and though it has 
undergone periods of weakness and near elimination, it has survived.
The Cosa Nostra’s ability to quickly diversify its income grossing activities in 
order to keep up, if not anticipate the global market demand, has enabled it to stay ahead
^Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 69. 
^ a n y  of the terms used are from the Sicilian dialect and not from common Italian usage.
Falcone, Giovanni, and Marcelle Padovani. Cosa Nostra. Paris: Austral, 1991.
^efer to state and the Mafia chapter.
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of the financial, and perhaps more importantly the judicial authorities. Through this 
diversification of income sources the Cosa Nostra avoids being affected to severely if the 
market crashes, or if State targets one area in particularly. Although it is true that nearly 
eveiy sector of the economy is penetrated at a more or less significant level by the Mafia, 
however the prime focus and preference given to a specific area at a specific time changes 
constantly: drug trafficking in the 1980's, today money laundering, as well as legitimate 
ventures.^
Understanding of the organisation and the code of honour that regiments the Cosa 
Nostra greatly impacts the strategic and judicial decisions that are taken to combat it 
efficiently and effectively. Judge Falcone firmly believed that understanding the inside, 
the very core of the Cosa Nostra was essential.^ All the specific information about the 
Cosa Nostra has been obtained since 1984, as a result of co-operation between 
government t u r n c o a t s , n a m e l y  Tommaso Buschetta and Antonio Calderone and 
justice officials like Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino.
Estimates of the actual Cosa Nostra membership vary of course because of the 
illicit nature of the organisation and the obvious impossibility of obtaining an accurate 
census, but Michel Debacq, former liaison Magistrate to Rome estimates that there are 
143 families^, approximately 5,000 men of honour, and as many as 20,000 to 50,000 
additional affiliates. The estimated gross annual turnover is $46 billion USD, equivalent 
to the annual turnover of Fiat.^ In addition the Cosa Nosüa also manages or controls as 
much as 10% of the local electoral votes.**
The Mafia although present throughout Sicily and across the world, has its 
headquarters in the triangle of death: the triangle joining the Sicilian cities of Palermo, 
Agrigente and Corleone. The Cosa Nostra is characterised by several important criteria.
 ^This change was sparked by a government crackdown on certain activities (mainly drug trafficking) as 
well as an evaluation o f the risk-profit equation. Because o f the crackdown (both nationally and 
internationally) it became increasingly risky to engage in it. By contrast money laundering legislation was 
far less harsh and the potential profit yield remarkably good.
‘^ Falcone, Giovanni, and Marcelle Padovani. Cosa Nostra. Paris: Austral, 1991, page 43.
^Refer to Appendix 1 for an alphabetic listing o f major Cosa Nostra families.
^Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, page 114.
**Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée Internationale. 
Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 14.
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including a unique hierarchical structure, the universal “blanlcet” law of silence, the 
recruitment of specialists, the use of personal violence and intimidation, and the 
involvement in every aspect of a “penetrated”'^® society, usually implicated in the politics, 
economics, and social sectors, preferably at every leveFl In addition, the Mafia has the 
capacity for global activity, through a veiy sophisticated and complex network or 
accomplices and "sympathisers” throughout the world. In addition, the Mafia has set up 
an effective self-defence mechanism to protect it for the police. Its three principle goals 
are money, power and survival.^  ^ According to Giovanni Falcone, the Cosa Nostra is the 
most dangerous amongst all criminal organisations, not because of the number of recruits, 
but rather because of its unique structure and strategy, and assuredly because of its 
capacity to export its crime “model”intemationally."
The Cosa Nostra is particularly interesting as a case study because much has been 
written about it, and much has been discovers (largely thanks to justice collaborators), and 
hence a better understanding of its structure, goals and operations has emerged. Looking 
at the Cosa Nostra in a more in-depth fashion allows for better insight on its strengths and 
weaknesses, enables a more accurate evaluation of its threat and can begin to allow for 
a formulation of strategies to combat it. This case study also enables to answer the 
question of how one family can operate within a national and international context.
For further discussion on the concept o f a penetrated society, see James Rosenau’s The Scientific 
Study o f Foreign Policy. Pinter publishers.
^^Lacoste, Pierre. Mafia Contre la Democratic. Paris: JC Lattes, 1992, page 148.
^T,acoste, Pierre. Mafia Contre la Democratic. Paris: JC Lattes, 1992, page 145-146.
Power: the capability or relative capability o f actors such as states. The ability to influence the 
outcomes or the actions o f  others. Viotti, Paul, and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory. New  
York: Macmillan, 1993, page 591.
^Talcone, Giovanni. “La Criminalité organisée: un problème mondial. La mafia italienne en tant que 
modèle pour la criminalité organisée opérant a niveau international.” Revue Internationale de 
criminologie et de police technique .4 (1992).
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n History
1282 Beati Paoli societies
4 1924-1929 Mussolini attempts to eradicate the Mafia
\ 1943 Cupertino with Allies
1957 Palermo Drug Summit
1962-1963 First Mafia War
t 1970's Enter the drug trade
1981-1982 Second Mafia War
1982- today Supremacy of the Corleone Clan
In the beginning:
The Mafia as a structured organisation sprang firom a legacy of Sicilian well-intentioned^** 
“home grown bandits” that protected their poor fellow peasants from the excesses and 
abuses of foreign domination (Nonnans, Arab, Spanish, Bourbon) Slowly these bandits 
evolved into a secret brotherhood that fought the successive dominating factions that 
attempted to take control of the island. By the Xm century this secret brotherhood^^ had 
joined another grouping of secret societies, the Beati Paoli, who acted as the mediator 
between the peasants and the landowners.^®
■^*The history o f the Mafia will be purposely succinct as it is of interest but not crucial to the 
understanding o f the organisation.
*^*Catania, Enzo. Mafia. New York; St. Martin's Press, 1978, in Foreword.
faction of researchers have erroneously stipulated that the Mafia was bom out of Free Masonry, but 
this is not the case. Although the Mafia and Free Masonry may share some ideological and structural 
similarities, and may have forged links, the Mafia is not an ofifehoot of Free Masonry. Madelin, Philippe. 
La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 10.
IS.Clutterbuck, Richard. Drugs. Crime and Cormption. London: Macmillan, 1995. page 131.
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Mussolini
Benito Mussolini took power in 1922 as the Fascist Premier of Italy, and after having been 
subjected to a humiliating incident, orchestrated by a local Mafia boss, promised to stamp 
out the Mafia. He sent Cesare Mori, the Prefetto di ferro (or “Iron Prefect”) to Palermo, 
who engaged in a violent anti-Mafia campaign, and almost succeeded in stamping out 
much of the Mafia activity and gieatly impaired the organisation. Believing that the 
Mafia had been eliminated, Mussolini called back his prefect and stopped his “crusade”. 
Allied landing of World W ar II
The turning point and resurrection of the Mafia came as a result of its co-operation with 
the U.S. Army during World War n. In order to plan and carry out the invasion, and 
subsequent occupation of Sicily, the United States securing the help of jailed American 
Mafia boss Lucky Luciano^ ** who agreed to play a key role in enlisting the co-operation 
of local Mafia bosses (namely Calogero Vizzini known as Don Calo).^ ® They agreed to 
deliver the intelligence and reconnaissance crucial in planning the invasion (Code Name 
Operation Huslcy).^  ^ The US Army fearful of Communist or Fascist talce over after the 
occupation ended, installed many Mafia bosses in influential position in the island’s 
government, solidifying the Mafia stronghold on important jobs.^^
The two key developments that have most impacted the organisation and strategy 
of the Cosa Nostra have been the decision to participate in the drug trade and the 
ascension of the Corleonesi clan to power following the second Mafia war.
*^*Lucky Luciano was freed from US jail on January 3 rd, 1946 and “returned”, so to speak back to Sicily 
as his reward for having cooperated with the US Army during the war. For more details o f this operation 
please refer to; Campbell, Rodney. The Luciano Project: the Secret Wartime Collaboration of the Mafia 
and the U.S. Navy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
^®Don Calo was later rewarded for his cooperation with the Allied Forces by being installed as Mayor, 
despite his well known track-record as the capi dei capi (boss of the bosses). Bottamedi, Claude. La 
Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 1997, page 20.
American Army brief concerning the invasion o f Sicily: “To organize and prepare dissident elements for 
active resistance: Establishment o f contact and communications with the leaders of separatist nuclei, 
disaffected workers and clandestine radical groups e.g. the Maffia [sic] and giwng them every possible 
aid.”Servadio, Gaia. Mafioso: a History o f the Mafia from its Origins to the Present Pay. New York: 
Stein and Day, 1976, page 82.
^^ "in a secret dispatch to the Foreign Office, Lord Rennell pointed out that many mafiosi had been given 
responsibility in local administration”. Servadio, Gaia. Mafioso: a Historv o f the Mafia from its Origins 
to the Present Day. New York: Stein and Day, 1976, page 83.
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Drugs:
In the early 1970's the Mafia decided to join in the large-scale drug trade as 
manufacturers, and moved from an urban, racketeering based organisation, to a multi­
disciplinary highly organised and efficient international actor. With this significant 
change in activity came changes in the strategy and recruitment of the organisation. The 
Mafia began to seek out special skills associated with the drug trade, established 
significant logistical support, and devised a new criminal strategy that concentrated 
mainly on internationalisation. With the flourishing of the drug trade came the necessity 
to devise strategies money launder. This necessity propelled the Mafia further into the 
business arena, rendering it even more professional.
Corleonesi clan:
The Corleonesi clan took over the leadership of the Cosa Nostra in the eai*ly eighties 
following the blood bath of the second Mafia war. First headed by Luciano Leggio, and 
after his arrest in 1974 by his lieutenant, Toto Riina, the Corleonesi imposed a tyrannical 
rule of the family, hunted down and murdered all suspected rivals, and eliminated any 
potentially unreliable associates.^® The Family and Commission went from being a 
relatively democratic “institution” to becoming an absolute monarchy ruled by a single 
capi di tutti capi (boss of all bosses) embodied by Riina.®**
Leggio
Riina
<> (Corleonesi clan) •=!>
Favoured families Eliminated families
Madonia Bontade
Brusca Inzerillo
Ganci /  Calo Bandalementi
Galatolo / Gambino
®®De Gennaro, Giovanni, and Direzione Investigativa Antimafia. Criminal Organisations with Particular 
Regard to CosaNostra: its Influence on Politicians. Media. Economv and Public Administration. Berlin, 
1993.
®"*Labrousse, Alain, and Alain Wallon. La Planete des Drogues: Organisations Criminelles, guerres et 
blanchiement. Paris: Seuil, 1993, page 124.
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n i Organisation
The Mafia is generally considered as the most structured and hierarchical of the 
Italian organised crime families. It’s overall structure is pyramidal and strictly 
compartmentalised, gr avitating aroimd one principal building block: the family unit, and 
its core element the man of honour. Compartmentalisation is one of the main attributes 
of the Cosa Nostra, by maintaining it even within the hierarchy, secrecy is preserved.
1. The structure:
The hierarchy is based on the rigorous control of each section, as well as the 
protection of the upper echelons so that if a man of honour is arrested and interr ogated he 
is unable to divulge and endanger the entire Mafia family structure. Giovanni Falcone was 
able to discover and subsequently describe the make-up of the hierarchy as a result of the 
pentiti confessions. He proved that, contrary to what was previously believed, the Mafia 
was not a casual group of individual crime organisations, but rather a very unified and 
structured organisation, regimented by strict rules and a very specific code of conduct.®®
The hierarchy firom the ground up is as follows: The men of honour or soldiers 
report to the capo decina  ^who in turn report to the head of family. Each head of family 
must report to the district boss (or representative of the Family Chiefs), who are members 
of the cupola (provincial commission). The provincial representative finally reports to 
the Commission or regional cupola.®** The cupola resembles a board of directors, in its 
operation.
Regional Commission 
Provincial Commission -  Provincial Commission 
Representatives of the Family Chiefs - Representatives of the Family Chiefs
#
Family Chief 
Sotto-Capo 
Advisors -  Advisors 
Soldier Chiefs -  Soldier Chiefs -  Soldier Chiefs- 
Soldiers - Soldier Chiefs -  Soldier Chiefs- 
Soldiers - Soldier Chiefs -  Soldier Chiefs - Soldier Chiefs- 
Affiliates Affiliates Affiliates Affiliates Affiliates Affiliates Affiliates Affiliates
®®d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de 
Lutter Contre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, 
page 18.
®**ldem, page 172 (annexes)
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The man of honour: The ^^ uomo d'onore'", is the basic foot soldier of the 
organisation, and is linlced to the organisation by a solid bond, and a life-long allegiance. 
The family, referred to as the meaning artichoke leaf, is the central unit, or
building block of the Mafia. The average family size is usually about 50 people but has 
been known to reach 200 to 300. Each family manages a defined territory within which 
no action may be taken without its prior consent.®  ^ The family is protected by a system 
of concentric circles. The first circle, or core, regroups only the most trusted men of 
honour, and veiy close collaborators. The second, slightly more distant protects the core, 
and is constituted by men with particularly close ties to the core, either blood relatives or 
privileged professional ties. The third circle is made up of criminal associates who do 
work for the family, but are not men of honour.®® The Family Chiefs, called the 
^^Cacocciuld\ or artichoke, and sometimes capo famiglia, are the decision makers of the 
family and are responsible for all activities occurring on their defined territory, but are 
also principally responsible for overseeing the recruitment and initiation of new 
“soldiers”. The Advisor, or consiglieri is the official advisor to the family chief, he is 
elected by the soldiers and accompanies the chief everywhere and advises him on all 
affairs.®** The soldier Chief, Capo decina is the formal and sole link between the soldier 
and the family chief. Generally in chai ge of a dozen or do men, he relates the orders of 
the bosses to his soldiers. The soldier, ^^ soldatV’ox "^picciottiV  ^Has a “contract for life” 
with the Mafia. The affiliates, are not men of honour, and do not belong to the Mafia, 
but rather are hired to work for the family on specific contracts, There are two 
Commissions, or cupolas within the Cosa Nostra: the provincial commission and the
®*AssembIee Nationale: Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre les 
Tentatives de Penetrations de la Mafia en France. Paris (1993), page 15.
®®Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée Internationale. 
Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994, page 16.
®**Arlacchi, Pino. Les Hommes du Deshonneur. Paris: Albin Michel, 1992, page 44.
®®During the 1985 Manhattan trial o f Mafia boss Gaetano Badalamenti, Tommaso Buscetta was asked by 
the prosecutor about Mafia membership: “ When you became a member o f the Cosa Nostra [...] did you 
come to learn whether you were able to leave the Cosa Nostra at any time?”, he answered” I could never 
leave it!” Source: Lubasch, Arnold. “Drug defendant identified as ex-Mafia 'boss' in Sicily.” New York 
Times 31 October 1985.
®^Falcone, Giovanni. Men of Honour: the Truth about the Mafia. London: Fourth Estate, 1992.
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regional commission, the latter being the more powerful of the two. The cupola is the 
governing body for the different families and aims to limit inter-family conflicts and chart 
out the global strategy of the Cosa Nostra. All important projects and especially key 
assassinations (called "'^ cadavere eccellentdy^ are agreed on at the Regional Commission 
level.
2. Recruitment procedures and indoctrination ritual®®
The “pentiti”®^ are largely responsible for shedding light on the recruitment and 
initiation practices. Although recruitment procedures and rituals may vary from one 
Family to another, they tend to share many characteristics. Men do not ‘apply’ to join 
the CosaNostra, but rather are ‘called upon’, recruited and asked to join.®® The cardinal 
qualifications are that only men aie welcome and the recruits must be Sicilian and Icnown 
to the family.®® There are a few recruitment criteria including a specific “criminal 
profile”.®’’ Once the recruitment procedure, including observation phase, courage testing 
and evaluation are accomplished, and the soldier has been deemed worthy to join by the 
Family chief, he must undergo an initiation ceremony, transforming the “lay-man” into 
a man of honour.®® By becoming a man of honour, the recruit also promises to adhere to
®®Refer to Annex 2: Key Mafia murders
®®For a detailed description of the initiation ritual please refer to Annexe B of: Gambetta, Diego. The 
Sicilian Mafia: the Business o f Private Protection. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
®‘*Men of honour who agree to collaborate with the police by speaking up in order to lessen liis sentence, 
hence violating their oath o f omerta.
®®Lubasch, Arnold. “Drug defendant identified as ex-Mafia 'boss' in Sicily.” New York Times 31 October 
1985.
®®Exceptions to the “home-grown” law have been made for Camorra bosses most notably Michele Zaza, 
Lorenzo Nuvolletta, and Antonio Bardellino. They were accepted into the ranks of the Cosa Nostra as a 
business gesture, and so that the Mafia could attempt to better control the Neapolitan drug market. They 
were invited to set-up a Neapolitan branch, and were subsequently represented in the Cupola.
®®Some young men are immediately excluded because o f their family ties. No man related to a police 
man, judge, or magistrate may be accepted. Furthennore, homosexuals, divorcees or illegitimate children 
are excluded Source:De Gennaro, Giovanni, and Direzione Investigativa Antimafia. Criminal 
Organisations with Particular Regard to Cosa Nostra: its Influence on Politicians. Media. Economv and 
Public Administration. Berlin, 1993, page 18.
®®For a detailed description o f the initiation ritual, please refer to: Gambetta, Diego. The Sicilian Mafia: 
the Business of Private Protection. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, Appendix B.
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a strict code of honour that dictates almost every sphere of his life, making the Mafiosi 
extremely disciplined criminals.
3. Territorv
The very concept of territory is crucial to understanding the mind-set of the Mafia. 
Each of the four large Italian organised crime families controls a very precise 
geographical part of Italy, and within each family, the sub-families are also attributed their 
own territory. The concept of territory is synonymous to “the monopoly over the exercise 
of physical violence with almost total impunity”.®** Within this defined territory, the family 
has full jurisdiction; it must be consulted, and must give its approval before any action can 
be taken. Even the common criminal, must gain approval to operate within the family’s 
territory.
Additionally, territory permits the “ruling” family to levy a tax called the pizzo, 
the physical manifestation of a family or clan’s domination and complete control over a 
defined territory.^® It not only legitimises the power of the family, but also represents a 
substantial source of revenue.'*® Protection of a given territory, as well as desire to 
maintain domination and supremacy over a given territory are the usual reasons from 
bloody inter-family wars.
®®d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete sur les Moyens de 
Lutter Contre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, 
page 22.
®^ Padovani, Marcelle. Les Demieres Années de la Mafia. Paris: Gallimard, 1987, page 43.
^®d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de 
Lutter Contre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, 
page 22.
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IV Mafia Code of Conduct
The Mafia operates with a rigid rules and regulations. The men of honour swear 
at initiation to obey without fail and without question the strict laws and orders of the 
family, both in their professional and private lives. Voluntarily disobeying the family 
means stepping outside of the circle of protection offered by the Mafia in exchange for 
absolute loyalty and obedience.
Derived from Sicily’s tradition of "mutism" towards strangers, omerta is the law 
of silence."*® The best word, is that which is not spoken (Old Sicilian Proverb).^® A man 
of honour does not reveal anything to anyone not in the "family”, and most especially not 
to the police. Omerta, ‘literally being a man’, is an extreme form of loyalty and solidarity 
in the face of authority”.**^ Within the Mafia family, there is no greater "sin” than 
violating this oath of silence.
The concept of truth is almost always coupled with silence as a pillar of Mafia 
belonging because a man of honour can never lie, if he cannot tell the tmth, then he must 
remain silent. Reciprocally, if he remains silent than he can avoid having to tell the 
truth."*® Giovanni Falcone while working with government turncoats discovered that even 
within the confines of jail and even after having accepted to collaborate, most of the men 
of honour continued to apply the rule of truth. If they chose to speak, then what they said 
could be counted on as being truthful. If they could not, or would not speak the truth, then 
they would remain silent.
Obedience, honour, respect and respectability are also imperative "qualities” for 
a man of honour. He must, at all times, obey his superior within the command hierarchy, 
honour his family, and must never bring shame to it by inappropriate public behaviour.
"*®Allen, Edward. Merchants o f Menace - the Mafia: A Study of Organised Crime. Springfield: Charles 
C. Thomas, 1962, page 15.
'*®Falcone, Giovanni. Men o f Honour: the Truth about the Mafia. London: Fourth Estate, 1992, page 9.
"^*Servadio, Gaia. Mafioso: a History o f the Mafia from its Origins to the Present Day. New York: Stein 
and Day, 1976, page 27.
"*®Giovanni Falcone illustrates this idea with the following example. The son o f a man murdered by the 
Mafia is barred from entering the family, as this would guarantee him the right to know why his father 
was murdered, and would no doubt lead to many problems. Hence to avoid having to lie to him, he is 
not accepted into the family preserving both the truth, and keeping silent, d’Aubert, Francois, and 
Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d' Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre les Tentatives 
de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, page 20.
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Excessive gambling (other than for money laundering purposes) is frowned upon, as is 
the solicitation of prostitutes, or keeping of mistresses.
Organised crime and the Mafia are often portrayed by the media as thriving on 
violence and bloodshed, and even nicloiamed the "industry of violence”,"*® but the opposite 
is actually true. The Mafia uses violence as the last resort, the ultima ratio, and the result 
of a very pragmatic decision.**’’ Only when all other forms of threats, intimidation and 
scare tactics have been exhausted, is violence authorised. Total obedience, and blind 
acceptance of orders is imperative for a man of honour to ensure his survival within the 
Family. Orders from hierarchical superiors are to be followed and never questioned, no 
hesitation, no matter how brief is acceptable,"*®
■*®Gambetta, Diego. The Sicilian Mafia: the Business o f Private Protection. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993, page 2.
'*’’Stille, Alexander. Excellent Cadavers. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995, page 119.
■*®According to turncoats Antonio Patti and Carlo Zinchitella two local Marsala bosses, Francesco 
Caprarotta and Vincenza d’Arnica were killed on orders from Toto Riina, because they had hesitated to 
murder Paolo Borsellino, and had granted him a temporary stay o f execution. This hesitation represented 
a refusal to follow orders and signed their own death warrant. Their deaths were then used as examples 
to the other men of honour. Source: Bottamedi, Claude. La Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 
1997, page 26.
CosaNostra 181
Activities'^^
SICILIAN COSA NOSTRA
Major actlvltie^
Inttnutional drug iraffkMng Iwk tNCorrt a major actnnty of Cosa Nostra wMchW»#» à cfeaing^touse for agreements and drug and finançai activities in laundering colossal suma, #itm W ickin;, extortion and skimming public works coiAmds.
j International
h s f t t l e a /
m m m
,----------------- — , # /  '
“ ' ' Mafia famine# lin Ba^um. Braz.
Size and structure
.
WftOmember* ' '(one man of honour for every ‘ person in popufailon.) anddonmof %
Vartioal organization a #  
regional eommfeslon 
andprovineüi
MCMnea#Tried#i «*»**•«*«»•-i Ranks of members
The Cosa Nostra originally made their money by cattle rustling and controlling water 
supply and distribution. Times and markets having evolved significantly since then, the 
Mafia has capitalised on the globalisation process and tailored their activities to the 
changing environment.^® What has made the Cosa Nostra so resilient is its ability to 
constantly adapt its activities to the emerging markets. Entrepreneurship is prohibited in 
all aspects of Mafia life; except for business and money making possibilities. The Cosa 
Nostra does not have any specific activity of choice; the only two restrictions are the 
prohibition of gambling and prostitution.
Some estimates suggest that out of the Sicilian population of 5 million, as many 
as 100,000-200,000 families rely on some form of revenue generated by the Cosa Nostra,"
^^his section is a survey of the major Cosa Nostra activities, and not a detailed analysis o f all the 
activities it is involved in.
^®Servadio, Gaia. Mafioso: a BSstorv of the Mafia from its Ori|zins to the Present Dav. New York: Stein 
and Day, 1976, page 215.
"Stille, Alexander. Excellent Cadavers. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995, page 157.
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and that it controls between 1/3 and Vi of all criminal activities in Italy, controlling a
massive portion of the business and real-estate markets as well as a significant share of
the industries. The following statistics are a breakdown of the estimated percent of a
given industry control of the Mafia in certain sectors of the economy:"
-Construction companies: 22%
-Commercial enterprises: 19%
-Distribution centre for 24%
-agricultural products 
-Hypermarkets 14%
-Finance companies 50%
According to the Italian Chamber of Commerce, the Mafia controls an estimated 
12 % to 15% of the Italian GNP." The annual turnover reaches nearly $70 billion USD,^ '^  
generated from three principle activities, extortion, public works contracts and drug 
trafficking," but recently additional activities have supplemented the Cosa Nostra profits, 
including money laundering, frauds on the European Union budget, counterfeits and 
trafficking in illegal immigrants.
One of the secondary goals of the Cosa Nostra is to camouflage the illicit origins 
of their capital and invest it into legitimate ventures, thus creating a legitimate business 
structure under their control." The more capital they can legally generate, the less risk 
they are actually taking, and the less scrutiny they get from the police and judicial 
authorities. The following examples of Cosa Nostra activities are but a brief overview of 
their major centres of interest. Each pole of activity differs from region to region, and 
country to country, and may either be expanded, curtailed or altogether halted depending
"Italian Federation of Public Enterprises. “Mafia Money Laundering Practices Explained.” Trends in 
Organised Crime 1.4 (1994).
"Arias, Juan. “Aumentan los atentados y las estorsiones.” El Pais 29 April 1991 and Waddington, 
Richard “Italy's Financial War with Mafia needs Computers Not Guns.” Reuters 18 July 1991.
"Once again estimates on the annual turnover generated by the mafia vary. According to Xavier Raufert 
it equates to approximately $46 billion USD, whilst Michel Debacq places it between $40-55 billion 
USD. Source : Raufer, Xavier, “La Mafia: Elle envahit la France et l'Europe.” L'Express 26 November 
1992: 90-106. De Bacq, Michel. “Criminalité Organisée.” Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. 
Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996.
"Campagnola, Francois. Crime organise et gangstérisme professionel: experience française et analyse 
comparée. Paris: Institut de Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure, 1996, page 16.
"Savona, Emesto. “European Money Trail.” Transnational Organised Crime 2.4 (1996), page 8-10.
Cosa Nostra 183
on market forces, legislation and profitability. Preference is obviously granted to a sector 
of activity where the potential profit yield is high, whilst the risk factor is minimal. If for 
some reason, participation in a particularly risky activity is necessary, then outside help, 
or affiliates are sometimes used so as to minimise the danger posed to the organisations. 
By understanding and defining not only the activities the Cosa Nostra is involved 
In, but how it penetrates and controls these activities, it becomes more evident how to 
focus counter-OC strategies.
Extortion
The pizzo (meaning percentage), or extortion money is the traditional form of “fund- 
raising” for the Mafia families, and consists mainly in local businesses paying the local 
Mafia boss a set sum of money for protection, or working tax. It allows a business to 
operate unhindered within the family's territory,^^ and contributes to the Cosa Nostra's 
overall operational costs." Contribution to the pizzo is not voluntary, and if a business 
refuses to contribute willingly, escalating actions, including casual threats, thefts and 
arson, bodily harm to employees, friends and eventually relatives, are taken to convince 
the owner to “rectify” the situation. The pizzo is generally well calculated, 
mathematically sound, based on the estimated annual revenue of the business in question 
and hence remains reasonable. With the ascension of the Corleonesi clan and the 
blossoming of the heroin trade, the emphasis on the pizzo diminished, but recently, with 
the loss of interest in the drug trade because of more severe penal legislation, the Cosa 
Nostra has once again begun to concentrate on extorting businesses, particularly those 
with construction and real-estate activities. Total pizzo revenue collected by organised 
crime in Italy reaches an estimated $20-23 billion USD a year." According to the Anti- 
Mafia Parliamentary Commission as many as 90% of shops and businesses in Catania pay
^^Glorieux, Patrick. “Criminalité Organisée et groupes mafieux en Europe.” . Paris; Institut des Hautes 
Etudes de la Sécurité intérieure, 1993, page 8.
"Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, page 116.
’^ ®The Italian government, in an eflTort to encourage reporting o f extortion attempts, has passed a 1% sur­
tax on some forms of insurance policies. This added revenue, coupled with seized Mafia assets are used 
as a “solidarity fund” for victims of extortion. Source: Follain, John. “Italy creates fund for mob 
victims.” . Rome: Reuter, 1991.
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extortion money, similar figures have also been suggested for Palermo" even Parish 
priests are not exempt from paying the pizzo."
Public works contracts
Controlling the distribution of public work contracts has long been a profitable activity 
for the Cosa Nostra. In fact, its involvement dates back to the 1950’s rush towards rapid 
urbanisation throughout Italy, and the subsequent high demand for construction 
companies and building materials. The Cosa Nostra saw this phenomenon as a golden 
opportunity to control the industry, at least in Sicily, and make huge profits from it." 
Thr ough intimidation and violence it is able to dissuade competitors from bidding for 
contracts, and through corruption and blackmail it controls the decision-malcers and hence 
the attribution of these contracts. In addition, the Cosa Nostra has power over many of 
the supply and distribution networks for construction goods and materials, and hence can 
speed up or slow down the delivery of essential supplies. A public works construction 
firm, not affiliated with the Cosa Nostra and not contributing to the pizzo will likely 
encounter severe materials shortages that will halt its progress and eventually may result 
in termination of the contract, in favour quite obviously of a more “Mafia friendly” 
company. According to an Italian Parliamentary Report, as many as 80% of all small- 
medium size construction companies are under Mafia protection."
Drug trafficldng"
The Cosa Nostra entered the international drug market in July 1957 following the Palenno 
Crime Summit that brought together the Italian and American crime families and planned 
global strategies to develop and maximise the drug trade. The US crime syndicates, under
‘^ ®Follain, Jolin. “Italy's Mafia Rakes in Extortion Money.” . Rome: Reuter, 1991.
"One priest explained: “The scoundrel wanted me to give them 500 million liras (= $400,000 USD).
They threatened me on the phone, in booby trapped letters.” Source: Follain, John. “Mafia Tames 
Leopard in Bloody Battle for Sicilian Fiefdom.” . Rome: Reuter, 1990.
"Clutterbuck, Richard. Drugs. Crime and Corruption. London: Macmillan, 1995, page 134.
"Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, page 117.
"For specific cases of illicit markets connected to drug trafBcking refer to: Zamagni, Stefano, ed. 
Mercanti Illégale e Mafia: L'Economica Del Crimine Organizzato. Bologna: IlMulino, 1993.
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massive pressure from US justice officials, turned to their Sicilian cousins for help. Acting 
mainly as middlemen in the 1950's and 60's the bulk of the Mafia’s heroin trade passed 
through the French connection, linking the Turkish suppliers, to the Marseilles and 
Corsican laboratories and finishing on the streets of the United States". Estimated profits 
from refined heroin ranged between 1,000-2,000%." The explosion of drug addiction in 
the 1970's, especially to mind-expanding drugs in the US, further boosted Cosa Nostra 
involvement in the trade," but it was not until the dismantling of the French Connection 
(1974) that the Sicilians" began to play a much more active role in the heroin trade, 
edging out the French, and eventually setting up refining laboratories in Sicily, nin by a 
few choice French chemists.^® It was estimated that in the 1970's, the Sicilian Connection 
supplied as much as 80% of the refined heroin consumed in the United States,^ ® and 75% 
of the world’s heroin between 1982-1985.^^ As market demand in the United States 
changed, requiring less heroin and more cocaine, and the market in Europe required just 
the opposite, more heroin and less cocaine, the Cosa Nostra set-out to strengthen ties with 
the other major drug distribution networks (see chapter II). Eventually the Cosa Nostra 
developed close ties with the Colombian drug cartels, a “joint venture” of sorts, drafting 
an exclusive distribution deal with the Medellin cartel,^  ^swapping cocaine for heroin^ .^
Refer to Appendix 3 for illustrations o f the Cosa Nostra drug trafficking routes.
"Jamieson, Alison. Terrorism and drug Trafficking in the 1990's. Aldershot; Dartmouth, 1994, page 
45.
"Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, page 104.
"The drug trade was run mainly by three families: Porta Nueva, Brancaccio and Pagliarelli.
"Statistics referring to total production levels differ substantially from source to source. Thierry Cretin, 
estimates that between 1975 and 1978 the Sicilian heroin industry produced 1/3 o f the US consumption, 
equating to 15 tons. Source: Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1997, page 104. It is not really known why the Sicilians had a prefrence for French chemist 
other than they were qualifies and willing to engage in this illegal activity all the while respecting the 
secretive nature of it.
^®Labrousse, Alain, and Alain Wallon. La Planete des Drogues: Organisations Criminelles, guerres et 
blanchiment. Paris: Seuil, 1993, page 136.
^^Campagnola, Francois. Crime organise et gangstérisme professionel: experience française et analyse 
comparée. Paris: Institut de Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure, 1996, page 17.
^^Staff Writer. “Drug Conwctions reveal Medellin link with Mafia.” New York Times 6 November 1990.
^1 kilogram of heroin was exchanged for 3 kilograms o f cocaine, Falcone, Giovanni, and Marcelle
Cosa Nostra 186
Despite their status as quasi-exclusive heroin supplier to the US, and the world the Cosa 
Nostra was never able to monopolise the drug trade as a whole/"' and little by little lost 
their footing in the drug trafficldng arena and heroin supply, today producing only 5% of 
the world’s heroin. According to the US Dmg Enforcement Agency (DBA) the Cosa 
Nostra only plays a very minor role in today’s drug trade. Family cohesion may have been 
a casualty of the drug market: the internal wars that rocked the Cosa Nostra may have 
been derived from their involvement in the drug business. Different faction fought bitter 
and bloody disputes over distribution networks, territory and even distributors and dealer. 
Cosa Nostra drug trafficking activities became less prominent not only as a result of 
much more fierce competition on the international “provider” market, but also because 
the Cosa Nostra became aware of the increasing risk associated with this trade, and began 
to look elsewhere for less risky, but equally profitable, activities like money laundering.
Money laundering’'^
In order to conceal, dispose or invest the narco dollars generated from the booming diug 
trade, the Mafia was obliged to become involved in money laundering. Money laundering 
became a profitable activity because of the quasi-insignificant risks involved with it, 
between 1.8-1.9% get intercepted.^^ Until recently money laundering offences were 
subject to comparatively minimal sanctions as compared to drug trafficking offences, and 
despite the enactment of national and international legislation designed to combat this 
type of activity, money laundering continues to thrive. Emesto Savona, Italian Mafia 
expert, agrees that the Mafia’s money laundering activity remain profitable because it is
Padovani. Cosa Nostra. Paris; Austral, 1991, page 118.
^^Wiiliams, Phil, and Emesto Savona. “Problems and Dangers Posed by Organize Transnational Crime in 
Various Regions o f the World.” Transnational Organised Crime 1.3 (1995). Also refer to : Robinson, 
Jeffrey. The Laundrymen: Inside the World's Third Largest Business. London: Simon & Schuster,
1995.
’^ T^he IMF estimates that the money laundering industry, the third largest business in the world, accounts 
for 2% of the world’s GDP ($500 billion USD), $85 billion o f which are generated from the drug trade. 
IMF Survey. “Tougher Measures Needed to Counter the Macro Effects o f Money Laundering.” Trends 
in Organised Crime 2.3 (1997), page 5.
’'®Case o f the Bank o f Ambrosiana that laundered a significant portion o f th Cosa Nostra’s narco dollars. 
Paoli, Letizia. “The Bank Ambrosiana Case: An Investigation into Underestimation o f Relations between 
Organised and Economic Crime.” Crime Laws and Social Change 23.4 (1995).
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equipped with the world’s best, and most highly paid financial advisors, and experts at 
concealing the criminal origin of these funds/’' In addition to laundering their own narco­
dollars, the Cosa Nostra has also begun to launder money for the drug cartels. The main 
launderers of the Mafia were the Cuntrera/Caruana brothers of Aruba.
Other activities
Although extortion, public works contracts, drug trafficldng and money laundering are the 
principle activities of the Cosa Nostra, they are also involved in a plethora of other illicit 
activities like loan sharking (rates varying between 100-200% interest). Murder-for-hire 
has re-emerged as a quick, money generating activity, with the base cost as low as $450 
USD (500,000 liras). The smuggling of illegal immigrants is also a popular activity of 
the Cosa Nostra." More traditional activities like cigarette hafflcldng, and manufacturing 
of counterfeit goods and currency continue to generate healthy profits, but new ventures 
like frauds" are quickly becoming favourites." The European body for monitoring frauds, 
the UCLAF estimates that between July 1989 and March 1993 the Italians, presumably 
led by the Cosa Nostra hijacked $500 million USD from the agricultural subsidy fund." 
As new profitable markets and opportunities emerge, the Mafia will no doubt begin to 
partake in them", one such potential for Mafia activity is computer crimes."
’^Tn 1993, only 270 suspected transaction were reported by the banking sector, out of a total o f 13 billion 
yearly transactions. Italian Federation o f Public Enterprises. “Mafia Money Laundering Practices 
Explained.” Trends in Organised Crime 1.4 (1994).
’^ ' l^ickman, Tom. “The Rothschilds o f the Mafia on Amba.” Transnational Organised Crime 3.2 (1997), 
page 53.
^^oUain, John. “"Murderfor Hire".” . Palermo; Reuter, 1990.
*®Madelin, Philippe. La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 45.
"  Frauds, although very profitable often necessitate less manpower than other traditional criminal 
activities and most o f all are less sanctioned by the law then drug trafficking.
"Also refer to: d’Aubert, Francois. Main Basse Sur l'Europe: Enquête sur les Derives de Bruxelles. 
Paris: Pion, 1994.
"Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquête sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le 
Midi. Paris: Seuil, 1995, page 62.
"Refer to Chapter H for a full listing o f OC activities.
"Refer to: Le Doran, Serge, and Philippe Rose. Cvber Mafias. Paris: Denoel, 1998. - Le Doran, Serge,
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Legitimate activities
A particularity of the Cosa Nostra is its keen ability to quickly recycle dirty money into 
legitimate enterprises, thereby laundering it or further hiding it. So legitimate business 
ventures, with a clean, respectable profile are eagerly sought out to invest previously 
laundered money. An international target for Cosa Nostra investments is the real-estate 
ventures on the Riviera. An investigation by the Guarda di Finanza (1993), estimated that 
Cosa Nostra investments where split up in the following fashion: ^
In fact, Jean de Maillard, French Magistrate and Substitute of the prosecutor of the 
Republic estimates that more than 50% of all the Mafia income is generated from one 
form or another of legal activities.*^ The Italian CENSIS was more conservative in its 
1992 estimates, quoting Mafia overall share of legitimate activities near 19%.**
□  real e s t a t e  
17%
S h o p s  
b u s i n e s s e s  
1 1 %
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60%
and Jean-Marc Lamere. Menaces sur les autoroutes de l'information. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996. - 
Council o f Europe. “La Criminalité Informatique.” . Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1990. - Barret, D.J- 
. Bandits on the Information Superhighway. New York: O'Reilly & Associates, 1996.
**Cretin, Thierry. Mafias du Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, page 166.
*^ de Maillard, Jean. Un monde sans loi. Paris: Stock, 1998, page 50.
**Graham, Robert. “A Message from the Mafia.” Financial Times 7 July 1992.
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VI The Export of the Cosa Nostra
Traditionally, organised crime groups in general, and the Cosa Nostra specifically, 
limited their sphere of activities to within a very restrained territory, usually a small 
regional, or even a local microcosm, yet this phenomenon has dramatically changed, and 
the Cosa Nostra has grown from a insular organisation, to one with a significant 
international dimension.*  ^ The modem Mafia, according to Italian sociologist Catanzara, 
is a mixture of traditions and adaptability, mixing old with new in a relatively peaceful 
cohabitation/® This noticeable trend towards internationalisation has been a result of 
several factors including, immigr ation, internal wars, and choice of market activities. This 
ability to export, with relative ease, its members and criminal activities has dramatically 
altered the way in which the Cosa Nostra can be addressed from a judicial and law 
enforcement point of view, and has no doubt significantly contributed to making it 
increasingly vimlent and dangerous,
L  Voluntary Immigration
The first factor that facilitated the Cosa Nostra’s move from insularity to 
internationalisation was the successive immigration waves to the New World: between 
1900-1914, more than 780,000 Italians immigrated to the United States (4,000,000 
between 1820-1930), obviously amongst those were Sicilians and member of the Cosa 
Nostra, who maintained contact with their relatives still in the Old Country.
Z_ Forced Immigration
In addition to ‘Voluntary immigration”, there was also forced immigration of Cosa Nostra 
bosses fleeing the persecution or prosecution of the state. The most significant wave of
forced immigration came about in the 1920's, when Prefect Cesare Mori forced many of
the members of the Cosa Nostra to flee Sicily and establish themselves elsewhere, notably 
Tunisia, where Sicilian immigration was already present, and the United States where a
*®Flosi, Leone. “La Dimensione Intemazionale Della Criminalita Organizzata.” Trattato di Criinilogogia. 
Medicina Crimmologica e psichiatra Forense: Forme di organizzazioni criminali e terrorisme. Ed. Franco 
Ferracuti. Milan: Giufïre, 1988, page 79.
®®Bottamedi, Claude. La Mafia en Belgique. Ottignies: Quorum, 1997, page 18.
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big Italian and Sicilian community was already established. The “victims” of forced 
immigration continued their activities, basing with their members, therefore expanding 
their activities, by their mere presence abroad to an international level. Again in the 
1970's, the Ministry of Justice forced “dangerous Mafia elements” to leave Sicily. It was 
thought that by banning them from living or even visiting Sicily they would cease to be 
active in the Cosa Nostra. According to Falcone these measures had quite the opposite 
effect: banished from the islands the members of the Cosa Nostra spread out across the 
world, continued their criminal activity, and in fact penetrated areas that had up until then 
been sparred: “The mob ran wilder than ever”.®^
3. Internal wars
The two bloody internal wars that rocked the Cosa Nostra in the 1960's and again in the 
1980's caused many members to flee, seeking to avoid either their elimination by the 
waning factions, or did not want to work with the victorious clan. These wars entailed 
systematic execution of the heads of family, hunting each down and murdering him until 
the entire family was decimated.®^
A Activities with a international sphere
Although immigration, forced or voluntary opened up possibilities and opportunities for 
the Mafia across the world, this did not represent the sole basis for internationalisation. 
Rather the most significant factor propelling the Cosa Nostra into the international arena 
was their firm belief that in order to ensure their viability; they needed a guarantee of 
financial viability like drug trafficking. As the world demand for drugs began to rise, so 
too did the interest and involvement of the Cosa Nostra in this area, but it required not 
only an international dimension, but also the creation and maintenance of global networks 
for growers, suppliers, purifiers, distributors. Subsequent diversification of activities like
®^Falcone, Giovanni. “Mafia - Trial and Error.” La Stampa 21 June 1991 and Rome Correspondent. 
“Italy's ever growing monster.” The Economist 27 July 1991.
®^Tommaso Buschetta, later turned state witness, fled to Brazil to avoid being eliminated by the 
Corleonesi clan as they gained supremacy in the second Mafia war. Generally as things calm down, and 
the internal wars end, the dominant factions then seek to contact the members that fled and establish links 
w th them, using them as an antenna of the family wherever they are established.
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money laundering and weapons trafficking also implied internationalisation/*
5. Pattern of internationalisation:
The pattern of internationalisation through links forged with other groups outside of the 
immediate Family was at the very beginning based on geographic proximity, and later 
based on market activity and nature of the illicit ventui es. The Cosa Nostra, once it had 
truly solidified its stronghold on Sicily sought out temporal alliances with other Italian 
national crime groups: The Camorra, Sacra Corona Unita and ‘Ndrangheta even granting 
Camorra boss Michele Zaza exceptional status of man of honour in order to facilitate 
relations between the two crime syndicates. The underlying idea of the Cosa Nostra, was 
that by allying themselves with the Camorra, they could better control its involvement in 
the drug trade. As the scope of the market widened and became heavily concentrated on 
drug trafficking and especially heroin trafficking, the Cosa Nostra began to seek out 
additional alliances that would facilitate and enhance their approach to global trafficking, 
“reactivating” criminal elements in the immigrant communities around the world and 
drafting formal working agreements with other crime groups: like the Colombian drug 
network. Giovanni Falcone believed that the reason the Cosa Nostra was so dangerous 
was the fact that it had such an international dimension, and therefore that the Cosa 
Nostra could not be defined as a puiely Italian problem but rather a planetary problem.®^
®*Jamieson, Alison. “The Transnational Dimension o f Italian Organised Crime.” Transnational Organised 
Crime Review 1.2 (1995).
®Valcone, Giovanni. “Speech before the November 1990 Congress.” Revue International de Criminologie 
et de Police Scientifique .6 (1992).
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v u  Conclusion
The Cosa Nostra because of its history and structure, as well as its code of conduct 
and rule of operation is a solid and surprisingly resilient organisation doted with defence 
mechanism that have withstood successive State crackdowns. The fact that it is 
secretive, well protected and strictly compartmentalised has made it difficult to penetrate 
and police/judicial authorities have always found it difficult to dismantle. The violent 
retaliation that the organisation has orchestrated against persons collaborating has limited 
the number of prospective collaborators. In the case of justice collaborator Buschetta, 47 
members of his family and close friends were assassinated in an effort to silence him and 
serve as an example to others. For the Cosa Nostra these targeted assassination can 
continue for seven generations.
Perhaps with the increased information available today as a result of pentiti co­
operation will help authorities combat the Cosa Nostra more efficiently. Its sphere of 
interest has shifted over the last two decades from entrance into the drug trafficking arena, 
to more discreet, less risky operations today like money laundering and subsidy fraud. 
Because the Cosa Nostra is a rational organisation, it will rarely chose to engage in an 
activity that is very risky and will chose instead to engage in more “safe” activities, also 
making it more difficult to catch. The image often used to describe the Mafia is a 
octopus: with each limb the police or state is able to sever a new one will quickly sprout. 
Its constantly changing spheres of interest, coupled with its compartmentalised structures 
and protection of each level, enable it to survive.
The internationalisation of the Cosa Nostra, transforming it from a local/regional 
entity to a global player has made it not only more dangerous, but has also meant it 
needed to develop “ex-patriate” operations basis and communications corridors outside 
of Italy. The European activity hub for the Cosa Nostra, elected in the late 1980’s is the 
French Riviera. By understanding the aims, goals and structure of the Cosa Nostra, it 
become more evident why it is so dangerous and also why it has chosen to export itself 
abroad, notably to France.
The Cosa Nostra has always entertained a very special relationship with the Italian 
state in general or with specific political parties or individuals state actors or influential 
partners like the Church. These ties have been cultivated over time and have allowed a
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very ambiguous and occasionally opaque relationship between the Mafia and the state to 
emerge. A rather simplistic and controversial assertion is to stipulate that OC activities 
within a state are detrimental and should be actively combated, but the next chapter will 
seek to nuance that assertion.
Despite the obvious menace that any degree of OC activity poses, it is still 
daring to ask the highly explosive question of whether a degree of mafia activity is 
tolerated within a state, and even more so whether a degree of mafia activity is in some 
cases encouraged. Only after having looked at these possibilities does it becomes possible 
to understand why national and international responses have not always been as quick and 
as powerful as might be expected in light of the grave threat of OC. The research has 
sought to enumerated the instances in Italy where Mafia presence was not contested nor 
combated by the state and the reasons that might be behind that strategic choice.
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Appendix U*:
Cosa Nostra Families & Clans
Acquasanta-Aienella-Vergine Alfano Agate Amiarolo-Riggi Altofonte
Bagheiia Berhnonte-Mezzagtio Bontempo-Scavo Borgetto Borgo Vecchio Buccellato 
Bolognetta-Maiineo Brontesi
Caccamo Cabro’Giocchino Cammaiata Camporeale Cappello Cerda
Ciaculli-Crocei’verde-Giai'diiii Cimmina Coiieone Corso del Mille
Craparotta Cuntrera-Carauana Cursoti Cariolo Code Piatte Code Strette Caramazza Costa
D'Amico Di Gangi Di Vincenzo Di Salvo
Emanuello Evoca
Gale-Montanti-Sfenezza Galli Giobane-Mafia Gullotti Gullo GioaculH Gieco 
Kalsa
Licaii Lupitto
Madonia Malpassottu Messina Denaro Milone Minore 
Noce Napoli Nai’do
Paceco Partania Mondello Passo di Rigano Patti Antonino PiUeraPülera-Cappello-Miano Polara 
Porta Nuova Palermo Paleimo-Acquasanta
Resuttana Ribera Rimi-Greco Russo
Santapaola Sciacca Schiavone-Aparo-Provenzano Stiddaii StimoU-Morabito-Fiorello 
S.Giuseppe Jato-s.Cipkello San Lorenzo S.Maria di Gesu* Santangelo Siculiana San Mama- 
Castelverde
Terrasini Tommaso Natale-Caidillo Tonetta-Villagiazi di Cami 
Villagi’azia di Paleimo
The following list regroups the totality o f the Cosa Nostra families and clans as repertoried by the 
Italian police. The ability to even draft such a list shows just how far authorities have come to 
understanding the organisation and its structure.
®*Hand-out. "Italian organised crime.” . Nanterres: Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire, 1997.&  
Raufer, Xavier. “La Mafia: Elle envahit la France et lEurope.” L'Express 26 November 1992: 90-106.
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Appendix 2
02/08/1958
03/06/1953
10/12/1969
16/09/1970
05/05/1971
20/07/1977
30/05/1978
09/03/1979
21/07/1979
25/09/1979
06/01/1980
03/05/1980
06/08/1980
23/04/1981
11/05/1981
30/08/1982
16/06/1982
03/09/1982
25/01/1983
28/07/1983
05/01/1984
23/02/1985
28/07/1985
06/08/1985
21/01/1988
14/01/1988
25/09/1988
26/09/1988
28/09/1988
14/12/1988
21/09/1990
09/08/1991
28/08/1991
12/03/1992
23/05/1992
08/06/1992
27/07/1992
08/11/1992
15/09/1993
Key Mafia Murders®^
{Cadavere eccellente)
Navarro, Michele (Doctor)
Ciaculli massacre (7 bomb disposal experts and carabinieri)
Viale Lazio massacre (5 dead)
De Maura, Maura (Journalist)
Scaglione, Pietro p^ublic Prosecutor of Palermo)
Russo, Guiseppe (Colonel of the Carabinieri)
Di Cristina, Giuseppe (Mafia Boss)
Reina, Michele (Secretary of Paleimo DC)
Guiliano, Boris (Head of Palermo flying Squad)
Terranova, Cesare (Chief examining magistrate)
Mattarella, Piersanti (President of Sicilian Region)
(Captain of the Carabinieri)
(Palermo Public Prosecutor)
(Mafia Boss)
(Mafia Boss)
(National deputy)
(4 dead)
Dalla Chiesa, Carlo Alberto (General)
Montalto, Giacomo (Deputy Prosecutor of Trapani)
(Chief examining magistrate of Palermo +3 men) 
(Journalist)
(Businessman + driver)
(Police Commissioner)
(Deputy Head of Palermo flying squad + escort) 
(Former mayor of Palermo)
(Policeman)
president of Palermo Court of Appeals + son) 
(Director of drug rehabilitation center of Trapani) 
(mafia boss +wife)
(building contractor)
(Judge)
(Appellate Court Counselor)
(Nationally-known businessman)
(Member of European Parliement)
(Judge - State Prosecutor + wife + 3 policemen) 
(Judge - Anti-Mafia Pool + 5 guards) 
(Anti-extortion Chief)
(Mayor of a Sicilian town)
(Anti-Mafia priest)
Basile, Emmanuele 
Costa, Gaetano 
Bontate, Stefano 
Inzerillo, Salvatore 
La Torre, Pio 
Ring Road Massacre
Chinnici, Rocco 
Fava, Giuseppe 
Parisi, Roberto 
Montana, Giuseppe 
Cassara, Antonio 
Insalaco, Giuseppe 
Mondo, Natale 
Saetta, Antonio 
Rostagno, Mauro 
Bontate, Giovanni 
Ranieri, Luigi 
Livatino, Rosario 
Scopelliti, Antonio 
Grassi, Libero 
Lima, Salvo 
Falcone, Giovanni 
Borsellino, Paolo 
Lizzio, Giovanni 
Larosa, Salvatore 
Puglisi, Giuseppe
® J^ainieson, Alison. Terrorism and drug Trafficking in the 199Q's. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, page 49 
and Richards, Charles. “He was single greatest tlireat to Cosa Nostra.” The Independent 25 May 1992.
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Appendix 3 
Major Drug trafficking Operations *^
Drug trafficking and weapons trafficking by Turkish, Italian and Bulgarian organised
crime
Mer NoireVamaYOUGOSLAVIE
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The Pizza connection route shows how Asian, Italian and American OC families worked 
in a co-ordinated fashion to ensure safe passage through Europe and the US of heroin. In 
return, wire transfers and currency shipments were expedited from the US through 
Switzerland and back to Asia.
Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues. Atlas Mondial des Drogues. Paris: PUF, 1996, page 73 & 
77.
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Appendix 4
Cosa Nostra code of honour
never touch another man of honour’s wife 
never steal
always have a serious and correct comportment in public (no excess of any kind).
always tell the truth to the family
never kill another man of honour unless ordered to
deny the existence of the Cosa Nostra
never speak or divulge information about the family to the police 
obey unconditionally
never maice money off prostitution and gambling®®
never shame your wife by having public affairs (discretion is essential)
never kill women and children
never use drugs^ ®®
®®Francesco Rinella, despite being the brother o f two men o f honour, the son and grandson of men of 
honour was never asked to join the Cosa Nostra because he made his living from pimping prostitutes. 
Arlacchi, Pino. Les Hommes du Deshonneur. Paris: Albin Michel, 1992, page 26.
®^®Falcone, Giovanni, and Marcelle Padovani. Cosa Nostra. Paris: Austral, 1991, page 104. - and 
Arlacclii, Pino. Les Hommes du Deshonneur. Paris: Albin Michel, 1992 and Stille, Alexander. 
Excellent Cadavers. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995 .
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( 2 h a p t e r  ^
~]~hc ^ ta ta  an d  th e  hAafia
I  Introduction
Today the nation-state is faced with the growing complexities of changing world 
politics. The state is more constrained and the levers of power more difficult to 
monopolise than ever. The opposite scenario is emerging however for crime groups like 
the Mafia, for whom the levers of power are become increasingly easy to manipulate and 
eventually monopolise. States may remain powerful entities, but non-state actors are also 
gaining strength and are beginning to seriously compete with the state in certain very 
specific domains. The new international environment and its ramification on the very 
nature of the nation-state have created new, unprecedented opportunities for non-state 
actors. These new opportunities have proven in different instances to be both positive and 
negative for various aspects of the overall state structure and power. Because of this 
changing environment, transnational organised crime now possesses some of the tools 
previously available only to legitimate states/
Can there really be a concrete political will for the state to aggressively combat the 
Mafia, and other forms of organised crime when in fact that same state derive some short 
term benefits from its very presence? What degree of presence and activity is tolerated 
before a real will to combat it actually emerges? These are just two of the questions that 
must be explored in order to begin to answer the dilemma of potentially absent political 
will and degree of political liability that is posed by the presence of the Mafia within a 
state.
^Lupsha, Peter. “Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation State.” Transnational Organized Crime 
Reriew (1996), page 23.
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H The Mafia and the State^
The four main concepts surrounding Max Weber’s definition of the State are 
monopoly, territory, legitimacy and use of force, however his main emphasis is focused 
around force. Weber’s approach can be qualified as a more functional model of statehood: 
what does the state actually do and provide? According to Weber, the State’s main 
prerogative is to successfully monopolise violence.*
h Loss of the monopoly over the use of force and violence : the Mafia as a potential 
State.''
The very need to exercise monopoly of legitimate force 
arises only because States are challenged by rebels and 
criminals who themselves resort to force and who contests 
the legitimacy of the laws they brealc.*
The Mafia’s continued monopoly over the use of violence in Sicily and in regions 
where its is very present, concords with Weber’s definition and hence can be said to act 
like, mimic, if not actually be a state. A rather simplistic, yet illustrative mathematical 
equation of transitivity can be set up to develop this assertion:
IfA=B, andB=C then by transitivity A=C 
If only a State (A) can monopolise the use of violence (B), and the mafia (C) monopolises 
violence, then the Mafia must be a state (A) = (C). Granted this represents a rather 
restricted view of this very complex issue, but can at the very least help to place the Mafia 
relationship with/to the state into perspective. Perhaps Max Weber’s definition has become 
a bit outdated, or is insufficient when trying to apply it to the modem mafia. In Sicily, the 
Cosa Nostra has managed to gain near total monopoly over the use of force and violence 
with relative impunity. Until quite recently, many criminal attacks went un-prosecuted and
^Throughout this analysis, the term “state” shall refer to the entity generally called state, and not 
necessarily to a specific national state. Although most illustrative examples will be derived firom the Italian 
state, mainly because of the prevalence and extent of Mafia penetration in that state, this does not mean to 
signify that it is the only reference point. This discussion is in fact centered rather around the broader 
theoretical context o f the state.
*Giddens contends that Weber’s definition o f total monopoly over violence is realistically unachievable. 
■'Also refer to: Giddens, A. The Nation State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity, 1985.
*Hoffinan, John. Beyond the State. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, page 5.
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unpunished for various legitimate (prosecution difficulties or technicalities) or more
dubious reasons (usually as a result of threats or bribes). Organised crime and domestic
battery* are two examples of persisting and chronic violence within contemporary societies
that evade effective control by the State. ^
Cesare Mori, a Sicilian sociologist, rather than go as far as equate the Mafia with
an actual State, tempered his analysis by qualifying the Mafia as only a potential state, not
yet a full state in its own right.
The Mafia... It is a potential state which normally takes concrete form in a 
system of local oligarchies closely interwoven, but each autonomous in its 
own district.*
Granted the State no matter how rivalled it might be by actors like the Mafia, still 
retains, at the very least, from the legal stand-point, the right over the legitimate use of 
violence. The problem posed with equating the Mafia to a state is then the dual-monopoly 
incurred over a single prescribed territory. This analysis contends that the State has 
(voluntarily or not) renounced on a practical (as opposed to legal) level to its dominance 
over violence, at least in some specific geographical areas, and that the Mafia has hence 
be allowed to substitute itself for the State. Perhaps this situation can be qualified as a 
duality of monopoly over violence.
Z The creation of rival structures: the Mafia State within a State?
The Mafia can also be classified as a state within a state based on the idea that it 
mimics rather effectively structures already existent in a state. The Cosa Nostra for 
example, just as most states in their own right, has its own army, exercises its (self 
appointed granted) right to levy taxes, the “pizzo”, and judges and prosecutes violators of 
its own laws (or code of honour), all of which are normally attributed as functions of a 
State. In addition from a more sociological point of view, the Mafia has a defined territory 
(Sicily), population (the inhabitants of Sicily), language (dialect), and culture (“la
* In the United States 50% of all women are victims, at least once in their lifetime, of domestic abuse and 
battery.
^Pierson, Christopher. The Modem State. London: Routledge, 1993, page 10.
*Mori, Cesare. The Last Struggle with the Mafia. London: Putnam, 1933, page 39.
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Sicilianité”), together these form the pillars of a society and state. The Mafia is unique in 
its determination to establish itself as a state within a state.® A Sicilian scholar wrote the 
following in 1918;
We know that, under the threat of the State law, there are often shadow 
associations whose organization could be deemed as analogous, on a small 
scale, to that of the State. They have legislative and executive authority, 
courts which settle disputes and mete out punishments, agents who cany 
them out inexorably, and complex and precise statutes similar to those of 
States. These associations therefore create their own order, like the State 
and its legal institutions.^®
According to Phil Williams (editor of the journal Transnational Organized Crime Review) 
the Mafia is truly a state within a State equipped with a rival authority structure, parallel 
or black market economy, and able to challenge the State’s monopoly of the use of 
violence. '^' The Mafia mirrors the State and its institutions, even running a parallel economy 
to that of the State’s.
T Insufficient Infrastructures: The forgetful, distant state
The political history of Sicilian autonomy is that of a State at the same time 
“impotent and disgraceful”. In 1900, Sicilian scholar Colajanni evaluated the relationship 
between Sicily/Mafia and the State. He believed that they were products of social 
oppression and bad central government.^* Problems of a weak central rule were further 
accentuated by the outcome of World War II, and the involvement of the Allied Forces in 
the region. From the period between its liberation until 1944, Sicily was governed by the 
Allied Military Government o f Occupied Territories (AMGOT). Since most of the 
government officials that had been compromised and involved with the fascist regime fled 
or went into hiding creating a significant political vacuum as well as severe supplies and 
food shortage. The AMGOT stepped in and tried to govern. It instilled a system of indirect
®No author cited. “The Sicilian Mafia: A State within a State.” The Economist. 24 April, 1993.
*®Gambetta, Diego. The Sicilian Mafia: the Business o f Private Protection. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993, page 5.
^^Williams, Phil. “The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime.” Transnational Organized 
Crime Review (1995), page 34.
^*Colajanni, Napoleone. Au Royaume de la Mafia. Rome, 1900, page 17.
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rule which focused on local government yet resulted in further alienating the central Italian 
govermnent. The legacy and desire for semi-independent rule was resurrected, and when 
the Allied occupation left on Febmary 11,1944, Sicily was far from keen on returning to 
a strong central rule. This period marked the legitimisation of the Sicilian quest for 
independence from the distant Italian State. The Sicilians felt that since they had been so 
severely neglected by the State for so many years during the war that they should continue 
to fend for themselves and no longer count on or, or welcome, the government from Rome. 
The Mafia was able to exploit this situation, developed a flourishing black-market 
economy, and ended up acting as a security force attempting, rather successfully at 
maintaining public order.** Little by little the population came to view the State as “a far 
off government” that provided little administration or justice and the Mafia as a more 
present and reliable form of governance. **
Regardless of the actual definition, or label imposed on the relationship between 
Mafia and State, it remains essential to emphasise that the Mafia needs a state from which 
to live off of. It can not survive with out the presence of a state system and structure. The 
State is the “food source” and main supplier of the Mafia. There are in fact certain other 
organisations that wish to bring down the State an replace it totally**, but this is not the goal 
of the Mafia. It is not dis-integrationalist organisation that seeks to eliminate the State, and 
but would rather have a weak state from which it can usurp some control. The State may 
in fact have sporadically or symbolically loss its total monopoly over the use of force in 
Sicily, and may even have been subjected to the creation of rival structures that inevitably 
mocked its own, or finally may even be guilty of inadequate infra structural provision in 
Sicily, but one fact remains: the Mafia has never sought to eliminate the State completely. 
The Mafia seeks to weaken the State, rival it, and exploit it for maximum profit. A weak 
central state is well suited for Mafia activities as it represents a penetrable, corruptible 
structure. The Mafia ultimate aim to achieve maximum financial enrichment, not replace 
the State. However, the Mafia has been and continues to be present both at the 
local/regional organisations of the State and progressively more present in the upper
**Matar-Bonucci, Marie-Aime. Histoire de la Mafia. Brussels; Complexe, 1994, page 178.
*‘'No author cited. “The Sicilian Mafia: A State within a State.” The Economist .24 April, 1993.
** Bull, Hedley. The Anarcliical Society. New York; Columbia University Press, 1977.
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echelons of the central State system.
IV The State and the Mafia: Parasite of the State or Symbiotic relation with the 
State?
It is generally assumed by scholars, politicians and justice officials alike, that OC 
and more specifically the Mafia presence within a State is detrimental, that it is an un­
welcomed, undesirable entity: the Mafia is nearly always construed as being a parasite of 
the state.** Coupled with this, is the basic concept that faced with such a threat. States are 
necessarily willing to effectively combat Mafia presence. This is not always the case 
however. There are in fact some advantageous bi-products of Mafia presence, that either 
directly advantage the State as a unitary entity, or advantage specifics groups contained 
within the state like certain political parties, the overall economy, or even the Chuich. 
Many Mafia activities have been met with “ tolerance and even passive acquiescence by 
the organs of the State”.*^  The State, as a result of mitigating interests, may even become 
quite reluctant to engage in an active anti-Mafia campaign. This presence, even if it can 
be beneficial in some domains does come to the expense of some degree of fairness, 
justice, legitimacy and sovereignly, and entails at least a partial loss of control by the State 
over local and regional powers like the Mafia. The State and the Mafia, in Italy, appear to 
have settled for a non-aggression pact, centred around the idea of tentative, sphere-specific 
cohabitation.**
h What are the benefits to the State of Mafia presence?: clientelism
The relationship between the two entities, Mafia and State can, in some certain 
specific instances, be qualified as, symbiotic.*® The Mafia and the State appear to live off 
each other, each reaping benefits from the other’s presence. It has been argued by
**"Parasite: Living as an organism (i.e. Mafia), in or upon another (i.e. State) from the body o f which it 
derives its nourishment”. Oxford English Dictionarv. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, page 207.
**Giraud, Henri-Christian. Terres de Mafia. Paris: JC Lattes, 1993, page 25.
**Giraud, Henri-Christian. Terres de Mafia. Paris: JC Lattes, 1993, page 165.
*®Symbiotic; "Association o f two different organisms (i.e Mafia and State) which five attached to each 
other, or one tenant o f t he other and contribute to each others support”. Oxford English Dictionarv. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, page 451.
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organisations like the Centre for Safer Society that in fact there is very little difference 
between organised crime and govermnents. They tend to act in the same way, and seek 
similar goals through identical means, the main difference being that each stands on the 
opposite sides of the law. The State has constitutional/legal powers, and OC does not.*® The 
State can derive benefits from Mafia presence, and in exchange, the Mafia can continue 
its activities and enrich itself, more or less undisturbed. The two entities can develop a sort 
of peaceful cohabitation whereby some Mafia presence and some specific activities can be 
tolerated by the State entities in exchange for certain services or payoffs. The Mafia offers 
services to its client, the State, and in exchange receives a reward (preferential treatments, 
immunity, etc..). This phenomenon can be referred to îis “clientelism”. The State’s actions 
can be perceived as an endorsement, a passive acquiescence, and in some cases an active 
complicity with OC.
The positive bi-products, or offshoots of Mafia presence can include security sub­
contracting, investments and boosts to the regional or local economies, setting up of 
adequate infrastmctures, guarantees of political support and votes, and finally massive 
contributions to the Church. In these instances the Mafia and the State have reached a form 
of compromise, or mutual tolerance. The interests of the Mafia and the State converge 
where the Mafia is able to run things more efficiently than the State.**
a. Security
In the domain of security there is a clear collusion of power between the public 
authority (the State) and organised crime (the Mafia).** The Mafia serves the State’s 
interests when it acts as a security sub-contractor. It solves many of the law and order 
problems with which the State is faced with, yet does not always have the mechanisms to 
actually resolve. This phenomenon can be referred to as the auctioning off of security or 
the renunciation by the State of its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.** Faced
*®Center for Safer Society (CSS). “Organized Crime versus the Government,” 
Http:/www.altematives.com/crime/crime3.html.
**Gambetta, Diego, The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, page 3. 
**Matar~Bonucci, Marie-Anne. Histoire de la Mafia. Brussels: Complexe, 1994, page 71.
**Matar-Bonucci, Marie-Anne. Histoire de la Mafia. Brussels: Complexe, 1994, page 49-50.
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with long lasting civil disobedience or disorder (escalation of violence, increase in petty 
crime, etc...) that persist despite legitimate police or military intervention, the state may 
be driven to call on (active), or allow (more passive), outside powers to curb the violence: 
the Mafia.
As small scale violence multiplies at home and abroad, state aimies will 
continue to shrink, being gradually replaced by a booming security business 
[...] and by urban Mafias [...] who may be better equipped than municipal 
forces to grant physical protection to local inhabitants.^''
This sub-contracting of security has historical roots dating back as far as the Middle
Ages, when the feudal authorities first, then the State, preferred to back the “brigandage”
to conserve at least a form of public and private order. Even the local barons, instead of
calling on the government (whom they despised), for help in restoring or maintaining
public order, sought out the “monutengoli”(protector of the brigands) or robber barons.^^
The Bouibon rulers of Sicily also relied on armed bandits for enforcement of law and
order. Again, in the 1860's in Sicily, the more sophisticated yet equally outlawed Mafia
represented the solution to security dilemma posed by an unruly “province”.
Crime in Sicily reached such epidemic proportions that in 1874 it became 
the subject of an enormous national debate. Public order in Sicily was 
restored through a typical Italian compromise between Mafia and 
govermnent that set the pattern for the future.^ "^
The historical precedent, set as early as the Middle-Ages, of calling on the robber barons 
and eventually the Mafia to settle crime problems or civil disorder, has perpetuated itself, 
and permitted groups like the Mafia to form lasting ties with authorities and really anchor 
itself within the State’s internal security mechanism. The Mafia slowly became to act as 
a guarantor of public order.
It is not significant that the Mafia had their order as along as it represented an 
order. When a Sicilian village was subjected to the rigorous control of the Mafia order, it 
made governance by the State tremendously easier.^  ^ In this instance the goals of the State
Van Creveld, Martin in Kaplan, Robert. “The Coming o f Anarchy.” The Atlantic Monthly .February 
(1994), page 74.
■^^Matar-Bonucci, Marie-Anne. Histoire de la Mafia. Brussels; Complexe, 1994, page 52.
'^^ StiUe, Alexander. Excellent Cadavers. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995, page 15.
^T*adovani, Marcelle. Les Demieres Années de la Mafia. Paris; Gallimard, 1987, page 216.
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(Monarchy first, then Republic), were by no means contradictory to those sought out by the 
Mafia: order. The Mafia became and “instrument” of stabilisation for the State that chose 
to seek the active help of the Sicilian elite, embodied by the Mafia, to ensure stability and 
order. In fact, the United States '^' also relied heavily on the Mafia to restore and maintain 
order at home in New York and in Sicily after World War 11.^ 7^ ®
Eventually as the States (Italy, France and even the United States) developed and 
strengthened, zones of insurrection were progressively eliminated, and near total order 
achieved. However, some areas are still problematic and continue to oppose any 
semblance of authority, and virtually evade all forms of State order. Many of the areas, 
have fallen under the control of organised crime and its attempts to foster operational 
order. This phenomenon, called gt'ey-zone^  ^is still evident today, especially in Sicily and 
Palermo, but also in the inner-city ghettos of France, the “cite-HLM”. The grey zones also 
known as the “cement” jungles refer to the urban ghettos that the Mafia has moved into and 
“set-up shop”. These “state-less” zones almost automatically become niches were the 
Mafia can operate. In some more extreme circumstances they may even become counter­
state niches.^  ^ The conditions for Mafia activities are ideal because not only is the 
population relatively submissive due to their financial capacity (or lack thereof) but the 
economic and social conditions lend themselves well to Mafia involvement (availability 
of drug couriers, potential explosion of drug market and trade, possibility of hiring hit-men.
^^ The US (OSS department) used Lucky Luciano as Cosa Nostra godfather to restore order in the New  
York docks, used his intelligence and contacts to prepare the Sicily invasion, and finally used Ins influence 
to rally the Sicilian Mafia in fighting Communist forces on the Island. In exchange the mafia controlled 
New York heroin drug trade was restored. Source: Campbell, Rodney. The Luciano Project: the Secret 
Wartime Collaboration o f the Mafia and the U.S. Navy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977., and Nell, 
Edward. Making Sense o f a Changing Economy - Teclmology. Markets and Morals. New York; 
Routledge, 1996, page 187-188.
29>Zemor, Olivia. La Mafia Au-dessus de Tout Soupçon. Paris: Londreys, 1985, page 167.
^^ollowing the Allied invasion of Sicily (Code Name Operation Husky) the US enlisted the help o f local 
Mafia bosses, Don Calo in particular to help in combating guerrilla Communist forces on the Island. In 
exchange, or rather as a reward, the US Arniy placed a significant number o f Mafiosi in positions o f power 
with the local and regional governing structure, thus solidifying and more importantly legitimizing the 
Mafia’s stronghold on the Island. Source: Servadio, Gala. Mafioso: a History of the Mafia from its 
Origins to the Present Dav. New York: Stein and Day, 1976, page 82-83.
^^Also refer to: Raufer, Xavier. Planete Mafieuse: Atlas Pratique de la Grande Criminalité Organisée 
Internationale. Paris: Institut de Criminologie, 1994.
■^^oreau-Desforges, Philippe. “Criminalité Sans Frontières.” La Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel 
Leclerc. Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996.
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etc...)/^ Interestingly, one author notes, by the mid- 20* century most grey-zones around 
the world had disappeared as a result of the solidification of govermnent power, but today 
a resurgence of grey zones is becoming apparent. This is the case for the “cement 
jungles”.^ ^
In many cases the official State police often does not even dare venture in to these
grey zones. When police do go into them, they are harassed, verbally abused, and even
physically aggressed. Some police units blatantly refuse to patrol these areas or even
investigate occurrences as they feel insecure, know they are being watched, and vyill not,
in any case obtain any answers or assistance for them inhabitants. The Mafia by contrast
is respected and feared, and through less orthodox methods can substitute for the police.^^
In these grey-zones, the State (as represented by the police) can no longer enforce security
with the legal mechanisms available to it, but the Mafia, and similar organised crime
groups already considered outlaws, hence have more “means available to them”. The
violence that is used to ensure this form of security is tolerated by the State as a necessary
means to achieve a more secure end. '^'
“The effect [of the Mafia] is to weaken the State, it no longer has a 
monopoly and violence and force. The police are not masters in their own 
house, regional governments are not in full contiol.”^^
The Mafia can achieve law and order through paralegal, or even illegal means that 
are not available to the State, and although the State may not endorse or even approve of 
the means used to achieve this law and order, it welcomes the end results nonetheless.^* 
The Mafia can of course threaten, intimidate, and even hurt any suspect or informant it
**Raufer, Xavier. “Desordre Mondial : Nouveaux dangers. Nouvelles figures Criminelles." Criminalité 
Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996, page 109.
'^'Gurfinkiel, Michel. “Géopolitique de la Criminalité Organisée.” La Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel 
Leclerc. Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996, page 125.
*^Madelin, Philippe. La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 111.
■^ 'Pierson, Christopher. The Modem State. London: Routledge, 1993, page 10.
*^ell, Edward. Making Sense o f a Changing Economy - Teclinologv. Markets and Morals. New York: 
Routledge, 1996, page 188.
**Lacoste, Pierre: Admiral in the French Navy and Former Director of the "Direction Generate de la 
Sécurité Extérieure (retired). Interview (25 April, 1996).
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iv The Mafia in Clergy’s clothes
A very interesting phenomenon has also emerged concerning Church/Mafia 
relations: Some members of the Clergy are simultaneously members the Church and of 
the honourable society. Not only has there always been a keen interest on the part of some 
Catholic groups in the Mafia, but many priest doubled as Mafia bosses (i.e. Don Mariano 
Ardena).
For some young men it is normal to hesitate between a career in the Clergy 
and one in the Mafia, since in small villages the two institutions appear to 
be plausible associative options/^
This was the case more recently with Pieti'o Algieri, number one in the Cosa Nostra 
(following the arrest of Toto Riina) and simultaneously a “seminarist”. Responsible for 
numerous assassinations including that of Salvo Lima the European Parliamentarian, he 
was from a very pious family (his sister was a nun), and had studied at the Palermo 
Seminary.^'' Today, and especially since the Pope’s 1991 speech, the Church’s stance 
against the Mafia seems to have slightly changed. This is in part do to the visible 
escalation of violent activities conducted by the Mafia. It is increasingly difficult for the 
Church to maintain its previously ambiguous and pro-Mafia position. Its previous stance 
has become untenable, uncomfortable and more and more difficult to justify.
/  Masonic Lodges
Masonic Lodges have been a central focus of the Italian governments targeted 
assault Mafia of penetrated institutions. These lodges have allegedly been used as the 
neutral ground on which all interested parties converged to strike deals and settle 
disagreements. The State is represented by high ranking government officials, police 
officers and politicians as influential members of the lodges. The economic interests of 
the State are met by developers, businessmen and ranking CEO’s^, and finally and most
^^Gambetta, Diego. The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private Protection. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993, page 50-51.
^T)unglas, Dominique. “LaPiete d'un Pairain.” Le Point 21 June 1997 1997: 40-41.
^  Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
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importantly perhaps, the Mafia is also very present. It is in these Masonic lodges that 
govermnent, businessmen and Mafiosi gather to strike deals and forge alliances. For this 
reason the Palermo Judicial authority has launched an investigation into allegations of 
close Mafia government ties sponsored by the Free Masons. Traditionally high ranking 
Men of Honour from the Cosa Nosti a have also been members of the lodges. In April 
1993, the Italian Anti-Mafia Parliamentary Commission confirmed that in fact the 
membership of Men of honour to the Masonic lodges was surely not a recent or sporadic 
phenomenon, but rather a strategic choice, geared at forging close, secretive ties with 
various factions in the government and administration, as well as influential members of 
the community.^*
2. What risks are there to the State as a result of Mafia presence?
Despite the significant positive bi-products associated with Mafia presence within 
a country, the State experiences serious risks as a result of that very presence. As with any 
compromise, there is always a cost associated with every concession granted, the Mafia is 
no different. In exchange for the services it provides for the State, the Mafia expects, and 
often demands allowances. These concessions may include, lenient and understanding 
judges and prosecuting district attorneys, a relative free hand at going about their activities, 
as well as the possibility for continued and stable, and unhindered economic growth. The 
Mafia primarily wants to go about its business of making money with limited disturbances 
from the State.
The [Mafia] phenomenon resembles that of cancer, it is a parasite: the 
process of Mafia contamination and proliferation, deviates the resources of 
society to the profit of a few individuals, in the same manner as the virus 
settles in to the core of living cells to control them.^^
Some concessions are clearly more important and more rislcy than others and entail 
potential risks for the State granting them. The threat that Mafia poses to the State and its 
citizens are multifaceted. The most visible, outward risk associated with Mafia presence 
is violence, and the potential for a metamorphosis towards terrorism. Perhaps more costly
^*Pintacuda, Ennio. Un iesuite contre la Mafia. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1995, page 107-108. 
^T.acoste, Pierre. Mafia Centre la Démocratie. Paris: JC Lattes, 1992, page 27.
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however is the potential destabilisation of a national economy through black market and 
illicit investments. Lastly, but certainly not all inclusively is the threat the Mafia poses to 
democracy, justice and sovereignty.
a. Violence: Is Mafia a terrorist thi'eat?
The most visible risk associated with Mafia presence is some degree of violence.
Where as petty violence is lessened through increased Mafia presence and its desire to
maintain law and order, other forms of more targeted violence increase. It is evident that
in many cases the State no longer has the monopoly of the use of violence, but rather shares
it, if not surrenders it to the Mafia.
The Mafia generally approaches a “candidate” with intimidation and threats. If the
candidate in question refuses to satisfy the Mafia’s request then violence is escalated little
by little until he concedes to the demands. There are in fact very few un-foretold murders.
The potential victim is usually made aware of his pending execution, and given the chance
to attempt to rectify the situation. There are essentially six incremental stages of traditional
Mafia associated violence.
Stage 1 : Intimidation and threats (extortion/racketeering/blaclanail)
Stage 2: Physical Assault (beatings)
Stage 3: Accidental Murders (casualties in an attack)
Stage 4 : T argeted murders
Stage 5: Reprisals against turncoats
Stage 6: Reprisals against family and friends- systematic elimination
Theoretically though, violence is only the initial stage of Mafia establishment and 
involvement, ultimately the necessity for continued use of violence should cease as the 
institutions, political and judicial systems are sufficiently penetrated and corrupted.** This 
has rarely been the case however and the threat of renewed violence is always ever present.
The Mafia is not a terrorist organisation. It uses teirorist tactics*  ^on occasion, and 
may even have working relations with various terrorist cells, but legally and strategically
**Kelly, Robert, Chin Ko-Lin, and Rufiis Schatzberg. Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States. 
Westport; Greenwood Press, 1994, page 28.
*^"The Mafia does not hesitate to use terrorist tactics to cow its opponents, as the murders o f Falcone and 
Borsellino prove.” Source: No author cited. “The Sicilian Mafia: A State within a State.” The Economist 
.24 April, 1993 (1993), page 26.
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speaking is not defined as a terrorist organisation.*^ Terrorism is qualified as the use of 
violence as the means to a political end** but organised crime uses violence to permeate 
the political sphere, yet has financial profits, not politics as an end. OC laclcs the political 
dimension that terrorism strives for. Certainly OC is heavily involved in politics, and 
always aims to be further implicated in politics, but that represents only an intermediary 
stage, the final goal being ever increasing financial benefits. Furthermore, the targets of 
terrorist acts are not necessarily the intended final targets (often chosen randomly), but 
rather seive as a “message generator”?*^  a means to get the attention of the appropriate truly 
targeted authority.** OC, by contrast specifically targets its victims, the choice is rarely 
random.
The United States justice system ran into a “judicial dilemma” when attempting to 
define and distinguish terrorism and organised crime. The department of Justice ruled that 
in fact organised crime and related activities could not be prosecuted under terrorism laws 
as they were separate entities, and hence stipulated the necessity for further, organised 
crime specific laws. Eventually the RICO** laws were passed permitting the Justice system 
to prosecute members of organised crime families under a specific set of targeted laws. 
Furthermore, organised crime can be involved in victimless crimes a concept rarely present 
amongst tenorist tactics.*^
Although the Mafia is not classified as a terrorist group, it does on occasion employ
**As with the State, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Some include the element o f  
political goal, others limit themselves to the attainment o f power. “Individual or collective coercive 
conduct employing strategies o f terror violence which contain an international element or are directed 
against internationally protected targets whose aim is to produce a power oriented outcome.” Source: 
Bassioni, Cherif. International Terrorism and Political Crimes. Springfield: Charles Thomas, 1975, page 
xiv.
**"Terrorism is violence or the threat o f violence calculated to create an atmosphere o f fear or alarm, and 
the really bring about some social or political change”. Source: Kegley, Charles. International Terrorism. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, page 28. “The use o f violence or putting the public or any section of 
it in fear for political progress”. Source: Reference, Oxford. Dictionary o f Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, page 397.
*^Perhaps with the exception o f political assassinations.
**Schmid, Alex, and Ronald Crelinsten. Western Responses to Terrorism. London: Franck Cass, 1993, 
page 8.
*'^ederal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization. See also: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
“Local Prosecution o f Organized Crime: The Use o f State RICO Statutes.” . Washington D.C., 1993.
**Perhaps with the exception o f false alarms aimed at disrupting activities (i.e. IRA bomb scares).
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terrorist tactics** to help achieve, or speed up its financial enrichment. A rash of terrorist 
events in Italy between 1992-1993 demonstrated the Mafia’s use of teiTorist tactics.
The first time the Mafia, under the alias of the Triangle of Death, actually claimed 
responsibility for a terrorist attack, and showed a turning point towards the use of terrorist 
tactics, violence with a terrorist component*'' was Operation Carlo Alberto. Some authors 
and analysts argue however that this turn towards the use of terrorist tactics is unnecessaiy 
as the Mafia does not need this sort of strategy for the purposes it has.
There are of course documented instances where the Mafia and terrorist groups 
have worked together to reach a common (sometimes non-violent) goal. This was the case 
in Italy during the 70's and 80’s the Mafia, terrorism and Masonic lodges worked together 
to prevent the Left from gaining power. Most notably because the rise of the Communist 
Left (feasibly representing 1/3 of the electorate), would entail massive reforms to the 
current status quo, position that would greatly impair the Mafia, but also would disturb the 
current political class.*'*
b. Potential Destabilisation of the economy
Parallel or black market economies can pose a substantial danger to the stability of 
a national economy. Although this phenomenon particularly affects weaker national 
economies, stronger economies like the United States and Western Europe are affected 
nonetheless:***
Once established, organized crime becomes part of the capital - a very 
special part however, providing important services to other parts of capital
Matar-Bonucci, Marie-Anne. Histoire de la Mafia. Brussels: Complexe, 1994, page 218.
**’The following is a transcript o f a telephone conversation between a member of the Mafia to a journalist at 
the Ora, a Sicilian daily newspaper;
- "We are the killers of the Triangle of Death [Paleimo, Trapani, Agrigente]. The operation that we have 
nicknamed Carlo Alberto, in homage to the prefect, we have almost, I reiterate almost finished it.”
The next day, following the death o f a general:
- “ the operation is finished” Source: Giraud, Henri-Christian. Terres de Mafia. Paris: JC Lattes, 1993, 
page 29.
***Padovani, Marcelle. Les Demieres Annees de la Mafia. Paris: Gallimard, 1987, page 251.
'^^ Lupsha, Peter. “Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation State.” Transnational Organized 
Crime Review (1996), page 24.
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and to the state/^
These parallel economies can attract and channel certain theoretically taxable fimds 
away from legitimate economy. They represent non-controlled, non-accountable entities 
with significant influence and power over the legitimate economy. Because of the illegal 
nature of these economies, they are much more volatile. They can disappear anytime 
without notice or guarantee as to the remaining stability. Unlike legitimate economies that 
create and leave behind at least a semblance of elementary infrastructures, illicit ones that 
withdraw suddenly can entail catastrophic (economically speaking) results for the people, 
businesses and local economies that had progressively grown to depend on it.
c. Challenge to sovereignty and democracy
In addition to the threat of violence and economic destabilisation, the Mafia and 
other powerful organised crime groups represent a threat to the pillars of statehood: 
sovereignty and democracy,
i. Sovereignty*"*/**^
Even though borders have become increasingly porous, (due in part to new 
technology, increased populations migration, and globalisation) national governments still 
try and maintain at least elementaiy control over them. Violation of these national borders 
by organised crime groups represent a violation of the very comer stone of national 
sovereignty. Considering that sovereignty entails the right of the State to impose its laws 
on everyone residing within its territory, the constant challenge by the Mafia of that very 
right equates a challenge to the very sovereignty of that State."* The Mafia believes, and
Edward. Making Sense o f a Changing Economy - Technology. Markets and Morals. New York: 
Routledge, 1996, page 187.
"^Sovereign: Supreme authority of a state. In a state sovereignty is vested in the institution, person or body 
having the ultimate authority to impose law on everyone else in the State. Source: Oxford Reference. 
Dictionary of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, page 376.
"■'Sovereignty was officially outlined in the Declaration on Principles o f International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations 
(Resolution 2625 o f the UN General Assembly- 1970). Source: Brownlie, Ian. Basic Documents in 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, page 35.
"*Lacoste, Pierre. Mafia Contre la Démocratie. Paris: JC Lattes, 1992, page 33.
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certainly acts as though the laws passed by the State are not applicable to them. It 
purposely tests the will and capacity of the State to impose its sovereign right. More often 
than not, the State is unwilling or ineffective in imposing that sovereign right, and hence 
perpetuates the violation of the sanctity of international borders and ceases to uphold the 
rule of law.
In addition, the police that is supposed to represent an unbiased, fair body, 
dedicated to preserving the rule of law, can easily be corrupted. The Mafia uses three 
incremental ways to neutralise or sway a police officer: approaches them and tries to reason 
with him, has him transferred elsewhere, and finally just eliminates him."*
There are essentially two kinds of sovereignty, inward and outward. The Mafia 
primarily poses a challenge to the inward sovereignty of the State."* Stipulating that 
sovereignty is “the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political 
community”."* True sovereignty is not only the claim to final authority but also the capacity 
to enforce it. The Mafia impedes the capacity of the State to do. The State hence only 
possesses a partial sovereignty, the theoretical but not practical sovereignty.
ii. Democracy and the threat of corruption""
In addition to the Mafia’s challenge of state sovereignty and its violation of the rule
of law and its supremacy over all citizens, it also attacks the principle of democracy, and
the democratic process through targeted and sometimes massive corruption. It does so in
part by falsifying true electoral results, penetrating the judicial and political system.The
Mafia’s anti-democratic machine is generally comprised of four main stages:
Stage 1 : Votes for sale
Stage 2: Political Influence
Stage 3 : put up its own Mafia candidates
Stage 4: Complete penetration of institutions.
"*Pintacuda, Ennio. Un jesuite contre la Mafia. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1995, page 110.
"*Pierson, Cliristopher. The Modem State. London: Routledge, 1993, page 47-52.
"*Hinsley, H. Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, page 101.
"" For a more complete debate on democracy and its principles, please refer to: Dahl, Robert. Democracy and its 
Critics. New Haven: Yale, 1989.
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The first stage, votes for sale, entails the buying of votes by a political candidate 
from the Mafia/** A candidate who is unsure of his re-election can seek out “electoral 
assistance” from the Mafia families, in exchange for which he becomes a pawn for those 
families, and carrying out requested favours. The second stage consists of directly 
approaching political officials and either gently coercing them into accomplishing certain 
tasks, or simply bribing, blaclcmailing of physically threatening them. The first two stages 
take up very little time and effort, and can bring out rather substantial rewards. Stage 3, 
requires that the Mafia actually run its own candidate first in local and regional elections, 
and eventually in national or European elections. In this instance, the candidate must 
appear to distance himself from the “family” in public but continues to work in favour of 
the Mafia behind the scenes. The last, and ultimate goal of the Mafia is achieved with 
complete penetration of the system and institutions. It aims to control key power posts in 
the national govermnent. This was the case with Guilio Andreotti, alleged Mafia 
godfather, but also with Vito Ciancimini Mayor of Palermo (Christian-Democrat), and 
Salvatore Lima (Member of the European Parliament). The Mafia become particularly 
dangerous however when it surpassed the stage of electoral assistance of specific 
candidates and starts to run its own candidates, pooled from amongst the ranks of the men 
of honour. At this stage its begins to field Mafiosi as candidates for town councils, 
provincial councils and eventually at the national level. Former seven-time Italian Prime 
Minister, and life senator, Andreotti is currently charged with Mafia belonging and is 
awaiting trial on those grounds.
We see Italian ministers of every party setting the example by engaging in 
those “ interested transactions” that are the ruin of Sicily, by recognizing 
and negotiating with those local powers they ought to try and destroy in 
order to get their help at election time.^ *^
This sort of compromise and political pact has been wielded by many in Sicily as the 
treason of the Christian Democratic Party, and has resulted in the creation of an anti-Mafia 
Party, the “Rete”.-'**/*** Rather ironically though, Gurfunkiel contends that the more and
*^* Please refer to IH, Section 1, part d; Votes for sale: the bartering of political clout.
***Stille, Alexander. Excellent Cadavers. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995, page 16.
^*^intacuda, Ennio. Un jesuite contre la IVfafia. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1995, page 151-156.
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more the Mafia invades and invests themselves in politics, the more they are in fact 
condemning themselves to play a politically responsible role and having to eventually give 
up their criminal activities in order to maintain their claims to legitimacy/*'' The trade-offs 
however for Mafia presence in a State are significant. They touch on the very pillars of 
statehood, sovereignty and democracy.
*^*The Rete won 12 seats in the 1992 Italian general election. Generally the Mafia does not kill within its 
own territory, however on occasion it bends the rules to its own sacred law. This was the case for Leoluca 
Orlando, founder o f the Rete, and former mayor o f Palermo. He was assassinated within Mafia territory 
which proves the importance o f this specific victim. Source: Giraud, Henri-Christian. Terres de Mafia. 
Paris: JC Lattes, 1993, page 40.
^*'Gurfinkiel, Michel. “Géopolitique de la Criminalité Organisée.” La Criminalité Oraanisee. Ed. Marcel 
Leclerc. Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996, page 132.
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VI Conclusion
This analysis has attempted to show that although there are warranted concerns 
about Mafia presence with a State, it should not be immediately assumed that all Mafia 
activities, at least on a short-term basis, are necessarily detrimental to either the State or 
actors within the State. There are obvious instances of collusion between the Mafia and 
State bodies, as well as significant trade-offs for these compromises.
The clearest threat is the escalation of violence through the sporadic use of terrorist 
tactics, menace to democracy and sovereignty and the potential for economic 
destabilisation. Individually and even more so collectively, they work to create a climate 
of instability, insecurity and lawlessness.
Despite the overwhelming menace. States are not always willing to aggressively 
combat Mafia presence and activity because it has mitigated interests, and may cause 
severe political liability. For corrupted and corruptible officials, the Mafia represents a 
source of financial enrichment through bribes as well as a guarantee of political votes and 
election. For the populations residing in high petty crime zones, the Mafia act as a security 
and public order guarantor. When combined these different interests may have sufficiently 
impaired the state’s willingness to launch a truly effective anti-Mafia campaign, and not 
just a symbolic gesture aimed at appeasing the public opinion
Thus, those who exercise violence within the jurisdiction of a state may do
so under the express dispensation of that state.^ **
Much debate in international relations theory has been centred around the role and 
place of the State, as well as the role, or lack thereof, of other actors in the decision making 
and political equation. One clear conclusion exists: the state is in flux, and globalisation 
may in turn be affecting its effectiveness as a whole. The questions surrounding the very 
nature of the State, whether it is withering or maintaining its power ought to focus more 
on the crucial question, for the context of this analysis, of the importance of non-state 
actors.
Pierson, Christopher. The Modem State. London: Routledge, 1993, page 10.
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The Mafia is one of these non-State actors, traditionally seen as detrimental but 
now being re-evaluated in light of its positive bi-products. The State may in fact see Mafia 
presence and activities as benefiting it, in some circumstances, and may in fact chose to 
tolerate if not encourage its presence, all the while trying to maintain the outward 
appearance of cracking down on it. This presence however does entail consequences 
generally less beneficial to the State. This dichotomy of bonuses versus payoffs of Mafia 
presence may in part explain the ambiguous situation the State seems to perpetuate when 
deciding to combat the Mafia effectively: The State is “ as much a fighter than a 
beneficiary of organised crime”.
It has been demonstrated that in certain instances the State is complacent in its 
tolerance of Mafia activities within its borders -  this is the case with Italy and its 
acceptance of a certain degree of Mafia presence and activity. The case study of Cosa 
Nostra activities outside of its “traditional” border of Italy, or historic and family ties with 
the United States, leads the researcher to look at another instance where the Mafia has 
elected domicile and is slowly growing in influence and importance. France represents 
this type of opportunity for the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. With a initial reticence to 
acknowledge Mafia presence in France and even more so to admit possible activities, 
France may be in danger of “playing the ostrich” and opening itself up to further 
penetration. Is the French State tolerant of Mafia presence on its territory because of 
possible derived benefits as is probably the case in Italy, or is France only in a phase of 
denial before it comes to term with its “problem” and decides to concretely act to combat 
it.
The next chapter will focus on the Cosa Nostra in France and will seek to 
analyze the reasons why the Cosa Nostra has elected France as its secondary “European 
Hub” for refuge, investments and for activities. The impact of geographic and political 
proximity of Monaco will not be neglected
**'^oreau-Desforges, Philippe. “Criminalité Sans Frontières.” La Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel 
Leclerc. Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996, page 133.
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To combat and destroy the Mafia, it is necessary and indispensable for 
the Italian government to cease to be the Idng of the Mafia.../107
^**Mosca, G Uomini e cose di Sicilia, Palermo 1980. page 2.
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^ îc iiîan  CLosa fSlostra on th  
j^M era a n a  in ran ee
Highlighted in the square (lower left hand and top of next page) is the PACA region -  Provence 
Alpes Côte d’Azur, also referred to as the French Riviera
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I Introduction
France has no indigenous organised crime. There are French criminal groups, namely the 
“Milieu” from Marseilles or the Corsican crime networks, but neither can be considered as full- 
fledged organised crime groups. The GOC groups operating in France are: ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra 
and Cosa Nostra (to lesser degree the Sacra Corona Unita), the Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakusas, 
and more and more so the Russian Mafiya.'
The necessity for OC to internationalise in order to compete globally has pushed them to 
establish activity hubs outside of their traditionally territory. Because the Mafia is a rational 
organisation it carefully studied the prospective terrain, calculated the advantages and inconveniences 
of settling in a specific region, and evaluated the risks/ benefits linked to that choice. If the Mafia 
has elected France and the French Riviera as its favoured base of operations in Europe outside of 
Italy, it can be concluded that there are concrete, rational, and beneficial reasons for doing so.
^Leclerc, Jean-Marc. “Les Sept Families de la Mafia.” Valeurs Actuelles 2 November 1993 - and Leclerc, Jean-Marc. 
“La France des Mafias.” Valeurs Actuelles 8 October 1994.
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This research will attempt to understand what elements may have convinced the Cosa Nostra 
to establish in France. The proximity of Monaco should not be underestimated as a key strategic 
implication. Because Monaco has specific banking legislation that facilitates anonymity and ^ b e e n  
accused by France of tolerating money laundering practices.
Conflicting opinions: reality of Mafia penetration in France
Although some French officials like former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, may persist in 
denying the reality of Mafia penetration into France, or tend to dramatically under-emphasise its 
presence, concrete, factual evidence exists to prove that France, and especially the French Riviera, 
have become a choice location for the Italian Mafia. French prosecutor Sampieri of the Marseilles 
tribunal stated that he feared a “Sicilianisation” of the hexagon (France), and noted that in recent 
years too many Italian godfathers' had been arrested in France for it to be a simple coincidence.' 
Roger-Louis Bianchini journalist specialised in OC went as far as stating that except for Sampieri, 
the members of the Parliamentary Mafia Commission, and a few other alert authorities, nobody in 
France had the least idea of what the implantation of the Mafia in France really represented, and 
spoke of the generalised scepticism surrounding Mafia presence in France:' “How can we explain that 
we are so ignorant of this reality nonetheless so close?”'  France finally became conscious of the 
reality and threat posed by OC operating within its borders only as recently as 1993,*’ and even though 
many politicians still contest the authenticity of such a claim, the French Assembly report brought 
proof of this cohabitation: there is a Mafia influx into France.' The experts working for the 
Investigation Commission of the French National Assembly* attempted to differentiate between the
^Including, Michele Zaza, Antonio Calderone, Pasquale Pergola, Rolando Tortora and Mario Jovine. Also refer to 
table at end of chapter.
^Calvi, Fabrizio. L’Europe des Parrains: La Mafia a l'Assaut de 1 Europe. Paris: Grasset, 1993 page 119.
'^Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquête sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 18.
 ^Tretiack, Philippe. Vie Blindée: Seul Contre la Mafia. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992, page 13.
^Dupuy, Gerard. "Prise de Conscience (editorial).” Liberation 3 February 1993.
^James, Barry. “Single Market Side Effects: Mafia Influx in France.” International Herald Tribune 8 February 1993.
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different types or levels of Mafia penetration in France. They determined that there are three 
distinctive phases: the first characterised by violence and trafficking that ensures control over a given 
territory and generates revenue, the second includes money laundering, and the third encompasses 
investments of laundered money in legitimate business deals.' These experts believed, however, that 
France was experiencing only phase three: although there was substantial Mafia investment deals, 
the actual money laundering process was being conducted outside of France, but the consensus was 
however that France was not immune from further penetration."
This view of the limited extent of Mafia activities is not echoed by practitioners and justice 
officials who strongly believe that in fact, Mafia penetration has gone much further, and includes 
money laundering, as well as criminal activities conducted in France. Paolo De Stephano, head of 
the 'Ndrangheta family, told French authorities, when he was arrested, that every Italian Mafia 
family always seeks to settle abroad, and that France represents the ideal territory". Two questions 
must be asked, why the choice of France, and why the French Riviera specifically?
* d’Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre les 
Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993.
 ^d’Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre les 
Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, page 39.
d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d’Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre 
les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993, page 40.
^^Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquête sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 19.
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II Why are France and the Riviera so prized by the Mafia?
As European border loosen and Italy increases pressure on the mafia, Southern France is
sprouting pizzerias, banks that are winking at money laundering... smuggling is profuse^^
h Whv is France ideal?
The implantation of the Mafia in France has undergone distinctive phases taking the Mafia 
presence in France from a simple refuge from judicial prosecution to an operations base for activities 
in France and abroad. There are many reasons that may have prompted the Mafia to consider France 
as an ideal setting for refuge, but also as an activity hub outside of Italy.
- France the safe-haven: In the mid-1980's, the Italian government began its harshest ever 
anti-Mafia campaign. This crackdown resulted in massive “migration” for targeted Mafiosi, who fled 
Italy in search of safer ground. In addition, France, by its geographic proximity, allowed these 
fugitives from justice to circulate to and from Italy, with little inconvenience. The 1990's European 
open-border policy and elimination of border checks further facilitated this crossover."
- France the birth of partnership: As the Mafia began to settle in France, they started allying 
themselves, and conducting joint ventures with the local criminal elements: the Milieu, and the 
Corsicans. This first contact was necessary because the Mafia had little knowledge about the terrain, 
and had few, if any, contacts. By working with these local groups, they were also working with their 
expertise. However, these ties were not durable, and quickly evolved into independent professional 
level Mafia activity, fully disassociated from these local groups.
- France: prosperous economic zone: As the extent of Mafia activities and domain grew, 
France began to be used first as a ideal investment area for pre-recycled funds," and eventually as 
more contacts were established, as a money-laundering capital. This phase also represented the 
beginning of the economic penetration of France by the Mafia.
- France: land of political penetration. The final phase of Mafia implantation, occurring by 
the 1990's consisted in corrupting various local and regional political entities to ensure that their
" Drozdiak, William : « European-unity... for Organized Crime » The Washington Post. 2 August 1994, 
" Refer to the European Union Treaty and the Schengen Agreement.
^^ The money is laundered prior to its arrival, and arrives already “cleaned” in France.
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power was consolidated, and that their zone of influence was complete."
- France-Geo-Strategic location. The geography of France offers many attractive benefits to 
any multi-national corporation and by extension to the Mafia. It is centrally located in Western 
Europe, shares borders with six states, facilitating continental travel and transit, multiple access to 
the sea, and is served by several large waterways. From a geo-strategic vantage-point, France offers 
the ideal conditions for transiting, expediting and receiving shipments, and because French national 
territoiy extends to its overseas TOM/DOMS," it also has particularly attractive transhipment zones 
in the Caribbean, like Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St. Martin.
-Monacoy although legally classified as an independent state is under French tutelage, and 
French national law, and offers particularly attractive banking benefits, and possibilities for tax 
evasion, and money laundering possibilities.
- France: more lenient legislation. In addition, French law offers substantial benefits (as 
compared to Italy) and, often times, immunity from prosecution or extradition to Mafiosi. Unlike 
Italy, France does not have a law against “Mafia association”. The only similar French law is 
“association de malfaiteur” which is more an association of law-breakers or criminals, which does 
not carry the same sanctions as the Italian law. This dissimilarity between the Italian and French laws 
greatly complicates extradition procedures, and sometimes event halts them because in effect the 
French legal Code prohibits extradition of person if the crime he is charged with in the requesting 
state (Italy) does not exist in French law and in essence protects many Mafiosi." Such was the case 
of Michele Zaza who spent three years in French prison, prosecuted on the grounds, not of his 
association with the Mafia, his murders, or heroin trafficking charges, but rather on the lesser charge 
of illegal cigarette trafficking."
Finally, until veiy recently, the French legal system only stipulated that money laundering 
was an offence if the funds were derived from drug trafficking, and altogether ignored funds
■^^ Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 45.
^^Territoires Outre Mer/ Department Outre Mer : overseas territories and departments
^^Michele Zaza was tailed for months by the Brigade Anti-gang de Nice, knew the officers by sight, and often stopped 
to chat with them. He felt sure he was safe from prosecution in France.
ISiCalvi, Fabrizio. LEurope des Parrains: La Mafia a 1 Assaut de 1 Europe. Paris: Grasset, 1993. page 129.
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originating from other criminal activity like contraband, extortion, frauds. It has also been argued that 
Italian Mafiosi prefer to be tried in France because sentences are more lenient, and prison conditions 
more pleasant than in Italy."
2. Whv is the Riviera ideal?
Police Commissaire Guida, explained that the three largest Mafia families in operation in 
France today, namely the Camorra, the 'Ndrangheta, and the Cosa Nostra, used the 
Provence/Maritime Alps region (PACA region)" not only as a refuge, but more and more so as a base 
of operations." Mafiosi “repenti” Nino Calderone also told police inspectors that “they must realise 
that Nice is full of roaming Mafiosi”." Within France, the Riviera offers additional, more regional 
benefits that can be tentatively divided into seven broad categories, including history, language, 
geographic proximity, socio-economic level, investment possibility, geo-strategic advantages and 
money-laundering facilities.
- Italy and the greater Riviera region share a common history. Originally part of Northern 
Italy, the Riviera became French only in 1860 (during the reign of Napoleon IE), a gift from the 
Italian government to thank the French for having helped in the unification of the Italian provinces. 
This historical element may appear rather trivial, but a common history and similar customs may be 
important attributes when seeking to expatriate.
- Linguistically, many regions within the Riviera still speak Italian, and even the local dialect, 
the “Patois Niçois”, or Provencal is greatly speckled and influenced by Italian. An Italian who does 
not speak French can operate without problems on the Riviera. In fact many linguistic, historical and 
by transitivity, cultural characteristics are shared between the Riviera and Italy. An Italian can not 
only feel close to home but will not seem particularly out of place, and hence able to integrate or hide
" In Italy, Mafia criminals are held in special encarceration conditions, banned from direct contact with the outdide. 
Some are held in special fortified prisons, and subjected to solitary confinement. This is not the case in France.
^^rovence Alpes Cote d’Azur region
Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 35.
Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 35.
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with ease.
- One of the more obvious characteristics is geographic proximity of the Riviera to Italy. For 
a Mafia businessman conducting business in Italy, but hiding in France or for a Mafiosi in Italy 
conducting business in France the geographic proximity is not a negligible factor. The French/Italian 
border between Menton and Vintimiglia is less than an hour drive from Nice.
-The general socio-economic level and investment possibilities of the Riviera also constitute 
a significant characteristic in the choice of activity center. The economic infrastructure enables many 
diverse investment possibilities like elite golf courses, ski resorts, real-estate ventures, yacht clubs 
or hotels, or more modest investments like night-clubs, restaurants and even bureau de change. The 
cities of Nice, Cannes, Juan-les-Pins, Antibes, Beaulieu, St.Jean Cap Ferrat or Marina Baie des 
Anges have been, and continue to be prime investment locations for Mafia owned properties: villas, 
equipped with state of the art surveillance and security equipment, armed guards and high powered 
satellite dishes. Because these areas are in general very affluent, even expensive or luxury real-estate 
deals are common place, and will not particularly attract attention.
- The geo-strategic location of the Riviera also lends it self particularly well to Mafia needs. 
Centrally located in Europe, and within the Schengen Agreement area," it allows for free movement 
of people, goods and service across the signatory states. Additionally the Riviera is accessible by 
water: Marseilles is the largest French commercial port, by air: Nice is host to an international 
airport, as well as a large tourism port, helipads and a variety of private landing strips, and hence 
offers options for trafficking. In addition to rail, boat and helicopter services between the Riviera and 
Italy, three major direct roadways (high, medium and low “comiche”), and one highway links the two 
countries. Major highways link the Riviera to many major European capitals, and create an essential 
link for Portugal and Spain to Italy. Finally, the remoteness of the “arriéré pays”" offers excellent
By the Agreement signed at Schengen on 14 June 1985, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands agreed that they would gradually remove their common frontier controls and introduce freedom of  
movement for all individuals who were nationals of the signatory Member States, other Member States or third 
countries. The Schengen Convention was signed by the same five States on 19 June 1990. It lays down the 
arrangements and guarantees for implementing freedom of movement. It amends the relevant national laws and is 
subject to parliamentary ratification. Italy (1990), Spain and Portugal (1991), Greece (1992), Austria (1995), Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark (1996) have since joined the list of signatories, while Iceland and Norway are also parties to 
the Convention. Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000s.htm#sl
24-Back country/rural outback of Nice
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hideout possibilities,
- Lastly, the Riviera offers remarkable money - laundering facilities, like casinos, bureau de 
change and Monégasque banks. In fact, the Casino Ruhl, the largest in France, and the Monaco 
Casino, perhaps the most famous in the world, are preferred gambling locations for Mafia bosses, and 
the ideal setting for money laundering transactions. Additionally the secretive Monégasque banking 
policy also ensures that dirty money can be recycled, laundered and reinvested without difficulty.
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I l l  Mafîa Activities in France
1. Where in France is the Mafia present?
In France since the 1990%, with the opening of the borders and the era of globalisation, the 
Mafia has been able to develop and exploit their contacts within the local ethnic community already 
established in France/^ Obviously not all the Italians living in France are members of the Mafia or 
even have links with the Mafia, but in the Alps-Maritimes department alone, more than 10-12,000 
Italian nationals reside/'*
According to Michel Debacq, former liaison magistrate to Rome, the Italian/Sicilian ethnic 
community across France willingly welcomes and hides Mafiosi fleeing Italian Justice, and 
individual Mafiosi operate in France, but no Mafia family structure is anchored, or operational in 
France. " A 1994 Police Judiciaire (PJ) report pointed out the exact opposite, saying that the 
‘Ndrangheta had a small *'cosca** structure operating in the South mobilising approximately 100 
soldiers."
The Mafia is present all across France, in major urban centres like Bordeaux and Paris, and 
even in very rural locations like the country side of Brittany, and Nonnandj/*’ but the highest 
concentration remains between Lyon, Marseilles and Monaco (see map of France at the beginning 
of this chapter)." The Assembly report created an up-roar when it mentioned Grenoble as a city 
with a high Mafia presence, specifically mentioning the Sommatino clan.^  ^ This declaration was
^^Duroy, Lionel, and Philippe Madelin. “Oui, La maha a pris pied en France.” L'Evénement du Jeudi 22 September 
1994.
‘^^ Interview with: Kerbeuf. “Director.” Nanterres. France. Police Judiciaire. The role of the PJ, 1997.
^T)e Bacq, Michel. “Technical Counsel to the Minister of Justice, former Liaison Magistrate to Rome.” Paris. 
France. Ed. Ministère de la Justice. Organised Crime in France, 1998.
^^Bianchini, Roger-Louis. “Les Habits Neufs de la Mafia.” Le Point 15 August 1998.
^^aufer, Xavier. “La Mafia: Elle envahit la France et l'Europe.” L'Express 26 November 1992: 90-106.
^^Colombani, Jean-Michel. “Commissaire SDAC.” Nanterres. France. Ed. Police Judiciaire. OC and the Police 
Judiciaire, 1997.
^^d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre les 
Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993.
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prompted by the confession of Mafia turncoat Leonardo Messina, who fingered Giacomo Pagano 
as a Mafia leader, and the head of the first ever Mafia cell implanted and operational in France. 
Despite the outcry of politicians and local residents, enough incriminating evidence was collected 
for Pagano to be eventually arrested in Nice (20 February 1993). Further proof of Mafia activities 
in Grenoble surfaced when Calogero Pulci, godfather of the Cosa Nostra was spotted in Grenoble, 
and subsequently arrested (7 June 1994)."
The reason that Grenoble was elected as a base of activity is the fact that a large Sicilian 
ethnic community had been residing there since the 1920’s, was well established and accepted, and 
provided cover for any Mafia activities." The Isere Region counts at least 25,000 Italians with as 
many as 7,000 Sicilians and 1,600 from the Sommatino region." Allegedly, as many as 4-4,500 votes 
from the Sicilian community, are controlled by the Sommatino clan, and can be sold to local elected 
officials, (obviously at a cost)."
There arc many other places in France" where Mafia activities have been reported, or where 
the presence of known Mafia bosses has been recorded, but a tme long term penetration, is obviously 
radically different from a temporary, one time only site used for punctual operations." The area with 
the largest most durable implantation, and greatest activity remains the French Riviera". .............
2. What type of Mafiosi are in France?
According to Commissaire La Plaque there are three types of Mafiosi living in France: those
^Y L . “Ces parrains qui se cachent a Grenoble.” Le Monde 8 June 1994.
■^ F^rancillon, Claude. “M. Carignon veut savoir si Grenoble est infiltree par la Mafia.” Le Monde 3 February 1993 
1993.
"^^ Mandrine, Erwann. “Grenoble aux Prises avec la "Pieuvre".” L'Evénement du Jeudi 4 February 1993.
^^Mandrine, Erwann. “Grenoble aux Prises avec la "Pieuvre".” L'Evenement du Jeudi 4 February 1993. Y.L. “Ces 
parrains qui se cachent a Grenoble,” Le Monde 8 June 1994,
*^^ Areas with documented Mafia presence include: Grenoble, Isere, Paris, Nimes, Alsace, Savoie, Metz, Vichy, 
Finistère, Paris, Menton, Brittany.
^^The French term “plaque tournante” literally rotating surface, clearly denotes the difference with a permanent 
“fixture”.
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that are fugitive from the Italian Justice, those that have voluntarily expatriated themselves before 
they were caught, and finally active Mafiosi who conduct discrete business ventures in France, or 
continue to either control, or work for a Mafia network." Amongst those Mafiosi that are active in 
France, and still very much involved in daily affairs, there are typically three profiles: the lowest 
echelon of the family hieraichy, the thugs and killers, the family chiefs still directing activities from 
France, and the financiers looking to invest in new activities, or launder money.""
3. What activities is the Mafia conducting in France?
Italian crime groups (Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta and CN) had begun to penetrate the Riviera
region as far back as the 1950's by allying themselves with local gangs. By the 1970's the Marseilles
gangs and the CN were co-operating for drug trafficking. The 1980’s saw the CN and the Marseilles
“chemists” work together to refine heroin and operate the French connection, which linked the
American LCN to the Sicilian CN via the chemical labs of Marseilles, Later, the CN also engaged
in cigarette trafficking, the bulk of the operations being planned and carried out by Zaza."^
According to turncoat Buscetta the colonisation process of the Mafia in France comports four
stages: refuge, traffic, investments / laundering, take-over of local economy." However, the
conclusions of the French Assembly Report on the Extent of Mafia Penetration suggested that the
four stages of penetration described by Buscetta had not yet occurred in France:
Assemblv Report Conclusions 
There are localised Mafia situations 
The penetration of the Mafia is still very territorially limited 
The Mafia uses France as a communications road 
France is occasionally used as a refuge for the Mafia 
France is vulnerable to second degree activities (money laundering)
Third level activities have a Mafia“ odour” (investments)_________
According to Aix-en-Provence Procureur Claude Salavagione, the Mafia’s activities are much
" Commercial operations are carried out across France, but because durable ties are not present everywhere then long 
lasting ventures are established only where a network is already in place, thus largely concentrated in the Grenoble- 
Marseilles-Nice triangle.
^^a Plaque, Pierre. “Commisaire Principal.” Nice. Ed. Antenne de Police Judiciaire de Nice Section Financière, 
Mafia activities on the Riviera, 1998.
''®Le Maou, Michel. “Commandant.” Nice. France. Ed. Antenne de Police Judicaire de Nice Section Financière. 
Mafia activities on the Riviera, 1998.
'^^Madelin, Philippe. “Journalist /  Author.” Paris. France. Police Rivalries & Mafia activities, 1997.
‘^ ^Arlacchi, Pino. Buscetta: La Mafia par I'un des Siens. Paris: Felin, 1994.
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more extensive that the report concludes: “the Mafia’s penetration is not longer confined here just 
to selling drugs...they have managed to infiltrate themselves into virtually every sector of the 
economy.”" A 1992 UCLAT brief (Anti-Terrorist Co-ordination Unit) reported that the Mafia was 
trying to invest in casinos on the coast, in real-estate ventures, and that France was a refuge and a 
meeting place for the Mafia.
Like in any other countiy the Mafia in France manages an extensive portfolio of varied 
activities, that can change repeatedly over time. The activities listed below are but a few of the 
activities conducted by the Mafia.
-Public works: The fifth largest European public works consortium, Italimpresse, is suspected 
of being under Mafia influence: Italimpresse was a major contractor for Disneyland Paris, for the 
Chunnel as well as for the Parisian convention center Paris-Bercy- Expo. Its director, Mario Rendo 
has been under extensive investigations, and was questioned on several occasions by both Judges 
Falcone and Borsellino about his Mafia associations."
- Frauds: According to Anita Gradin, European Commissioner, (in correlation with UCLAF 
statistics), EU subsidy frauds amounts to 1.4% of the annual subsidy budget, 50% of which occur 
within only the agricultural subsidies." To encourage trade with the Third World, the EU offers 
generous subsidies (otherwise known as agricultural restitution) for export or import to those states. 
According to French journalist and Mafia expert Philippe Madelin, the Mafia was able to collect huge 
amounts of these subsidies by double billing and collecting for the same product. Examples of 
successful EU subsidy frauds include the sugar, butter, and meat trade.
In September 1993, the financial branch of Police Judiciaire of Nice, uncovered a scam 
involving the brown sugar trade: a ton of sugar sold inside the European Union is valued at $1,300 
US dollars, while its international equivalent selling price is $2,5(K) US dollars. With the help of 
falsified customs documents, the Mafia" was able to make significant profit from the EU restitution
'^ N^o author cited. “Italian Mafia Gets a Grip on France, Recycling Criminal Profits Into Legal Activities.” Organised 
Crime Digest .24 August (1994).
^Rouard, Danielle. “Les Nouvelles Routes de la Mafia.” Le Monde 29 January 1993.
^^Gradin, Anita. “European Union Fraud.” 7 Jours en Europe 13 May 1996.
'"Wafia activities are specifically referring to Cosa Nostra activities, but also Camorra activities because the two
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subsidies for sales outside Europe of $1,200 USD per ton. The sugar was bought in the Netherlands, 
and declared to be exported to Croatia, but in fact was sent to Italy via France and sold to 
winemakers."
- Another example of such fraud involves the French prize-winning Limousin cattle." A 
group of Italian [Mafia] cattle buyers survey a given region for potential targets, and approach a 
farmer, offering to pay for, in cash, cattle for substantially higher than the market price. Phase two, 
the buyers return again but pay the cattle shipment half in cash half in checks. Having gained the 
confidence of the farmer, the final and substantially larger shipment is paid in its entirety in checks 
that bounce because the account has been closed. Because the farmer has omitted to declare a 
substantial part of his cash revenue to the Internal Revenue Service (French FISC), and hence is in 
an irregular situation, he is hesitant to contact the police and has to claim bankruptcy. This method 
has been used without fail all across France."
- As far back as 1985, various other meat schemes have been detected across France, they are 
as diverse as the Mafia and can be imaginative. They range from having 240 tons of pork delivered 
to five fictitious Italian companî^the seller of course, going unpaid^to the 60,000 tons of veal " that 
mysteriously make their way to Sicily each year without ever actually being paid for cheating 
banking establishments and defrauding the EU’s agricultural subsidy budget.^^
- Money Laundering and investments: Because money laundering legislation has become 
more strict, the Mafia has tried to limit their detection rate by using French nationals as covers for 
their money laundering/investment ventures." By paying a commission fee to the official owner, the
organizations have been linked through Michele Zaza, the “joint” godfather.
Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 63.
'^Duroy, Lionel, and Philippe Madelin. “Oui, La mafia a pris pied en France.” L'Evenement du Jeudi 22 September 
1994: 72. Carvoyeur, Gilles. "Le veau sous la "pieuvre".” 5 April 1994.
'^^adelin, Philippe. La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 48.
^^Carvoyeur, Gilles. “Le veau sous la "pieuvre".” 5 April 1994.
Known as Operation Mare Verde. Inciyan, Erich. “Coup Double réussi dans la lutte anti-Mafia sur la Cote 
d'Azur.” Le Monde 14 May 1993. Madelin, Philippe. La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 47.
^^Salomon, Jean-Claude. “Researcher /  Chief o f documentation.” Paris / France. Ed. Institut de Hautes Etudes de la 
Sécurité Intérieure. Diverging police discourses on Mafia activities in France, 1997.
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Mafia can invest in various ventures with little chance of detection. A preferred investment area 
appears to be upscale health clinics as well as real estate."
- Drug trafficking routes between France and Italy tend to use old contraband routes that had 
been used to smuggle cheap olive oil and contraband cigarettes from Italy into France." Illegal drug 
and narcotics trafficking currently accounts for no more than 30% of all Mafia activity*  ^ Two key 
drug operations were dismantled in France, the French Connection (heroin trafficking) and the Pizza 
Connection, further proof of the Marseilles-Sicily /  French-Italian link. The Mafia uses France as 
a passageway, a communications corridor between the Colombia drug cartel cocaine shipments from 
South America that are destined for Italy. The traditional shipment route is by boat cargo across the 
Atlantic, with docking in Spanish ports (Galicia, Catalonia or Basque), then by truck across France 
to Italy. According to Madelin," French customs and police officials are far more vigilant concerning 
drug trafficking than their Spanish or Italian counterparts, and do not hesitate to use all means 
possible to obtain infoimation and intercept shipments.
- The Mafia has also shown a desire to keep France as a sanctuary from violence and family 
wars, a sort of neutral zone, where families can live, free from violence."
•^ ^Nundy, Julian. “Italian Mobs Buy Their Way into France.” _ 3 February 1993.
^^Rouard, Danielle. “Les Nouvelles Routes de la Mafia.” Le Monde 29 January 1993.
^^Madelin, Philippe. La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 45.
" See appendix of Chapter HI.
•^^Madelin, Philippe. La France Mafieuse. Paris: Du Rocher, 1994, page 20-23.
^^Salomon, Jean-Claude. “Researcher /  Chief Of documentation.” Paris/ France. Ed. Institut de Hautes Etudes de la 
Sécurité Intérieure. Diverging police discourses on Mafia activities in France, 1997,
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III Mafia Activities on the Riviera
L Where on Riviera is the Mafia present?
The Mafia has elected The French Riviera as its privileged sanctuary in France and wider 
Europe. The Riviera, the coastal section of. the PAC A (Provence- Alps Côte d’Azur Region) is 
defined as the zone that spans the coast from the Italian border of Ventimiglia/Menton to Marseilles. 
Proof that the Riviera is an area of predilection for the Mafia, as well as other Italian organised 
groups is the important number of arrests that have been made there in the last ten years. Since the 
late 1980's until 1999 more than 80 arrests of Mafia and Italian organised crime members have 
occurred in the Riviera region alone." It would seem probable that these statistics demonstrate a 
high level of Mafia presence on the Riviera. The epicentre of Mafia activities on the Riviera appears 
to be Nice. Former mayor of Nice, Jacques Medecin once said: “The Mafia existed already (in Nice), 
put marginally, preferring to go elsewhere. Today we offer her a large in road”." Observers 
satirically believe that the Mafia has made such inroads and developed to such an extent in the region 
that soon Nice will be paired up with Palenno."
-The Mafia feels confident enough about its penetration in France to use the Riviera as a 
Meeting place: The Riviera has hosted many international strategic “Mafia” conferences, or family 
reunion, the two most important ones were the International Summit of Organised Crime which took 
place at the Negresco Hotel in Nice which brought together representatives of the three largest Mafia 
families, and a subsequent Elysée Palace Hotel (also in Nice), conference on February 14, 1989." 
Additional less “formal” events include the July 1993 marriage of Gaetano Catagirone’s daughter 
(Guilio Andreotti was a witness)" in St. Jean Cap Ferrat and the documented high power meeting that
^^See appendix.
‘Couard, Danielle. “Nice, la peur et les rumeurs,” Le Monde 2 February 1993.
“^^Aubry, Bruno, and Frederique Lantieri. “La Pieuvre mafieuse etend ses tentacules sur la Cote d'Azur.” L'Evenement 
du Jeudi 13 August 1992.
Present at the Negresco conference were: for the ‘N ’Drangheta family- Paolo De Stephano, Domenico Libri and 
Pepe Morabito; for the Camorra- Michele Zaza and Lorenzo Nuvoletta; for the Cosa Nostra Gaetano Findanzati; also 
present were representatives of the American Gambino family. The Elysee Palace conference counted among the key 
participants, Michele Zaza, Gaetano Findanzati and thirteen addition influential and high ranking mafiosi. Source: 
Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enouete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris:
Seuil, 1995, page 21.
Andreotti is a very controversial Sicilian politician, former Prime Minister, and President of the Corte de
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followed." The aim of these meetings was to split up the Riviera coast amongst the different Italian 
crime families, into spheres of influence and zones of activities."
2. What activities is the Mafia conducting on the Riviera?
According to Philippe Madelin, there have been at least four significant offensive tries to 
penetrate the Riviera and set up an activity center: The first was in Marseilles with Gaétan Zampa, 
who served as a “pilot fish”" but the town was not wealthy enough, Zampa loyalty began to waiver 
and he was eliminated on the Mafia’s way out. The second attempt took place in Corsica, but again 
it failed. The third try was in the Var region where the Mafia set up a cement factory, to racketeer 
constmction companies and public works contracts, and co-operated with the local crime gangs led 
by Jean -Louis Fargette, but he began to operate on his own and was also eventually killed. The 
fourth and most successful attempt took place via the casinos of the Riviera. The Mafia wanted to 
take control of a large casino through which they could launder their crime money."
Mafia activities in France and on the Riviera can be broken down into several broad 
categories that range from “harmless” refuge, to total economic and political penetration of the local 
system. Each step represents a greater danger for the host country as it represents greater inroads for 
the Mafia. Although some experts (National Assembly Report Rapporteur) may contend that the 
Mafia is only involved in level thiee activities, others argue that Mafia activity is much more 
extensive. The Assembly report does admit that the Mafia is suspected of operating much more 
widely, but French officials have not been able to gather concrete evidence of it.
The Italian Mafia families operating in France engage in many illegal or marginally legal 
sphere of activity, including, but not limited to, drug trafficking, EU subsidies, frauds of all types,
Cassazione Corrado Carnaval, currently under investigation for association with the Mafia and suspected of having 
very close ties with the Cosa Nostra.
'^Information obtained from a French police inspector involved in the surveillance.
'^^Raufer, Xavier. “Mafia: le partage du Midi.” L’Express 8 June 1995.Aubry, Bruno, and Frederique Lantieri. “La 
Pieuvre mafieuse etend ses tentacules sur la Cote d'Azur.” L'Evenement du Jeudi 13 August 1992.
'^ '^ Marsat, Alain. “Commandant, Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire.” Paris. France. Ed. Ministère de 
rinterieur. Mafia activities in France, 1998.
‘^ ^Madelin, Philippe. “Journalist /  Author.” Paris. France. Police Rivalries & Mafia activities, 1997.
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cigarette trafficking and money laundering.
Refuge
The first level of Mafia activity in France, and particularly on the Riviera is refuge or safe-haven. 
Mafiosi seeking to flee Italian Justice, or even wishing to remain outside of clan wars have elected 
the Riviera as their preferred destination zone."
Investments and monev laundering 
Investments and money-laundering pperations are sometimes barely discernible form each other, as 
one of the preferred forms of money laundering for the Mafia in France consists of investing the 
“dirty” money into a legitimate real-estate deals in order to launder it." To the Mafia, a trip across 
the Alps is considered like an opportunity to launder money.™
Real-estate: Despite serious pan-rEuropean economic recession during the 1980's, the Riviera 
continued to flourish and build extensively. According to Giovanni Falcone as much as 1/3 of all 
the real estate ventures on the French Riviera were financed by the Mafia.” Other real-estate 
ventures that interested the Mafia are golfs courses, two in particular Pierrevert and the Chateau de 
Taulanne. The second method particularly prized by the Mafia to launder money consists of recycling 
money through casinos.
The Casino Route:
France has the most dense casino presence in all of Europe with 153 registered casinos,” 17,000 
employees, with an estimated 45 billion players a year generating $1.2 billion USD, 80% of which
'®Kerbeuf, “Director.” Nanterres. France. Ed. Police Judiciaire. The role of the PJ, 1997.SoIomon, Jean-Claude. 
“Director of International Relations.” Paris. Ed. Institut Des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure. Organised 
crime in France, 1997
'^^Giancarlo Cassacia invested in a 30-storey luxury block of flats in Beausoleil, and a golf course in Pierrevert 
(Alps). Nundy, Julian. “Italian Mobs Buy Their Way into France.” 3 February 1993. Gudin, Christian. “Councilor au 
Senate.” Paris. France. Ed. French Senate. Organised Crime In France, 1997.
^'^amel, Ian. “L'Italie traverse les Alps pour blanchir son argent.” I'Hebdo 29 October 1992.
^ .^Aubry, Bruno, and Frederique Lantieri. “La Pieuvre mafieuse etend ses tentacules sur la Cote d'Azur.”
L'Evenement du Jeudi 13 August 1992.
Number of registered casinos: Great Britain (130), Germany (38), Spain (40) Holland (12).
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is through slot machines. The Riviera has the highest concentration of casinos within France with 
11 casinos between only Cannes and Menton, employing 2,000 people and generating $400 million 
USD, equivalent to 1/3 of the revenue for only 6% of the casinos.”
Since 1970, Casinos on the Riviera have been used by Cosa Nostra, and Camorra" to recycle 
money, with and estimated 80-85% of profits coming from Italian origins and considered very 
suspicious.” In 1970's that 49% of the shareholders of Nice’s Casino Ruhl were anonymous Italian 
investors, whose money had arrived in Nice from a Mafia banking establishment via a Swiss bank 
known to have ties with the Mafia.”
Casino Ruhl”
- In February 1989, following the dismantling a cigarette trafficking operation, the 
Investigating judge Sampieri uncovered possible ties between the cigaiette smuggling ring and 
money laundering at the Ruhl Casino in Nice.
- Preliminary administrative investigation against the Casino was conducted (15-19/01/1990) 
and reveals the existence of irregularities in the casino’s accounts, including the use of Casino 
capital”, and the system by which checks are cashed. Also under investigation was the large quantity 
of Italian checks for fiscal years 86/87, 87/88 and 88/89, totally $16 million USD.
-The check recovery circuit revolved around the public relations director, Guilio Gianuzzi and 
three Italian intermediaries: Remo Donada, Trusfrd S.A, and Girolemo Mehnoia, as well as two 
Swiss banking establishments: Rohmer S.A. (in Chiasso) and Migros Bank (in Lugano).
- The checks (used by players to get gambling chips) were cashed in Italy, yet money was 
received by the Casino via a Swiss bank. The three intermediaries were using a system of false
^^The casino industry generates substantial tax revenue for the cities: Nice: $6 million USD, Cannes $16 million 
USD. Source: Tuaillon, Carole. “La Criminalité Organisée de Type Mafieux et la Situation en France.” DESS. 
Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, 1996, page 75.
^Chabrun, Laurent. “La Mafia voulmt racheter le casino de Beaulieu.” ? 25 February 1995.
^^Campagnola, Francois. Crime organise et gansterisme professionel: experience française et analvse comparée. 
Paris: Institut de Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure, 1996.
Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Mafia. Argent et Politique: Enquete sur les Liaisons Dangereuses dans le Midi. Paris: 
Seuil, 1995, page 122.
^^Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire. “Note d'intervention sur les casinos de Menton et du Ruhl.” (Undated).
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billing to funnel money, presumably dirty money, into the casino.
- For example, one Italian player wrote out three checks totalling $400,000 USD, the 
intermediary took his 10% commission, but the remaining $360,000 USD never appeared on the 
Casino balance books as cash deposits, but rather was written off as exceptional, unrecoverable 
losses.
- Further background checks revealed that Mr. Donado, another “check negotiator” working 
with Trustfid S. A. was actually a close friend of Mafia godfather Zaza and had been involved in the 
operation.
- The investigation concluded that the casino via the different intermediaries and banks was 
used to launder money for the Mafia.
Menton Casino
The Menton casino also became the target of the Mafia, and an attempted take-over (by 
Sofextour Corp) was halted at the very last minute when the French Gambling Commission used 
their right to refuse to issue a buyer certificate (to any individual or organisation) that they evaluate 
as suspicious because the prospective buyers were anonymous and the guarantor company though 
to be a front.
As a result of both the Ruhl and Menton Casino fiasco’s the French Minister of Interior 
demanded more transparency in the acquisition and management of all French casinos; this is an 
attempt to prevent Mafia interest and take-over. A French police official confirms the importance 
of the money laundering through casinos scheme:
France should not concentrate on drug trafficking. The real danger is economic. It is the
gangrene of the social tissue. [Sic] The recycling of dirty money through the intermediary
of casinos.”
Because of the increase in Mafia activity in the casinos as players, but also as prime investors, the 
French Government refused to renew many casinos’ gaining license and subsequently shut them 
down: they included the casinos of Bandol (1988), Menton (1989), Beaulieu (1989) and Chamonix 
(1991).” In addition to the official government policy, local officials have also taken steps to limit
^*Calvi, Fabrizio. L'Europe des Parrains: La Mafia a 1 Assaut de lEurope. Paris: Grasset, 1993, page 135. 
author cited. “La France: un terrain attractif pout les capitaux de la Mafia.” Nice Matin 4 February 1993.
The Cosa Nostra in France ^
Mafia involvement in the casino industiy by requesting Italian certificates of “non-membership to 
the Mafia”.”'"
- The Casino Wars: The attempted take over (1977) of the Palais de la Méditerranée Casino 
in Nice by Jean-Dominique Fratoni" launched the Nice Casino war. Fratoni, a close friend of Nice 
Mayor Jacques Medecin, but also a close ally of the Italian Mafia tried to gain control of the Palais 
de la Mediterrannee casino owned by the Leroux family. This bitter power struggle ended with the 
mysterious and highly suspicious disappearance of the youngest Leroux daughter and part owner of 
the Casino. Although her disappearance has never fully been elucidated, there is evidence that 
Fratoni and his Italian allies may have had something to do with it. By eliminating the Leroux 
daughter, Fratoni was able to take control of the Palais casino, presumably to help the Mafia launder 
money".
Despite French governmental measures to hinder Mafia involvement in the casino industry, 
the Mafia has not given up on the idea of buying up casinos of the Riviera in order to launder dirty 
money."
Other activities
The Mafia’s activities on the Riviera are tailored by their environment and the various market 
possibilities, but their activity portfolio greatly resembles their traditional activity portfolio in Sicily: 
racketeering, drug trafficking, contraband, money laundering and frauds of all types.
Francois d’Aubert announced that Mafia presence was also likely in the domain of public 
work contracts, and offered as evidence the fact that Italian corporation were making unusually low 
bids (-30%) and obviously winning contracts, a traditional method to eliminate competitors".
Racketeering
‘^^ ditorial. “Crime, Prosperity and science.” Financial Times 13 May 1993.
" These cetrificates, issued by the Italian Ministry of Interior certify that the bearer is not under investigation for 
mafia association, not has he/she ever been suspected of Mafia membership.
^^Laborde, Jean-Pierre. “Jean-Dominique Fratoni est mort.” Le Monde 10 August 1994.
" Because Fratoni was probably only a business associate of the Mafia, he was not held to the same rules as the 
« made » men of honour, and hence was « allowed » to kill a woman.
"^Chabrun, Laurent. “La Mafia voulait racheter le casino de Beaulieu.” ? 25 February 1995.
author cited. “Maastricht une aubaine pour la Mafia.” Paris: AFP, 1992.
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The Cosa Nostra on the Riviera, just like in Italy, makes substantial profits out of its 
racketeering/protection industry. It appears that for the moment the targets for protection rackets are 
only Italian businesses, and has not yet extended to the French business community. The two 
preferred businesses for CN racketeering are public works contractors and pizzeria/Italian restaurants. 
Not only must the restaurant industry pay a protection fee, but they are also “encouraged” to buy their 
supplies from “approved” food whole sellers. In exchange for their full co-operation, these 
restaurants are given a sticker (“macaroon”) to display in their front window that certifies they are 
protected.^
Cigarette trafficking*’'
Quantity of Cigarettes seized In France (in tons)
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Cigarette trafficking is a very profitable trade. A pack of cigarette bought from a US 
manufacturer outside Europe cost only $0.40-0.60 USD, and can be sold for $3.00 - $4.00 per pack 
in Europe: this amounts to a net profit of $1.2-1.4 million USD in profit for a single 1ST truck.**
^'Warsat, Alain. “Commandant, Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire.” Paris. France. Ed. Ministère de 
rinterieur. Mafia activities in France, 1998.
^^Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire. “Note d'intervention sur les casinos de Menton et du Ruhl,” (Undated).
^*The amount of contraband cigarettes seized by French police has increased dramatically between 1992-1995: 1992 
(13.2 metric tons) -1993 (60T) -1994 (185 T) - 1995 (117 T). Valdiguie, Laurent. “Le trafic des blondes fait un 
tabac.” Le Point 23 April 1996.
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Michele Zaza, jointly godfather of the Cosa Nostra and the Camorra, was been called the Neapolitan 
Emperor of contraband in light of his extensive and highly profitable cigarette trafficking activities 
first as a child, and then as an adult. Zaza, operating out of his Riviera home in Villeneuve-Loubet 
used to plan operations and intercept and re-route Philip Morris shipments of cigarettes intended for 
sale outside the EU, and hence tax-exempt, and resell them directly to retailers, tobacco shops and 
wholesalers. His asking price was slightly less than the official factory direct price and hence was 
advantageous to the buyer. In effect, Zaza was intercepting the cigarette taxation (equivalent to 76% 
of the sale price) money that under normal circumstances would have gone to the State, and keeping 
it for his own personal profit. In addition, although never proven in court, Zaza had the uncanny 
habit, of adding to his cigarette cargo shipments, substantial packages of cocaine or heroin, therefore 
greatly increasing the street value of the overall shipment.**' In March 1997, French customs agents 
intercepted a truck shipment of 1,660 cartons of cigarettes near Andorra, three Italian nationals were 
arrested and under interrogation revealed that the contraband cigarette was on its way through France 
to the Riviera then on to Sicily, once again demonstrating the usefulness of the Riviera as a 
communications corridor to Italy. " According to François d’Aubert, contraband cigarettes account 
for 3.5% of the French national cigarette consumption, as opposed to 15-30% of the Italian and 
German consumption."
Meat frauds:
In May 1993, Operation Mare Verde (Green Sea) allowed police to uncovered a fraud set up by Zaza, 
and run out of his Riviera home, which consisted of buying cheap meat from Eastern Europe and 
selling it repeatedly in and outside of Europe, each time collecting different EU import and export 
subsidy with each operation.
Political corruption:
Political corruption by the Mafia, even at the local or regional level does not seem to be very 
prevalent yet, but this type of Mafia activity generally represents the last echelon of penetration. 
Although suspicions of corruption surface occasionally, especially close to or right after local
Calvi, Fabrizio. L’Europe des Parrains: La Mafia a TAssaut de l'Europe. Paris: Grasset, 1993, page 80. 
Author Cited. “Trafic des Cigarettes.” . Perpignan: AFP, 1997.
^^d'Aubert, François. Main Basse Sur l'Europe: Enquete sur les Derives de Bruxelles. Paris: Pion, 1994.
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elections on the Riviera, no concrete, indictable evidence has surfaced as of yet. Jacques Medecin, 
former mayor of Nice, was accused repeatedly of collusion with the Mafia because of his ties with 
school friend Jean-Dominique Fratoni, but appears today that although Medecin may have been 
aware of Fratoni’s ties with the Mafia he was never directly implicated." Finally, Bernard Tapie, 
former minister and protégé of former French president Francois Mitterand, and political figure in 
the South (as well as coach of the O.M. Marseilles football team) was also accused, with little 
substantiating evidence of collusion with the Mafia."
Cells and familv structures implanted in France 
All the French experts agree that despite Mafia presence in France and especially on the Riviera, no 
cells or family structures have been established, and France has not yet become a true operational 
base. However, two Cosa Nostra turncoats, who testified before the French National Assembly’s 
committee on Mafia affairs, addressed this very issue of Mafia cells in France, In opposition with 
common belief, both agreed that cell structure was limited in France, but nonetheless existed. 
Leonardo Messina named Grenoble as a cell base for the Mafia, and Antonio Calderone, although 
remaining quite vague about the precise location, thought that at least one comprised of ten people 
existed in France."
^^The other politicians suspected of having had ties with the Mafia was Maurice Arrexx, arch enemy of Yann Piat, 
deputee from the Var region who was shot, execution style by two motorcyclists as she was driving home from work. 
Much fabulation and little concrete facts emerged from her death, but again it appears that although her assassins 
may have executed her in a Mafia style-killing, the Mafia itself was never implicated in her death.
93P. A., and I.H. "Derrière Tapie, une forte odeur Mafieuse.” L'Hebdo 12 July 1994.
^d’Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de Lutter Contre les 
Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France.” . Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1993.
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status with France. Although Monaco has always remained “officially” independent” from France 
(except for a very brief period during the French Revolution), it has always maintained close ties in 
the economic, judicial and financial spheres. In fact, France recognised Monaco’s independence in 
1489, and made official its privileged relations with Monaco by signing the Treaty of Peronne^^. 
Shortly thereafter, in 1865, France and Monaco signed their first customs union, and finally in 1918 
the Treaty of Protective Friendship was also signed, stipulating, and solidifying the nature of 
French/Monaco relations.
Todav
Today Monaco’s “policy” is such that both its interior and exterior affairs are strongly 
influencedby the different treaties and “Conventions” it has signed with France. In fact  ^from an 
“exterior” perspective: “Monaco is a sovereign state within the framework of treaties signed with 
France, and all aspects of its international dealings wkh benefit from a French/Monegasque 
agreement. From an “interior” point of view, the Principality in-trusts its defence to France, and 
France agrees to defend the sovereign territory of Monaco, as if it were and integral pait of France.
As a result of a 1930 “Convention”,^  ^most of the important posts in the administration aie 
reserved for French nationals. Today, the head of government, special counsel to the interior 
government, director of fiscal affairs, director of judicial affairs are French nationals, but, are paid by 
Monaco, and serve in the interest of Monaco.
Today, obviously the context has vastly changed. Monaco has become an important financial 
center and now wants to act much more, if not totally, independently from France, especially in its 
international relations. However,the particularity of France and Monaco’s historic relations continues 
to affect their dealings with each other, as well as Monaco’s dealings with international community.
No doubt the turning point in Monaco’s recent history comes in 1962, when Prince Rainer
" Treaty of Peronne was signed on the 14* September 1961 between Louis XIII, and Honoré II. It provided for the 
« lending » of 500 French troops to Monaco to serve and protect Honoré II.
" Originally this Convention was set up because of the lack of qualified personnel in Monaco. It was thought at the 
time that France was more apt to fill these key posts. Although progressively the situation evolved, and Monaco was 
able to find highly qualified personnel, the 1930 convention remains in effect, despite occasional, and increasingly 
frequent contestations by Monégasques. Furthermore, the fact that French nationals were set up in key positions 
reassured France that in the case that the Monaco dynasty were to come to an end, control of the Principality would 
automatically revert to France.
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of Monaco fired Emile Pelletier, a high-ranking civil servant of French nationality. This incident is 
viewed by then French president General de Gaulle as a humiliating act, and began what is known 
as the “Crise”. As a result of the ever increasing tensions, and quickly deteriorating relations, Prince 
Rainer, in a move to increase Monaco’s independence declared his Principality a fiscal paradise. 
This new status marked the beginning of a very peculiar relationship between France and Monaco, 
but certainly marks the beginning of Monaco’s financial prosperity. France continued to “tolerate”^  ^
Monaco’s special financial situation as long as it remained mainly centred around profits emanating 
from the proceeds of games and tourism. When suspicion of money laundering and harbouring of 
criminal proceeds began to be expressed by French fiscal authorities this historic tolerance became 
quickly eroded.
2. Fiscal / Financial matters
France and Monaco have a “practically “ unified banking sector. In theory Monaco’s banks 
are supposed to respect and apply all French laws. The custom’s union that defines French/Monaco 
ties also includes key aspects of the banking industry, notably the transfer of funds, and the 
declaration of origin of tr ansfer amounts superior to 50,000 FF.^ ®^  Again, in theory, France is jointly 
responsible of Monaco’s banking industry. Because of the increasing public pressure to curb money- 
laundering activities and to show “good faith” in 1998, France and Monaco negotiated a 
reinforcement of the money-laundering program.^“
Monaco* businesses:
According to Fabienne Reybaud^^ Monaco’s economy has dramatically improved reaching 
a dizzying +25% in overall economic activity in only the last two years (1998-2000). The breakdown 
of this remarkable growth in the key sectors is a follows:
mFrance and Monaco are still linked by a treaty governing Monaco’ economic and financial dealings.
1963 Fiscal Convention between France and Monaco, defined these transfers as a customs violation if the origin is 
not ascertained
31/12/1998
™ Reybaud, Fabienne: Le Figaro newspaper 18 April 2000
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Telecommunications: + 50%
Banking sector: + 29%
Real-estate: + 22%
Tourism: + 8%
The banking sector alone employs 1,700 employees (=5% of active population), operates within 70
banking establishments and has an annual turnover 44.6 billion FF, equivalent to about 20% of the
annual Monaco turnover for all industries. Because Monaco has a specific fiscal and banking regime
it attract a huge amount of non-Monegasque clients. Below is a list of “advantages” for banking
clients in Monaco. These advantages are conducive not only to “organised” fiscal evasion, but
especially advantageous for criminal investments and proceeds.
Fiscal regime for Monaco citizens, residents and businesses.
Citizens of Monaco =
Residents of Monaco =
No inheritance taxes 
No added value taxes
No with-holding of interest (at the banking establishment) 
No with-holding of dividends (for business)
No tax on your fortune(or luxuiy tax)
= great asylum for money fleeing any fiscal authority
no income taxes
no income taxes (except for French nationals)
Moneeasque Banks.
There are approximately 70 banks in Monaco (for a population of 30,000), equally divided 
between Monégasque establishments, foreign banks, and subsidiaries of French Banks. Between 
1993-1995 the quantity of cash deposits increased by nearly 40%, leading financial experts to wonder 
if Mafia involvement was not to blame for this sudden increase in cash transactions'". Already in 
1992, Monaco receive surprisingly large cash deposits totalling $12 billion USD."* A few interesting 
figures:
In 1999, over all deposits into Monaco banks increased by 27%.
10 times more bank accounts than residents
69.4 % of money managed in Monaco belongs to non-residents
^^Follain, John. Dishonored Society: the Sicilian Mafia’s Threat to Europe. London: Warner Books, 1995, page 
200.
^^ ^Barry, James. “Single Market Effect: Mafia Influx in France.” International Herald Tribune 8 February 1993.
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3. Monev-Laundering Laws & monev laundering practices
Monaco despite its “tolerant” banking practices is in fact equipped with money-laundering laws: 
Jjiw 1-161 o f  T"" July 1993:
-Article 218/1: 5-10 year imprisonment for any person facilitating money laundering
-Article 218/2: provisions for a harsher sentence for a member of an organised crime network
In addition, the banking establishments and banking industiy employees are under obligation to report 
suspicion funds, deposits or transfers. In reality though^very few reports of suspicion are ever filed 
with the Financial Circuits Information and Control Service (SICCFIN),^^ . the entity 
authorised to investigate claims of suspicions dealings or deposits in the banking industiy. '^^  ^During 
a five-year period between 1994-1999 only 12 of the 299 cases of reported suspicion of money 
laundering were actually prosecuted. By comparison, the Assembly report rapporteur noted that the 
Isle of Man which is equipped with similar structures to report and prevent the occurrences of money 
laundering, in 1998 alone, reported 1,500 cases of possible transgressions to the competent authority.
Declaration of suspicions in Monaco '^^
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Declaration of 
Suspicions 43 37 54 45 37 50 266
Cases brought to 
the prosecutor 3 0 3 0 2 4 12
Monev laundering schemes: the Casino route:
In addition to the “complacent” banking practices, Monaco offers other money laundering 
advantages, including casinos. The Monaco Casino was founded in 1963 by the Société des Bains 
de Mer (SBM) was bought out several times^^ before being definitely acquired by Prince Rainier of 
Monaco in 1966.
SICCFIN : Service d’information et de Contrôle sur les Circuits Financiers.
On paper this Service if staffed by three people, but the French Assembly Reports estimates that the figure in 
actuality is closer to one.
as registered by the SICCFIN between 1994-1999. 
one time owner was Aristotle Onassis.
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The Monaco casino, as most other casinos around the world,functions with the help of agents. 
These agents are solicited to bring in choice clientele, and are remunerated in various fashions, and 
according to different criteria. In Monaco, some of the agents are involved in large-scale money 
laundering operations. The player that has been “lured” to the casino by the agent writes a check to 
the order of the casino, and is given tokens in exchange. If by the end of the evening he has benefits, 
then his check is given back to him and his earnings calculated and paid out to him. If, however, the 
player has suffered losses, his initial check is given back to the agent, who then seeks to cash it in 
through the player. These agents were reported as having earned as much as 400-500,000 FF a week
in commission^^®.
Monaco’s suspicious banking practices are not a new discovery, but the amount of business 
transiting through its establishments has grown significantly in the last ten years. Already a US, 
Secret service note dating back to 29 March 1945 pointed out that Monaco was the European money 
laundering capital, used by Nazi to launder and hide their money, and used by French companies to 
evade high import taxes on foreign goods.'"
Also under suspicion, are the ties between Monaco and the American La Cosa Nostra via 
Grace Kelly. Some experts believe that the original connection between the Mafia and Monaco may 
have begun when Grace Kelly married Prince Rainier on 12 April 1965, and that the negotiator \So 
formalised these ties was none other than singer Frank Sinatra."^ Unfounded rumours also circulated 
shortly after Grace Kelly’s fatal car crash that the Mafia was responsiblelbr the accident."* Already 
in 1963 there was a Franco-Monegasque crises which opposed President De Gaulle and Prince 
Rainier, seemingly on fiscal policy, but more secretly about money-laundering and suspicious 
Monégasque banking practices.
The official position Monaco is that they do not harbour particular ties with organised crime.
"“Nearly $80,000 USD.
French government estimates their war time, tax evasion losses at 800 million FF, with Monaco taking a 3% 
commission for all the transaction that transited through the Principality..
^^^Leauthier, Alain. “Monaco, des traces d'argent sale sur le Rocher.” Liberation 3 February 1993.
^^^Bianchini, Roger-Louis. Monaco. Une Affaire qui Tourne. Paris: Seuil, 1992.
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and accuse the French government of using them as a scapegoat. However, in the face of an 
extensive list of operations proven to have Mafia links, and with many other occurrence having a 
strong Mafia odour, it is unrealistic that Monaco is completely unscathed by Mafia activities.'" But 
Jean Deflassieux, president of the Association of Monégasque banks denied organised crime’s 
involvement in Monaco stating that the Mafia did not need Monaco to invest money in France.
4. Evidence of organised crime presence and involvement:
- Casino of Monaco. The Monaco casino is managed by the SBM, Société des Bains de Mer, 
in which Prince Rainier has controlling interests. In June 1994, a letter, signed by six shareholders, 
was sent to the SBM condemning the actions of various parties in the Casino, and accusing them of 
having suspicious practices and ties with suspicious Italian loan-sharks agents. At least three of the 
Italians cited by name have confirmed ties with the Mafia, they were reprimanded and thrown out 
from Monaco, and their co-ordinator/manager was sentenced to prison time. The Monaco Casino, 
despite these expulsions, continues to have suspicious links with the Mafia. In November 1997, five 
Italians, regular and very big players at the casino were arrested while driving their Ferraris and 
thrown out from Monaco on the grounds that they had mafia ties, evidence that the casinos had once 
again been gangrened by Mafia."* Again, according to National Bureau chief at Interpol: it is not 
possible that the casino be used for money laundering, because the casino is owned by the Société 
des Bains de Mer in which the Prince has controlling interests, and it is “unthinkable that we would 
allow it (Casino) to be used to launder”."®
-Daniel Ducret, Princess Stephanie’s (Rainier youngest daughter) husband also came under 
suspicion after one of his business associates, Mr. Chiarolanzo was questioned by police about his 
links to the Mafia. While investigating possible money-laundering operations conducted by Mr. 
Chiarolanzo, the Asti ‘Procureur’ discovered that irregularities were also evident in his Ducret’s bank 
accounts, as well as his joint account with the princess.
**'^ First ever case of money laundering against Moshe Binyamin (Drugs T) on 7/7/1995 deposited $5.5 million USD 
Inciyan, Erich. “La Justice Monégasque confronted a sa premiere affaire de blanchiment.” Le Monde 17 November 
1998.
^*^Roire, Claude. “Rainier oblige de faire le menage dans son casino.” Le Canard Enchaine 7 June 1995 - T.O. “La 
Mafia aurait investi Monaco.” Le Monde 28 January 1993.
Bresler, Fenton. Interpol. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992.
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-Grand Prix Sponsor. The Grand Prix race that takes places eveiy year in Monaco is a huge 
media event that bring attention and international prestige to the city-state. The 1996 event was 
tainted by allegations that a key Italian sponsor, Ricardo Fanchini was sought-out by Italian and 
French authorities for Mafia association. Police tried to arrest him on the opening day of the Grand 
Prix, but he managed to escape aboard his yacht.
-San Georgi. Gaetano San Georgi, son in law of Mafia financier Nino Salvo, also came under 
suspicion for his ties with the Mafia as well as his possible money laundering operation through a 
Monégasque company. Police suspect he may have laundered as much as $1 million USD, through 
funnelling money through off shores, and then onto Monaco."*
- Stefano CasigherL In addition to Princess Stephanie’s’ relationship with shady, Mafia 
linked people, her sister Princess Caroline has also been accused of choosing partners with similar 
suspicious ties. Her second husband Stefano Casigheri was repeatedly suspected of having received 
bizarre financing by Italian friends, and of having close ties with Mr. Contini, and Italian national 
known to be close to the Mafia,
-Furthermore, other names closely associated with the Mafia have appeared repetitiously in 
Monégasque affairs, namely the facade company Sociétés Civiles Immobiliers (SCI), directed by 
Roberto Memmo, (Mafia association), Licio Gelli (head of P2 lodge and sought for Mafia 
association), and Giancarlo Parretti (Mafia Association)."*
In the face of so many confirmed examples of Mafia activities in Monaco, or of links between 
Monégasque affairs and Mafia presence, it seems unlikely that Monaco is not penetrated by the 
Mafia. Its proximity to Italy and its connection between France and Italy coupled with its banking 
practices and money-laundering opportunities have made it an attractive tenain for the Mafia.
*^ I^nciyan, Erich. “Différentes Affaires qui ont bien failli ternir la reputation de la principauté.” Le Monde 17 
November 1998.
^^^Leauthier, Alain. “Monaco, des traces d'argent sale sur le Rocher.” Liberation 3 February 1993.
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VI Conclusion
In view of the evidence presented above both in France and in Monaco, and in contrast with 
the evaluations offered by the various French or Monégasque authorities, it seems unlikely that Mafia 
involvement in France, the Riviera or Monaco is limited only to refuge, but rather that it has elected 
France as a base of activities. By infiltrating the banking establishments, investing in property, and 
laundering in multiple ways, organised crime in general and the Cosa Nostra specifically has 
established itself and at least a portion of its activities in the region.
Annexe two of this chapter is a table, a compilation of all the organised crime arrests that 
have occurred on the Riviera during the 1980’s and 1990’s, more than 80 in all. It is presented as 
evidence of proven Mafia presence in the South, and leaves little room for argument. In the face of 
such a list it is henceforth difficult for the local or national authorities of France or Monaco to pretend 
that organised crime is not present within their border.
If it appears that the preceding research is presented almost like a investment brochure for 
Mafia activities in France and on the Riviera, it is because a systematic approach and analysis of aU 
the factors potentially attractive for Mafia activities and presence need to be investigated, to explain 
why it has chosen France and the Riviera as its area of predilection.
Italian organised crime and the Mafia specifically is present in the South, it’s a fact. Now 
French and Monégasque authorities need to develop a plan of action and draft ways in which they 
can seek to combat it. Italy for obvious reasons has been the pre-cursor in the anti-Mafia campaign. 
Much can be learned from their fight, and lessons drawn from their experience that can be applied 
to France. ___
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the reality of ^ a f ia  presence in France and 
specifically in high concentration on the Frehch Riviera. Once France comes to terms with this 
reality, it will logically seek ways to curb Mafia activities and limit Mafia presence either in terms 
of zone of refuge or for investment purposes. Its transalpine neighbor, Italy, has had to equip itself 
with a unique, Mafia specific legislative arsenal and police procedures in order to try and catch up 
with these organized criminals. France could probably benefit from bilateral consultations on this 
topic and could also probably gain time by looking at the Italian experience and learning for its 
mistakes and successes. The following chapter, entitled “Italian Lesson” will outline the special 
procedures that Italy has devised in an attempt to curb Mafia activities. Obviously Italy’s arsenal is 
impressive but reflects the extent of Mafia presence within its border -  France’s situation is far 
different in terms of extent of Mafia activity and presence and hence would probably not need, at 
this stage at least, the totality of the Italian anti-Mafia measures. France could however greatly 
learn from the Italim lesson.
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Organised Crime In France: a few indicative numbers
Infractions 1993 1994 1995 Evolution 
1995/1994 (in %)
Armed Robbery 11211 10243 9147 - 10.7 %
Murders between criminals 105 79 95 +20.3 %
Organising prostitution 679 627 533 - 15 %
Abating illegal immigration 1 271 1 102 1514 +37,4 %
Infractions to legislation on drugs 
- drug trafficking 9 010 8 714 5 661 -35%
- seizures (in metric tons) 40 54,5 34,4 - 36.9%
Counterfeit
- commercial/industrial fraud 4 850 4 916 5 755 +17,1 %
- artistic & literary 1676 2132 4 250 +99,3 %
- number of articles seized by customs 63 700 206 183 299 012 +  45%
- number of customs infraction 142 741 651 -12,1 %
Counterfeit currency 3 065 5 428 6568 +21 %
Cigarette contraband (in metric tons) 59,7 185,8 117 -37,1 %
The preceding table is a list of infractions perpetrated by persons recognised as being members of an 
organised crime group as tabulated by the French Police Judiciaire. Obviously the numbers presented 
are not necessarily representative of the reality or the volume of OC activity in France, but only 
represent the number of infractions that were noticed and subsequently compiles as statistics. 
Increases in seizures may not reflect an increase in trafficking, but may reflect and increase in police 
vigilance in certain areas. Alternatively decreases in seizures may reflect a decrease in trafficking, 
but may also reflect a change of tactic or an alternative root or means of trafficking that has not yet 
been detected by the police.
^^^Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire, DICCILEC et Direction Générale des Douanes et des Droit Indirects. 
“La Criminalité Organisée en France.” . Paris: Ministère de l'Interieur, 1996.
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Italian L e s s o n
donH believe the Italian State really does have 
the intention of combating the Mafia” ‘
I Introduction
Being the cradle of Mafia “civilisation”, culture, and expansion, Italy has been the 
first State to have to confront the Mafia head on. For this reason, and as it has been the 
most profoundly affected, and penetrated country, Italy is the logical choice as a base of 
comparison for international Mafia combating efforts. The way in which Italy has chosen, 
or in some cases not, to approach its fight against the Mafia can be used as a reference 
from which to compare and contrast France’s anti-Mafia efforts. During a 1991 French 
National Assembly hearing on international organised crime\ Giovanni Falcone urged 
France to analyse and evaluate Italy’s anti-Mafia experience, and derive from it the 
positive and negative aspects of this difficult fight. He encouraged the French legislators 
to draw their own conclusions, based on the trials and tribulations of Italy, and devise their 
own adapted strategy to combat the Mafia in their own country
In Italy, three factors have greatly contributed to fighting the Mafia more 
aggressively and more effectively, the creation of new institutions designed specifically 
to combat the Mafia, the drafting of several new laws, including the inauguration of the 
pentiti (justice collaborators) system for Mafiosi, and the dramatic shift in public opinion 
away from the Mafia in favour of government action.
The turning point: 1992:
Italy came to a significant turning point in its fight against the Mafia in 1992. The 
Italian Supreme Court finally made a ruling on the Maxi-Trials of 1987, and upheld the 
earlier sentences. The Mafia reacted immediately, assassinating Salvo Lima, a popular 
European Member of Parliament. Violence escalated further, culminating in the Summer 
1992 assassinations of both Giovanni Falcone (23/05/92) and Paolo Borsellino (19/07/92). 
The new parliamentary Anti-Mafia Package was approved less than two weeks after
^Follain. John. “Can Italy beat the Mafia after the Falcone murder?" . Rome: Reuters, 1992.
^d'Aubert, Francois, and Bertrand Gallet. “Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Moyens de 
Lutter Contre les Tentatives de Penetration de la Mafia en France,” . Paris: Assemble Nationale, 1993.
^This chapter does not aim to be the definitive reference on Mafia specific legislation in Italy, but rather 
a presentation of a few specific laws that are key in Italy’s anti-Mafia campaign.
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Falcone’s death and more than 700 arrests were conducted that very night (a vast majority 
were comprised of convicted Mafiosi benefiting from house arrest). Post 1992, the 
government began to look at winning the war against the Mafia in much the same way that 
they had dealt with terrorism in the 1970-80's.
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II T he new institutions
The three Italian structures whose sole aim is to combat the Mafia are the 
Direzione Investigativa Anti-Mafia (DIA), the Direzione Nazionale Anti-Mafia (DNA), 
respectively the Anti-Mafia Investigative Directorate, and the National Anti-Mafia 
Directorate,^ as well as the General Council for the Anti-Mafia fight. Originally this task 
had been the responsibility of the High Commission, but considered ineffective, it was 
abolished and its place the DIA and DNA were established.
L Direzione Investigativa Anti-Mafia (DIA)
The DIA, police branch of the Anti-Mafia institutions, was created in October 
1991, turned into law 30/12/1992.^ It largely inherited the personnel and equipment from 
the restructured High Commission, but aims to surmount rivalries between the different 
police forces during the investigation process of cases pertaining to OC, and gives impulse 
to any inquiries it feels are necessary to combat the Mafia. Falling under the jurisdiction 
of the Public Security department, it is also dependent on the Ministry of Interior. The 
central Office of the DIA is in Rome, but also has twelve regional centres and five satellite 
offices. It is an inter-force structure, regrouping 1,500 administrative agents, and an 
additional 1,000 civil servants, belonging to the national police, the carabinieri (Ministry 
of Defence) or the Guarda di Finanza (military branch with fiscal, financial and customs 
competencies). In addition, it can seek logistic and technical support from all general 
police forces, the army and the security services.Placed under the control of the High 
Commissioner and the Minister of Interior, it is headed on a rotating basis by the head of 
one of the three sections, police, carabinieri or finanza. In addition the National Anti- 
Mafia Prosecutor, supervises the judicial section of the DIA. The DIA has regional units,
called districts in all appellate jurisdictions. The special mission of the DIA is the
protection of justice collaborators.
^Shortly following the creation of these two new structures was the passage of decree-law, 367 of 
20.11.91, stipulating the coordination of investigations on activities pertaining to large scale banditry, 
and Mafia activities.
^Scotti’s initiative was originally entitled: "Disposizioni urgent! per il coordinamneto delle attivita 
informative e investigative della lotta contri la criminalita organizzata” or urgent measures for the 
coordination of intelligence information and investigations o f  OC.
'^Different intelligence services, namely the SISDE - Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza 
Democratica/ Information and Democratic Security Service (internal) and SISMI- Servizio per le 
Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare/ Military Security Information Service (external) are also involved 
with the DIA.
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Direzione Investigativa Anti-Mafia Hierarchical Structure '
Minister of Interior
(presides)
LL
Department of Public Security/State Police Service
General Council for the Fight Against Organized 
Crime
3 police Chiefs - 2 heads of security services - High Commissioner
High Commission
Presided by the High Commissioner
Direzione Investigative Antimafia (DIA)
Governing body
> 1 Representative of the State Police
> 1 Representative of the Carabinieri
> 1 Representative of the Finance Guard
Composition of the Personnel
> State Police
> Carabinieri
> Finance Guard
Duties and Responsibilities
> Preventive Investigations
> Judicial Investigations
> International Relations
Specialized Structures
> Servizio Centrale Operativo (SCO) of the State Police
> Raggruppamento Operativo Spéciale (ROS) Carabinieri
> Gruppo investigative sulla Criminalita Organizzata (GICO) Finanza
De Bacq, Michel. “Criminalité Organisée.” Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1996, page 208-209.
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2, Direzione Nazionale Antimafîa (DNA)
Direzione Nazionale Antimafia hierarchical stnictnre
Supreme Court
General Prosecution Office
Direzione Nationale Antimafia (DNA)
National Antimafia Prosecutor
aided by 20 Senior Level Magistrates
Procu ra to r: della Republica
26 prosecution offices 
26 district courts
Direzioni Distretualli Antimafia (DDA)
Pool Antimafîa
For each district court 
(Exempt from routine duties)
Also known as the “superprocura”, the DNA, the Direzione Nazionale Anti-Mafia 
created by law 8 of 20 January 1992, is the judicial branch of the Anti-mafia machine.
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Based in Rome, the DNA serves as a centralised political/public action forum/ Headed 
by the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor (PNA), it sits in the general prosecution office of 
the Supreme Court (this was to have been Giovanni Falcone’s position) and manages 
twenty senior level magistrates with experience in OC. The DNA can initiate inquiries, 
in strict collaboration with competent regional authorities. The district subset of the DNA 
is the Direzioni Distretualli Anti-Mafia (DDA). The number of members of the DDA, 
varies according to the size and importance of the penal jurisdictions and the presence of 
organised crime within it.
3. The General Council for the Anti-Mafia Fight
This council sits in the Ministry of Interior and is presided over by the Minister of 
Interior. It is composed of the Chief of Police, Commanders of the Carabinieri and the 
Guarda di Finanza, the Director of the DIA as well as the directors of military and civil 
intelligence. It’s task is to devise strategies to counter organised crime, define objectives 
for each police force, as well as divide and allocate available resources.
*De Bacq, Michel. "Criminalité Organisée.” Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1996, page 204.
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IV The New Laws:
In order to combat organised crime and the Mafia effectively, the Italian 
government underwent legislative, judicial and investigative changes. In addition to the 
creation of three new structures, DIA, DNA and Council, the Italian Parliament voted into 
application several fundamental laws that would help the anti-Mafia effort by facilitating 
investigations, enticing collaboration, and making sentencing more strict. These laws 
include; Law 416 defining Mafia association, Law 306 reversing the burden of proof, as 
well as other highly specific laws that together revolutionised the anti-Mafia campaign.
1. Article 416 ^
Originally, Law 646 of 13.09.82, it was voted on in 1982, and was completed by Law 
356/82 in August 1992. This law establishes the legal concept of Mafia membership, and 
became the single most effective tool with which to combat the Mafia. It defines Mafia 
appurtenance as:
An association of three or more members is of “Mafia kind” when those 
who form it make use of the power of intimidation provided by the 
associative bond and the state of subjugation and of criminal silence 
(omerta) which derives from it to commit crimes, to acquire directly or 
indirectly the running or control of economic activities of concessions, 
grants, contracts and public services in order to realise illicit profits or 
advantages for themselves or for others."
Also known as the Rognoni law, it was partially based on the US RICO law, and was 
designed to compensate for the lack of available incriminating evidence, as well as the 
reticence of witnesses to give statements against the Mafia (in large part due to fear of 
reprisals). Because the old penal system did not recognise the traditional scare and 
intimidation tactics used by the Mafia as indictable offences, it was necessary to develop 
a definition that would describe one or several of these methods, recognise them as 
indicative of Mafia association and hence punishable. Originally intended as a way to 
open an inquiry, the Rognoni-LaTorre law turned out to be grounds for indictment and
^Article 416 was originally introduced in the Italian parliament by Communist delegate Pio La Torre 
(who was murdered by the Mafia on April 30,1982, and DC Interior Minister Virginie Rognoni 
following the Mafia commandeered murder of the prefect of Palermo, General Carlo Alberto Della 
Chiesa.
^°Jamieson, Alison: The Modern Mafia: Its Role and Record. Conflict Studies No.224, London (1989), 
page 1.
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conviction/' In order to open an investigation the allegations being presented had to 
constitute an illegal act, and by rendering Mafia association and Mafia tactics illegal, Italy 
was allowing investigations on suspected Mafia membership to be opened with much 
more ease. The Rognoni Law was comprise of four essential parts:
- Defining the Mafia and stipulating minimum sentencing
- Permission to conduct investigations into the finances of a suspect
- Baring persons with a criminal record from competing in public contract bidding
- Establishment of anti-mafia certificates."
In addition to legally defining Mafia belonging and Mafia related activities, the 416 bis, 
established a minimum sentencing requirement based on the exact nature of the Mafia 
association. The sentencing stipulations ranged from 3-10 year mandatoiy imprisonment 
requirement with: 3-6 years imprisonment for Mafia conspiracy and belonging, 4-9 years 
imprisonment for anyone promoting, managing or organising a Mafia conspiracy and 4-10 
years if it is an armed conspiracy." As a result of this new law, the number of incarcerated 
Mafiosi has been steadily rising, doubling between 1992 (2,060) and 1994 (4,164)."
2. Law 306: Reversal of the burden of proof and freezing assets
In order to further facilitate the prosecution and subsequent conviction of 
suspected Mafiosi, the Italian parliament reversed the burden of proof chaige shifting it 
from the prosecution to the defence in cases of financial dealings suspected of being 
orchestrated by the Mafia. The suspect is required to prove the legitimate origin of his 
income and wealth:
Inversion of burden of proof in presence of accusation, assuming a continuous
criminal attitude resulting from organised criminal membership."
^^Padovani, Marcelle. Les Dernieres Annees de la Mafia. Paris: Gallimard, 1987, page 158-159.
Anti-Mafia certificates are official documents obtained from the Italian government that certify that a 
given person has not been under investigation, nor is currently under investigation on charges o f Mafia 
association. Jamieson, Alison. Terrorism and drug Trafficking in the 1990’s. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1994, page 23.
^^Servizio per le Informazione e la Sicurezza Democratica. Per Aspera ad Vertitem. Rome, 1995, page 
19.
^^ De Bacq, Michel. “Criminalité Organisée.” Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1996, page 210-211.
^^Servizio per le Informazione e la Sicurezza Democratica, Per Aspera ad Vertitem. Rome, 1995, page 
99.
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In addition, the seizures of suspicious assets was also initiated to prevent Mafia them from 
being transferred or hidden while the investigations were taking place." The innovation 
of this law, was the possibility to also investigate and freeze the assets of direct family 
members, and all persons having a direct link with the suspected Mafiosi. This eliminated 
the possibility of hiding assets with family members or friends, as they were susceptible 
of also being investigated. If the illegal nature of the assets could be established, the 
property, bank accounts, and overall assets are sequestered by the State and the inversion 
clause put into effect.
1, Special penitentiarv conditions
In addition to the 416 and 306 laws, a special treatment during incarceration 
proviso was implemented for convicted high ranking and influential Mafiosi: decree/law 
8 June 1992 was enacted principally to prevent the “bosses” and family chiefs from 
issuing orders, managing their activities or intimidating potential witnesses from jail, and 
incarcerated them under specific guidelines with limited access to the outside, and little 
contact with other prisoners (sometimes even held in solitary)." There have been 800 
special detainees, since 1982, when the special treatment clause was implemented. In 
1995, 466 prisoners'* were being held under this provision, the vast majority of which 
were members of the Cosa Nostra (269).'" To further isolate Mafia bosses and limit their 
potential to continue working while in jail, authorities turned to an ancient solution, 
incarceration in remote islands.”
Bacq, Michel. “Criminalité Organisée.” Criminalité Organisée. Ed. Marcel Leclerc. Paris: La 
Documentation Française, 1996, page 208-212.
^^Michele Greco, boss of all bosses, and convicted of ordering the murder of at least 78 people was held 
in solitary confinement for five years, while guards watched him around the clock. Source: Follain, John. 
“Godfathers Walk-out of Jail, Mafia Fighters See Red.” . Rome: Reuter, 1991.
^^Servizio per le Informazione e la Sicurezza Democratica. Per Aspera ad Vertitem. Rome, 1995, page 
99.
^^ In addition to the new legislation and incarceration proviso, investigative changes were enacted. These 
included: -Police can seize an inquiry without having to obtain specific authorization from the Magistrate 
- police can collect spontaneous declaration from the accused - Telephone tapping authorization was 
extended from 15 to 40 days - autonomous power of searches -permission to use illegal substances to ID 
members of OC - length/duration of investigation increased.
®^In July 1992 more than 100 Mafiosi were exiled to Agrippa prison, one of three incarceration centers 
on Devil’s Island. Follain, John. “Rome ponders exiling Mafia bosses after Falcone murder.” . Rome: 
Reuters, 1992.
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Breakdown of special penitentiary conditions hv organised crime families
6 . 7 % ( S a c r a  C o r o n a  Unl l a )
5 7 . 7 %  ( C o s a  No s t r a )
17 . 0 % ( N ' Or a n g h a t t a )
1 8 . 7 % ( C a m or ra )
4. Other Mafia specific legislation
- Money Laundering prevention’. In an effort to curb money laundering, a new law 
(based on the US law) limited the maximum amount of a single cash transactions, or 
contents of anonymous bank accounts to 20 million liras (approximately £9,150 UK)/'
- Suspension of the Gozzini Law: The Gozzini law had enabled jailed criminals to 
obtain partial liberty, in the form of house arrest, after having served a part of their 
sentence, this law was suspended for Mafiosi who were required to serve the full length 
of their sentence and could not obtain the privilege of partial liberty.”
- Post jail restrictions: in order to try and curb the number of Mafiosi re-engaging 
in criminal activity after having been released, or at the very least to curb their capacity 
for action, a new law established restrictions on their choice of residence, and stipulated 
that freed Mafia bosses could not live nor even return to Palermo, and rather had to live 
in a Sicilian town of less than 10,000 people, and in addition, have to report to the police 
everyday.”
- Cash bounties for tips: In an attempt to break the Omerta law, and to encourage 
witnesses to come forward and testify the Italian Justice passed a law offering “bounty” 
money for tips on Mafiosi. The cash reward was set up on a grading scale, with a list of 
Italy’s top 20 most wanted Mafiosi, the higher the place on the list the higher the cash 
reward. The top cash reward was established at $50,000 USD.”
^^Waddington, Richard. “Italy's Financial War with Mafia needs Computers Not Guns.” Reuter 18 July
1991.
^^Wyles, John. “Italy Introduces New Anti-Mafia Laws.” Financial Times 12 November 1990. 
^^Follain, John. “Godfathers Walk-out of Jail, Mafia Fighters See Red.” , Rome: Reuter, 1991. 
^^Wireservice. "Italy offers bounty to Mafia informers.” . Rome: Reuter, 1992.
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The application of these laws finally gave the Italian justice a very slight 
advantage in their anti-Mafia campaign. Each new law on its own targeted a specific 
aspect of the Mafia, and together aimed to really impact Mafia activities and homogenise 
sentencing guidelines. Measures like the special incarceration proviso and post jail 
restrictions sought to also enact preventative measures, and avoid the easy reintegration 
of freed Mafiosi back into their criminal system.
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Y PENTITIS: Reforms in the judicial process
The pentiti system, that encouraged criminals to collaborate with justice officials
in order to benefit from more lenient sentencing and relocation was first established for
terrorist collaborators, but in light of the increasing Mafia related violence was extended
to organised crime members. The veiy first Mafia pentiti was Salvatore Contomo in the
early 1980’s. The special provisions for collaboration enabled prosecutors and police to
obtain precious inside information on the Mafia, and resulted not only in a much better
understanding of the overall organisation, but also allowed for the arrests of very
influential Mafia bosses.” Contrary to many other countries Italian collaborators of justice
are not anonymous but rather afforded alternative protective custody in exchange for their
testimony. The pentiti provision was the result of Law 82 of 15.03.1991, finally really
activated Summer 1992 and stipulated the following:"
[...] protection and assistance o f  any individual (and member o f family living with this 
individual) who are exposed to a serious and present threat as a result o f co-operating with 
authorities in relation to matters under investigation concerning crimes for which 
mandatory arrest is provided when caught in the act o f committing the crime^ .^
Originally managed under the Central Protection Commission, it later became the 
responsibility of the DIA:
M in is te ^ f  Interior 
U ndersecretary
Central Protection Commission 
Judge + 5 other members with OC experience
Consult with;
Police + Judicial authorities + Director o f Prison Services
^^Law 304, also known as the “Penitence Law” was passed 29 May 1982 to help combat the Red 
Brigades. It entailed reduced sentences and protection in exchange for full confession and active 
contribution. The first pentiti under this law were Patrizio Peel (Red Brigades) and Michele Viscardi 
(Front Line). Source: Jamieson, Alison. Terrorism and drug Trafficking in the 1990's. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1994, page 13.
^*^he Pentiti law was revised after Falcone’s death and converted to Law 356 of 7 August 1992. It gave 
special stipulations for cases involving grave and urgent reasons of security, and allowed for the 
relocation of the witness and his family to a destination outside of jail.
^^Servizio per le Informazione e la Sicurezza Democratica. Per Asoera ad Vertitem. Rome, 1995, page 
25.
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Since the 1991 legislation was passed, the number of collaborators has been steadily 
rising: in 1993, there was a total of 283 pentitis, by 1994 the number has risen to 765, and 
reached 1,052 by 1995. The rates have tripled in the past two years, with sometimes more 
than one collaborator a day coming forth to testify.
Increase in number of justice collaborators
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- Cost of Collaboration'. The main problem associated with the popularity and 
subsequent increase in collaborators has been the soaring costs associated with it 
popularity:^ on average, the cost of maintaining a collaborator of lesser importance is 
estimated at 3 million Liras a month (about $2,000 USD),” while a collaborator of more 
importance can easily reach $20,000 USD a month.^" By 1995, the annual expenditure for 
justice collaborators reached more than $21 million USD a year, more than eight times the 
allotted budget provided for by the 1991 law.^  ^ According to Italian Minister Rinaldo 
Corona, although most judges and government officials concur that the pentiti system has
all cases of justice collaboration, the presiding magistrate must evaluate and estimate the potential 
value of the pentiti, and his confession. Once his value has been established, the State then takes over 
the responsibility of covering his costs which generally include a new identity, a new bank account and 
funds, and a new residence for him and his family
^^d'Emilio, Francis. “Italy Weary of Keeping Mafia Traitors on Payroll.” Detroit News 7 August 1995.
^ ^ e Quarto, Aldo. Mafia et Gauche: les Noces Sanglantes. Paris: Editions Premiere Ligne, 1994, page 
191.
^^Jamieson, Alison. Recent Developments in the Italian Anti-Mafia Fight: Speakers Notes, 1995.
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been a critical weapon in the war on organised crime, yet as the numbers increase, they 
become a significant drain on public spending and hence a growing concern for 
legislators." The cost bom by the collaborators themselves is also quite high, because in 
order to dissuade them from speaking out and collaborating any further, the Mafia 
threatens the collaborator himself, but also his relatives."
- Collaborators and politics: To Falcone and later Borsellino’s surprise, pentiti 
were very reticent to collaborate on issues concerning political ties with the Mafia. 
Tommaso Buscetta eventually explained this unwillingness. He believed that Italy was 
not actually ready to hear the truth about the collusion between Mafia and politics, and he 
feared that by broaching this sensitive issue he would be coined as crazy, and the rest of 
his testimony would be considered unreliable. He waited until the judges and the 
“system” in general were more prepared to receive these damning accusations and take 
him seriously." Furthermore, collaborators were well aware that by accusing high ranking 
government or justice officials they could well be jeopardising their own personal security 
even within the confines of jail or even in the witness protection programme. Joacchino 
Natoli, Palermo Assistant Prosecutor in chaige of the Andreotti trial, believed that the 
pentiti modulated their declarations based on their confidence not in the State but in its 
will to combat the Mafia."
- System under Fire: The effectiveness of the pentiti system has come under fire 
however and those who contest the law, as well as some of the collaborators themselves, 
fear that the Mafia itself may be planting “mole” collaborators that would either puiposely 
mislead the authorities, or might be able to transmit warning and threats to past or 
potential collaborators.
Obviously persons accused of Mafia collusion by collaborators are not fond of the 
system, as is the case with former prime minister Andreotti who was accused and indicted, 
on grounds of Mafia association and collaboration, based on multiple pentiti confessions."
^^d'Emilio, Francis. “Italy Weary of Keeping Mafia Traitors on Payroll.” Detroit News 7 August 1995. 
^^ In an effort to quiet Contomo, the Mafia murdered forty-six of his relatives.
“^^ Arlacchi, Pino. Buscetta: La Mafia par I’un des Siens. Paris: Felin, 1994.
^^Decamps, Marie-Claude. “Les Repentis de la Mafia.” 2 14 June 1995. Jamieson, Alison. Terrorism 
and drug Trafficking in the 1990*s. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, page 277.
*^^11 must be noted that all confessions must be corroborated, and that those that remain unsubstantiated 
are not admissible in court.
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He claimed that these sorts of confessions are easily manipulated by political enemies, 
and that in addition, confessions are not reliable because pentiti are prone to say anything 
to get protection and money." Andreotti also claimed that the Mafia is able to set up 
pentitis for the sole purpose of bringing down politicians on orders of the Mafia bosses, 
in revenge for their tough Anti-Mafia stance."
^Valsecchi, Piero. ‘Top Mafia Turncoat Testifies That Andreotti Met with Mafiosi.” . Padua: 
Associated Press.
^*Giraud, Henri-Christian. Terres de Mafia. Paris: JC Lattes, 1993, page 189.
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VI Mobilisation of public opinion
In addition to the changes in Italian legislation that enabled the State to combat the 
Mafia more effectively, the single other most important change that affected the Mafia 
position and stature was the dramatic shift in public opinion, and the massive popular 
mobilisation against the Mafia. Whereas in the past the Sicilian population had adopted 
either a overtly pro-Mafia position, or at best an ambiguous stance, public opinion shyly 
started shifting in the 1980’s and exploded in 1992 after the assassinations of Falcone and 
Borsellino.
Several developments helped mobilise public opinion in favour of the fight against 
the Mafia, notably the Mafia’s involvement in the drug trade and a significant increase in 
violence. Already a subtle shift in public opinion had begun following General Della 
Chiesa’s murder (1982), and grew more perceptible with each subsequent murder. The 
change in leadership that occurred as the Corleonesi clan took power also brought about 
a change in tactics and a change in practice as women and children as young as eight were 
murdered. As a result of these changes public awareness and support began to sway away 
from the Mafia," and for the first time, the impetus for change was given not by the 
governing class, but rather by the population.^'Many different popular manifestations of 
this rising anti-mafia sentiment emerged in the form of associations, public 
demonstrations, school projects and even police strikes, newspapers and the creation of 
political parties.
■^ ^Dionne, E.J. “Sicily's Changing Life Turns Against Mafia.” New York Times 1 January 1985.
Johnston, Bruce. “Italian Mafia turns its guns on children.” Sunday Times 14 October 1990. Pullella, 
Philip. “Organized Crime Killings o f Children Shock Italy.” . Palermo: Reuter, 1990. Montalbano, 
William. “Violating Code, Mafia Takes Aim at Women.” Los Angeles Times 13 January 1990.
^^ An opinion poll concluded that more than half the Italians, angered by the deaths of Falcone and 
Borsellino wanted the return of the death penalty to combat organized crime. Source: Follain, John. 
“Palermo police chief sacked after Mafia murder.” . Rome: Reuter, 1992.
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1. Public Demonstrations
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Public demonstration following the murder of Judge Borsellino & Funeral procession for slain judge
Both pictures are taken from: Villeuneuve, Jacques: Chroniques des Sacndales et des Affaires 
Criminelles Paris: France Loisirs
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“Two Bombs too Far”," was the public outcry that followed Falcone and 
Borsellino’s death, and gave rise to a grassroots movement geared towards denouncing 
the omerta, finally rebelling against the Mafia. Primarily lead by women, widowed or 
orphaned by Mafia violence, this movement also encompassed students and young people 
who defied the law of silence and indifference to demonstrate in the streets and voice their 
discontent and anger:" “Too much greed and to much bloodshed had argued against 
honour”." Women hung white sheets out of their apartment windows, scribbled with 
messages condemning the Mafia. At Falcone’s, but even more so at Borsellino’s funerals, 
crowds gathered to pay tribute to the fallen judges, and tried to break through police lines 
to insult politicians. The fury of the crowd forced politicians to urgently evacuate the 
Church from the rear in order to avoid confrontations." To give voice to their anger, 
members of the Sicilian population established the “Coordinamento Anti-Mafia” a 
movement run by citizens including the family of Mafia victims. The movement aimed 
to denounce Mafia activity and force politicians to actually do something about it."
2i Police: Bodvguards
Sicilian police led by the special bodyguard detachment (usually assigned to anti­
mafia judges) went on strike after Borsellino’s murder, because not only had two popular 
judges been murdered but their police escorts had also been decimated in the process: the 
Mafia was not only endangering the lives of high ranking government or justice officials 
but also that of the bodyguard details assigned to protect them. The police bodyguards 
concluded that the government was not doing sufficient to protect and preserve the police 
force and was in fact colluding with the Mafia."
3. Businesses
Business owners and shopkeepers also joined in the anti-mafia mobilisation
'^ N^o author cited. “The Sicilian Mafia: A State within a State.” The Economist .24 April, 1993.
“^ ^Siebert, Renate. Secrets of Life and Death: Women and the Mafia. London: Verso, 1996.
“^ Time Life Books, ed. Mafia. Alexandria, Va: Time Life Books, 1993, page 35-3Ô.
“^ ^Hillmore, Peter. “Land of Illustrious Corpses.” The Observer 26 July 1992.
‘^T.eney, Fiona. “Tentacles that tie down the Italian state.” Observer 6 August 1992.
'^^Waddington, Richard. “Italy deploys troops after judges murder.” . Palermo: Reuter, 1992.Johnston, 
Bruce. “Violent protest in Italy after bomb death of leading anti-Mafia judge.” The Times 21 July 
1992.Palermo Correspondent. “Protesters clash with police after Mafia bomb.” . Palermo: Reuter,
1992.
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process and formed anti-extortion associations." The head of Palermo’s shopkeepers’ 
guild, Constantin Garraffa, launched the first ever Anti-Mafia hotline, called SOS- 
Business. The operation of the hotline was simple, callers (in order to preserve their 
anonymity) leave messages explaining their situation, or denouncing someone. The 
messages are then transcribed and reported to the proper authorities. In its first week 
SOS-Business recorded more than 200 calls."
Another businessmen initiative called Associazione Commercianti Imprenditori 
Orlandini (AGIO) aimed solely at reporting Mafia extortion was launched by a group of 
seven businessmen in Capo d’Orlando, they got national attention when together they 
defied the Mafia and refused to pay the pizzo (protection money) demanded of them. In 
addition, and at great risk to their lives and that of their relatives, they denounced this 
practice and identified the culprits in court, and became known as the Magnificent Seven."
Teachers and Students 
Teachers and students also became implicated in this anti-mafia sentiment and 
took initiatives to denounce the detrimental effects of the Mafia. Teachers finally felt 
confident enough to talk openly about the Mafia and its impact on their pupils and 
encouraged discussion. In one school project in Corleone, students were asked to 
illustrate their sentiments about the Mafia, and their artwork was then exposed. One boy 
wrote: “Dear men of the Mafia, when we grow big and become magistrates, judges, 
policeman and journalists, we will defeat you”.^ '
5. The Rete
Capitalising on the massive public opinion shift, a new political party was created, 
the Rete, (meaning the network) with a charter based on a strict anti-Mafia stance. The 
Rete, founded by former Palermo mayor, Leoluca Orlando, obtained twelve seats in the 
lower house of Parliament and three in the senate in 1992, as well as 2% of the national
encourage business to stand-up to Mafia racketeers, the government created a special fund to 
reimburse business that suffered for defying racketeers.
^^ireservice. “Anti-Mafia hotline in Sicily bring calls flooding in.” . Palermo: Reuter, 1990.
■^ F^arrell, Nicholas. “Blow to Mafia as Magnificent 7 Ride High.” Sundav Telegraph 28 February 1993.
^^Pullella, Philip. “Pax Mafiosa reigns in Corleone but children want change.” . Palermo: Reuters,
1992.
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Italian vote, and 10% of the Sicilian vote in Italian elections/^ Orlando was also re-elected 
as mayor of Palermo by a landslide victory of more than 72% of the votes."
Citta Nuove newspaper
In the wave of massive anti-Mafia manifestations, Dino Paternoster launched and 
edited a specifically anti-Mafia newspaper. An independent town councillor, he sells 
average 2,000 copies a week."
7. The Church
The last faction to join the anti-Mafia campaign was the Catholic Church. 
Country priests who had spoken out against the Mafia in the past had been shunned and 
reprimanded by the Vatican, but by 1992 the Church finally changed its position." In a 
sermon pronounced in Sicily (Agrimento), Pope John Paul II criticised the Mafia calling 
on his followers to reject the Mafia culture which he qualified as the “culture of death”." 
Priests who are generally considered as having significant influence over their 
parishioners, especially over the children also began to speak out publicly against the 
Mafia. Because the Church had broken the law of omerta, it was no longer considered 
protected by the Mafia and actually became a target, for this reason, particularly 
outspoken priests were obliged to contract bodyguards."
Not only was the Mafia targeted by the massive population opinion change, but 
also the political class that was seen as either implicated with it, or ineffective in 
combating it. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that at the time of the 
murders, there was a dangerous power vacuum in Italy: there was no president and no 
government." Without the backing of public opinion, politicians are not properly
^^Giraud, Henri-Christian. Terres de Mafia. Paris: JC Lattes, 1993, page 166.
■^ F^arrell, Nicholas. “Voters reject dons of Corleone.” Sunday Telegraph 28 November 1993 and 
Pullella, Philip. “Anti-Mafia Candidates Triumph in Italian Elections.” . Palermo: Reuters, 1992.
“^^ Massey, Paul. “The Godfather.” Times Saturday Review 22 August 1992.
^^Bocca, Giorgio. L'enfer: Enquete au Pavs de la Mafia. Paris: Documents Payot, 1992, page 154.
*^^ Usher, Rod. “Heat on the Mob.” Time International 3 June 1996, page 27 and Pullella, Philip. “Pope 
presses anti-Mafia crusade, experts see hope.” . Palermo: Reuters, 1993.
■^ ^Hooper, John. “Fathers join in battle for soul of Sicily.” The Guardian 19 November 1994.
'^^ Afier the resignation of President Francesco Cossigna, it took more than 11 voting days and 15 ballots 
for the Parliament to finally elect a president.
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motivated to constructively work at solving a problem, especially if the situation brings 
with it potential political liability, this is the case with the Mafia. The massive public 
opinion change that emerged from the shadows of the Falcone and Borsellino murders not 
only motivated the politicians, but also rather humiliated them into applying themselves 
to the Mafia cause. Evidence of the absolute exasperation of the population towards the 
inefficiency of the political class was evident at the funerals of Della Chiesa, Falcone and 
Borsellino." The public masses shouted at, insulted and denounced the politicians, 
spitting at them and throwing objects as they walked by.
■^ Z^emor, Olivia. La Mafia Au-dessus de Tout Soupçon. Paris: Londreys, 1985, page 166.
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VII Conclusion
This chapter has sought to summarily illustrate some of the changes and 
pioneering legislation brought forth by the Italian state as a response to a growing 
problem: the Mafia. Two new institutions, the DIA and DNA, in addition, key laws have 
been passed and implemented giving more power to the judges and subsequently tilting 
the scales of justice away from the criminals. Whereas in the past the judicial procedure 
always favoured the defendant, especially in cases pertaining to the Mafia, with the new 
legislation, Justice had a better chance at obtaining a conviction. Being a member of the 
Mafia has become a punishable offence with specific minimum sentencing guidelines and 
incarceration proviso. The justice system has finally been given the tools that it needs to 
effectively combat the Mafia and confiscate its assets.
The innovation and popularity of the pentiti project has had clear and significant 
ramifications on the judicial process and a detrimental effect on the Mafia. The Mafia 
cannot however be fought solely from a judicial perspective. It must benefit from 
political, local and popular support.*' Measures must me instituted outside of the legal 
framework to isolate the Mafia from a socio-cultural context, and help the population 
disassociate itself from it." Already the Mafia has suffered psychological and symbolic 
blows to its invincibility shield. Not only has the government recently shown a firm 
commitment at combating it, but also more importantly the Mafia has lost the 
acquiescence and tacit support of the population. According to the late Judge Borsellino, 
the very weight and definition that the word “Mafia” bore has begun to change as well. 
Rather than symbolise power and independence, it has come to be synonymous with 
criminal, corruption and outcast."
The war against the Mafia is not a new phenomenon, it stretches back at least a 
century, yet nothing seems to have successfully eradicated it. For the first time however, 
public opinion is not only backing legislators and judges, but rather forcing them to forge 
forward.
*^ ®Lacoste, Pierre. Mafia Contre la Démocratie. Paris: JC Lattes, 1992.
‘^ ^Chubb, Judith. The Mafia and Politics: the Italian State Under Siege. Ed Center for International 
Studies. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1989.
'^^Bocca, Giorgio. L’enfer: Enquete au Pavs de la Mafia. Paris: Documents Payot, 1992, page 117.
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The fight against organized crime, or more specifically the Mafia, cannot be 
viewed in a solely national context. Referring back to the theoretical backbone of this 
research, the New Medievalist theory accentuates the transnational dimension of these 
non-state actors. In order to effectively combat these non-state actors who, by the very 
nature of their criminal activities, disregard national boundaries, the response, at least 
on one level, must also reflect this international and transnational dimension. The 
international approach to OC as a threat does not take the place of a national response, 
but must come in addition. International organizations like the UN, Interpol or regional 
entities like the European Union provide a forum and mechanism to address these 
threats.
In the space of a few hours, and greatly facilitated by the Schengen no-border 
treaty, a Mafiosi can cross several European borders unhindered, and in practice, several 
judicial spaces. Police authorities on the other hand cannot do the same and must 
relinquish their chase with each new border. Even following a financial trail as is often 
the case in money laundering cases is a real judicial obstacle that can take years, or even 
decades to surmount. If the fight against OC remains quartered in each state, the 
national borders risk becoming the ally of these criminals. By calling upon 
international organizations to also address GOO issues, states are acquiescing the reality 
of the transnational nature and threat and transfening some of their sovereignty to an 
international level. OC can only be effectively combated when addressed at a national 
and international.
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child has the strength to write “down with the M afia’ 
then we are on the right path”.
(Franciscan monk, brother Patemostro in Corleone)"
G iovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino
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1943: 9/10 July
• I Allied landing in Sicily
I). Prominent Mafiosi join Sicilian separatist movement and obtain powerful
positions.
25 July
 ^ Mussolini’s Regime crumbles
*
1944: 11 February
End of Allied rule of Sicily
Sicily returns to Italy
1945: 15 May
Autonomy granted to Sicily
1945-55; Consolidation of Mafia
1948: First bill proposed to create an Mafia Commission (rejected)
1950's: Mafia clan warfare begins - power struggle between families
Mafia at crossroads: Political alliances are forged with the DC
1957: 1 October
Italian-American Mafia Summit held in Palermo
1958: Mafia bill presented again (rejected)
1960’s: Corleone clan ascends to power
1962: December
Palermo gang warfare (50 deaths a day)
1963 February
First Anti-Mafia Commission created.
Proposed by Socialists Parri and Gatto, it was presided by Social 
Democrat Paolo Rossi. It lasted only three months.
Second Anti-Mafia Commission, presided by Donato Pafundi
July
Special laws passed after deadly car bombing 
seven carabinieris killed
1970: 29 August
Mafia Summit (Switzerland)
1972: Parliamentary Report published
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1973: Tommaso Buscetta arrested for the first time on charges on heroin
possession
1976: January
Anti-Mafia Commission closed down 
Had been presided by Senator Luigi Carraro
1977: Pax Mafiosa
1980-90’s: Mafia veers towards terrorist tactics
1981: 23 April
“Big” Mafia War begins
1982: 30 April
Pio La Torre Murdered
29 May
Law 304: Penitence Laws
3 September 
Dalla Chiesa murdered
9 September
New Commission of Investigation agreed on
13 September
Creation of Office of High Commissioner on Mafia Affairs
Law 646 (416 bis Rognoni-La Torre) defining Mafia association
1983: Palermo Anti-Mafia Pool created: Falcone, Borsellino, Di Lello and
Guamotta
May
Buscetta arrested in Sao Paolo (Brazil) on drug trafficking charges 
17 June
640 Camorra/Mafia suspects arrested in Naples Region
1984: 2 July
Falcone & Greco meet with Buscetta for first time in a Brazilian prison
7 July
Buscetta attempts suicide
14 July
Buscetta decides he will collaborate with Italian magistrates 
16 July
Buscetta collaboration begins in secret bunker near Rome. Buscetta speaks
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only to Falcone: 366 arrest warrants are issued as a result 
29 September
Operation St. Michel- 366 arrests issued - 70 arrests 
First Mafia defeat
1985: 4 February
Naples Gang trial (New Camorra)
251 suspects tried
20 Febiuary and 15 March 350 more tried
22 June
200 suspects arrested near Messina (Sicily) and 107 in Rome 
24 June
165 arrests in/near Naples 
9 November
475 suspects arrested in Sicily
1986: 10 February
Maxi Trials begin -474 defendants
1987: 16 December
Maxi-Trials end - 344 convictions, 114 not-guilty verdicts
1988: 21 July
Dismantling of Palermo Anti-Mafia Pool
1989: New Legal code
1991: 15 March
Law 82: Pentiti Programme
29 October
Creation of new Anti-Mafia structures: DIA and DNA 
20 November
Decree/Law 367: co-ordination of Mafia related investigations
1992: 31 January
Supreme Court Upholds Maxi-Trial sentences
12 March
Salvo Lima murdered
23 May
Falcone murdered
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June
Tough new set of anti-Mafia laws including incentives for pentitis
7 June
700 arrests across Italy in Police raid 
151 arr ests in Sicily
8 June
Law 41 bis: Special incarceration regimes for high ranking Mafiosi 
19 July
Borsellino murdered 
23 July
7,000 troops sent to Sicily by President Amato 
Tough new Crime package adopted
August
Completion of 416 Law 
26 August
Liliana Ferraro replaces Falcone as top Mafia Fighter 
Summer
Rete founded: first anti-Mafia political group 
17 November
Operation Leopard police raid 
203 arrest warrants
100 legal warnings of pending investigation
1993: 15 January
Salvatore “Toto” Riina arrested
9 November
Trial of 450 Mafiosi
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In ternational O rg a n iz a t io n s
I Vr
International bodies fighting Organised Crime
AfBD:
AsBD:
CELAD:
CFATF:
CICAD:
CITES
Council of Europe 
Dublin Group 
ERBD:
EU
EUROPOL:
FATF:
IDC:
IMF:
INCH:
African Development Banlc 
Asian Development Banlc 
Budapest Group
European Commission for Anti-Drug Fight 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
Endangered Species
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
European Union
Financial Action Task Force 
Inter-American Development Banlc 
International Monetary Fund 
International Narcotics Control Board
INTERPOL:
lOM: International Office for Migration
OAS: Organisation of American States
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
Pompidou Group
PEEM: Trafficking in explosives and weapons
Regional Banks:
TRE VI Group 
UNCPCJD:
UNDCP:
WB:
WCO:
WHO:
United Nations Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice Division 
United Nations Drug Control Program 
World Bank
World Customs Organisation 
World Health Organisation (Drugs)
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I Introduction
Because organised crime is an international threat that does not recognise national 
jurisdiction or international boundaries, then it obviously cannot be combated efficiently 
and realistically using only national or even bilateral mechanisms. The role of 
international organisations, with international mandates and international treaties is 
essential. In fact, it is probably one of the most crucial elements if the fight against OC 
is to be successful on a global scale. The problems with international organisations 
fighting global organised crime however is that too many instances are working to combat 
the same things, often allocating precious financial resources only to replicate each others 
work, many times in a less efficient manner. In an era where many states are looking to 
curb expenditures in international organisations and focus more internally, this can be 
problematic.
As can be seen on the graph on the previous page, several dozen institutions are 
involved in fighting organised crime, because the very nature of organised crime is such 
that it touches on many different spheres of activity. For example the World Patent 
Organisation based in Geneva, may not appear as an obvious institutions fighting 
organised crime, but because counterfeits resulting in patent violations are activities of 
OC, then it also becomes involved in fighting it. Many international organisations 
comprise a small piece of the larger counter-OC puzzle.
The three international bodies that are best equipped to combat organised crime 
on a global scale are the United Nations, the European Union and especially Interpol. For 
the moment, international co-operation is not at its optimal level, and much progress still 
needs to made, but the instances that can enable the international community to combat 
organised crime exist and are reasonably well equipped to do so, providing the political 
will of the different member states is there. There are many other organisations, either 
regional, or activity specific that strive to combat organised crime, but their influence is 
limited, either because they are regional entities, or because they are constrained by 
intergovernmental agreements that limit their sphere of action.
^Sabourin, Serge. “Le Ciime Organise.” Le Monde Economie August 1997.
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n  United Nations^
The United Nations crime fighting division, the UN Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Division, is under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council 
(EcoSoc), and sits in Vienna. The UN mandate to deal with organised crime come from 
Article 3 of the Declaration on Human rights that stipulates: “the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person, as well as Articles 12 and 17 (2). The United Nations has been 
addressing the problem of organised crime as a business since its fifth Congress in 1975, 
and continued to address this issue by developing the 1988 convention on drug tr afficking, 
thus attacking one of the main activities of OC ,^ and more recently the Palermo 
Declaration of December 2000.
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice‘s
The UN section that deals exclusively with organised crime is the Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, is composed of 40 representatives and is
mandated to develop and monitor all the UN crime programs, as well as inform and seek
the support of member states for these programs.^ The priorities of the Commission are:
International action to combat national and transnational crime, including 
organise crime, economic crime and money-laundering.
Promoting the role of criminal law in the protection of the environment 
Crime prevention in urban areas, including juvenile and violent criminality 
Improving efficiency and fairness of criminal justice administiation 
systems.*^
The goal is to prevent crime and criminal behaviour around the world and in 
member countries by informing, training and encouraging international co-operation. 
The programme is strongly geared towards research at all levels, local regional and global, 
and conducting a variety of international survey to learn more about the nature of crime
^Also refer to: Williams, Phil. “The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime.” Transnational 
Organised Crime Review (1995).
■^ Department of Public Infonnation. The United Nations and Crime Prevention: Seeking Security and 
Justice for All. New York: United Nations, 1996.
''United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. “Double issue on the tliird and fourth sessions of 
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.” . Vienna: United Nations, 1995.
^The body that applies decisions reached by the Commission is the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Division. In addition, it generates two publications, the yearly International Review o f Criminal Policy, 
and the bi-annual Crime Prevention an Criminal Justice Newsletter.
'department o f Public Information. The United Nations and Crime Prevention: Seeking Securitv and 
Justice for All. New York: United Nations, 1996.
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as well as the different methods used to combat it. The conclusion reached as a result of 
the survey and research are presented every five years at the UN Crime congress.
The aim of the commission is to be a “warehouse” of expert Imowledge about 
crime issues. Not only can member countries send their experts to be more fully trained 
at the UN, but the UN can also dispatch their in-house experts as crime consultants to the 
member countries (2-4 year period)^ Two Interregional Advisers manage these requests. 
Technical expertise can also be requested in seven areas: criminal law and procedure, 
criminal justice management, criminal justice statistics, law enforcement, rehabilitation 
of offenders, victims of crimes and juvenile justice.
The Commission under its new leadership (Pino Arlacchi) has set three short term 
aims: to combat corruption, to further technical assistance to member states, and finally 
to draft a Global Convention Against Organised Crime. This Convention was already 
under negotiation in Buenos Aires (August 1998) and was up for ratification at the Xth 
UN Congress in December 2000. This Convention aims to define organised crime, define 
the field of application of the convention and finally create measures to encourage judicial 
co-operation an extradition.'^
In addition to the Commission, the United Nations has a number of “affiliated and 
associated institutes”, generally regionally specific that also study crime issues and try and 
devise solutions.®
The UN hosted two key conferences on OC in 1994, the International Conference 
on Preventing and Controlling Money Laundering and the Proceeds from Crime 
(Courmayeur, Italy),'® and the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Crime" in
'Request for assistance dramatically rose from 40 in 1974 to 200 in 1982-1994.
^Direction des Affaires Stratégiques, de Sécurité et du Desarmement, and Sous Direction de la Sécurité. 
“Conference des Ambassadeurs: Table ronde: "les Mafias".” . Paris: Ministères des Affaires Etrangères, 
1998.
®UNICRI, UNAFEI, ILANUD, UNAFRI, HEUM, AIC, ISPAC, etc...
'®United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. “Special Double Issue on the International 
Conference on Preventing and Controlling Money-Laundering and the Use o f Proceeds o f Crime: A  
Global Approach, Courmayeur, 1994.” . Vienna: United Nations, 1996.
"Lallemand, Alain. “Mafia Russe, L'Europe du Crime.” Le Figaro 19 December 1998.Heuze, Richard. 
“Le pacte de Naples contre les Mafias.” Le Figaro 24 November 1994.Rioufol, Ivan. “L'Onu et la Mafia.” 
Le Figaro 23 November 1994. Heuze, Richard. “Naples, ephemere capitale antimafias.” Le Figaro 22 
November 1994.Heuze, Richard. “L'ONU face aux Mafias.” Le Figaro 21 November 1994.
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Naples which resulted in the Naples Declaration."
Recommendations of the International Conference on Preventing and Controlling Money 
Laundering and the Proceeds from Crime - Commaveur Conference
(20th June 1994)
an increasingly an undeniable global problem
global trends in prevention and control policies
gaps in the anti-money-laundering net: what needs to be done
Implementation priorities
Naples Political Declaration and Action Plan 
(Adopted: 3 November 1994)
Political Declaration:
Closer alignment of legislative texts concerning organised crime 
Operational matters at the investigative prosecutorial and judicial levels 
Establishing modalities and basic principles for international co-operation 
at the regional and global levels
Measures and strategies to prevent and combat money-laundering and to 
control the use of the proceeds from crime
Global Action Plan:
Strengthening National legislation
International Co-operation
Feasibility of international instruments
Control of money laundering
Support for the UN Crime Prevention Programme
Task Force
'^United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. “The World Ministerial Conference on 
Organised Transnational Crime - Naples Italy 21-23 November 1994.” . Vienna: United Nations, 1995.
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The 2000 Palermo Convention on Crime
The UN convention, also referred to as the Palermo Convention, is a 41 article, 
34 page document that outlines the methods and measures necessaiy to combat 
international organised crime. The convention marks the culmination of more than 2 1/2 
years of intense negotiation between UN member states" The Convention also contains 
two related protocols. The document presented over a three-day summit in December 
2000 was signed by 124 nations (out of 148 represented)," and is being viewed as a 
pioneer document in the fight against organised crime. In order for this convention to 
become effective each signatory nation must follow its own internal legislative process 
such as ratification for its legitimacy to be recognised internally. France just became the 
26*^  state to ratify the UN Palermo Convention."
This Convention which was long awaited by many members of the crime fighting 
community may prove to be the turning point in the planetaiy fight against OC if it ever 
really comes into application. The signatoiy nations have finally doted themselves with 
the international tool necessary to efficiently fight back against this form of crime, not 
only by concretely defining the notion of organised crime and participation in organised 
Clime, but also laying down the ground for real, practical co-operation between states, and 
hence moving international crime fighting efforts from the current sphere of largely ad 
hoc bilateral involvement, and occasional sporadic international efforts, to a truly 
planetary level. Pino Arlacchi, executive director of the UN crime fighting unit 
(UNODCCP) believes that this Convention is the turning point for the war against 
organised crime:
Change is in sight [...] the Palermo Convention strikes a chord that echoes 
throughout the world. The world was ready for concerted action against organised 
crime"
The seven main points were outlined in this Convention are as follows: J 7
"  Arlacchi, Pino ; « Conclusions o f the UN Crime Convention » 23 January 2001 (Paris, France)
"  Rouard, Daniel : « L’Onu s’engage fermememnt dans la lutte contre le crime organisé » Le Monde. 
18/12/2000.
"  French Ministry o f Foreign Affairs: Thematic Files “Non-Military Treats”.
"  Arlacchi, Pino : « United Nations Strategies against Transnational Organized Crime » January 30®* 
2001 (Tokyo, Japan)
"  Rouard, Daniel : « L’Onu s’engage fermememnt dans la lutte contre le crime organisé » Le Monde. 
18/12/2000.
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Criminalise participation in organised crime activities, and membership in a crime 
group
Outline specific measures to criminalise certain behaviours
Actively fight against money laundering
Facilitate and speed up extradition
Guarantee witness protection
Secure active co-operation
Allocate appropriate resources
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® United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
Palermo, December 2000
Article 1 Statement of purpose
Article 2 Use of terms
Article 3 Scope of application
Article 4 Protection of sovereignty
Article 5 Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal gi'oup
Aiticle 6 Criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime
Article 7 Measures to combat money-laundering
Article 8 Criminalization of corruption
Article 9 Measures against corruption
Article 10 Liability of legal persons
Article 11 Prosecution, adjudication and sanction
Article 12 Confiscation and seizure
Article 13 International cooperation for the purposes of confiscation
Article 14 Disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime or property
Article 15 Jurisdiction
Article 16 Extradition
Article 17 Transfer of sentenced persons
Article 18 Mutual legal assistance
Article 19 Joint investigations
Article 20 Special investigative techniques
Article 21 Transfer of criminal proceedings
Article 22 Establishment of criminal records
Article 23 Criminalization of obstruction of justice
Article 24 Protection of witnesses
Article 25 Assistance to and protection of victims
Article 26 Measures to enhance cooperation with law enforcement authorities
Article 27 Law enforcement cooperation
Article 28 Collection exchange and analysis of infonnation on tiie nature of organized crime
Article 29 Training and technical assistance
Article 30 Other measures
Article 31 Prevention
Article 32 Conference of the Parties to the Convention
Article 33 Secretariat
Article 34 Implementation of the Convention
Article 35 Settlement of disputes
Article 36 Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and ascension
Article 37 Relation with protocols
Article 38 Entry into force
Article 39 Amendment
Article 40 Denunciation
Article 41 Depositary and languages
Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime
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Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
« The purpose of this Convention is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat 
transnational organized crime more effectively » (Article 1)
The United Nations Commission also works with a large number of non-governmental 
organisation that are also striving to fight organised crime, and develop prevention 
programmes."
The following chart represents the United Nations System.
"Asia Crime Prevention Foundation, Defence for Cliildren, European Forum for Urban Security, Friends 
World Committee for Consultation, Henry-Downwind Institute, Howard League for Penal Reform, 
Human Rights Watch International Bar Association, International Center of Sociological, Penal and 
Penitentiary Research and Studies, International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Science, Prison 
Fellowship International, Society for the Reform o f Criminal Law, Street Kids International and World 
Society of Victimology. Source: United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. “Special 
Double Issue on the Community o f non-governmental organisations working in the filed o f crime 
prevention, criminal justice, human rights and the treatment of offenders.” . Vienna: United Nations, 
1997.
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m  Interpol"
With the international headquarters based in Lyon (France), and with 177 country 
members, the International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO), more commonly known 
as Interpol, has an exclusive mandate to combat all forms of organised crime by assisting 
states in the transmitting of information concerning criminals or crimes, and provide a 
forum for mutual assistance between member countries. Interpol’s constitution prohibits 
it from interfering or even addressing matters dealing with political, racial or religious 
beliefs (Article 3), and hence does not act on international war crimes, genocide or other 
non-common law crimes." Interpol employs 320 officials of 50 nationalities, has four 
official languages, French, English, Spanish and Arabic, and operates on a modest annual 
budget of $30.6 million USD." It diffuses as many as 6,000 messages per day concerning 
criminals, on their special computer messaging system."
Interpol Constitution: Article 2:
1. To ensure and promote the widest possible assistance between all 
criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the 
different countries and in spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.
2.To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively 
to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crime.
Membership:
Membership is open to all countries, providing they meet the entrance criteria, and obtain 
a 2/3 majority vote in the General Assembly which meets once a year."
'®Interpol was created as a result o f two international criminal Congresses, the first in Monaco (1914), 
and the second in Vienna (1923). First called the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) it 
was first referred to as Interpol in 1946, its name was officially modifies in 1953. France (Paris-St.
Cloud) became its permanent headquarters in 1984, before being transferred to Lyon in 1989. Source: 
Secretariat, Genera. The International Criminal Police Organisation Brochure. Lyon: Interpol, 1996.
^"Krishna, Murali T. “A Global Police Service to Combat Rising International Crime.” CBI Bulletin 
.September (1995),
"All members contribute to the operating budget according to their GNP. The minimum contribution is 
two “units” o f  $14,600 USD each, and the maximum contribution is 100 units. $24 million USD are 
contributed to the budget in this manner, the remaining $16 million USD are obtained through sub­
contracting, sale o f reports and documents, etc... Source: Sabourin, Serge. “Assistant Director, Head of  
Communication.” Lyon. France. Interpol, the role o f Interpol, 1997.
"Interpol. Un monde plus sur. (Video) Lyon; Interpol, 1997.
"Membership and arrests:
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Article 4 states:
Any country may delegate as a member to the Organisation any official 
police body whose functions come within the framework of activities of 
the Organisation.
Inteipol operates on the basis of six co-operation principles. They are: respect for national 
sovereignty, enforcement of ordinary criminal law, universality, equality of all member 
states, co-operation with other agencies and flexibility of working methods."
Functioning: Interpol operates on the basis of National Country Bureau, (one for each 
member state). Regional Stations (total of seven)," and the Central Station (Lyon 
headquarters). Each is linked by a network messaging service (X.400) that enables rapid 
and safe transmission of infonnation pertaining to criminals and crimes,"
Information database: Interpol’s primary asset is the information database it maintains on 
crimes and criminal ar ound the world. This database is accessible from all NCB’s of 
country members (providing the information has not been expressly kept confidential)." 
There are six types of computer information: record of names and alias of criminals, 
record of offences (classified by nature, place and modus operandi) record of drug and 
counterfeit currency seizures, record of theft of art works, and record of all identification 
numbers noted during the course of police investigations. In addition, the information 
database includes a fingerprint file, a photograph file (for offenders and missing persons)
Year Number of Members Number of arrests
1947 24 n/a
1972 116 1,177
1996 177 906
"General Reference Department. ICPO - Interpol General Information. Lyon: Interpol, 1995.
"Lyon (Europe/Mediterranean/North America /  Middle-East), Nairobi (East Africa), Abidjan (West 
Africa), Buenos Aires (South America), Tokyo (Asia), Puerto Rico (Caiibbean/Central America) and 
Canberra (Pacific).
"in theory each NCB is able to receive the X.400 system, but some have not yet requested it, or have not 
been able to provide the environment witliin which Interpol can install it.
^'A country may request that certain highly sensitive information may have a restrained diffrision, and not 
be made available to all member. The General Secretariat ensure this information is kept confidential 
Source: Gibbons, Sarah. “The IPR Interview: Raymond Kendall.” International Police Review .June 
(1997).
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Notices: The principle method for information transmission is the circulation of notices, 
via the X.400 system to all the NCBs. Notices are categorised as individual notices, 
stolen property, modus operandi, and general information. The individual notices are also 
subdivided into five sections: wanted notices, enquiry, warning, missing person and 
unidentified body. For faster recognition notices are colour coded:
blue notices: request for information
- green notices: request for surveillance of a known criminal
- yellow notices: missing person
- black notices: information pertaining.to a corpse
red notices: international arrest warrant.
Activities" Interpol’s activities are divided into four categories or divisions: General 
administration, liaison and criminal intelligence, legal matters and technical support. 
Within each division are more specialised fields (refer to structure).
Contrary to common public belief, Interpol is not a super-police force mandated 
to police across the world. Much the opposite, it is not even considered a police force, 
but rather an institution composed of member police officers who facilitate contacts and 
information-sharing, and who can only act within the context of the national laws. 
Interpol has no power of arrest, or search/seizures, tasks that have to be carried out by the 
national police within which the case is being conducted. By courtesy Interpol officers 
are allowed to be present during interrogation, but this is a privilege and not a right.
Specific Organised crime activity.
Although all Interpol activities are geared towards fighting organised crime 
activity and members, two subdivisions in particular have an exclusive mission that 
concerns OC: the Organised Crime Group and the FOP AC groups.
- Developing a definition for OC: one of the important obstacles Interpol 
surmounted was the various problems surrounding the international adoption of a
"Other Interpol activities include: international symposiums, training for police personnel, staff training, 
technical training and cooperation.
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definition on organised crime. During its first Internal Conference on Organised Crime 
(May 1988) members were able to agree on a single definition of organised crime."
- Arrests made thanks to Interpol information: In 1996, a total of 1130 notices 
were issued, 739 of which were red. The same year 206 red-notice arrests were made, and 
a further 710 arrests were conducted because of Interpol broadcasts for a total of 916 
arrest in 1996."
-Organised Crime Group fl/1/90) The Organised Crime group was created in 
January 1990, as a subsection of Division II (Liaison and Criminal Intelligence). It 
categorised three types of crime groups: traditional groups (Mafia), professionals 
(smuggling rings, but not durable), and ethnic groups.
The OC Group has several essential mission that aim to repertory OC groups and
activities and diffuse this information to all NCBs. The main functions are:
create and maintain and information database on international criminals 
centralisation and analysis of information sent in by members 
circulate important information to the NCB’s
organise workshops and information exchange opportunities for police 
officers and NCB representatives.
publish a detailed organised crime bulletin and encourage country
feedback
-FOPAC The FOPAC groups specialised in money-laundering issues was devised
at Cannes General Assembly in 1983. '^ It’s main missions are:
publishes a monthly money laundering bulletin
holds working meetings for Interpol on money laundering
holds joint meeting with Customs Cooperation Council
attends international law enforcement seminar on money laundering
liaises with the Federal bank of EU
builds a financial information database
publishes Financial Assets Encyclopedia"
"See appendix for the Interpol definition..
"Communication and Press Division. Criminalité Organisée et Actions Terroristes. Lyon: Interpol,
1997.
'^Callamand, Damien. “Criminal Funds Investigation Branch (FOPAC).” Lvon. France. Ed. Interpol. 
Money Laundering, 1997.
"Bresler, Fenton. Interpol. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992, page 253.
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The first money laundering case, Interpol and FOP AC was involved in was the Pizza 
Connection (1984).
Efficacv of Interpol: As with any international organisation, Interpol has come under 
scmtiny, and has received much international criticism. Interpol can only be as effective 
as the member states are willing to be.
A questionnaire was sent out to 45 member states about the occurrences of auto­
thefts in their country, only 11 responses were mailed back.... The main '"glitch" in 
Interpol’s system is the reporting by countries. With all the input, Interpol can digest and 
analyse it, and make predictions and recommendations, but without the information its 
not possible.
Paul Higdon gave the analogy between Interpol and a bakers oven. The balcer is 
ready, the mixing bowl is out, and the oven is hot, but there is no flour so there will never 
be any bread.... Information from member states is like the flour, without it the balcer 
cannot work^ .^ Additionally, even if Interpol deals with States at a police level, the reality 
is that there is always and will always be political involvement.
■^ ^Higdon, Paul. “Director o f Criminal Funds Investigation Branch,” Lyon. France. Ed. Interpol. The 
functioning and role o f Interpol, 1997.
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IV The European Union:
European Union: Issues of international organised crime have only 
recently begun to interest the European Union, who created the Trevi Group (1975) as an 
informal police co-operation structure. Although at first predominantly focused on 
terrorism issues, by 1986 it began to also look at drug and organised crime issues/'^ The 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and its provision as to Justice and Home Affairs 
(Pillar ni) further propelled the European Union in the crime prevention arena. The 
Schengen Agreement, although limited in its membership also addressed issues of cross- 
border police co-operation, and created the Schengen Information System to facilitate 
information exchanges.^  ^ More recently the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997 also made 
provision for a pan-European police co-operation in criminal matters (Third Pillar), as 
well as a unification of national legislation.
Within the Euiopean Union the stmctural branch geared towards addressing issues of 
security including organised crime is Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Known as the 
third pillar of the EU it seeks create an area of “freedom, security and justice” *^^ and has 
three principal aims^ :^
- to facilitate and strengthen police and judicial co-operation within the EU area.
- To evaluate national implementation of members of the European Union with regards 
to organised crime.
- More generally to improve knowledge and recognition of OC as a reality and threat.
JHA ensures a number of different privileges to EU members national including 
protection of EU citizens against serious crime such as OC. It stipulates that in order to 
counter such a serious crime a common effort must be initiated as well as the joint 
mobilisation of police and judicial efforts.^® OC has been labelled as one of the sixteen
“^^ Trevi working groups are: I- combat terrorism, Il-police training, public order & football hooliganism, 
m-organised crime & drug trafficking, IV- safety & security of nuclear installations, V - emergency 
disaster relief.
^■^ Schengen Agreement Title HI deals specifically with police and security matters: Chapter I- Police 
cooperation. Chapter n  - mutual assistance in criminal matters. Chapter IV- extradition. Chapter VI - 
drugs.
Treaty of Amsterdam on the European Union, 1 May 1999.
JHA bring together, under one structure representatives for the Ministries o f Justice and Interior o f the 
European Union member countries. Europa: JHA: “ Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs” www.ue.eu.int 
Europa: Justice and Home Affairs -  Freedom, Security and Justice.
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policies where JHA is involved^ .^
The European Union has focused and emphasised the drafting of additional 
legislation designed to halt coiTuption and fraud like the General Convention against 
Frauds (26 May 1997)/°
The main texts that outline and guide the European Union’s counter OC policy are 
as follows.
o Treaty of the European Union (Title VI): Article 30 that enunciates the basis for
police and judicial co-operation 
o Vienna Action Plan (1999) on OC that identifies the need for an integrated approach
to the fight against organised crime fiom its prevention, to repression and prosecution, 
o Feira European Council held in Portugal in June 2000. The Feria Council sought to
demonstrate the necessity for “political and security related dialogue”.''^  
o Tampere European Summit*^  organised in Finland in October 1999 was specifically
dedicated to the establishment of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” as well 
as Eurojust^  ^and a bi-annually updated “scoreboard” to track the implementation of 
the Tampere conclusions.''''
In addition to these binding texts and conventions the European Union through its 
Commission also finance a number of other projects that aim to inform, curb or combat
Other policy areas include, for example, visa policy, Schengen area, asylum, EU citizenship, police and 
customs cooperation.
■'"Malingre, Virginie. “Une loi pour interdire la corruption de fonctionnaires a l'etranger.” Le Monde 28 
January 1999.
EUROPE, JHA Documentation Center: A common EU approach to the fight against organized 
transnational crime.
■'^  European Parliament: Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999. Presidency Conclusions. 
www.europarl.eu.int
Eurojust is tasked with doing the following : 
o issue a Member State with a (non-binding) request to undertake an investigation or institute
proceedings in a specific case, or request several Member States to coordinate their investigations 
and prosecutions. Member States which refuse to comply will be required to state the reasons for 
their decision;
o help the Member States, at their request, to coordinate investigations and prosecutions, for example 
by inviting their judicial authorities to meet; 
o ensure that the Member States are kept informed of investigations and prosecutions pending;
o in cooperation with the European Judicial Network, set up a database enabling Member States to
obtain legal and practical information; 
assist Europol on request; 
o take the necessary measures to simplify the execution of international letters rogatory.
(www.europa.eul
Main points discussed at the Tampere Summit were: A common asylum and migration policy, a
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o c . These include the STOP II project, OCTOPUS 2001, FALCONE Programme as well 
as the Forum on the prevention of OC.
Council of Europe: In 1990 the European Council decided to tackle the 
problems of OC by agreeing on an important treaty: the Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime. The Eui opean Union Council, 
along side the head of state and head of government, decided in October 1996 (Dublin 
Conference) to focus more on organised crime than in the past, and created a multi­
disciplinary group to develop and apply recommendations drafted on organised crime. 
The four aims developed by the group included: a better understanding of the 
phenomenon with a particular emphasis on prevention, encouraging of rapid application 
of recommendations into national law, reinforcement of police co-operation. The 1999 
Tampere meeting of the European Council also marked an important milestone in 
Europe’s regional fight against organised crime. More recently, in 2001, a convention 
aimed a curbing and punishing cyber crime was also signed by twenty six countries.'^ 
Established in 1949, the Council of Europe operates within an inter-govermnental 
framework. It seeks to “protect human rights, pluralist democracy as well as the rule of 
law”. It also seeks to find answers to important issues facing Europe. This issues can 
include OC, but also drug use, AIDS, intolerance and xenophobia to name only a few. 
There are two specialised expert groups, the first deals with money laundering issues 
(1990 convention on money laundering ) and the second organised crime. The Council 
of Europe attempts to bring about legal reforms and legal initiative to curb money 
laundering and organised crime, but has also specialised in Cybercrime:
Considering that the fight against serious crime, which has become an 
increasingly international problem, calls for the use of modern and 
effective methods on an international scale. (Preamble)
During France’s rotating European Union presidency, it “encouraged strengthening the 
provisions in the 1990 European Council text on Laundering”. Subsequently it also 
enlarged its field of application with a political agreement signed in September 2001.'"  ^
In the next few years, Europol, the European Police Office, will also become a 
more important, and play a bigger role in combating organised crime. It has been dotted
genuine European area o f justice, a union-wide fight against crime and a stronger external action. 
Signed on 23 November 2001.
French Ministiy of Foreign Affairs Thematic files: “money laundering”
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with operational powers as well as specific missions"' .^ Integrated in title VI of Treaty of 
Maastricht:
[...] a commitment to fully establish a Central European Criminal
Investigation Office (Euiopol) to cover drug trafficking and organised crime.
Based in The Hague, EuropoP^ and its fifteen European Union member countries 
seeks to provide a structure conducive to information exchange, experts meetings and 
prevention efforts in the areas of non military security threats. It also aims to provide 
support for national law enforcement entities faced with serious trans-border crime 
problems''^. Organised crime is one of Europol’s main preoccupation. One of the focal 
points of Europol anti-OC activities is asset seizure in cases of suspected money- 
laundering. As a result of the 1999 Tampere conclusions Europol members are tasked 
with setting up a central body that would trace, seize and confiscate assets from money 
laundering, advice law enforcement and prosecutors in matters of seized assets and 
facilitate international and judicial co-operation in money laundering cases "^. Europol is 
also mandated by the European Council to publish an annual Organised Crime Situation 
Report (OCSR) “a mechanism for the collection and systematic analysis of information 
on international organised crime”. This report, based on voluntary contributions and 
reporting from member countries seeks to disseminate information about OC in Europe, 
and aims at “supporting policy malcers and law enforcement decision makers in their fight 
against OC”.^ ' In May 2001 the OCSR was amended to reflect a change in perception 
concerning OC, the new appellation escalated the concern on OC in Europe and became 
Threat Assessment on OC. Europol is not however a crime fighting organisation in the 
active, on the street sense, but rather acts as a formal information warehouse on crime.
Europol and its international homologue Interpol have signed a “joint-venture” 
type agreement that outlines the fact that both organisations combat the same threat and 
that because crime sees no boundaries they need to interact and rely on each other to 
exchange information. This agreement was signed in December 2001 between ICPO’s
France was a member o f the Multi-disciplinary working group on Europol (MDW),
‘'■^Europol entered into force on 1 October 1998 but its implementation started 1 July 1999.
German Foreign Policy. International cooperation in combating organised crime (March 2002). 
WWW. auswaertiges-amt. de.
Europol: Asset Seizure, a special focal point for Europol. www europol. eu.int 
EUROPOL : 2002 EU Organised Crime Report www.europol. eu.int
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Ronald Noble and Interpol’s Director/^
V Other multilateral institutions
Lyon Group: The G8 group has only recently begun to address issues 
pertaining to organised crime. The Halifax Summit (1995) empowered an expert group 
to look at the possibilities of reaching a common approach to dealing with organised 
crime. In 1996, this expert gi'oup drafted 40 recommendations, divided in two major axis, 
law enforcement project and judicial co-operation. These recommendations were adopted 
at the following Lyon Summit, and the expert group received the nickname of Lyon 
group. Today the Lyon group is also looking at the possibility of drafting and 
international convention on organised crime, but has begun to look at money laundering 
cyber-crime as well as large scale trafficking of all kind.
FATF/GAFl group was the result of the G7 heads of state conference. 
Sommet de l’Arche, that took place in France in July 1989. France initiated the idea and 
was then mandated to manage the Financial Action Task Force against money laundering. 
Now composed of 130 experts ftom 15 countries, it has 29 member countries (mainly 
OECD members with a few exceptions). It is headquartered at the OECD in Paris. In 
1990 the FATF group published it report as well at its 40 recommendations on money 
laundering prevention. The three main actions ofFAFT are:
- To spread the message about f ittin g  money laundering, uncover the various methods 
used to launder and encourage the building of networks and systems to counter them.
- To develop policy recommendations
- To oversee the implementation of FATF recommendations.
In July 1990 FATF member countries adopted the 40 recommendations against money- 
laundering which included a list of Non Co-operating Countries or Territories (NCTT). 
The NCTT list is in reality a “black list” of countries who do not meet the minimum 
standard for actions to counter money laundering. This list is debated and updated 
regularly. Sanctions can be imposed if minimum measures are not implemented when 
NCTT identified countries do not work toward meeting these 40 recommendations.
OECD The OECD, an international organisation not immediately thought
EUROPOL : 2002 EU Organised Crime Report www.europol.eu.int
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of as implicated in the fight against organise crime, has drafted a Convention on 
Corruption. Officially in effect on 15 February 1999, it has been in discussion for ten 
years (1989). This Convention binds 34 countries, and vows to attack an industry that 
generates on average $84 billion USD ($64 billion according to the World Banlc), mainly 
in the energy, armament, oil and construction of infrastructure. Its aim is to prevent the 
corruption of public agents in international negotiations, sanctions corruption at its base, 
(the one who attempts to corrupt), and can impose a 10 years jail, as well as up to 
$200,000 USD fines, but the biggest limitation of the Convention, is that it does not 
address the issue of offshores, which are the heavens and traditional route for corruption.
Ed Yardeni (Chief economist at the Deutsche Bank in New York) stated that: 
“Now that communism is dead the biggest enemy of capitalism is corruption”." The 
Convention is not unanimously welcomes, and industry leaders fear that this Convention 
will but Western businesses at a disadvantage, because other countries may not report 
corruption as vigilantly as others."/"
"Delattre, Lucas. “La Lutte anticorruption devient un objectif international de premier plan.” Le Monde 
16 February 1999.
"Orange, Martine. “Les entreprises craignent les effets perverts de la convention de l'OCDE.” Le Monde 
1999: 16 February.
"  The international criminal court (ICC) will not be mentioned here as it deals mainly with genocide, 
crimes against humanity and massive killings, and so organised crime does not readily figure into its 
jurisdiction.
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VI Conclusion
Because of the rising awareness of issues pertaining to organised crime, there has 
also been an increase in international conferences linlced to this topic, and although the 
efficacy of such conferences as a vector for legislative change is not necessarily proven, 
is has at least the merit of bringing public attention to these pressing matters.
Leaders of the fight against organised crime: Amongst the organisations fighting 
organised crime Interpol and the United Nations seem to be the organisation that have 
the ability and possibility to most impact the progression of organised crime, Interpol is 
best adapted to fight organised crime on a daily basis, because not only does it have an 
infrastructure created only for this sole purpose, but its is present through NCB bureaux 
around the world, and manages to also respect the sovereignty of the States, and acts only 
in accordance to the national legislation. By contrast the United Nations is the 
organisation most qualified to propose and enact legislation and international convention 
at the global level, but not necessarily involved in the day to day implications of organised 
crime.
Co-operation is the key: Judicial and police co-operation on bilateral as well as 
international basis are essential tool to combat organised crime. Today, although steps 
are being taken to ameliorate these types of co-operation, much still needs to be achieved 
before reaching optimal levels of co-operation and mutual assistance. Frustrated by the 
current situation, the “Appel de Geneve” was launched by six European magistrates who 
challenged the European states to increase co-operation, and improve the working 
relationships between European magistrates, especially in cases pertaining to money 
laundering, and specifically called for the creation of a European judicial space (refer to 
appendix). Without this judicial co-operation magistrates are faced with the impossibility 
of fighting organised crime, because they usually are required to wait months to obtain 
an international “commission rogatoires”, and by then, they suspect have moved on. The 
slow and heavy justice machinery greatly impairs anti-Mafia efforts.
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Uneven chances: For the moment both justice and police are faced with an uneven
battle, and do not have the tools necessary to even out the odds. Europe has made a few
timid steps to counter-balance this situation and has created the European Group of Anti-
Mafia experts", composed of police officers and magistrates.^^
The hurdle of ratification o f international conventions: A further problem is that
States despite having signed onto international conventions are not always willing, not
capable of ensuring that their national governments officially ratify those conventions. In
October 1998, Elizabeth Guigou, French Minister of Justice organised a conference in
Avignon, where 100 specialists, magistrates and government representatives adopted a
common declaration for more justice co-operation in view of working together to
eliminate organised crime. Jack Straw, Minister of Justice, and Home Affairs of the UIC
attended this conference.’
Europe is functioning with co-operation mechanisms of the XX century 
while to the goal is to fight against organised crime of the XXI century^^
Liliana Ferrano, Palenno Judge who succeeded both Falcone and Borsellino at Italy anti-
Mafia judge, was also quite pessimistic about the capacity to combat OC:
We have realised that the rhythm of international organisation is ill 
adapted to this type of combat (organised crime)"
Political will—the changing tide? The institution necessary to combat organised 
crime, and with a few rare exceptions the legislative tool exist but the political will to 
really apply them is sometimes still lacking. Rather than continue to create and duplicate 
more and more institutions, working groups or study cells, the international community 
should focus on the co-operation hindrances that can be surmounted by existing 
legislation.
Reason for optimism? However, on a much more positive and optimistic note, 
Palermo 2000 may prove to be the turning point in the fight against the Mafia and other
"inciyan, Erich. “Les Douze vont cree un groupe anti-Mafia.” Le Monde 20 September 1992.
■^Yeauthier, Alain. “A Arles, l'Europe fait table ronde contre la Mafia.” Liberation 19 January 1993.
"Prieur, Cecile. “En Avignon, les premiers pas de la lutte européenne contre la délinquance financière.” 
Le Monde 19 October 1998.
^'Leauthier, Alain. “La France a une place essentielle.” Liberation 19 January 1993.
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organised crime groups. Because of its worldwide support, scope of activity and 
reinforcement and creation of basic, practical and efficient co-operation mechanisms, it 
may be the most important tool ever, with which to combat organised crime on a 
planetary level.
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Je soutiens l'appel 
lancé à Genève 
le  1" octobre 1996 
par sept magistrats 
européens
l^ appel deGenèiie
NOM
PRÉNOM
VILLE
PRO FESSIO N
SIGNATURE
onseil de l'Europe, traîtê de Rom e, acco rd s d e  S chengen , traité de M aastricht l'ombre de cette Europe en construction visible, oflicieile e t respectable, se cache u autre Europe, plus discrète, m oins avouable. C’es t l'Europe des paradis fiscaux i prospère sans vergogne grâce aux capitaux auxquels elle prête un refuge compialsa C’est aussi l'Europe des places financières et d es étab lissem ents bancaires, où secret est trop souvent un alibi et un paravent. Cette Europe des com ptes à numéros d es lessiveuses à billets es t utilisée pour recycler l’argent de la drogue, du terrorisn d es sectes, de la corruption e t des activités m afieuses.Les circuits occultes em pruntés par les o rgan isations délinquantes, voire dans nom breux cas criminelles, se développent en m êm e tem ps q u ’explosent les échang fin an c ie rs  in ternationaux  et que le s  e n tre p r is e s  m u ltip lien t leu rs  activités, transfèrent leurs sièges au delà des frontières nationales. Certaines personnalités certains partis politiques ont eux-m êm es, à diverses occasions, profité de ces drcui P ar ailleurs, les autorités politiques, tous pays confondus, se  révèlent aujourd’f incapables de s ’attaquer, clairement et efficacement, à  cette Europe de i’ombre.A l’heure des réseaux informatiques d ’Internet, du moderii e t du fax, l’argent d'origi frauduleuse peut circuler à  grande vitesse d 'un  com pte à  l’autre, d 'un paradis fisca l’autre, sous couvert de sociétés offshore, anonym es, contrôlées par de respectabt fiduciaires généreusement appointées. Cet argen t est ensuite placé ou Investi hors to u t contrôle. L'impunité est aujourd'hui quasi a ssu rée  aux fraudeurs. Des anné seront en effet nécessaires à  la Justice de chacun des pays européens pour retrouvla tra c e  de ce t a rgen t, quai cela ne s'avérera pas Imposait dans le cadre légal actuel hér d ’une époque où les frontier avaient encore un sen s pour i p e r s o n n e s ,  le s  b ie n s  et li capitaux.Pour avoir une chance de lutt c o n tre  une crim inalité qui profite largem ent des règlem entations en v igueur d a n s  les différents pa; européens, il est urgent d'abolir les protectionnismes dépassés en m atières policières et judiciaires.Il devient nécessa ire  d ’instaurer un véritable espace judiciaire européen au sein duquel les magisira pourront, sans entraves autres que celles de l'état de droit, red tercher e t échanger las informations utili aux enquêtes en cours.N ous d e m a n d o n s  la m ise  en app lication  effective d e s  a c c o rd s  d e  S c h e n g e n  prévoyant transm ission  directe de com m issions rogatoires Internationales et du résu lta t d es investigations ent juges, sa n s  interférences du pouvoir éxécutif et sans recours à  la voie diplomatique.Nous souhaitons, au nom de l'égalité de tous les citoyens devant la loi. la signature de conveniîor internationales entre pays européens:-  garan tissan t la levée du secret bancaire fors d e  dem andes d 'entraide Internationale en matlè pénale ém anant d es autorités judiciaires des différents pays signataires, là où ce secre t pourrait encore et Invoqué.- perm ettant à  tout juge européen de s ’adresser directem ent à  tout autre juge européen.-  prévoyant la transm ission  immédiate et directe du résu lta t d e s  Investigations dem andées p: com m issions rogatoires internationales nonobstant tout recou(s interne au sein de l’Etat requis.-  incluant le renforcem ent de l’assistance mutuelle administrative en m atière fiscale. A ce propo d a n s  les  pays qui ne le connaissen t pas, nous p ro p o so n s la création, d ’u n e  nouvelle incrlmlnalic «d'escroquerie fiscale» pour les cas où la fraude porte sur un m ontant significatif.A celte fin, nous appelons les parlements et gouvernem ents nationaux concernés:- à  ratifier la Convention de Strasbourg du 8 novembre 1990 relative au blanclilment, au dépistage, la saisie et à  la confiscation des produits du crime.
- à  reviser la Convention européenne d ’entraide judiciaire en m atière pénale, signée à  Strasbourg 20  avril 1959.
-  à  prendre les m esures utiles à la misa en oeuvre effective d es  dispositions du titre VI du Traité c l’Union européenne du 7 février 1992 et de l'article 209 A du m êm e traité.-  à  conclu re  une convention prévoyant la possibilité d e  p oursu iv re  pénalem ent les natlonau coupables d 'actes de corruption à l'égard d'autorités étrangèresP ar cet appel, nous désirons contribuer à  construire, dans l'intérêt m êm e de notre communauté, un Europe plus juste et plus sûre, où la fraude et le crime ne bénéficient plus d 'une large impunité et d ’où I corruption sera réellement éradiquée.Il en va de t’avenir de la démocratie en Europe et la véritable garantie des droits du citoyen est à ce prix
R e n a u d  V a n  R u y m b e k e  ( F r a n c e  
E d n t o n d o  B r u l i  L i b é r â t !  ( I t a l i e  
B e r n a r d  B e r l o s s a  ( S u i s s e  
G h e r a r d o  C o l e m b o  ( l l a i U  
C a r l o s  J i m e n e z  V l l t a r a j e  ( E s p a g n e  
B a t t a s a r  G a r z o n  ( E s p a g n e  
B e n o i t  D e j e m e p p e  ( B e l g i q u eA retourner à égalité devant la loi 7, rue des Arènes 75005 Paris
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International Treaties Pertaining to One Aspect or Another 
of Organised Crime Activities or Nature
Name Date Institution Siibiect
European Convention on Extradition 13/12/1957 Council o f Europe Extradition
European Convention on Mutual Legal 
Assistance
20/04/1959 Council o f Europe Co-operation between 
states
European Convention for the Repression o f 
Terrorism
27/01/1977 Council o f Europe Terrorism
Recommendation pertaining to the transfer 
and hiding o f money originating from crime
27/06/1980 Council o f Europe Money Laundering
Recommendation Pertaining to the Crime in 
business
25/06/1981 Council o f Europe Business crimes
European Convention on Money 
Laundering
08/11/1990 Council o f Europe Money Laundering
European Convention sur la valeur 
internationale des jugements répressifs
28/05/1970 Council o f Europe Mutual recognition of 
judgments
Vienna Convention Against Drug 
Trafficking
20/12/1988 United Nations Drug Trafficking 
Money Laundering 
(art 3)
Convention on Insider Trading 20/04/1989 International Insider Trading
Schengen Accords 24/06/1985 European states Open border
Convention for the application o f the 
Schengen Accords
19/06/1990 European states Open border
Treaty o f Maastricht 07/02/1992 European states
European integration
Europol Convention 07/02/92 European states Organised crime
Interpol Convention 1956 International Organised crime and 
drugs
Directive on Money Laundering 10/06/1991 European Union Money Laundering 
(art 1)
Basel Declaration 12/12/1988 Groupe o f Six Banking Control
Convention on Drugs 30/03/1961 United Nations Drugs
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Comvention on Psychotropic Substances 21/02/1971 United Nations Drugs
Convention on the Trafficldng o f Human 
Beings
1949 International Trafficking in humans
Convention on Currency Counterfeit 1929 International Counterfeit
TREVI European Union
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(C h a p te r  ^
C onclusion
I Introduction
International organised crime is a veritable international industry that generate as 
much as $1,200 billion USD in turnover a year, boasts at least 4,112,002^ active 
members and many more who gravitate and are employed by various factions within the 
crime sphere. The five major crime families each have their own characteristics, their 
own history and structure and own choices of preferred activity. In order to be more 
efficient or in order to exploit new markets these crime families joined together and 
created world criminal alliances, thus making themselves even more powerful and even 
more resilient, but also much more financially well off.
The Cosa Nostra, originating in Sicily is one such organisation. Powerful, 
diverse and entrenched in the local and regional culture it has survived a multitude of 
assaults fiom the central state against it. Doted with highly compartmentalised 
structure, a code of conduct and predilection for penetration of the political sphere it has 
reaped huge benefits and has sought to export itself to further escape prosecution and 
engage in other activities.
The usual, it is almost to say natural premise is to assume that organised crime is 
always bad and undesirable, but this is not always the case. The State and the Mafia re 
able to co-habitate if and when they each find their advantages in the situation. The 
state and individual state actors can reap specific benefits from co-operating with the 
Mafia. The political willingness to aggressively combat it obviously dwindles as a 
result. Public opinion must then surface and force the legislator and the state to take 
notice and be held accountable for their actions, or in this case lack thereof.
In France, a state where the Mafia has decided to settle, both as a place of 
refuge, but more and more so as a secondary activity hub, the willingness to admit the 
presence of organised crime and more specifically the Mafia within their borders, and 
the desire to do something about it is totally absent. The Mafia has settled on the 
Riviera, has used the local banking infrastructure of Monaco as well as the various real- 
estate and investment opportunities to launder their money, yet the French 
administration persists on denying its existence.
^The number was found by adding up all the estimated membership statistic as presented in chapter two.
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Italy for obvious reasons is the pioneer in Mafia specific legislation and has 
developed and arsenal of legislative and punitive tools designed to efficiently combat 
the Mafia. From devising a Mafia specific appurtenance law, to defining incarceration 
conditions and devising a certificate of non-membership to the Mafia is has sought ways 
to alleviate the problem and tilt Justice in the favour of the state. It appears that these 
fundamental and pioneering changes have had their impact.
The French state is faced with a strange dilemma: it persists in denying the 
existence of the Mafia and hence is quite limited in its scope of action to combat it. The 
current anti-Mafia/OC structures in France are highly inadequate and more often 
resemble and arena for competition that a forum for co-operation. The police structures 
are so complex, intertwined and overlapping that they are rendered highly inefficient, 
plagued by internal wars, rivalries and in some instances sabotaging of cases. This 
chaos obviously benefits the criminals.
Because organised crime does not recognise nor respect national boundaries and 
because organised crime is a global problem, international co-operation must be 
achieved in order to combat it. The plethora of international organisations and treaties 
that seek in one way or another to combat organised crime testify to a growing “prise de 
conscience” on the subject but are themselves rarely efficient or rapid in containing the 
problem. Because international treaties and conventions, even when signed by a state 
generally require ratification by the legislative authority, they are not always applied not 
applicable. Again, political will is a dominant, if not sole, deciding factor. Palermo 
2000 may be the landmark convention and mark a change in tactics to combat organised 
crime on a really planetary level, providing of course that the signatory states ensure the 
ratification and application in their own countries.
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H France and organised crime — Is its response proportionate to its problem?
Perhaps it is important in this conclusion to take the time to look at the reasons 
that France has had a weak response to organised crime especially in light of the 
considerable efforts of its transalpine neighbour Italy. Without attempting to disculpate 
France, the critique of its response should be examined in light of the French specific 
O.C. situation and not be automatically contrasted with Italy’s.
- As was mentioned in the introduction to the research, France does not have an 
indigenous organised crime group and so may have lacked the experience and practical 
knowledge necessary to identify the threat and quicldy react to it. As O.C. presence and 
activity began to grow, France was not prepared to react and subsequently placed itself 
in a position to play catch up rather than be proactive.
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in  New medievalism: is it an applicable theory after all?
It has been demonstrated and supported early on in this research that organised 
crime in general and the Sicilian Cosa Nostra in particular thrive within a sphere than 
can be coined as New medievalist. Looking back at the basic principles of New 
Medievalism it is evident that although France is not necessarily the perfect terrain for 
Cosa Nostra penetration it does offer some of the conditions necessary for O.C. to 
operate. The five criteria that Hedley Bull had outlined as necessary to fulfill the 
medievalist theoretical model are;
a. Regional integration of States
b. Disintegration of States
c. Restoration of private mtemational violence
d. Transnational organisations
e. Technological unification of the world
The researcher had argued that in the case of the Cosa Nostra crieria “c”, “d” and “e” had been 
fulfilled.
Alain Mine also aigued for consideration of the New Medievalism theory. He enumerated four" 
basic principles that were;
o Loss of control of state over certain non-state actors 
o Rule of force
o Insufficient existing structures 
o Grey zones
It should be noted though that the condition of New Medievalism is not irreversible nor 
is it a condemnation to perpetuity. Specifically if France can overturn the trend that was 
set up in the South and attempt to eradicate the factors and actors that encourage it and 
thrive on it: organised crime.
- In order to do so however the French government would have do really come 
to terms with its organised crime problem and determine whether it wants to address 
this situation or not, and if so how to most effectively do so. Subsequently allocation of 
resources, both in terms of budgetary effort and manpower would have to be determined 
and followed through. The driving force for this change would have to be political will. 
Political will in Paris where the legislation is drafted and from where the directives are 
applied, but also political will fi*om the elected officials and legislators firom the South.
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A lack of clear determination on the part of the regional and local leaders and decision 
makers would largely leave Parisian impetus inefficient.
- The French legislative arsenal is currently not optimally adapted to counter 
organised crime efforts across the board, however if the judicial authorities were to start 
systematically applying the legal provisions that already exist, while talcing the time to 
study and propose new laws would probably already be making and effort in the right 
decisions. The current arsenal is most likely not capable of eradicating organised crime, 
but could probably curb its growth significantly and send a clear signal that France has 
the will to exploit all its legislative resources to counter O.C.
- French authorities could probably benefit from fostering professional and 
helpful co-operation not between the different branches of the government implicated in 
the fight against OC, but also paving the way for intra ministry co-operation such as in 
the Police. Any system that is divided is more easily penetrable by an outside entity, 
exponentially so when that entity is the Mafia.
“ It would be unfair to say that France has not be co-operating with international 
institutions, but perhaps France could still make a further effort to more readily 
exchange information on a bilateral and international basis. Full co-operation between 
with foreign judicial and investigative authorities can only benefit the fight against 
organised crime. Granted every nation is reticent to relinquish what each perceives as 
domains of national sovereignty, but compartmentalisation in an effort to protect the 
idea of national sovereignty can only help transnational crime to prosper and spread. 
Full cooperation, exchanging intelligence and sharing is no doubt the only method to 
limit the scope of activity of OC and eventually curb it.
The French Riviera has always been considered as being more lax than other 
regions of France, more tolerant of “alternative” systems that do not always correspond 
to the highly centralised French state system.
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IV Organised crime today and the reality of political will. What can be done? 
What solutions for the future?
By first asking important relevant questions about the climate today, the reality 
today of OC presence and activity and trying to draft practical measures and solutions to 
help eradicate it, OC can potentially be, at the very least contained. The three deciding 
factors in the fight against organised crime are: the cultivation of a true political will, an 
implementation of national co-ordination, and international co-operation that can aid the 
harmonisation of national laws.
Questions:
Three main questions can be raised as a conclusion to this research and that may help 
project towards the future are:
® Does organised crime continue to progress on a planetary level or is it stagnating?
® Is there a true political will to combat organised crime in France or around the 
world ?
® Should the future be held as optimistic or pessimistic concerning the capacity to 
eradicate or at the very least contain organised crime?
In order to attempt to answer these questions, six people where asked these three 
questions: a police commissaire, a police inspector, a UN ranking administrator, a 
criminologist, a university researcher and an author/journalist The aim was to obtain 
answers and reflections from experts emanating from different disciplines. The result 
are compiled in the table below, the full answers in written form aie included in the 
appendix of this chapter.
Conclusions:
• Everyone agrees that organised crime is still progressing today despite, attempted, 
national and international crackdown on activities and increased legislative and 
judicial tools to combat it.
• Everyone agrees that there is a lack on concrete political will to fight organised 
crime. This answer may in large part explain why organised crime continues to 
progress.
• The way in which the future is perceived varies according to the profession. Those 
in the police are optimistic and explain that they have to be in tiieir line of work. 
The academics and journalist are less certain that the future looks good and are in 
fact more pessimistic.
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It appears that the only thing that may brighten the future is the concrete application of 
the Palermo Convention, but that would also necessitate political will to do so, and 
because they have already stipulated that it is non existent today, then Palermo will 
most likely not be applied in a timely manner.
Martin Peroz Arlacchi Raufer Quéré Madelin Total
IsOC
progressing?
Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes 5/5
Is their a 
political will?
No No No No No No 6/6
Are you 
optimistic?
Yes Yes Yes - No No Yes: 3/5 
No: 2/5
What is the Mafia up to these days? Since the capture of Toto Riina, the 
boss of all bosses, the Mafia seems to have quieted own a little, and 
generally appears less active. Is this really the case however? The Mafia 
is nearly always most violent when it feels threatened, so perhaps the 
current tranquility which Sicily is permeating is not as many believe the 
sign that the Mafia has been “beat” into submission, but the exact 
contrary, the proof that the Mafia is operating undisturbed. According to 
Italian Anti-Mafia magistrate Guido Lo Forte, the fact that there have 
been no killings in Palermo for the last year means that the Mafia’s 
stability is on the rise: So for now at least, its mostly briefcases instead of 
bullets and balance sheets instead of bombs. The Cosa Nostra has 
returned to what it likes most— maldng money, preferably without 
getting its hands too bloody^
1. Political
If there is no true political will to deal with a problem, it won Y happen. 
We need this political will and we need resources behind us.^
^Conflicting opinions: Not everyone agrees that political will is lacking, in fact Raymond Kendall the 
Secretary General o f Interpol believes that the political will is evolving:
No serious problem o f criminality will be resolved simply by police action. That is obvious.
But at least, what we are seeing now is a political will to do something about drugs, and the moment that 
happens, there is a good chance you will achieve a certain amount o f success. So I suppose there is some 
real hope. [...] At times, I get depressed and think we are trying to catchup with a battle that is, to a large 
degree, lost. And I do not mean us, but all the national law enforcement agencies and customs people as 
well. But we still cannot give up the fight, and we are having some major success; Source:Pullela. Philip. 
“What is the enemy up to these days.” . Palermo: Reuters.
^Bresler, Fenton. Interpol. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992, page 226.
Raymond Kendall, Secretary General o f Interpol in Gibbons, Sarah. “The IPR Interview: 
Raymond Kendall.” International Police Review .June (1997).
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The biggest impediment to combating the Mafia is in the lack of concrete 
political will. Without political will neither legislative changes nor the re-organisation 
of structures, nor aims to improve national or international co-operation mechanisms 
can even aspire to be achieved. Political will is the sole driving force for change, and 
its only motivator seems to be political gain or political liability.
Admit the existence of the Mafia: The first step in combating the Mafia 
is for the States and governments to actually admit that the Mafia and organised crime 
in general actually exist. In France for example, Minister of Interior Chailes Pasqua 
denied the presence of organised crime in France despite evidence to the contrary. 
Nothing can hope to be achieved if the problem does not yet exist in the eyes of the 
political class.
Admit the reality of the threat: The second logical step, is admitting that 
not only does the Mafia actually exist, but that its presence is actually a threat to the 
State, to its democracy, to its economy. By admitting this potentiality for problems., the 
political class is admitting it may actually have to devise a strategy to counter it.
Admit the state is at risk: The third step consists in realising that the not 
only is organised crime a threat, but that the State in which it exists can actually be at 
risk for massive destabilisation, clandestine economy and perhaps even and escalation 
of violence. By becoming conscious of this risk, the political class is preparing to 
confront it and combat it within its own borders.
Be witting to do really do something about it: Finally with the 
awareness of the reality, threat and potential risks, the political class also has to want to 
actually do something about it rather than ignore the information. Obviously the issue 
of political liability is not negligible. Is publicly broaching the issue of organised crime 
going to help or hinder a politicians position? What is the political liability associated 
with addressing or ignoring the issue? Because politicians often weight issues they 
address based on their importance, not in an objective rational way, but rather 
importance in a personal “political re-election” point of view, issue that can be 
rationally be classified as pressing, urgent and even crucial to address may remain 
unaccounted for because the political will is lacking.
2. National Co-ordination
Once the political will of the governing class has been firmly established, and 
the State is willing to actively combat organised crime, a certain number of measures
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must be taken nationally to efficiently campaign against the Mafia, notably eliminate, 
inter-force rivalries
re-haul organisations, and stream-line investigative process .
eliminate inter-force rivalries. By concretely worldng to eliminate 
inter-force rivalries like that present between the Gendarmerie Nationale and Police 
Nationale, the State can make each service not only more efficient and productive, but 
by further encouraging co-operation and mutual assistance, these services can finally 
disadvantage the criminals like the Mafia who had traditionally benefited and counted 
on the chaos and evident lack of co-operation.
re-haul organisations. As we have seen the French institutions are 
chai acterised by a lack of clear conceptual logic that has been achieved by centuries of 
creating new institutions and services, without eliminating any preceding ones, resulting 
in a pile-up of over lapping, competing structures that are not tailored to combat a quick 
and potent menace lilce organised crime. The current institutions are loaded down, and 
slow to respond and in fact need to be urgently stream-lined in order for them to 
become efficient.
3. Harmonisation of national laws and international co-operation
international definition of organised crime: To combat organised crime 
on an international scale, a common, universal definition of what organised crime 
actually is should be addressed. Several international organisations are currently 
debating this issue and it is possible that such a globally approved definition will soon 
emerge. However, ratifying an international convention does not suffice, and national 
governments also need to strive to ensure ratification within their own governments of 
these treaties and conventions.
harmonise national laws: By striving to harmonise national laws.
States would be greatly reducing the capacity and will for organised crime members to 
move across national boundaries to benefit from more lenient legislation, or less strict 
policies. The discrepancies that exist today between all the different national legislation 
mean that criminals can pick and chose which country to settle in, or which country to 
operate out of in terms of its legislation. Up until very recently France was a country 
very propitious to laundering criminal profits because national law only recognised 
money laundering as a crime if it involved money originating from the trafficking of
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narcotic substances. Hence Mafiosi seeking to launder extortion profits were largely 
immune from prosecution in France. Since France has altered its definition to include 
all proceeds from crime, money laundering has become a more risky activity and hence 
probably less prevalent than before. If all countries applied a stricter money laundering 
policy, its would increase the cost and risk associated with money laundering and malce 
it a lot less interesting as an activity to organised crime.
Harmonisation of national laws, and universal definition of organised crime 
would also facilitate extradition procedures as the crimes would exist in both countries 
and not hinder extradition.
eliminate safe-havens and fiscal paradises: Furthermore, in order to 
really combat organised crime, and attack the money from which they benefit, it is 
essential for the international community to work towards eliminating fiscal paradises. 
These paradises although created in their very beginning for legitimate, legal tax 
evasion purposes, are now used at international money laundering hubs by cartels and 
organised crime families. By disposing of this special status, money laundering 
investigations would not only proceed much more fast, but many more money- 
laundering rings could probably be halted.
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H I Conclusion to the Conclusion
It is highly unlikely that one day, despite the applications of the measures 
suggested above, that organised crime will ever completely disappear. As grim as a 
prospect as that may seem, these measures would however severally curb the extent of 
Mafia penetration into a state, as well as significantly reduce or impede its sphere of 
activities. Crime has always existed, and no doubt always will, that's a historic reality, 
however by applying certain measures, but encouraging co-operation and co-ordination 
at the national and international level, the scope of action, the breadth if activity that 
organised crime can engage in will be, at the very least limited.
Slain Palermo judge, Giovanni Falcone was more optimistic and thought that as 
all things human, the mafia (and by extension global organised crime) had a beginning 
and would have an end... someday! Perhaps this was a bit overly optimistic, 
containing organised crime by motivating political and popular will would already be a 
significant step in the fight against this powerful scourge.
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Daniel Martin
Commissaire Divisionnaire Honoraire & Special Councillor to the Executive Director 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
® Organised crime continues to progress, I would say at the same rhythm as 
globalisation. Criminals have easily understood all the tools as their disposal to 
escape prosecution in countries still very much attached to their notion of 
teiTitoriality and sovereignty. The new technologies are a chose vector for OC 
operations, their arena is the entire world. The complexities of legislation and rules 
that aimed to combat OC are a considerable advantage (to these organised crime 
groups)
We can only reach the conclusion that there must be a lack of political will to 
combat OC. Today, satellites allow us to have a very precise idea on the cultivation 
of heroin around the world, yet this infoiniation is not exploited. Drug trafficking is 
on the rise. CoiTuption and money laundering no doubt pollute the decision-making 
circles. Mafia-like behaviours, passive complicity to corruption, [...] jealousy are 
behaviours as old as the world and that are still very much cunent today. The 
human factor constitutes the weak link...
® We must however remain optimistic. Protection services, deontology, ethics are 
marking points every day. But the octopus is difficult to kill off. Of severed arms, 
new one grow out of, in different forms and it becomes necessary to constantly 
adapt are defence shield to protect ouiselves from the wounds inflicted by the 
criminals. IT is a combat that never ceases to be relived and that never has an end. 
The fight remains uncertain, but we can say that « Faith is the Strength » The pride 
of democratic nations is to respect the Law. SO even if  sometimes it can be 
perceived as a handicap, it is more importantly an ideal that cannot be beaten. In 
fact, it is Man who is at the heart of the system, with his contradictions. You have 
to leave it a she is. Believing or wanting to change him would be illusory.
Martin, Daniel : Interview on 23'^ '* April 2001. (Paris, France)
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Maurice Peroz ;
Inspecteur de Police, Officier de Police Judiciaire
(the following commentaries are his personal opinion and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Police Nationale or the Police Judiciaire)
• In my opinion, organised crime continues to progress for several reasons :
It is not easy to combat because legislation is so different. There is not enough 
collaboration between the different police forces (problem that exists at the national 
scale, so we can easily imagine conflicts between police services of other countries) 
New forms of more modem organised crime are emerging (cybercrime) and 
reactions to combat them are not organised in these new spheres. The judicial 
processes are too constraining and put off the actors that fight against this form of 
crime. To summarise, there is no reason to believe that organised crime is stagnating 
or regressing.
• All « politicians » are unanimous in saying that organised crime must be fought. 
Very few however actually given themselves the means, financial, legal and even 
less so in terms of structures services and centralised units ar ound this issue.
® A police officer is always optimistic, otherwise he stops working. From a 
philosophical point of view it's a another story. Public opinion is not sensitive to 
this form of crime, and is not preoccupied by it. Mafia governs countries, 
politicians are part of those, money has replaces God, etc... In my opinion 
organised crime still has beautiful days ahead of it.
Peroz,Maurice : biterview on 24* April 2001. (Paris, France)
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Pino Ariacchi ;^
Director General of the United Nations Office in Vienna
Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
MZ: Are you optimistic that some day OC can be eradicated?
PA: I remain optimistic. Catastrophic scenarios and exaggerations do not help. By
using only a small percent of resources we can win. The problem is that we 
don’t use these resources.
MZ: Why? Is there a lack of political will?
PA: Yes, to an extent. There is no social awareness because its not a highly visible
threat. Political will is mobilised for highly visible threats, so there is no
political awareness for organised crime. Without political awareness and 
subsequent political will there is no mobilisation of resources. So you see, it’s a 
vicious circle, but I remain optimistic nonetheless.
In another interview, conducted more than a year later, Mr Arlacchi was asked again 
about political will. He answered that the idea of fighting against OC is still a 
relatively young subject and hence does not have the benefit of vast support. He 
added that OC is also perceived as uncontroversial by contrast to terrorism®.
 ^Arlacchi, Pino ; Interview on 2"^  March 2000 (Paris, France)
 ^Arlacchi, Pino : Interview on 23*^  January 2001 (Paris, France)
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Xavier Raufer^
Directeur des études au centre de recherches sur les menaces criminelles 
contemporaines, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Directeur de la collection 
Criminalité Internationale aux Presses Universitaires de France
® As long as the world protocol on organised crime, drafted in Palermo in December
2000 is not effectively implemented on a planetary level, but also ratified, etc,., 
transnational organised crime can only progress, because there is a lack of efficient 
instruments to combat it.
® In France, the political class could not care less about organised crime [... ] and does
nothing except make empty media-ftiendly declarations. The police does not have 
the means do adequately do its job, the justice even less so.
® Wlien Palermo will CONCRETELY be put in place, then life will be more difficult 
for Transnational Organised Crime... Before that they wander about [without any 
really obstacles]
 ^Raufer, Xavier ; Interview on 24* April 2001 ^aris, France)
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Stéphane Ouéré^ ^
University researcher, author and co-author of articles and books analysing OC 
activities, Hell Angels and Gangs, editor in Chief of “Drogues Etats de Dépendance ”
• In tenns of criminal activity, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 was a breath of fresh 
air. Criminal organisation were able to invest in new territories in Eastern Europe. 
Additionally criminal groups that were kept in check by the dictatorships were able 
to make contacts with other mafia-like groups abroad. Vast geographic areas thus 
became « grey zones », uncontrollable by the State structures (former Soviet Union, 
Balkans, etc...) The collapse of the bipolar system also made armed groups 
« orphans », and these groups turned towards alternative souices of financing 
(Colombian guerilla groups, African rebel groups, Asian rebel groups)
In addition new geopolitical realties, the development of international trade have 
rendered it possible for new forms of criminal activities. The opening up of borders 
and the increased mobility of people facilitate all types of tiafficking The quasi total 
liberalisation of the economy (including the financial sector) is a benefit for money 
laundered and white collar criminals (infiltration of the Cosa Nostra into Wall 
Street, SWIFT money transfers).
After these few observations, it appears to me that OC continues to develop, but 
more than anything adapts itself to the world today. No doubt in a more insiduous 
and discrete manner, OC money infiltrates, every day more and more in the 
economic sector (and hence political sector as well). OC also knows how to adapt 
itself to new sectors of activity (waste disposal, trafficking in migrants, frauds, new 
technologies) or knows how to create new activities, like « marketing” (explosion of 
synthetic drug trade).
We can observe a tremor on the subject. It is mainly linked to punctual events that 
mobilise public opinion (mmders of the Italian judges Falcone, Borsellino in 1992 
leading to a toughening of anti-mafia legislation) International mobilisation is long 
and difficult (ex Palermo Convention). This Convention constitutes a first step, but 
remains suspended to its concrete application at the level of the States. However, on
10Quéré, Stéphane : Interview on 25* April 2001 (Paris,France)
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the national level, the question of OC is very little if not at all broached. Becomes 
it normally entails a crime “without victim” (most notably in money laundering) the 
question does not carry much electoral weight because it does not find rooted 
interest in public opinion. Aside from this, some politicians (and in some cases 
some political state systems) are implicated in criminal activities and especially 
narcotics trafficking. The public declarations concerning “the war against drugs” or 
OC can risk becoming only media friendly (ex Andreotti was able to help pass the 
anti-mafia laws). Lets remember also the existence of “pirate-states” that exist only 
because of money laundering and hence have no reason to combat it. In addition 
these states are used by the economy (“grey money” used to fund commission on 
the international markets, intelligence services, or illegal political campaign 
financing of other states that have no interest in seeing the disappearance of the 
fiscal paradise
• In France, some scandals have shown that politicians were linked to “grand- 
banditisme” (like Bernard Tapie or more recently Charles Pasqua and his Corsican 
financing of his political party the RPF). The questions relative to OC do not 
interest the politicians until the time where public opinion has been mobilised 
(media effect). Hence there are not pro-active decisions to make, and this represents 
a very precious loss of time in terms of the anti-mafia fight. Finally, there is no long 
term vision of the problem: politicians globally believe and focus more on their next 
electoral campaign than on organised crime groups that have been around for more 
than a century.
• I am more pessimistic than optimistic because the reality is alarming: OC has rooted 
itself in the legitimate economy of the United States, first financial power of the 
world (syndicates, pleasure and games industry, waste management) the new 
countries or “anarchic countries “ are also controlled by OC (diamond trade in 
Africa, core materials like oil and aluminium in Russia), in some instance OC is 
actually at the origin of the creation of new States (like Kosovo). Despite this threat, 
the global and co-ordinated response is still being waited on, and is variable, largely 
dependant on the specific interests of States: Despite this pessimism, I keep in mind
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the analysis of Judge Falcone who observed that OC is a human activity, and like all 
human activity, it has a beginning and will have an end.
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Philippe Madelin^^
Journalist, author and specialist on organised crime. France Mafieuse, Filiere cocaïne
enFrance. Les Gaullistes et VArsent.
• On a planetary level and even European level, OC continues to progress, even in 
region up until know that had been spared. The reason for this worsening is the 
weakening of the public authority in many states. This is particularly the case in 
former Soviet block countries, responsible not only for the massive flow of criminal 
proceeds coming from fiscal fraud, as well as the organisation of human exploitation 
routes, prostitution, illegal immigrant workers. This phenomenon has also been 
observed in the Balkans where they also act as weapons and cigarette trafficking of 
a Mafia-like nature. We can also note that agricultural frauds and frauds on food 
subsidies coming from the European Union are a great financial resource for 
organised crime. The most recent affair of this nature (25 April) is the identification 
of a trafficking route, organised by a Lebanese businessman, of trafficking in 
animal-based feed products so heavily implicated in the mad cow disease. This 
Lebanese man was living n France and operating out of France and Belgium and the 
feed was exported to France and developing countries.
• At the veiy least in the discourse, there is a real will to fight organised crime. 
France is currently applying very rigorous criteria. However the partial dismantling 
of the Directorate of organised crime affairs within the Justice Ministry, coupled 
with the limited number of investigators dedicated to fighting OC, leave us asking 
further questions.
• Even on the world level; The Anti-Organised crime Summit held in Paleimo opened 
up some interesting avenues, but with little concrete practical applications. The 
"Colombia” project, destined to eradicate drug trafficking in Colombia is in reality 
much more geaied towards combating leftist communist guerilla groups rather than 
the real trafficking. For the moment the fight against organised crime is 
unfortunately much more present in books or at the cinema: the movie "Traffic" is 
brilliant but shows the limits of the fight against organised crime in the real world.
Madelin, Philippe : Interview 25* April 2001 (Paris, France)
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However the awakening to the risks and dangers represented the offshore financing 
platforms is an important step.
However, we can still estimate that the actions taken today have helped slow down 
the progression of OC. In order for there to be really efficient means, it appears 
necessary to work on the great inequality between the North and the South. (...) We 
must also bear in mind the persistent menace of State with no rule of law dominated 
my Mafiosi groups. It would be more useful and efficient to help them resolve their 
fundamental problems like corruption rather than talce only a repressive approach. 
Was is being attempted by the UN in Kosovo demonstrates that a certain form of 
improvement is possible.
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Research on mafîa criminality still needs to continue for a long time 
before we can conclude anything about the nature of the modifications, 
and the expansion of mafia groups.
it is hoped that in its own modest way, this research will help bring better 
understanding of organised crime in general and the Mafia specifically
... one step closer to that goal.
^^Catanzaro, Raimondo. “La Mafia et les recherches sur la Mafia en Italie.” Deviance et Société 
.June (1995).
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